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This thesis examines the default application of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties reservation rules to reservations to human rights treaties. The 
contemporary practice of formulating reservations allows states to unilaterally 
modify their treaty obligations following the conclusion of negotiations. Though 
multilateral treaties address a broad spectrum of subjects and are negotiated using a 
variety of methods, all treaties are governed by the same residual reservation rules of 
the Vienna Convention when there is not a treaty-specific reservation regime in 
place. The Vienna Convention system is only engaged if a state seizes the 
opportunity to determine whether a reservation is valid pursuant to default rules or if 
a challenge regarding the validity of a reservation s brought before another 
competent mechanism of review, such as a dispute resolution mechanism. Even 
when applied, the Vienna Convention rules are ambiguous at best and have been 
criticised since their inception due to the high degre  of flexibility in their 
application, especially in relation to human rights treaties. In light of the inherent 
flaws of the Vienna Convention reservation regime and the structural characteristics 
of human rights treaties, rarely will a reserving state be deprived of the benefit of the 
reservation even if it is determined to be invalid by another State Party. Though the 
consequences of an invalidity determination are more c ncrete when the decision is 
taken by a dispute resolution mechanism, such as a court, seldom are disputes over 
the validity of a reservation to a human rights trea y submitted to a competent 
mechanism. Using the core UN human rights treaties as a case study this research 
highlights that the past thirty years have revealed  practical impasse in treaty law 
when the default reservation rules are relied upon to regulate reservations to human 
rights treaties. Reservations of questionable validity gain the same status as valid 
reservations because the Vienna Convention rules do not address the consequence for 
a reservation determined to be invalid outwith the traditional inter se application of 
the reservation between the reserving and objecting s ates, which is not logical in the 
context of a human rights treaty. Against this background, this thesis examines 
whether the default reservation rules adequately govern reservations to human rights 
treaties. The conclusion affirms that the Vienna Convention reservation regime can 
regulate reservations to human rights treaties but only if there is a clearly defined 
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final view on the validity of a reservation taken by an organ other than the state. 
Therefore, it is argued that treaty-specific supervisory mechanisms attached to each 
of the core UN human rights treaties should be invested with the competency to 
serve a determinative function with respect to evaluating reservations to human 






Having had four years to think about who to thank for helping me get to the point of 
submission I now realise that the list would be quite long and could perhaps equal 
that of the thesis. However, there are several people I must mention as they were 
instrumental in my journey from start to finish. First I must thank my primary 
supervisor Professor Alan Boyle for giving me the space to pursue my ideas while 
keeping an architect’s eye on the overall project. His comments and our discussions 
helped shape the final form of this project. I am also hugely indebted to my 
secondary supervisory Professor Stephen Tierney for his constant encouragement, 
attention to detail and overall enthusiasm for thiswork.  I would also like to thank Dr 
Stephen Neff who helped me wrestle with this thesis in ts early stages. I owe a huge 
debt of gratitude to many members of the non-academic staff at Edinburgh for 
making many of the little road bumps smoother whether it was in relation to the PhD 
or one of the multitude of projects I juggled while trying to write. Lindsay Kelly 
particularly has been a huge support in so many ways and I am very lucky to know 
her.  
 On day one of the PhD you never know how you are going to feel about your 
office mates by the end but I can say without hesitation that they have been the best 
part of my PhD experience. For support, encouragement and reality checks my 
fellow PhD candidates are unparalleled and there are too many to thank individually 
but I must mention three: Dr Rebecca Zahn, Katrina Morrison and Pierre Harcourt–
wherever he may be–all made this process bearable. 
I extend the most heartfelt thanks to my family andfriends both in the US and 
in the UK for their unwavering encouragement. My mother and sister have, as 
always, been my greatest supporters. For reasons too numerous to point out but 
especially for their enthusiasm for this endeavour (even if feigned) and ensuring I 
took proper ‘brain breaks’ I must acknowledge the support of Jean Donnelly, Sue 
Longo, Courtney Fingar, Tiffany Oldham and Eleanor Milner.  
And finally, the most instrumental person in getting me to the final product, 






Declaration of Original Work 
 
I certify that this is an original work and it has been composed in its entirety by my 
self, Kasey Lowe McCall-Smith, the author signed below. This work has not been 
submitted for any other degree of professional qualific tion other than that for which 
it is presently submitted which is for the PhD in the College of Humanities and 
Social Science at the University of Edinburgh. 
 








This thesis examines the default application of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties reservation rules to reservations to human rights treaties. The 
contemporary practice of formulating reservations allows states to unilaterally 
modify their treaty obligations following the adoption of the text. The imperative for 
pursuing this research stems from the recognition that the Vienna Convention 
reservations regime contains normative lacunae and in the context of multilateral 
human rights treaties these normative gaps prevent th  formulation of a clear picture 
of the true obligations taken on by reserving state. This thesis also recognises that 
the mechanisms to clarify the incoherence in the human rights treaty system do exist 
in the form of the human rights treaty bodies. 
Reservations to treaties were rare prior to 1945. Until the delivery of the 
advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide1 (Genocide Opinion) by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1951 reservations made to multilateral treaties were 
generally subjected to a stringent unanimity rule. At the time the opinion was 
delivered, the International Law Commission (ILC) had already commenced a 
review on the subject of reservations to treaties in response to the evolving views and 
practice of states. These combined activities led to the eventual adoption of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties2 (Vienna Convention) in 1969.  
The Vienna Convention is generally viewed as the codification of the 
customary rules governing treaty law. The one-size fits-all reservations regime of the 
Vienna Convention applies to all treaties regardless of type, including normative, 
social and standard-setting, or subject-matter, including trade, environment and 
human rights. While treaties are the products of intense negotiations, the finalised 
agreements are more closely akin to ‘agreements to disagree’. This is particularly 
true of the core UN human rights treaties developed since 1965 where the catalogues 
of obligations are not straightforward exchanges of reciprocal obligations but are, 
                                               
1 1951 ICJ Reports 15, 28 May 1951 (Genocide Opinion). 
2 1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969 (Vienna Convention). 
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instead, compacts outlining obligations for the benefit of human beings who are not 
party to the treaties.3 Unlike the consensus law-making that facilitates a large 
majority of multilateral treaties, human rights treati s tend to be agreed in the 
‘majority plus reservations’ model.4 Quite aptly, Boyle and Chinkin note that ‘while 
consensus negotiations aim to produce a set menu for everyone, human rights 
negotiators prefer to offer an à la carte selection fr m a gourmet menu.’5 In the 
context of subscribing to human rights obligations, states not only decidedly favour 
an à la carte menu, they also prefer to eat very different meals. In light of the non-
reciprocal nature of human rights treaties and the obligations set forth therein, states 
have relied heavily upon the opportunity to make rese vations to these agreements 
and the result has been particularly detrimental to the advancement of a coherent 
international human rights system.  
In a best attempt to define the international human rights regime, it can be 
said to encompass ‘those international norms, processes, and institutional 
arrangements, as well as the activities of domestic and international pressure groups 
that are directly related to promoting respect for human rights.’6 This regime was 
born in the aftermath of successive world wars and following the struggle of its early 
decades it has taken on a new life. The UN Charter broke away from state 
sovereignty as the primary focus of international law and ‘established the human 
person as a second focal point, proposing to make it th  subject of international rights 
and to impose on states corresponding obligations under international law for the 
benefit of persons under their jurisdiction.’7 As noted by Zemanek, it is unclear 
whether the UN appreciated the great change that would result in international law 
by putting in place the human rights focused programme it adopted with the UN 
Charter and he credits this lack of appreciation for the fact that it ‘failed to prescribe 
                                               
3 See, Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 (24 Sept. 1982), IACtHR (Ser. A) No. 2 (1982), paras. 29, 33; W.A. 
Schabas, ‘Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Time for Innovation and Reform’ (1994) 32 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 39, 65; P.-H. Imbert, ‘Reservations and Human Rights 
Conventions’ (1981) 6 Human Rights Review 28, 33. 
4 A.E. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP, Oxford 2007), p. 159. 
5 Ibid. 
6 P. Alston (ed.), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1992), p. 1. 
7 K. Zemanek, ‘New Trends in the Enforcement of Erga Omnes Obligations’ [2000] Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 1, 3. 
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the manner in which these new types of obligations should be fitted into the 
traditional framework of international law.’8   
The 1980s and 1990s saw human rights move from a subsidiary theme to a 
dominant concern in international discourse due in large part to the efforts of the UN 
and the development of the core human rights treaties which moved human rights 
from aspirations to legally enforceable obligations. It was during these decades of 
increasing human rights treaty adherence that the lacunae in the Vienna Convention 
reservations regime became apparent. Recognising this, Hampson describes the 
relationship between human rights and international law:  
Human rights norms do not merely express moral values but those 
values that are essential to international society. They are constitutive 
of an international legal order. This results in an overlap between 
moral values and legal principles because the object and purpose of a 
human rights norm is, ultimately, the maintenance of international 
peace and security.9 
 
Pride of place has been given to human rights not oly at the UN, as evidenced by 
the continued reiteration of rights-based governance,10 but also in the policy 
decisions of many states11 as they increasingly underpin states’ external reltions.  
The idea of human rights as the basis of internatiol peace and order is not 
one that all states or international lawyers are willing to accept. Yet there is an 
                                               
8 Ibid. 
9 F. Hampson, Working paper submitted pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 1998/113, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/28 (1999) (1999 Working paper), para. 13.  
10 See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN World Conference on Human Rights, 
UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993) (Vienna Declaration); General views expressed in the Third 
Committee, Yearbook of the United Nations:1948-49 (UN, New York 1950), p. 527 (reflecting the 
human rights imperative from the outset of the UN); see also Zemanek, ‘New Trends in the 
Enforcement of Erga Omnes Obligations’. 
11 See, e.g., European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (2000); European Community 
Regulation (EC) 1889/2006 (setting forth an EU/Africa initiative linking human rights to the 
continued project of country strengthening at home and in global relations); Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Statement in relation to Special Economic Measures (Syria) Regulations, pursuant to the 
Special Economic Measures Act, [2011] Vol. 145, No. 12, available  at http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-
pr/p2/2011/2011-06-08/html/sor-dors114-eng.html <accessed 8 Feb. 2012> (Canada’s imposition of 
economic sanctions in response to human rights abuses in Syria); UK House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee, UK-Brazil Relations, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/949/949.pdf <accessed 8 Feb. 
2012) (underscoring the importance of both Brazil and the UK’s commitment to human rights in 
policy decisions). 
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undeniable truth that on a basic level, the internatio l legal order can only work if 
states respect the law that has been established as it is a ‘means of achieving 
outcomes possible only through coordinated behavior’.12 On the international level, 
this includes references to both legal rules and politics. It has been argued that the 
‘possibility of UN effectiveness is rooted in the fact that, as members of a 
community, states pursue goals whose achievement depen s significantly on 
avoiding political isolation.’13 This argument primarily attributes the success of the 
human rights movement and its institutions to politics,14 however there must be a 
more tangible reason compelling states to comply with their legal obligations.  
Human rights treaties recognise individuals as the subjects of international 
law and with that recognition grants them the benefit of obligations imposed on the 
state. It is clear that violations of human rights, unlike violations of obligations owed 
between states, are different because they rarely invoke international consequences in 
the context of state-to-state treaty relations.15 Human rights institutions rely on law, 
among other things, to ensure that human rights obligations are carried out by treaty 
parties. This includes not only the law found within the treaty texts but also the law 
that guides the formation and interpretation of treaties, the Vienna Convention. 
Without clarification of the law governing reservations, the institutions that promote 
and protect human rights have no hope to create a stable system based on 
accountability. 
Human rights do not exist in a legal vacuum.16 As human rights treaties have 
evolved, the existing legal rules for interpreting these treaties have proved an ill fit. 
There are three dynamic features of human rights treaties that support the argument 
that the Vienna Convention’s reservations regime is not adequately equipped to 
handle reservations to human rights treaties:  
1. The obligations are for the benefit of individuals, rather than states, and thus 
the traditional concept of treaty reciprocity is absent; 
                                               
12 O. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935, 
1950. 
13 P.J. Flood, The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut 
1998), p. ix. 
14 Ibid. 
15 H.J. Steiner, P. Alston and R. Goodman, International Human Rights in Context, 3d ed. (OUP, 
Oxford 2007), pp. 58-59.  
16 Hampson, 1999 Working paper, para. 13. 
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2. Human rights treaties generally have their own supervisory mechanisms to 
oversee implementation and interpretation; 
3. If the state acceptance/objection system is the end point on the validity of 
reservations, what is the point of having a treaty body? 
The reservations regime warrants reconsideration in light of these unique features of 
human rights treaties. 
Do human rights merit different protection from invalid reservations because 
they ‘are the world of the individual person’17 and represent some level of morality 
or because the UN has given them pride of place in the international norms 
hierarchy? The answer is probably a combination of both but, more importantly, 
reservations to human rights treaties deserve closer scrutiny because unlike the 
typical bargained-for treaty, the beneficiaries of these treaties have no role in the 
treaty process save being protected or not.18 This research does not engage the moral 
question but instead looks at the gaps in the legal structure governing treaties that are 
non-reciprocal in nature.  
The non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties is the primary factor which 
renders the application of the Vienna Convention rese vations regime to human 
rights treaties problematic due to the unconfirmed status of certain reservations. The 
flexibility of the regime anticipates that desired treaty terms will not always be 
identical and provides rules, including the reservations rules, to facilitate flexible 
agreements. However, those rules are premised on notions of legal reciprocity and 
the state self-policing aspect of the reservations rules, which have proved to have 
little effect on normative human rights treaties.  
Reciprocity is the leitmotif of international legal order according to Simma; 
however he contends that human rights treaties do not have reciprocal rights and 
obligations in the material sense, but rather in the sense that all state parties have an 
interest in accepting identical obligations.19 Simma’s contention fails to take into 
account reservations which by definition alter the id ntical nature of the obligations. 
If human rights treaties are intended to be universal and indivisible then it is even 
                                               
17 Comments by Eleanor Roosevelt at the signing of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
18 Schabas, ‘Time for Innovation and Reform’, 65; Imbert, ‘Reservations and Human Rights 
Conventions’, 33. 
19 B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 250 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 217, 296. 
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more important to establish the legal effect and consequence of all reservations. 20 
The UN human rights system is designed to improve the protection of rights-holders. 
This can only be achieved by facilitating implementation of the obligations defined 
in the core human rights treaties.  
Over a half-century after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights21 (UDHR) the large number of parties to the core agreements attests to the 
great strides that have been made toward realising the original intent of the UN ‘to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’.22 
Every one of the 193 Member States of the UN is party to at least two of the core UN 
human rights treaties.23 Most of the treaties, in fact, include over half of the UN 
Member States as parties. Unfortunately the number of parties does not necessarily 
reflect the strength of the international community’s commitment.  
Treaties are governed by the Vienna Convention bothin erms of formation, 
application and interpretation. The rules governing reservations, however, have 
proven untenable when applied to human rights treaties. Therefore, in terms of 
reconsidering treaty law the starting point must be th  Vienna Convention and its 
shortcomings for dealing with invalid reservations. To properly evaluate the state of 
reservations to the core human rights treaties and the propriety of applying the 
Vienna Convention rules, the history surrounding the reservations rules must be 
understood. The initial phase of this research involves returning to early to mid-
twentieth century writings on reservations published long before an international 
human rights system was contemplated. Thus there is an examination of the general 
law related to reservations to treaties. This broad context quickly narrows to focus on 
the law that developed in concert with the adoption of the first multilateral human 
rights treaty, the Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of 
Genocide24 (Genocide Convention). Not only did this agreement mark the first 
world-wide effort to establish the crime of genocide but it also represented the first 
                                               
20 Outlined in the Vienna Declaration. 
21 UNGA Res. 217A(III), 10 Dec. 1948 (UDHR). 
22 Preamble, Charter of the UN, 26 Jun. 1945. 
23 UN Treaty Collection at http://treaties.un.org (UN Treaty Collection). 
24 78 UNTS 277, 9 Dec. 1948 (Genocide Convention). 
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manifestation of a legal obligation to protect a human right–the right to be protected 
against genocide–by states.25  
Reservations are generally acknowledged as one of the most difficult aspects 
of treaty law.26 The overarching goal of the reservations regime is to balance the goal 
of universal ratification against the goal of mainting treaty integrity.27 However, a 
fundamental challenge exists in that the Vienna Convention provides little guidance 
as to how apply the rules related to reservations found in Articles 19–23. These 
articles contemplate a system where a treaty embodies reciprocal obligations among 
states and its system of reservations and objections ca  be employed to achieve 
identifiable consequences. Time has proven that the Vienna Convention residual 
reservations rules cannot provide coherent normative outcomes where the treaty is 
made up of non-reciprocal obligations and there is no final determination on the 
validity of reservations.  The lack of coherence stems from normative ambiguities in 
the rules themselves in the context of invalid reservations. The Vienna Convention 
works from the assumption that states will only formulate valid reservations yet a 
review of the core UN human rights treaties indicates hat a multitude of the 
reservations attached to these treaties are arguably invalid. Thus a practical impasse 
seems to exist as to how to address invalid reservations in the absence of a final 
determination. As succinctly summarised by Simma:  
When human rights are violated there simply exists no directly injured 
State because international human rights law does nt protect States 
but rather human beings or groups directly. Consequently, the 
                                               
25 Due to the particular purpose and limited scope of the Genocide Convention it will only be 
addressed to the extent that it formed the basis of the ICJ advisory opinion which shaped the 
development of the law governing reservations. It must also be noted that some human rights 
protections had been included in previous conventions concluded under the International Labour 
Organization, for example, ILO Convention No 29 on Forced Labour, ILO/C29, 28 Jun. 1930; ILO 
Convention No 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, ILO/C87, 9 
July 1948. 
26 Helfer notes that reservations have been the ‘longstanding irritant for international legal scholars’. 
L. Helfer, ‘Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design’ (2006) 31 Yale Journal of 
International Law 367, 367. See the following selection tracking the point since the Genocide 
Opinion, W.W. Bishop, Jr., ‘Reservations to Treaties’ (196) 103 Recuil des cours 245; D.R. 
Anderson, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventions: A Re-examination’ (1964) 13(2) ICLQ 450, 
450; J.M. Ruda, ‘Reservations to Treaties’ (1975) 146 (3) Recueil des cours 95, 101; R.W. Edwards, 
Jr., ‘Reservations to Treaties’ (1989) 10 Michigan Journal of International Law 363.  
27 A point recognised by almost every commentator on eservations: E.T. Swaine, ‘Reserving’ (2006) 
31 Yale Journal of International Law 307, 330; R. Moloney, ‘Incompatible Reservations to Human 
Rights Treaties: Severability and the Problem of State Consent’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 155, 155; R. Goodman, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State 
Consent’ (2002) 96 AJIL 531, 533 et seq; Schabas, ‘Time for Innovation and Reform’, 40.  
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substantive obligations flowing from international human rights law 
are to be performed above all within the State bound by it, and not vis-
à-vis other States. In such instances to adhere to the traditional 
bilateral paradigm and not to give other states or the organized 
international community the capacity to react to vilations would lead 
to the result that these obligations remain unenforceable under general 
international law.28 
 
Against this background, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the Vienna 
Convention reservations rules in their application to human rights treaties. 
Specifically the analysis will respond to two research questions: the first asks 
whether the Vienna Convention reservations regime adequately governs reservations 
to human rights treaties and the second asks whether the treaty-specific supervisory 
mechanisms are competent to serve a determinative function with respect to 
reservations to the core UN human rights treaties. In pursuit of the answers to these 
questions this doctrinal analysis comprises two main components in the form of an 
analysis of treaty law pertaining to reservations ad  review of the practice of states 
making reservations to human rights treaties. The legal analysis focuses on the 
Vienna Convention rules and relies on the Convention’s text, principles of general 
international law and the literature addressing reservations to both multilateral 
treaties generally and human rights treaties. Judicial opinions, where available, are 
also utilised to gather a complete picture of the intricacies of the reservations regime 
and how it works in theory. The practice analysis i firmly grounded in the core UN 
human rights treaties. The reservations and objections chronicled by UN 
documentation provide a wealth of practice examples from which the bulk of the 
analysis is drawn. Opinions of international tribunals further contribute to the 
examination of the practical use of the reservations rules to determine the validity of 
reservations and outline the legal effect and consequence for an invalid reservation. 
There is also a broad range of literature on reservation practice which further informs 
the analysis. This thesis argues that in order to fortify international law and its 
associated institutions the basic building blocks of this law must be strengthened. At 
its core, the international human rights regime is ba ed on treaties for it is within the 
UN human rights treaties that the legal basis of state ’ obligations are enumerated. 
Utilising each of these identified sources aids in painting a picture of the current state 
                                               
28 Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest’, 296-97. 
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of the law and practice surrounding reservations to treaties and provides a basis for 
the articulation of answers to the primary and secondary research questions. 
  
1 SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
This is by no means the first attempt to make sense of the Vienna Convention rules 
in their application to human rights treaties. It is a recurring topic among academics, 
practitioners and observers of the human rights regim  and it is often acknowledged 
that the topic of reservations even outwith the human rights framework is one of the 
most controversial subjects in international law.29 A survey of pertinent literature 
reveals that the following recurring analytical themes have attended reservations to 
human rights treaties since the Genocide Opinion was delivered: (1) the right of 
states to make reservations; (2) the unanimity versus integrity debate; (3) the 
application of the Vienna Convention rules, particularly the vague object and 
purpose test, to human rights treaties; (4) the appropriate authority (states, courts, 
treaty bodies) to employ the object and purpose test; and (5) the legal effect of an 
impermissible reservation. These themes have been bandied about in academic 
literature since the mid-twentieth century. Articles examining the question of 
reservations to general multilateral treaties date b ck even further.30 
The most recent comprehensive volumes on reservations t  human rights 
treaties address a wide range of rights-specific problems associated with the 
application of reservations.31 Both Ziemele’s and Gardner’s books are compilations 
of articles by authors with extensive experience in the field of human rights either as 
academics or practitioners and they have been greatly relied upon throughout this 
work. Additionally, the decade of the 1990s saw a flourish of academic writing 
surrounding reservations, both as a general concept and in relation to human rights. 
This is not unsurprising considering that the core treaties on women’s and children’s 
                                               
29 Helfer, ‘Not Fully Committed?’, 367; Edwards, ‘Reservations to Treaties’; Ruda, ‘Reservations to 
Treaties’; Anderson, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventions’, 450; Bishop, ‘Reservations to 
Treaties’.  
30 e.g., H.W. Malkin, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventions’ (1926) 7 BYBIL 141; M. Owen, 
‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’ (1929) 38(8) Yale Law Journal 1086; M.O. Hudson, 
‘Reservations to Multipartite International Instruments’ (1938) 32(2) AJIL 330. 
31 I. Ziemele (ed.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: 
Conflict, Harmony or Reconciliation (Martinus Nijhoff, Lieden 2004); J.P. Gardner (ed.), Human 
Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt ut: Reservations and Objections to Human 
Rights Conventions (BIICL, London 1997); L. Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties: 
Ratify and Ruin? (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1995). 
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rights gained considerable ratification momentum during that time and reservations 
to both conventions were steadily mounting. 
It is almost universally accepted that international law allows states to 
formulate reservations to treaties as long as specific treaty reservations rules or the 
Vienna Convention rules are observed.32 Early ILC rapporteurs on the law of treaties, 
including Brierly33, Lauterpacht34 and Fitzmaurice35, grudgingly acknowledged that 
the evolving practice of states had moved away from the unanimity rule that existed 
prior to 1950 and this reality was ultimately reflect d in the proposals put forward by 
Waldock36, the final rapporteur on the topic before the adoption of the Vienna 
Convention. During the developmental years of the Vi nna Convention the subtle 
shift in state practice was also noted out-with the ILC.37 More recent authors tend to 
treat the ability to formulate reservations as a necessary tool for the effective creation 
of international law38 or as a right to be exercised hand-in-hand with exercises of 
state sovereignty39.     
Despite the view of some that international law is largely a political project,40 
the rules related to reservations provide a unique ll stration of a legal doctrine that 
incorporates pure law and political considerations simultaneously.41 It is clear that 
motives behind becoming a party to a social, law-making or system changing 
convention are often complex, highly politicised and i volve reasons ranging from a 
state’s desire to be an upstanding member of the international community to the 
desire to avoid criticism for not becoming a member of such an agreement. 
                                               
32 See, generally, Swaine, ‘Reserving’; Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s 
Right to Opt Out. 
33 J.L. Brierly, Report on Reservation to Multilateral Conventions, UN Doc. A/CN.4/41 in ILC 
Yearbook, Vol. II, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1 ( 951), pp. 3-4, paras. 11-13 
34 H. Lauterpacht, Report on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/63 (1953), reprinted in ILC 
Yearbook, 1953, Vol. II, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1 (1953), pp. 91-92; Second Report on 
the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/87 (1954), reprinted in ILC Yearbook, 1954, Vol. II, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1 (1954), pp. 131-33. 
35 G.G. Fitzmaurice, Report on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/ 101 (1956); see, also, G.G. 
Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventio s’ (1953) 2 ICLQ 1, 11. 
36 H. Waldock, First report on the Law of Treaties, Appendix, UN Doc. A/CN.4/144 (1962). 
37 Bishop, ‘Reservations to Treaties’; Anderson, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventions’. 
38 Swaine, ‘Reserving’. 
39 C.A. Bradley and J.L. Goldsmith, ‘Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent’ (2000) 149 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 399, 426. This staunch perspective has been acknowledged 
by the ILC, see, e.g., ILC Yearbook 1995, UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), para. 438;  
40 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 
70 MLR 1, 1; Flood, The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions, p. ix. 
41 J.K. Koh, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Reflects World 
Vision’ (1982-83) 23 Harvard International Law Journal 71, 73. 
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Boerefijn42, Lijnzaad43, Marks44 and Schabas45 suggest joining a treaty regime is 
often an attempt to improve the international image of a state and has an inherent 
promotional value, especially in the field of human rights. Focusing on the question 
of why reservations are made,46 many writers reiterate that political considerations 
both at home and abroad have a great impact on the reservations formulated.47 While 
the ‘why’ question is helpful when reflecting on reservations, it is not one that is 
explored in the course of this research as it is a question greatly influenced by a 
wide-range of factors, including international relations and politics, and the purpose 
of this study is limited to the examination of pure reservations law. 
 There also exists the idea that ratification of s me human rights obligations is 
better than none at all.48 While this may be true, Schabas correctly notes that t ere 
are ‘both good and bad sides to this practice’ of rese vations.49 The good and bad 
sides to reservation practice is reflected in the competing desires for widespread 
participation and maintaining treaty integrity, as has been thoroughly examined by 
Redgwell50, Schabas51 and Swaine52. This idea is typically framed as the unity versus 
integrity debate and it has arguably been the core preoccupation in the reservations 
field since the ICJ introduced the concept of a dichotomy of rights in the Genocide 
Opinion.53 Swaine’s recent comprehensive article ‘Reserving’54 addresses a wide 
                                               
42 I. Boerefijn, ‘Impact on the Law on Treaty Reservations’ in M.T. Kamminga and M. Scheinin 
(eds.), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP, Oxford 2009), p. 65. 
43 Lijnzaad, Ratify and Ruin, p. 86. 
44 S. Marks, ‘Three Regional Human Rights Treaties and Their Experience of Reservations’ in 
Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out, p. 35. 
45 Schabas, ‘Time for Innovation and Reform’, 41.  
46 For a guide to the ‘why’ issue and critiques of such, see generally, Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as 
General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out; Lijnzaad, Ratify and Ruin. See also Hathaway, ‘Do 
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’, 1951-52.  
47 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2d ed. (CUP, Cambridge 2007), pp. 133-34; Swaine, 
‘Reserving’, 312; Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treatis Make a Difference?’, 1952; M.G. Schmidt 
‘Reservations to United Nations Human Rights Treaties–The Case of the Two Covenants’ in Gardner 
(ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out, p. 21; Marks, ‘Three Regional 
Human Rights Treaties’, p. 61; Koh, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’. 
48 Schmidt ‘Reservations to United Nations Human Rights Treaties’, p. 21; M. Morris, ‘Few 
Reservations about Reservations’ (2000) 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 341. 
49 Schabas, ‘Time for Innovation and Reform’, 40. 
50 C. Redgwell, ‘Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to General Multilateral 
Treaties’ (1993) 64 BYBIL 245. 
51 Schabas, ‘Time for Innovation and Reform’, 40-41. 
52 Swaine, ‘Reserving’, 330. Swaine disagrees that encouraging wider participation alone is a 
sufficient basis for allowing the reservations problem to go unchecked. 
53 See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to Multilater l Conventions’, 8; C.L. Piper, ‘Reservations to 
Multilateral Treaties: The Goal of Universality’ (1985) 71 Iowa Law Review 795; Redgwell, 
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range of treaties and spends a great deal of time exploring the value of reservations, 
objections to reservations and the insecurity that exists in current practice, all aspects 
of the modern universality versus integrity debate. The university versus integrity 
debate is a permanent fixture in treaty law and a delicate balancing act but one that 
could benefit from a more nuanced approach than that w ich now exists in order to 
address reservations to treaties that embody non-reciprocal obligations. Thus it is 
clear, and has been for some time, that reconsiderat on of the reservations rules in 
relation to human rights treaties is necessary. 
 The universality versus integrity debate is facilitated by the reservations rules 
found in the Vienna Convention. The default rules governing reservations have been 
described as ‘complex, ambiguous, and often counterintuitive’.55 The flexibility of 
the reservations regime embodied in Articles 19–23 is the focus of an extraordinary 
amount of literature due to the imprecise nature of the object and purpose test found 
in Article 19(c). The general meaning of object and purpose under the Vienna 
Convention rules has been chronically rehashed without a definitive answer from its 
inception beginning with Brierly56 and Fitzmaurice57 then, more recently, by Buffard 
and Zemanek,58 with a host of opinions in between.59 The object and purpose test 
represents a constraint on a state’s ability to attach reservations to its instrument of 
ratification.60 Lijnzaad astutely observes that ‘the claim that a particular reservation 
is contrary to the object and purpose is easier made than substantiated’.61 This is due 
to the fact that there is little guidance on how to apply the object and purpose test 
                                                                                                                           
‘Universality or Integrity?’; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed. (OUP, 
Oxford 2008), p. 614; A.-C. Martineau, ‘The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in 
International Law’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 1. 
54 Swaine, ‘Reserving’. Swaine argues that reservations enhance treaty commitments and 
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55 Helfer, ‘Not Fully Committed?’, 367. 
56 Brierly, Report on Reservations to Multilateral Conventions (1951). 
57 Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventio s’. 
58 I. Buffard and K. Zemanek, ‘The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: an Enigma?’ (1998) 3 Austrian 
Review of International and European Law 311.  
59 e.g., D. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 7th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, London 
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(1994) 27 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 419, 429-32. 
60 C. Redgwell, ‘The Law on Reservations in Respect of Multilateral Conventions’ in Gardner (ed.), 
Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out, p. 8; Koh, ‘Reservations to 
Multilateral Treaties’, 74-76; Ruda, ‘Reservations to Treaties’, 190. 
61 Lijnzaad, Ratify and Ruin, pp. 82-83. 
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when the treaty being examined contains multifarious rights and obligations, such as 
one of the core human rights treaties. Despite the fact that years of debate has not 
shed any further light on the application of the Vienna Convention rules, the ILC 
maintains that the object and purpose test should remain.62  
When specifically addressing human rights treaties commentators on the 
appropriateness of the regime tend to fall into twocamps. The first group typically 
relies on general principles of international law to support the adequacy of the 
Vienna Convention to address reservations to human rights.63 According to a few 
such authors the flexibility of the system is a boon t  human rights treaties.64 The key 
considerations are the appropriateness of a single residual system to govern 
reservations and the assumption that the Vienna Convention includes a self-policing 
element–the acceptance/objection system found in Article 20–which will rectify any 
invalid reservations. 
The second group of commentators points to the unique characteristics of 
human rights treaties, including non-reciprocity,65 that prevent any meaningful 
application of Vienna Convention regime66 and the subsequent detrimental effect of 
reservations on the realisation of human rights67. Redgwell notes that the flexibility 
of the Vienna Convention is ‘somehow contrary to the inalienable political rights and 
freedoms of human beings’ therefore circumstances, such as economic depression, 
are less palatable excuses for making reservations han they might be in the context 
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67 See generally, R. Higgins, ‘Human Rights: Some Questions of Integrity’ (1989) 15 Commonwealth 
Law Bulletin 598; Lijnzaad, Ratify and Ruin; Imbert, ‘Reservations and Human Rights Conventions’, 
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of an environmental treaty.68 Some commentators have attached an air of moral 
reprimand to their discussions of reservations formulated by states,69 while others 
contend that they could be a healthy sign that a state has seriously considered the 
treaty and its implications.70 Particularly damning is Hathaway’s contention that 
reservations perpetuate the idea that securing human rights through treaties is simply 
‘cheap talk’.71 
Non-reciprocity is one of the most salient features of human rights treaties 
when examining the issue of reservations from a pure treaty law perspective. The 
traditional concept of reciprocity is largely a ‘stabilizing factor’ in international 
treaty law as it allows for a balancing of interests between the parties.72 Lijnzaad 
insists that reciprocity is essential when there is no compulsory judicial system or 
central authority with the power to enforce the law such as the situation of 
international law.73 There is no ‘probability of harm’74 to the interest of a state 
stemming from the reservation of another state to a human rights treaty. 
There are also discordant views as to which entity–state, court or treaty body–
has the ultimate competence to assess reservations usi g the Vienna Convention 
rules. Some authors choose to avoid this question, yet others have argued adamantly 
in favour of concurrent competency including the trea y bodies75. Linton argues that 
it is precisely this failure to designate a competent mechanism of review that has 
created a ‘vacuum’.76 Alston and others have spent many years analysing the 
development, strengths and weaknesses of the treaty bodies as part of the overall 
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human rights regime.77 The strong criticism of the treaty bodies by states is attributed 
to their positions as independent, non-political fetures of the UN system.78 Though 
the ILC Special Rapporteur submits that human rights treaty bodies possess this 
competency pursuant to their mandates just as states h ve a concurrent competency 
under general international law,79 it is unclear whether his proclamation will alter he 
opposing view held by many, especially states. There is, however, confidence that 
treaty bodies are a powerful tool for improving human rights. Lijnzaad posits that it 
is the dynamic force of the international human rights system and functions of the 
treaty bodies that will ultimately lead to new rules r lated to treaty observance.80 It is 
the supervisory side of reciprocity that ultimately concerns human rights treaties as 
the mutuality of obligation and exercise of mutual limitations pursuant to 
reservations are absent in a human rights treaty, which is where treaty bodies can fill 
a gap. 
Another crucial sticking point is what to do once a position has been taken on 
the validity, more specifically the invalidity, of a reservation. Goodman’s 2002 
article on invalid reservations and state consent examines the ‘normative puzzle’ and 
progressively suggests that a human rights system allowing for severance of invalid 
reservations actually maximises state consent.81 Whether the reserving state’s 
consent to be bound is affected and whether the resrving state continues to be a 
contracting party is often questioned in relation t a determination that a reservation 
is invalid.82 Bowett, who is credited with the most extensive examination of these 
questions, framed the issue as tension between two different expressions of the will 
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of the state: on one hand a state expresses the will to be bound to a treaty and on the 
other hand there is the will to impose a condition, the invalid reservation.83 He 
equates the invalidity of the reservation to a mistake of law, rather than a mistake of 
fact, which will not automatically invalidate the consent to be bound or the treaty 
according to the Vienna Convention84.85 Bowett’s work is primarily concerned with 
the resulting relationship between the state parties. While the legal position of the 
state is an undeniably interesting legal query there is relatively little attention paid to 
what happens as a consequence of a reservation being d clared invalid.  
It is the lack of guidance on legal effect that facilitates a state’s ability to 
maintain an invalid reservation as there is nothing i  the Vienna Convention to 
address the legal effect when a reservation to a human rights treaty is determined to 
be invalid by an entity other than a state, such as a treaty body. When addressed in an 
international tribunal the legal effect will be detailed in the decision. Only in the 
context of the regional human rights systems has the question of precisely what legal 
effect an impermissibility determination has on a reservation been examined by an 
international tribunal.86 The practice of the judiciary in this regard fails to deliver 
failsafe answers to the legal effect question on the UN treaty level for a multitude of 
reasons.  
The primary doctrines that provide finality to the l gal effect and 
consequence of reservations are permissibility, opposability and severability. 
Permissibility argues that a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose test 
is invalid regardless of whether other states object and supporters of this doctrine 
                                               
83 Bowett, ‘Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilaterl Treaties’, 76. 
84 Article 48(1) provides: ‘A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be 
bound by the treaty if the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at 
the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the 
treaty.’ 
85 Bowett, ‘Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilaterl Treaties’, 76. 
86 See, e.g., Belilos v. Switzerland, (App. No. 20/1986/118/167), ECtHR, Series A, Vol. 132, 10 
EHRR 466, 29 Apr. 1988; Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention 
on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC 2/82 (24 Sept. 1982), IACtHR (Series A) No. 2 (1982); see 
discussions in Marks, ‘Three Regional Human Rights Treaties’,  p.35; S. Marks, ‘Reservations 
Unhinged: The Belilos Case Before the European Court of Human Rights’ (1990) 39 ICLQ 300;  I. 
Cameron and F. Horn, ‘Reservations to the European Co vention on Human Rights: The Belilos 
Case’ (1990) 33 German Yearbook of International Law 69; R.St.J. Macdonald, ‘Reservations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1988) 1988 Revue belge de droit international 429; H.J. 
Bourguignon, ‘The Belilos Case: New Light on Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’ (1988) 29 
Virginia Journal of International Law 347. 
 24 
argue that it is legally impossible for states to accept an invalid reservation.87 Thus a 
state formulating an invalid reservation should never benefit from its purported legal 
effect. 
Opposability is drawn from Vienna Convention Article 20 and proposes that 
if a reservation is objected to by another state party for being incompatible with 
Article 19 then the reserving state will not be considered a party to the treaty, a 
situation some note results in the splintering of atre ty into various bilateral treaties 
depending on the position taken by the objecting state.88 Opposability incorporates a 
political element in that under this doctrine states s lf-determine their relations with 
reserving states.89 It has also been argued that opposability seems to render 
objections to reservations a ‘fruitless endeavour’ because one state’s objection will 
have no bearing on the treaty relations between the res rving state and other state 
parties.90 Building on Bowett’s work, Koh argues that permissibility and opposability 
work together as the test for a reservation’s validity.91 However, as examples of 
practice will show, neither approach is universally ccepted nor do they seem to have 
much influence on a state formulating an impermissible reservation to a human rights 
treaty. 
By far the most controversial option for a defined consequence of invalidity 
is the principle of severability which effectively severs the reservation from the 
consent to be bound and holds the reserving state bound as if the reservation had 
never existed.92 Redgwell argues that severability is closest to the regime envisioned 
by the ICJ in the Genocide Opinion.93 States seem reluctant to press the issue of 
severability or any other legal effect or consequence i  the field of human rights in 
any meaningful way because the traditional concept of reciprocity does not apply. 
Because there is no dedicated rule to provide finality s to the legal status of the 
reservation the status of contentious reservations c tinue to hang in the balance. The 
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reality is that states have little incentive to take a great interest in how other states 
treat their own citizens.94 
Some have proposed to fill the gaps in the Vienna Convention rules,95 though 
none have managed to tease-out a solution to address p cisely what happens when 
there is a clearly incompatible reservation. Marks questions whether the Vienna 
Convention is the ‘most viable regime’96 and Klabbers has suggested an ‘overhaul’97 
might be in order. What is clear is that a reconsideration of the current regime is in 
order. There is a great opportunity to continue to imbed human rights into the 
international legal order through the UN human rights system. Bayefsky, who is 
generally less optimistic about the UN system, has acknowledged that the current 
implementation mechanisms are ‘relics of the past’ that were created when states 
were most unwilling to permit any form of interference in their domestic matters.98 
This point has been conceded by numerous authors99 though they are far more 
positive about the opportunities to improve the system. It is with a positive outlook 
that this thesis sets upon its examination of reservations to human rights treaties.  
This thesis will focus on three specific lacunae in the Vienna Convention 
including the vagueness of the object and purpose te t, he lack of a defined legal 
effect for invalid reservations and the failure to designate the consequence of invalid 
reservations. It avoids engaging the debate about universality versus integrity and 
certainly does not argue that reservations should be altogether prohibited. Nor does it 
consider the reasons behind why states make reservations. Situating this project 
amidst the existing literature this thesis posits that he gaps in the Vienna Convention 
do not prevent the use of the reservations rules to govern reservations to human 
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rights treaties and argues that designating an organ to provide definitive guidance on 
reservation validity can cure the inherent ambiguites of the default reservations 
regime. In light of recent developments in the area of reservations, particularly the 
culmination of the ILC study on reservations to trea i s, discussed below, this thesis 
serves to provide further elucidation on the specific legal issues surrounding 
reservations to human rights treaties. 
 
1.1 REVISITING RESERVATIONS 
A survey of the available literature is not complete without introducing the two most 
comprehensive studies on the subject of reservations under the direction of the ILC 
and the human rights treaty bodies. The ILC considered reservations to treaties on 
four previous occasions including in 1951 in association with the Genocide Opinion 
and within the framework of developing the 1969 Vienna Convention, 1978 Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties100 and the 1986 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
between International Organizations101.102 Beginning in 1993, the ILC launched an 
in-depth analysis of the existing reservations system under the Vienna Convention 
and how the opportunity to make reservations fit into the overall effectiveness of 
international treaties.103 Particularly the ILC indicated that it would attempt to clarify 
the special position of human rights treaties within the regulatory framework of the 
Vienna Convention’s reservations system.104 At the helm of this study was the 
Special Rapporteur, Alain Pellet, who was appointed to undertake the task in 1994.105  
From the outset of the study the major problem was noted as the 
reconciliation of two imperatives: ‘the need to maint n the essential elements of the 
treaty on the one hand, and the need to facilitate as far as possible accession to 
multilateral treaties of general interest,’106 thus the integrity versus universality 
debate shaped much of the early debate. The project was not envisioned as a 
                                               
100 1946 UNTS 3, 23 Aug. 1978. 
101 UN Doc. A/CONF.129/15, 21 Mar. 1986 (not yet in force). 
102 ILC Yearbook 1995, vol. II (Part Two) UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), para. 412. 
103 ILC Yearbook 1993, vol. II (Part Two) UN Doc. A/48/10 (1993), para. 440. 
104 A. Pellet, First report on the law and practice relating to reservations to treaties, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/470 (1995), paras. 138-42.  
105 ILC Yearbook 1994, vol. II (Part Two), UN Doc. A/49/10 (1994), p. 179, para. 381. 
106 ILC, UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), para. 413.  
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complete redraft of the Vienna Convention but was driven by the necessity to fill the 
existing lacunae in contemporary treaty law as well as to give guidance on related 
issues, such as interpretative declarations.107 There was debate within both the 
Commission and the UN Sixth Committee as to whether P llet’s work should 
produce a convention, an additional protocol, a restat ment of the law on the topic or 
guidelines for practice.108 The ILC indicated early in its work that they would not call 
into question the 1969, 1978 or 1986 Vienna Conventions, a contention that has been 
frequently reiterated,109 but would try and fill the obvious gaps and ambiguit es; 
furthermore, it was ultimately decided that the work would culminate in a ‘Guide to 
Practice’ with guidelines and model clauses that could be used in tandem with the 
existing rules on treaty law in the development of future treaties.110 
 In 1995 Pellet prepared and sent a questionnaire to states and international 
organisations with the purpose of ascertaining the practice and problems relating to 
reservations.111 This move was supported by UNGA resolution 50/45 of 11 
December 1995 which urged states to promptly respond t  the Special Rapporteur’s 
questionnaire.112 The detailed questionnaire methodically queried the practice of 
states in making reservations and objections to reservations, including the potential 
effect and whether an objection stimulated withdrawal of an invalid reservation. The 
phrasing sought to assess whether the states were motivated by politics, law or a 
combination of both. The questionnaire also directly addressed the determinative 
function of judicial organs and treaty organs with respect to reservations. By the end 
of 1996, only twelve states113 had responded with another twenty114 joining by April 
1998. As of July 2010, only thirty-three states hadresponded to the questionnaire and 
                                               
107 Note by the Special Rapporteur on draft guideline 3.1.5, UN Doc. A/CN.4/572 (2006), para. 4. 
108 ILC, UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), paras. 467-70, 483; Pellet, UN Doc. A/CN.4/470 (1995), paras. 
170-179. 
109 See, for example, ILC, UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), paras. 428, 430; ILC Yearbook 1997, UN. Doc. 
A/52/10 (1997), para. 157; ILC, UN Doc. A/53/10 (1998), para. 482; ILC, UN Doc. A/64/10 (2009), 
para 53. 
110 ILC, UN Doc. A/53/10 (1998), para. 482.  
111 A. Pellet, Second report on reservations to treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/478 (1996) Annex II, pp. 98-
106. For the text of the relevant portions of the Questionnaire to States, see Annex III. 
112 UNGA, Resolution 50/45, UN Doc. A/RES/50/45 (1996), paras. 5-6. 
113 Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States. UN Doc. A/CN.4/478 (Annex II), (1996), p. 97. 
114 Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, France, the Holy See, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, Panama, Peru, Republic of Korea and Sweden. See A. 
Pellet, Third report on reservations to treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/491 (1998), para. 6, ftn. 7.  
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those responding were mainly European or Western states.115 The meagre responses 
resulting from the consultation with states revealed that there remained staunch 
support for the idea that states alone were competent to determine reservation 
permissibility though some progressive states favoured allowing the treaty bodies 
determine permissibility.116 As disappointing as the feedback to the questionnaire 
was, it highlighted an integral problem with the practice of reservations in that states 
are generally unconcerned with the topic. 
 In 2005 the ILC once again sought input from state in the Sixth Committee 
on the issue of what effect objecting states expected their objections to have if the 
objection is based on incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty but the 
objection does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty between themselves and 
the reserving state.117 There was no conclusive answer among the states who did 
respond. It further appears from the views expressed in the Sixth Committee that the 
issue of reservations remained divided in much the way that they have been since the 
debate surfaced prior to the Genocide Opinion,118 as will be discussed in Chapter 
Two.  
In 2007, despite having formulated a large number of the draft guidelines 
Pellet once again sought the input of states on the qu stion of reservations. 
Particularly he questioned what conclusions states drew in the event that a 
reservation was deemed invalid due to contravention of Article 19 of the Vienna 
Convention and whether states favoured the severability doctrine, the opposability 
doctrine or a combination of the two.119 It further asked states to provide the legal or 
practical considerations for the response to the initial set of questions. The third 
question posed to the states was framed as follows: Do the replies to the above two 
sets of questions vary (or should they vary) according to the type of treaty concerned 
(bilateral or normative, human rights, environmental protection, codification, 
                                               
115 ILC Yearbook 2007, vol. II (Part Two), UN Doc. A/65/10 (2010), p. 10, fn. 13.  The questionnaires 
were directed both to states and international organisations serving as depositaries for multilateral 
treaties, however, because the focus of research deals specifically with reservations to UN human 
rights treaties, which are open only to states, the discussion is limited to responses by states thoug the 
percentage of responses was much higher from the organisations.  
116 UN Doc. A/53/10 (1998), paras. 483-84. 
117 Draft Guide to Practice, 4.5.2, commentary para. 19; see also ILC Yearbook 2005, vol. II (Part 
Two), UN Doc. A/60/10 (2005), para. 29. 
118 UN Doc. A/60/10 (2005), para. 355.  
119 UN Doc. A/62/10 (2007), para. 23(a), the questionnaire did not use the terms severability or 
opposability but instead outlined the consequences of both. 
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etc.)?120 This question attempted to elicit some information on the plausibility of 
separate specialised reservations regimes; however, th  responses were less than 
illuminating. 
In addition to states generally neglecting to provide information on their 
reservations practices, they have been reticent to address problems associated with 
broad or culturally based reservations. Several efforts have been made to investigate 
states’ views on the compatibility of reservations i  the context of specific human 
rights treaties.121 The UN Secretary-General initiated an open forum as p rt of the 
third meeting of State Parties to CEDAW in 1986 in a  effort to garner states’ 
opinions on reservations to that convention in a less contentious manner than they 
might express via reservations. Disappointingly, only seventeen states responded and 
most were ambivalent on the issue of reservation compatibility.122  
 Latterly in the ILC study and following the adoption of UNGA resolution 
61/34, the ILC availed itself of its right of consultation123 and initiated a series of 
meetings with UN experts in the field of human rights, including the human rights 
treaty bodies.124 Meeting with the chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies was 
intended to facilitate further information exchange related to the practice of the treaty 
bodies with regard to reservations.125 These exchanges appear to have been 
successful in that the final guidelines adopted by the ILC were endorsed by the 
chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies and the opinions coming from the 
treaty bodies’ special working group on reservations tend to reflect the ILC work.  
The draft guidelines forming the Guide to Practice on Reservations to 
Treaties with commentary (Draft Guide to Practice) were provisionally adopted at 
the sixty-second session of the ILC in 2010 and sent out to governments for 
                                               
120 The complete text of the questions submitted by the Special Rapporteur and recorded in UN Doc. 
A/62/10 (2007), pp. 10-11, can be found in Annex IV.  
121 e.g. UN Secretary-General, Status of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc. A/41/608 (1986), paras. 8 -10; UNGA, Res. 42/60, UN 
Doc. A/RES/42/60 (1987).  
122 Ibid., para. 10 and following state reports; see, also, Clark, ‘The Vienna Convention Reservations 
Regime’, 283-84. 
123 Statute of the ILC (1947), Art. 25(1). 
124 UNGA, Res. 61/34, UN Doc. A/RES/61/34 (2006). 
125 See Chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies, Report on Reservations, UN Doc. 
HRI/MC/2007/5/Add.1 (2007), UN Doc. HRI/MC/2008/5 (2008) and UN Doc. HRI/MC/2009/5 
(2009). 
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comment shortly thereafter.126 The Draft Guide consists of four parts meant to assist 
in interpreting both reservations and interpretative declarations. The first deals with 
definitions, the second with rules for assessing validity, the third with rules for 
assessing permissibility and the final part addresses the determination of legal 
effects. To encourage feedback from states, the UNGA also appealed to them to 
provide feedback on the Guide as an important step toward concluding the ILC’s 
lengthy study.127 State feedback was compiled in February 2011 and, not 
unsurprisingly, only ten states responded.128   
During its sixty-third session from April to August of 2011 the ILC working 
group on reservations adopted the finalized text of the guidelines.129 Several 
linguistic and structural changes were made to the Draft Guidelines based on the 
observations received from states as well as debate in the UN Sixth Committee.130 A 
few of the more controversial guidelines in the Draft Guide were also deleted. These 
changes and the Finalized Guidelines will be discused throughout the following 
chapters, particularly Chapters Five and Six. 
Collectively, the chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies also have 
been a driving force for reassessment of the reservations rules. The CERD 
Committee first proposed that a study be undertaken on reservations to human rights 
treaties in 1997.131 A working paper was delivered to the ECOSOC Sub-commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1999 exploring the 
following question: In applying the reservations regime to a particular reservation, 
are there special characteristics of human rights trea ies which have an impact on 
the interpretation of the reservation?132 The UNHCHR Sub-Commission on Human 
Rights then appointed Hampson, the working paper’s author, as Special Rapporteur 
for the purpose of preparing a comprehensive study on reservations to human rights 
                                               
126 UN Doc. A/65/10 (2010). 
127 UNGA, Res. 65/26, UN Doc. A/RES/65/26 (2010). 
128 Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland and 
the United States. 
129 Reservations to Treaties, Text and title of the draft guidelines constituting the Guide to Practice on 
Reservations to treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.779 (2011). 
130 Oral report by the Chairman of the Working Group on Reservations to Treaties, ILC, 63rd sess. 
(20 May 2011) at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/session/63/ReservationstoTreatiesReport20May2011.pdf 
<accessed 1 Sept. 2011>. 
131 UNHCHR Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/31 (1997) Annex. 
132 Hampson, 1999 Working paper, p. 5(f). 
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treaties that would not duplicate Pellet’s study.133 In close association with the treaty 
bodies, Hampson prepared multiple working papers on the subject with the final 
submitted in 2004. Hampson’s findings will be introduced as part of the analysis of 
the Vienna Convention rules. 
While both the ILC and treaty body studies have proved invaluable sources 
on what the law could, and in some instances should, be, this thesis seeks to fill in 
the gaps as to why the law on reservations must progress in specific reference to 
human rights treaties. It does so by analysing the entire body of reservations and 
objections to human rights treaties, paying particular attention to the progression of 
state practice over the past three decades. The application of the current reservations 
regime leaves many questions regarding the legal effect and consequence of invalid 
reservations unresolved and these lacunae are highlighted throughout this work. 
Therefore, this thesis is timely in light of the con lusion of the ILC work as it further 
explores points passed over by the ILC study which was directed toward addressing 
general treaty law rather than engaging questions specific to the particular nature of 
human rights treaties. 
 
2 THESIS MAP 
To conduct a doctrinal analysis of the Vienna Convention reservations regime there 
must first be a review of the development of the rules governing reservations. 
Chapter Two introduces the historical foundations of the Vienna Convention residual 
reservations regime and pays particular attention the early opinion and law on 
reservations. Primarily this involves reviewing the law leading up to the 1951 
advisory opinion on the possibility of making reservations to the Genocide 
Convention. The work of the ILC on the law of treati s that took place in tandem and 
subsequent to the Genocide Opinion is also chronicled. The ILC was heavily 
involved in the development of the reservations rules and its work was ultimately the 
basis of the 1969 Vienna Convention, including the reservations rules examined by 
this thesis.   
Chapter Three demonstrates that the nature of human rights treaties, including 
the non-reciprocal obligations which they are designed to protect, render the Vienna 
                                               
133 UNHCRC Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2000/26, Reservations to Human Rights 
Treaties, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/2 (2000), pp. 15-16. 
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Convention reservations regime ineffective. Initially it highlights the various rights 
protected by the core human rights treaties and defines the prevailing types of 
reservations formulated by states. Using the core UN human rights treaties as a case 
study this research highlights that the past thirty years have revealed the normative 
ambiguity created when the reservations rules of the Vienna Convention are used to 
regulate reservations to human rights treaties. The nin  treaties designated as ‘core’ 
that form the case study are as follows (in order of adoption): the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination134 (CERD), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights135 (ICCPR), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights136 (ICESCR), the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women137 (CEDAW), the 
Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment138 (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child139 
(CRC), the International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of Migrant 
Workers and Their Families140 (ICRMW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities141(CRPD) and the International Convention on the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance142 (ICED). Notably absent are human rights 
conventions that serve the specific, singular functio  of preventing and criminalising 
certain activities including the Genocide Conventio and the Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid143. These treaties are 
purposely omitted as they fall out-with the typology identified by this study and, as 
such, do not encounter the same practical difficulties in the application of the Vienna 
Convention reservations rules. The overarching purpose of Chapter Three serves to 
underscore the prevalence of unacceptable reservations in the human rights treaty 
system by providing examples of the reservation formulas most commonly 
                                               
134 660 UNTS 195, 7 Mar. 1966. 
135 999 UNTS 171, 16 Dec. 1966. 
136 993 UNTS 3, 16 Dec. 1966. 
137 1249 UNTS 13, 18 Dec. 1979. 
138 1465 UNTS 85, 10 Dec. 1984. 
139 1577 UNTS 3, 20 Nov. 1989. 
140 2220 UNTS 3, 18 Dec. 1990. 
141 UN Doc. A/61/611, 13 Dec. 2006. 
142 UN Doc.A/61/488. C.N.737.2008.TREATIES-12, 20 Dec. 2006. 
143 1015 UNTS 243, 30 Nov. 1973. 
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employed. It further notes the tension caused by reconciling the pursuit of universal 
treaty adherence against the sovereign right of states o make reservations. 
The ambiguities resulting from applying the residual reservations rules to 
human rights treaties in the context of reservation review are outlined in Chapter 
Four. The Vienna Convention envisions two methods of reservation monitoring. The 
first entails a system of objection exercised by state parties and the second 
contemplates resort to an international dispute resolution mechanism, such as the 
ICJ,144 to provide a final view on the validity of a reservation. The system of state 
objections is the political feature of the Vienna Convention reservations regime and 
is premised on the assumption that reservations formulated by states are valid. Once 
again resorting to the core human rights treaties th  chapter moves the analysis to the 
objections made by non-reserving states to illustrate the lack of clear legal effect and 
absence of a consequence when a reservation is deeme  invalid by another state 
party. Because the Vienna Convention operates on the assumption that treaty 
obligations are reciprocal and a definite legal effect and consequence will result from 
a state objection, such as the relations between the reserving state and objecting state 
being modified, there is no guidance on how to produce a legal effect when the 
obligations are not reciprocal, particularly when there may be no agreement among 
state parties as to the validity of the reservation. A  undefined legal effect cannot 
produce a concrete consequence thus the invalid reservation hangs in the balance and 
normative incoherence ensues. The response to objecti ns by reserving states proves 
there is little impetus to remove offending reservations due to the absence of a legal 
effect. The chapter then proceeds to demonstrate that these ambiguities can be 
resolved if a dispute resolution mechanism is utilised to provide a final determination 
on reservation validity. This piece of the analysis reviews the contributions of the ICJ 
and the regional human rights tribunals to the assessm nt of reservations. Ultimately, 
this chapter, coupled with Chapter Three, demonstrates the lacunae in Vienna 
Convention guidance as applied in practice to invald reservations to human rights 
treaties. 
With the assessment of the practice of reservations t  human rights treaties 
and the demonstration of the practical limitations of the Vienna Convention 
                                               
144 Vienna Convention, Art. 66; Statute of the ICJ, Art. 36. 
 34 
reservations regime complete, Chapter Five turns to a d ctrinal analysis of the actual 
reservation rules. Contemporary practice and commentary on the reservations rules 
indicate that something is missing in the Vienna Convention regime. The chapter will 
respond to the primary research question: does the Vienna Convention reservations 
regime adequately govern reservations to human rights treaties? In pursuit of an 
answer to the research question the analysis pays prticular attention to the object 
and purpose test, the legal effect of invalid reservations and the consequence of 
invalid reservations. Though the one-size-fits-all approach outlined by the Vienna 
Convention has widespread support, it is abundantly clear that there is room for 
clarifying the greatest gaps in the regime. Thus thi  c apter will look at the regime’s 
ambiguities both in general and in specific relation t  human rights treaties as the 
international community at large could benefit from normative coherence in the 
reservations system. Importantly the chapter will examine the approaches to dealing 
with invalid reservations that have been developed in concert with and tangentially to 
the Vienna Convention. Specific note will be taken of the principles advanced by 
states to respond to the question of legal effect in the face of an objection, including 
permissibility and opposability, yet these approaches will be shown to be ineffective 
in the context of human rights treaties. Options for defining a concrete consequence 
for an invalid reservation will be appraised, including the controversial severance 
doctrine. The primary purpose of the chapter is to outline the lacunae in Vienna 
Convention reservations regime and to confirm that despite the ambiguity that has 
heretofore resulted in practice, there is ample evidence to suggest that the central 
feature of the regime–the object and purpose test–can be employed to determine 
validity. Thus at the conclusion of Chapter Five, the primary unresolved normative 
issue with the regime is designated as the lack of a competent final arbiter on the 
validity of a reservation. 
As the final substantive chapter, Chapter Six reflects on the gaps in the 
Vienna Convention reservations regime, the current state of reservations practice in 
the UN human rights treaty system and the unique sup rvisory organs (treaty bodies) 
attached to the core treaties. Proceeding from the concluding position taken in 
Chapter Five, this chapter asserts the opportunity to be had in utilising the treaty 
bodies to determine reservation validity. Specifically it replies to the second research 
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question: are the treaty-specific supervisory mechanisms competent to serve a 
determinative function with respect to reservations to the core UN human rights 
treaties? In answering this question the chapter first examines the purpose for which 
the treaty bodies were designed and contemplates their perceived legitimacy. This 
initial inquiry is followed by an overview of the remits of each of the treaty bodies 
thereby grounding their functions in law. These overviews include a general synopsis 
of the individual treaty body’s experience in dealing with reservations. The core of 
the analysis examines the involvement of the treaty bodies in the reservations debate 
to date and the international response to this involvement. Contemporary academic 
writing and the work of the ILC, as well as evidenc of state acquiescence, reflect a 
gradual acknowledgement of the determinative role treaty bodies can play thus 
assisting in curing the impasse that currently exists when using the Vienna 
Convention rules to evaluate reservations to human rights treaties. Chapter Six 
proposes that as part and parcel of every monitoring role recognised under the treaty 
body remits there is a necessity for the treaty bodies to interpret treaty obligations 
and the fulfilment of those obligations. This necessarily implies that the 
determinative function extends to each of these rols as it is only in determining the 
validity of a reservation that a state party’s commitments under human rights treaties 














RESERVATIONS: HISTORY OF THE GENERAL REGIME  
 
Despite intense and prolonged negotiation on the part of many states during treaty 
development, it is all but impossible to create onedocument that reflects completely 
the terms preferred by every negotiating party. As often noted, treaties are effectively 
an agreement to disagree or a disagreement reduced to writing.1 This is where 
reservations enter as a tool for achieving an agreebl  result after negotiations cease. 
The debate surrounding reservations to human rights treaties is most often framed as 
a contest between maintaining treaty integrity and encouraging universal 
participation–the integrity versus universality debate.2 This framing of the debate 
reflects the tension between maintaining the integrity of the treaty to which the 
parties have ultimately agreed and allowing unilateral modifications in order to 
encourage a wider number of treaty participants. 
 Only in the past century have reservations been a concern as prior to this the 
practice of making reservations was rare. The United States is credited with the first 
reservation to a bilateral treaty in 1794 and the Sweden-Norway reservation to the 
Act of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 is acknowledged as the first to a multilateral 
treaty.3 Globalisation, world-wide social and environmental movements, the large 
number of nation-states and the desire for stronger i t national relationships have all 
contributed to the growing number of treaties and the increased inability to create a 
one-size-fits-all agreement. This reality has stimulated the use of the reservation as a 
means of adjusting a state’s obligations so that it can join a treaty without accepting 
all of the obligations in full. 
                                                
1 Though probably not the first to express the concept, Lauterpacht is often credited with the early 
1900s articulation of the role of treaties in the internatio al community. See H. Lauterpacht, The 
Function of Law in the International Community (first published by Clarendon Press, Oxford 1933, 
Lawbook Exchange, Union, NJ 2000), p. 72.  
2 See, generally, H.B. Schöpp-Schilling, ‘Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women: An Unresolved Issue or (No) New Developments’ in I. 
Ziemele (ed.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict, 
Harmony or Reconciliation (Martinus Nijhoff, Lieden/Boston 2004), p. 17; C. Redgwell, 
‘Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to General Multilateral Treaties’ (1993) 
64 BYBIL 245. 
3 W.W. Bishop, Jr., ‘Reservations to Treaties’ (1961) 2 Recueil des cours 249, 260-62. 
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This chapter introduces the historical foundations f the residual reservations 
regime as set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties4 (Vienna 
Convention). To assess whether the Vienna Convention reservations regime 
adequately governs reservations to human rights it is essential to introduce the early 
opinion and law surrounding the development of the contemporary rules on 
reservations. For the most part, this involves an advisory opinion by the International 
Court of Justice on the possibility of making reservations to the Genocide 
Convention5 which was delivered in 1951. The Court went to great lengths to 
examine existing state practice regarding reservations prior to delivering its opinion 
thus the debates of the international community will be summarised as the lack of 
common practice had an obvious impact on the Court. During the period in which the 
Court was deliberating the question of reservations t  the Genocide Convention and 
for many years following, the International Law Commission was also heavily 
involved in the reservations question. Set against thi  background the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties was born and today remains the primary governor 
of reservations when a treaty does not contain is own specific reservations rules. For 
the purposes of this research, the primary points to keep in mind when contemplating 
the history of the reservations regime include: (1) what rules are applied to evaluate 
reservations, (2) who determines which reservations violate the Vienna Convention 
rules, (3) what is the legal effect of a reservation f llowing a determination of 
invalidity, and (4) do the rules provide a clear nomative consequence for an invalid 
reservation?  
 
1 PRACTICE INFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
Until 1951, there had been no international judicial activity in the area of 
reservations. States had exercised their sovereign right to attach reservations to 
treaties as and when necessary in the course of binding their governments to 
international obligations with no generally applicable rules to guide them. Views on 
reservations tended to vary by region and type of government, though standardisation 
                                                
4 1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969 (Vienna Convention). 
5 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277, 9 Dec. 
1948 (Genocide Convention). 
 
 38
of formal articles of multilateral treaties was on the rise.6 Disputes regarding the 
acceptability of reservations were generally dealt with through diplomatic channels, 
namely the League of Nations Secretary-General or exchange of diplomatic letters, 
as the number of parties was relatively small.7  
This changed with adoption of the Genocide Convention. In response to 
reservations formulated by states upon accession, such as the Philippines and 
Bulgaria which made reservations regarding the automa ic dispute resolution 
mechanism found in Article IX,8 non-reserving states found themselves perplexed as 
to how to react to the various reservations formulated to the Convention. The 1951 
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention9 (Genocide Opinion) 
was the result of a request submitted to the Interna io al Court of Justice (ICJ) by the 
UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 17 November 1950 which asked the following: 
In so far as concerns the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in the event of a State ratifying 
or acceding to the Convention subject to a reservation made either on 
ratification or on accession, or on signature followed by ratification: 
 
I. Can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to 
Convention while still maintaining its reservation if the 
reservation is objected to by one or more of the parties to the 
Convention but not by others? 
II.  If the answer to question I is in the affirmative, what is the 
effect of the reservation as between the reserving State and: 
a. The parties which object to the reservation? 
b. Those which accept it? 
III.  What would be the legal effect as regards the answer to 
question I if an objection to a reservation is made: 
a. By a signatory which has not yet ratified? 
b. By a State entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet 
done so?10 
                                                
6 For summaries of reservations practices prevailing in the early 20th century see M.O. Hudson, 
‘Reservations to Multipartite International Instruments’ (1938) 32(2) AJIL 330; W. Sanders, 
‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties Made in Act of Ratification or Adherence’ (1939) 33 AJIL 488; 
Owen (n 3); H.W. Malkin, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventions’ (1926) 7 BYBIL 141. For a 
more recent summary ending with contemporary practice, see E.T. Swaine, ‘Reserving’ (2006) 31 
Yale Journal of International Law 307, 312 et seq. 
7 Hudson, ‘Reservations to Mulipartite International Instruments’. 
8 Both states made other interpretive declarations in addition to the reservations to the automatic 
referral to the ICJ in the event of a dispute among state . Bulgaria ultimately withdrew its reservation 
on 24 June 1992, see 78 UNTS 318, the Philippines maintains the reservation. 
9 1951 ICJ Reports 15, 28 May 1951 (Genocide Opinion). 
10 T. Lie, Secretary-General of the UN to the President of the ICJ, Request for Advisory Opinion, 




 The opportunity availing itself to the ICJ was one of two-fold importance. 
Firstly, it was an opportunity to provide definitive guidance on the issue of 
reservations, an area that appears to have been of concern to some states out-with the 
context of the Genocide Convention.11 The second notion of import concerned the 
protection of human rights, namely the prevention and punishment of genocide, and 
it is this concern, being fresh on the minds of states following the horrors of the 
Second World War, that seems to have diverted attention away from what could have 
been a defining moment for treaty law. Though the advisory opinion request clearly 
limited the scope of the request to reservations pertaining to the Genocide 
Convention—a law-making treaty with human rights as the subject matter—the 
Court’s opinion ultimately served as the preamble to a lengthy discourse on 
reservations which continues today. 
 
1.1 RESERVATION PRACTICE EXISTING PRIOR TO 1951 
During consideration of the issue of reservations to the Genocide Convention on the 
UNGA floor there were three lines of thought that materialised from the discussions 
in relation to the first question posed to the ICJ regarding whether a state can be 
considered a party while maintaining a reservation to which at least one party to the 
convention maintains an objection. First was the unanimity principle which required 
any proposed reservation be given unanimous consent by i terested parties and was 
based on the concept of maintaining the integrity of a treaty. Second was the extreme 
sovereignty position which asserted that making reservations was a sovereign act of 
the state, a right which was absolute and necessary to exercising sovereignty. Finally, 
there was a compromise between the two.   
The then-practice of the UN Secretary-General as depositary was to exercise 
what it considered accepted principles of international law which required that a 
reservation to a treaty would only be valid if all other parties consented to that 
reservation,12 following the unanimity principle. This involved the Secretary-General 
                                                
11 See Written Statement by The Organization of American St tes (14 Dec. 1950), Genocide Opinion, 
Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, 28 May 1951, pp. 15-20 (OAS Statement to the ICJ), p. 15.  
12 Written Statement of the UN Secretary-General, Genocide Opinion, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents, 28 May 1951, pp. 77-180 (UN Statement to the ICJ), p. 104. See also Redgwell 
‘Universality or Integrity?’, 246. 
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circulating the proposed reservation and seeking approval of the reservation from all 
existing state parties to the treaty. However, state  such as the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics challenged this practice of asking states which had previously 
ratified the Genocide Convention to express their op ni n on reservations carried by 
new ratifications.13 In addition to the dissent among certain states regarding the 
Secretary-General’s practice, another factor that may have led the UNGA to seek the 
advice of the ICJ was the potential problem regarding entry into force of the 
Genocide Convention due to uncertainty of the statu of states who had submitted 
reservations along with their ratifications. These uncertainties, coupled with the 
eager eyes of the world as it watched the infant UN and its first comprehensive 
attempt to eradicate genocide, spurred the UNGA into action and set the state of the 
law surrounding treaties onto the course it travels sti l today. 
Following the request for the advisory opinion, theICJ surveyed the existing 
practices of states with respect to reservations and observed principles that generally 
followed traditional contract law concepts. As an issue of first impression, the Court 
welcomed comment by interested parties on the practice employed by states up until 
that date. Written statements were received by the Organization of American States, 
USSR, Jordan, United States of America, United Kingdom, Israel, the International 
Labour Organization, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Romania, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Byelorussia and the Philippines and the Court heard oral statements from 
the United Kingdom, France and Israel.14 The main lines of thought expressed on the 
UNGA floor regarding reservations were echoed in the reports submitted to the ICJ. 
Each of the views was supported with a variety of lega  arguments which have been 
distilled below. Once again it must be underlined that the debate on the UNGA floor 
was centred on the Genocide Convention, however, when the ICJ requested 
information on state practice on the question of rese vations it did not limit the 
request to only reservations to the Genocide Convention but sought information into 
state’s views on reservations generally. 
                                                
13 G.G. Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventio s’ (1953) 2 ICLQ 1, 10-11, fn 20, citing 
Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/1372, para. 20. 
14 Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Genocide Opinion, Minutes of the Sittings held 10-14 May 
1951 and 28 May 1951, p. 301. 
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The following provides a brief summary of the prevailing practices prior to 
1951 and highlights the differences between the various practices, including the legal 
reasoning supporting each position. The summaries point out the emphasis placed on 
the type of treaty as well as the subject matter of the treaty which was a primary 
concern of the Genocide Opinion.   
 
1.1.1 UNANIMITY  
With only six years of experience at the time of the advisory opinion request, the UN 
Secretary-General’s practice15 regarding reservations employed a strict rule whereby 
a state depositing a ratification instrument with a proposed reservation would not 
become a state party to a convention if any single previously ratifying state objected 
to the reservation, the so-called ‘unanimity rule’. At the time, this rule was believed 
by many to be a universally recognised principle of international law.16 However, 
according to some states, the unanimity practice ‘extended the veto’ into the UN 
system because a single state could prevent another stat  from becoming a party to a 
multilateral treaty even where all other state parties o the same agreement accepted 
the reservation.17 The unanimity rule as exercised by the Secretary-General reflected 
a tightening of the previous League of Nations rules18–which had allowed even non-
state parties to reject reservations–and paid deferenc  to the ‘law-making’ character 
of treaties because the agreements embodied the rules of aw adopted by states which 
were to be enforced by the government of each19. Procedurally, the Secretary-
General would receive the instrument of ratification or accession with the 
accompanying reservation and immediately circulate th  reservation to the 
previously ratifying parties asking that any objections be submitted by a certain day–
usually the anticipated date of entry into force–and if no objection was received by 
                                                
15 For a brief summary of the UN Secretary-General’s practice prior to 1952 see Treaty Section of the 
Office of Legal Affairs, Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral 
Treaties, UN Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1 (1999), paras. 168-72. 
16 H. Lauterpacht, ‘Some Possible Solutions of the Problem of Reservations to Treaties’ (1953) 39 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 97, 97. 
17 OAS Statement to the ICJ, p. 19, referencing a memorandum from Uruguay to the Sixth Committee 
of the UNGA. 
18 The League of Nations rules were adopted following the Second Opium Convention of 1925 
(concluded 19 Feb. 1925). 
19 ‘Note: The Effect of Objections to Treaty Reservations’ (1951) 60 Yale Law Journal 728, 731. 
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that date then the state party was deemed to have accepted the reservation.20 Thus, 
the rule utilised by the Secretary-General was as follows: 
 
A State may make a reservation when signing, ratifying or acceding to a 
convention, prior to its entry into force, only with he consent of all States 
which have ratified or acceded thereto up to the dat of entry into force; and 
may do so after the date of entry into force only with the consent of all States 
which have theretofore ratified or acceded.21 
 
 In response to the questions submitted to the ICJ with respect to the Genocide 
Convention, the Secretary-General’s practice answered the first question posed–Can 
a reserving State be regarded as being a party to Convention while still maintaining 
its reservation if the reservation is objected to by one or more of the parties to the 
Convention but not by others?–in the negative. This left the consideration of 
questions II and III unnecessary in light of the unanimity rule, as it focused on 
complete uniformity of obligations for treaties of the law-making type.  The 
Secretary-General’s practice was only concerned with objections made by previously 
ratifying states and not those signatories who had yet to ratify, though signatory 
states were also informed of reservations. Under this approach, uniformity of 
obligations, especially in the instance that obligations were not reciprocal, was 
considered of primary importance for the purposes of ensuring equity and efficient 
enforcement since the only return states actually received from signing up to law-
making type treaties was the assurance that that oter treaty parties will do the same, 
thereby enhancing the peace and security of the interna ional community.22 
 The core problem for the Secretary-General as the depositary was that there 
was no unanimous agreement on either the procedure to obtain consent from the 
treaty members when a subsequently ratifying state proposed a reservation or the 
legal effect of an objection when made.23 In the 1950 Report of the UN Secretariat to 
the UNGA, the Secretary-General argued in favour of unanimous consent to 
reservations, which reflected its practice and the practice of the former League of 
Nations, noting:   
                                                
20 Report of the Secretary-General: Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, UN Doc. A/1372 
(1950), Annex I, para. 6. 
21 UN Doc. A/1372 (1950), Annex I, para. 46. 
22 ‘Note: The Effect of Objections to Treaty Reservations’, 731, citing the UN Secretary-General, UN 
Doc. A/1372 (1950), Annex I, paras. 32-35. 




While it is universally recognized that the consent of the other 
governments concerned must be sought before they can be bound by 
the terms of a reservation, there has not been unanimity either as to the 
procedure to be followed by a depositary in obtaining the necessary 
consent or as to the legal effect of a State objecting to a reservation.24 
 
The Secretary-General viewed the Genocide Convention as a legislative convention 
that was not adaptable by reservation because it created rules of law for identical 
operation in the different states adopting the convention.25 This view lent support to 
its position of maintaining a stricter form of the L ague of Nations reservations 
practice. While acknowledging in its report the advntages of compromise approach, 
such as the Pan-American approach which will be discus ed below, the Secretary-
General noted that the differences between a regional association and the UN, being 
open to the world at large, rendered the practice unsuitable.26 
 The United Kingdom supported the Secretary-General’s view that a reserving 
state could not become a party to a treaty in the face of an objection to the 
reservation. Though the United Kingdom had not yet signed the Genocide 
Convention,27 it offered its juridical view in light of its interpretation of treaty law in 
order to elucidate its understanding of the law andssist the ICJ in its search for an 
answer to the advisory opinion request. Essential to the United Kingdom’s position 
that the reserving state could not become a party in he event of an objection to its 
reservation was the incongruous relationship that would result between the objecting 
state and the reserving state if the reserving state were allowed to be a treaty party. 
Material to its evaluation was the type of conventio  nvolved such as whether the 
convention was a technical agreement, commercial in character, system-changing, 
social or law-making in nature.28 The United Kingdom viewed the Genocide 
Convention as the law-making type of treaty and as such it was meant to be accepted 
as a whole or not at all.29 It argued that allowing minority governments to alter the 
convention unilaterally through reservations would, in effect, impose the will of the 
                                                
24 UN Doc. A/1372 (1950), Annex I, para. 2.  
25 UN Statement to the ICJ, para. 32. 
26 Fenwick, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’, 147.   
27 The UK acceded to the Convention on 30 Jan. 1970. 
28 Written statement by the United Kingdom (Jan. 1951), Genocide Opinion, Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents, 28 May 1951, pp. 48-76 (UK Statement to the ICJ), p. 49. 
29 Ibid., p. 54.  
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minority upon the majority,30 which would defeat the point of the negotiation 
process. Though the United Kingdom did not illuminate the class of ‘concerned’ 
parties, it pointed out that a treaty was much like a contract and, following the 
Secretary-General’s unanimity principle, once adopted i  could not be altered without 
the consent of all concerned. 
 Interestingly, the United Kingdom pointed out that it was not necessarily the 
making of reservations to which it was opposed but more the fact that there was a 
‘failure to adopt the proper methods and procedures for doing so’31 in the Genocide 
Convention therefore the effect of unilateral reservations in the absence of a 
provision for such was an entirely different propositi n than making a reservation 
when the process was specifically outlined in a convention. It was also concerned 
that unchecked reservations would impede finality of the text as the negotiated terms 
would always be subject to variation in light of sub equently made reservations. The 
concern over no definitive text was largely based on c ntract theory:  
 
…[A]n essential element of any contractual system, that, save in so far 
as the contract itself created or provided for differences in the position 
of the parties, or in the obligations to be carried out by them, all the 
parties were, and must be, in the same position and subject to the same 
obligations.32 
 
Conventions that are essentially contractual in both f rm and operation consist of 
mutual reciprocal rights and obligations which, as noted by the UN Secretary-
General, create ‘a complex of bilateral agreements’33 despite the multilateral form. 
Where reciprocal obligations are involved, the adjustment between parties of those 
obligations owed is a relatively easy process of negotiation defined by reservations, 
acceptances and objections.   
 
But this is not the case where conventions of the United Nations type 
are concerned, because the obligations they contain exist and have to 
be carried out universally, once they are assumed. They do not consist 
of duties owed specifically to, and to be carried out t wards and for the 
benefit of, the other parties to the convention. In brief they are not 
                                                
30 Ibid., p. 54. 
31 Ibid., p. 54, n. 1.   
32 Ibid., p. 58, emphasis original. See, also, Redgwell ‘Universality or Integrity?, 246-47. 
33 UK Statement to the ICJ, p. 63, citing UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/1372 (1950), Annex I.
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fundamentally contractual.  Their operation is not dependent on the 
existence of a contractual tie with other States.34 
 
Because the Genocide Convention falls into the category of universally applicable, 
law-making treaty, the United Kingdom argued that the implication of a unilateral 
adjustment of obligations owed defeated the point of he convention because the 
premise of a law-making treaty is that all parties are equally bound by exactly the 
same obligations.35 It also noted that the lack of sanction, relief or remedy that would 
generally be operable in the case of a contractual tre ty has no potential with respect 
to a social, law-making or system-creating type of treaty.36 Therefore, the United 
Kingdom also answered the first question put to the ICJ by the UNGA in the 
negative. 
 
1.1.2 ABSOLUTE STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
The second approach to reservations was the absolute sovereignty principle which 
asserted that making reservations was a sovereign act of the state, a right which was 
absolute and necessary to exercising sovereignty. This position was mainly 
advocated by the USSR37 and some members of the Slav language group of states.38 
This approach was not concerned with the type of treaty as it viewed all treaties as 
subject to the whim of the ratifying state party. In support of this extreme view of 
sovereign power exercise it was asserted that becaus  conventions were the written 
expression of the will of the majority due to majority voting being the accepted 
practice for treaty adoption, reservations were the only method by which minority 
views could achieve fruition. If the minority states were not allowed reservations 
then they were forced to choose to subscribe to a cnvention expressing the will of 
the majority or to not become a party at all. This argument also reflected the shift in 
treaty negotiation which for most of the nineteenth century had been typically 
conducted between a very small number of states and with the exercise of the 
                                                
34 UK Statement to the ICJ, p. 64, emphasis original. 
35 Ibid., p. 63. 
36 Ibid., p. 64.  
37 Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventions’, 10-11, fn 20, citing Report of the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/1372, para. 20. 
38 UK Statement to the ICJ, p. 53; Y. Liang, ‘The Third Session of the International Law Commission: 
Review of Its Work by the General Assembly’ (1952) 46 AJIL 483, 492, citing UNGA, 6th Sess., 
Official Records of the Sixth Committee, 273rd meeting, paras. 34 and 36. 
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unanimity rule. As noted by Fitzmaurice, this theory was entirely untenable since it 
‘would make obvious nonsense of the whole process of negotiating and drawing up 
the texts of multilateral Conventions.’39 The Genocide Convention represented the 
new super-treaty where the number of negotiating state  increased multi-fold.   
 
1.1.3 THE COMPROMISE APPROACH   
Some of the written statements submitted to the ICJ demonstrated a reservation 
practice by states which sought to strike a balance between strictly maintaining treaty 
integrity and adherence to the long-standing traditions of state sovereignty. Drawing 
upon the experience of concluding over 100 multilater l treaties within the Pan-
American Union, the Organization of American States (OAS) explained the difficult 
situation in which the reservations question sat because it was a matter of drawing a 
line between two extremes. On the one hand was the adoption of a strict rule 
prohibiting all reservations except those with unanimous consent and on the other 
was to admit reservations without any limitation, a pr ctice that would effectively 
render futile the practice of subscribing to conventions.40   
 As reflected in the OAS statement, there was also  range of practice in 
between the two extremes which had evolved within te Pan-American system.  
From 1928 the OAS followed the practice consistent with the Hague Conferences 
which is summarised as follows: 
 
In international treaties celebrated between different States, a 
reservation made by one of them in the act of ratific tion affects only 
the application of the clause in question in the relation of the other 
contracting States with the State making the reservation.41 
 
This practice allowed the reserving state to become a party to all aspects of the treaty 
with the exception of the subject of the reservation. The natural consequences of the 
reservation, such as the effect of reservation on the other obligations or the 
possibility of invalidating the convention, were solely the responsibility of the 
ratifying states. The OAS statement suggested that the Hague Conventions practice 
                                                
39 Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventions’, 10-11. 
40 OAS Statement to the ICJ, p. 15. 
41 OAS, Convention on Treaties, Art. 6 (3), Havana Conference (1928), reprinted in OAS Statement to 
the ICJ, p. 15. 
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seemed to apply to conventions where the articles could be segregated and work 
independently,42 thus in line with the traditional contract idea of a treaty as a set of 
reciprocal obligations.  
 Recognising that not all treaties contain separable obligations, the OAS 
abandoned the practice in 1932 opting instead for the following rules which guided 
the juridical status of treaties whose obligations were the subject of a reservation: 
 
1. The treaty shall be in force, in the form in which t was signed, as 
between those countries which ratify it without reservations, in the 
terms in which it was originally drafted and signed. 
2. It shall be in force as between the governments which ratify it with 
reservations and the signatory States which accept th  reservations 
in the form in which the treaty may be modified by said 
reservations. 
3. It shall not be in force between a government which may have 
ratified with reservations and another which may have lready 
ratified, and which does not accept such reservations.43 
 
It is the third rule that signalled the OAS departure from the Hague Conventions 
practice. However, there was still no clear indication as to whether the original treaty 
would be valid between those parties ratifying without reservations in the event that 
the reserving states hampered the minimum number of parties required for entry into 
force, nor did it address what action subsequently ra ifying states could employ with 
regard to previously ratifying and reserving state parties.   
A few years later, the OAS went further to adopt a pr ctice where reserving 
states would first circulate reservations to existing state parties and obtain comment 
on proposed reservations prior to submitting an instrument of ratification or 
adherence. This additional feature tracked contract l w more closely and was 
employed in order to encourage states proposing an unpopular reservation to revise 
or reconsider the reservation in order to conform to the popular will of the other 
parties. Thus, the Pan-American approach, as outlined in the OAS statement, 
encouraged a high ratification rate while assuming that ‘reservations may frequently 
be technical qualifications of a treaty rather than substantial limitations of its 
                                                
42 OAS Statement to the ICJ, p. 16. 
43 Governing Board of the Pan-American Union, Rules of Procedure Regarding Ratification of 
Multilateral Treaties, 4 May 1932, reprinted in OAS Statement to the ICJ, p. 17.  See also, Fenwick, 
‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’, 146. 
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obligations’44 and was touted as the best rule to accommodate ‘the use of treaties 
both for purposes of a contractual character and for the development of general 
principles of international law’45. The OAS was adamant that there were certain state 
policies of such importance that even the promise of pr moting the development of 
international law or common political and economic interests was not a strong 
enough incentive for them to abandon these very individual national policies, even if 
the price was the inability to join a multilateral convention. The Pan-American 
approach neither contemplated a particular number of objections to a reservation that 
would impede ratification nor did it outline exactly when a state might not be 
considered a treaty party due to subsequent objections o a reservation. They were, in 
fact, without experience to guide the issue having had only one instance where a state 
that was already party to a treaty objected to a reservation made by a subsequently 
ratifying state. 
 The written statement offered by the United States of America initiated its 
discussion with a state-centric mantra advancing ‘the principle of consent as an 
element of a contract and the principle of purpose and intention as essential elements 
in determinations regarding treaties’46 as generally accepted principles of 
international law that should be observed. The prevailing US view at the time of the 
request was that two options were available when reservations were proposed. The 
first option reflected the UN Secretariat practice of the day and excluded the 
reserving state from treaty participation while the s cond, reflecting the Pan-
American practice, permitted the reserving state to ngage in treaty relations with the 
accepting states and gave the treaty no effect in relation to the objecting states.47 The 
second option was premised largely on the concept of a ‘new offer’ in contract law 
and the mandatory acceptance by the other party (non-reserving state) of the change 
of terms.48 The US espoused the application of contract principles to support the 
unanimity rule arguing 
 
                                                
44 OAS Statement to the ICJ, p. 18; see also Fenwick, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’. 
45 OAS Statement to the ICJ, p. 20.  
46 Written Statement by The United States of America, Genocide Opinion, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents, 28 May 1951, pp. 23-47 (US Statement to the ICJ), p. 24. 
47 Fenwick, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’, 145-46. 
48 See ‘Note: The Effect of Objections to Treaty Reservations’, 728 and fn. 3. 
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… that a multilateral treaty is one whole and single offer, and that a 
reservation is a counter-offer which, before it can v ry any terms of 
the treaty, must be accepted by all the offerors. This argument 
presupposes that there is some obligation binding the offerors not 
independently or bilaterally to vary the contract terms inter se or vis-à-
vis an offeree. Whether or not such a limitation exists depends, of 
course, on the intention of all the offerors, not the assertions of one, 
and in deciding the question the same general considerat ons must play 
a part…49 
 
 However, the US went on to reason that the unanimity rule was inappropriate 
for the law-making character of the Genocide Convention, though it could very 
easily apply to other types of treaties, such as an organisational treaty which might 
set forth the charter or constitution of an organistion.50 The US supported the idea 
that the purpose of the Genocide Convention would be best achieved by gathering a 
large number of parties even if this meant that many of the parties made reservations.  
Preferring the more liberal OAS practice which allowed a reserving state to become a 
party to a convention despite an objection, the US advocated a system which 
provided flexibility for those states whose hands might be tied due to constitutional 
or other legal obstacles, such as in the case of its constitutional democracy. It even 
went as far as to argue that the only way to defeat a state’s instrument of ratification 
that included an unacceptable reservation was to secure the objection of every party 
to the convention,51 something akin to a negative unanimity rule. The default legal 
consequence of the approach advocated by the US was that the failure of a state to 
object to a reservation would result in the legal equivalent of an acceptance,52 known 
as ‘tacit acceptance’.   
The US also rejected the Secretary-General’s view that he only benefit 
received by a state party to an agreement involving non-reciprocal obligations was 
the assurance that all other state parties would owe identical obligations. American 
observers considered that the merit in joining an international treaty was to support 
the principles found in the agreement and that thiscould be best achieved by 
maximum participation, not uniformity of obligation, as if mutual agreement on all 
                                                
49 US Statement to the ICJ, p. 32. 
50 Ibid., pp. 33-34.  
51 Ibid., p. 46. 
52 Ibid., p. 45. 
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terms would surely reduce the number of parties.53 The struggle to gain domestic 
support for international conventions was one of the key drivers behind the US 
reservation practice as rarely could its legislature obtain absolute agreement due to 
the strength of individual constituencies.    
 The US statement, unlike the OAS, drew largely on the purpose of the 
Genocide Convention to counter the existing UN reservations practice advocating 
instead that ‘[f]rom the terms, nature, history and purpose of the Genocide 
Convention, it follows that States entitled to ratify or accede may do so subject to 
reservations even if these are objected to by one or m re other parties to the 
Convention’54. The US relied heavily, as it continues to do today, on the intention of 
the parties and on the specific facts surrounding the history of the Genocide 
Convention, including the order of ratifications. It is important to note that due to the 
timing of ratifications, including those by the Philippines and Bulgaria which 
included reservations, it was ultimately not necessary for the Secretary-General to 
access the potential problem of the date of entry io force that could have resulted if 
the two reservation-laden instruments of ratification had been met by objections, 
which would have resulted in dropping the number of twenty mandatory ratifications 
to eighteen. Under the then-existing Secretary-General practice, the Genocide 
Convention would have not entered into force and it was this potential dilemma that 
instigated the advisory opinion request via the UN General Assembly.55   
 The main opposition to a compromise approach was th t it effectively set up 
a system of establishing a series of bi-, tri- and quadrilateral agreements that were 
broadly similar, therefore promoting an entirely different concept than a single 
multilateral agreement.56 The United Kingdom also argued that the Pan-American 
system could not be applied to the Genocide Convention retrospectively as it was an 
approach that had been agreed specially within the context of the OAS; thus, in the 
absence of a special agreement on reservations by the UN Member States there was 
no general principle of international law that would allow application of such a 
                                                
53 ‘Note: The Effect of Objections to Treaty Reservations’, 731-32; Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to 
Multilateral Conventions’, 10-11. 
54 US Statement to the ICJ, p. 25.  
55 For a discussion of this potential problem see US Statement to the ICJ, pp. 26-27. See also Swaine, 
‘Reserving’, 312-13. 
56 UK Statement to the ICJ, pp. 60-61. 
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system to the Genocide Convention.57 To further illustrate why the Pan-American 
system could not logically apply to the Genocide Convention, the United Kingdom 
reasoned that a party to the Convention assumes an obligation to prevent and punish 
all acts of genocide regardless of the nationality of the victims. Therefore, it would 
be unconscionable to think that a state would use the lack of membership in the 
Genocide Convention as a reason to deny jurisdiction over crimes addressed by the 
Convention but committed against the nationals of anon-member state. The point of 
the Convention is that the enumerated obligations ‘are of a general, self-existent, and 
non-contractual character, and do not consist of something that has to be done 
specifically towards another country. If assumed at all, they are assumed for all and 
towards all, by mere act of becoming a party.’58 
 
1.2 SUMMARY  
The primary approaches informing the ICJ as they contemplated reservations to the 
Genocide Convention provided a deep well of information not only on the division of 
states with respect to reservations but also on states views toward international law 
generally. In addition to the extreme ends and the Pan-American compromise rules 
there were also a number of states which argued that it was impossible to apply one 
rule to all multilateral conventions. These states argued that there should be different 
rules applicable to different types of conventions.59 These views hinted at the future 
divisions that would influence debates about both rese vations practice and the 
implications of general international law long after the ICJ delivered its opinion. 
 
2 THE ICJ GENOCIDE ADVISORY OPINION 
The invitation to the ICJ for an advisory opinion left the Court to navigate between 
the two extremes of the unanimity rule and unbridled exercise of state sovereignty 
through reservations. The request was couched in the fact that there was no 
reservations provision in the Genocide Convention nor was there otherwise 
universally accepted international guidance on the issue. The advisory opinion was 
                                                
57 Ibid., p. 62. 
58 Ibid., p. 65.  
59 H. Waldock, First report on the law of treaties, Appendix, UN Doc. A/CN.4/144 (1962), reprinted 
in ILC Yearbook, Vol II, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962/Add.1 (1962) (1962 Report on the Law of 
Treaties), p. 77.  
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meant to be limited to the scope of reservations to the Genocide Convention60  
pursuant to the request made of the Sixth Committee to the UNGA and several 
states61 thought that the advisory opinion would ideally reflect only the practice 
specific to that convention.   
 Recognising the rarity of objections to reservations in practice at the time,62 
the Court felt that none of the submitted views on reservations could provide 
definitive proof of an international customary rule. In fact, the views generally 
tended to represent administrative practices rather than legal interpretations and the 
Court noted that when the Sixth Committee debated reservations to multilateral 
conventions there was also a ‘profound divergence of views’ ranging from absolute 
integrity of a treaty to an extremely flexible approach which would maximise 
participation.63 A flexible approach was favoured to address the precise questions 
asked regarding the Genocide Convention,64 a treaty that was both normative and 
humanitarian and unlike any that had come before it. Because no settled practice 
could be extracted from the various debates and views xamined, the Court, by a 
slim seven to five majority,65 chose to forge a new principle of law and ultimately 
answered the first question posed in the affirmative with the caveat that the answer 
would vary depending upon the particular circumstances of each individual case.66 
Reservations would be subject to the objections of other state parties but an objection 
would not necessarily defeat the reserving state’s tr aty party status, which departed 
from the Secretary-General’s unanimity rule and reflected the OAS approach. Thus, 
in the particular case of the Genocide Convention,  
 
…a State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been 
objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by 
                                                
60 Fenwick, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’, 147.  
61 e.g., see US Statement to the ICJ, p. 31. 
62 Genocide Opinion, p. 25. 
63 Ibid., p. 26; For a historical summary of the debate about integrity versus universality see Redgwell 
‘Universality or Integrity?, 246-49; Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventions’ (1953) 2 
ICLQ 1, 8. 
64 R. Higgins, ‘Introduction’ in J.P. Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s 
Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections to Human Rights Conventions (BIICL, London 1997), 
p. xix.  
65 The majority opinion was supported by Judges Basdevant, Winiarski, Zoričić, de Visscher, 
Klaestad, Badawi and Pasha. There were dissenting opinions by Judges Guerrero, McNair, Read, Mo 
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others, can be regarded as being a party to the Convention if the 
reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention; otherwise, that State cannot be regarded as being a party to 
the Convention.67 
 
 The introduction of the ‘object and purpose’ test was the ground-breaking 
aspect of the Genocide Opinion. The test created a system of tiered rights which ad 
previously not existed by allowing states to choose among the rights enumerated by 
the treaty and only prohibiting those reservations that violated the object and purpose 
of the treaty. The glaring problem is that the determination as to whether the 
reservation overcomes the object and purpose test is left to each state to decide. This 
highly flexibly criterion for compatibility drew criticism across a wide-range of 
states in the Sixth Committee.68  
 In light of the assumption that a state should generally aim to preserve the 
essential object of the treaty,69 the Court presumed a reserving state would not 
intentionally make a reservation that was incompatible with the object and purpose 
test and if it did, then it would be assumed that the state failed to recognise the 
incompatibility.  Otherwise, as noted by the Court, the ‘Convention itself would be 
impaired’.70 The Court’s reasoning took into account the special ch racteristics of the 
Genocide Convention as a universally applicable convention that was of a mainly 
humanitarian and civilizing purpose without individual advantages or disadvantages 
for the contracting parties, as well as the fact that the crime and punishment of 
genocide was recognised by most nations even without a convention indicating such. 
The Court reiterated that the reservations practice it advanced was limited to 
conventions with a humanitarian subject-matter and that states could exercise their 
sovereign rights as long as the object and purpose of the convention was not 
contravened. 
 As it answered the remaining questions, the Court’s analysis was grounded in 
the particular circumstances of the Genocide Convention. Borrowing from the Pan-
American practice, the answer to question II–regarding the effect of the relationship 
between a reserving state and the other treaty parties–introduced into the mainstream 
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the legal oddity that if a reservation was objected to on grounds of incompatibility 
with the object and purpose test then the objecting state did not need to regard the 
reserving state as a party to the Convention though, simultaneously, any state 
accepting the reservation could consider the treaty in force between the two.  
 The Court’s hybrid approach has been attributed to the potential ‘accounting 
problem’ that arose as to at what point the Genocide Convention would enter into 
force since there were states that had ratified with reservations to which there had 
been objections.71 As mentioned above, at the time of the advisory request 
reservations still needed the assent of every state that had previously ratified the 
Genocide Opinion thus clarifying the status of the reserving state in the event of an 
objection was necessary in order to determine whether the requisite number of valid 
ratifications had been reached in order for the treaty to enter into force. This 
mathematical certainty could not be achieved if the treaty was in force between some 
states and not among others. Without reciprocal obligations to be enforced among the 
parties, many states were unconcerned about reservations made to the automatic 
interstate dispute resolution procedure, which represented the bulk of the reservations 
in question, as it was unforeseeable that obligations owed to third parties would give 
rise to an interstate dispute. 
 The major flaw in the Court’s decision was that it fa led to elucidate that the 
relationship between the states was not the object of the Genocide Convention, thus 
the legal conundrum resulting from its answer to question II in reality lay not in the 
relationship between the states but in the status of the reservation once a state made 
an objection based on incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. The 
effect of this particular point of the opinion will be discussed in the following 
chapters. The Court offered only the dispute settlement procedures arising under the 
Genocide Convention as a remedy in the event that there were different views among 
states as to the compatibility of a reservation. This is an interesting point in that it 
was precisely the issue of reservations to the dispute resolution procedure, as 
previously mentioned, that spurred the opinion in the first place. In practice it would 
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be the beneficiaries—the individuals in the states’ jurisdictions—of the obligations 
established under the Genocide Convention that would be the most affected by a 
reservation. For the purposes of this thesis, it is unnecessary to consider the 
implications of the third question asked of the Court. 
 
2.1 DISSENTING OPINIONS 
The joint dissenting judges (Guerrero, McNair, Read an  Hsu Mo) contended that 
there was a firmly established rule embodied in andillustrated by the Secretary-
General’s practice in that all parties must consent in order for a proposed reservation 
to become effective and only then would the reserving state become a party to a 
convention. Alternatively, they argued that states in the process of negotiating a 
multilateral treaty should include an express provisi n on reservations, as illustrated 
by the Pan-American states. Both the Court’s majority opinion and the dissenting 
opinion noted that an express provision inserted into a treaty would best serve the 
situation of reservations pursuant to the particular intention of convention drafters. 
However, as the Genocide Convention had no such provision the dissenting opinion 
noted with concern the potential for wider, unintend d effects that might result from 
the opinion72 despite the Court’s constant reiteration that it was limited to that 
particular convention.  
 Relying heavily on the Secretary-General’s comments accompanying the 
draft of the Genocide Convention, the dissenting opini n noted that there was no 
proposition related to reservations in the original draft as it was considered that 
reservations of a general scope would not be in line with a convention that dealt with 
the maintenance of international order as opposed to a convention dealing with 
private interests.73 The notes had further provided that if the members of the UNGA 
ultimately wanted to provide a framework for reservations during the course of 
negotiations then they would do so. During the subsequent ad hoc sub-committee 
review of the draft it was determined that there was ‘no need for any reservations’.74 
The sub-committee clearly paid no deference to the opinions voiced by a minority of 
states. 
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 The joint dissenting opinion highlighted that there was nothing to indicate 
that the negotiating states had contemplated a compatibility test based on the object 
and purpose of the Convention. It is on this point that the dissenting judges warned 
of the many problems which were to arise as a result of the assessment of 
reservations as espoused by the majority. Effectively, the majority created two 
classes of human rights and left it up to each indiv dual state to determine which 
rights fell into the major or minor category. The minority challenged this use of the 
object and purpose test as 
 
…a new rule for which [they] could find no legal basis. [They could] 
discover no trace of any authority in any decision of [the ICJ] or of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice or any other international 
tribunal, or in any text-book, in support of the existence of such a 
distinction between the provisions of a treaty for the purpose of making 
reservations, or of a power being conferred upon a State to make such a 
distinction and base a reservation upon it. Nor [could they] find any 
evidence, in the law and practice of the United Nations, of any such 
distinction or power.75 
 
 The minority opinion further argued that had the intention of the parties been 
to allow reservations under the ‘compatibility’ crite ion then they would have 
included such a clause within the text of the Convention as it was clear from the 
UNGA records that the issue had been discussed on several occasions. The minority 
grounded its main opposition in the fact that there was no evidence to support the 
contention that the negotiating governments intended for 
 
…any State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to [the Convention] 
would be at liberty to divide its provisions into those which do, and 
those which do not, form part of ‘the object and purpose of the 
Convention’ and to make reservations against any of the latter, which 
would thereupon take effect without the consent of the other parties.76 
 
Foreshadowing the problem that continues to plague the reservations regime 
today, especially in the context of human rights treaties, the minority opinion noted 
that the new ‘object and purpose’ test was so difficult to apply that it was  
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…inconceivable that the General Assembly could have passed the 
matter over in silence and assumed that all the contracting States were 
fully aware of the existence of such a test in inter ational law and 
practice and were capable of applying it correctly and effectively.77  
 
The primary reasons given for why the majority’s new rule would not work were 
because it was not easy to apply nor would it result in easily calculable or consistent 
results because it was not necessarily straightforward as to precisely which articles 
constituted the ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention. The minority also alluded to 
what it perceived as great difficulty in limiting the new object and purpose rule to the 
Genocide Convention as it deemed it a difficult task to establish it as unique among 
other potential humanitarian conventions that might be negotiated under the United 
Nations and that, consequently, the majority opinion would only serve to encourage 
reservations in the future.78 It was viewed that the new rule would prevent any type 
of certainty as to the status of a reserving state and/or its reservation due to the fact 
that it allowed individual states to draw their own conclusions. The opinion also 
pointed out that this type of subjective determination, both on the part of a reserving 
state and other state parties, did not support any determination at law as to when a 
reserving state would or would not be considered a party.79 Thus, a circle of 
normative inconsistency would continue with some states viewing the reserving state 
as a party while others viewed the state as a non-party.   
In response to questions about treaty relations between states in the event of a 
reservation that was determined not incompatible but to which there remained an 
objection the minority reasoned that multilateral tea y membership should not be a 
private affair between pairs of states. The minority also concluded–correctly as time 
would tell–that there would likely be little probability that states would resort to the 
Article IX facility for judicial resolution as to the compatibility of a reservation.80 
The opinion also duly noted the tendency of the time for all international activities to 
focus on the promotion of the common welfare of theinternational community, 
however, it maintained that this did not equate to ‘universality at any price’ but rather 
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‘acceptance of common obligations–keeping in step with like-minded States–in order 
to attain a high objective for all humanity, that [was] of paramount importance’81.   
 An additional, separate dissenting opinion was filed by Judge Alvarez 
focusing on the type of treaty the Genocide Convention could be characterised as, 
which, in his eyes, was a convention establishing new international law and, also, a 
convention intended to regulate social or humanitarian matters embodying the ‘new 
orientation of the legal conscience of the nations.’82 His dissent recognised that these 
types of conventions were of general interest, rather t an private, and imposed 
obligations on states without granting them any rights, unlike traditional reciprocal 
obligation treaties. A point reiterated often in the reservations debate as will be 
revealed throughout this thesis.  
Though Alvarez perhaps overstated the potential of the UNGA to serve as an 
international legislative body, the premise of his argument was that multilateral 
treaties as negotiated and adopted on the UNGA floor were akin ‘to ships which 
leave the yards in which they have been built, and sail away independently, no longer 
attached to the dockyard’83 and this is why it did not matter what the preparatory 
work surrounding the reservations issue had been. The key was that the finalised 
document failed to include a facility for making reservations thus regardless of the 
positions for or against, the treaty as it stood did not accommodate reservations. He 
also disagreed with any parallels being drawn betwen international law of the 
particular nature under discussion and domestic contract law. He took the view that 
conventions of the following types should not allow reservations unless they 
provided strict guidance on their admissibility and legal effect: treaties which 
establish organisations, treaties which determine boundaries, treaties which establish 
new international law and treaties which regulate social or humanitarian matters. 
However, Alvarez also felt that allowing reservations, even under restricted rules, 
would cause a treaty such as the Genocide Convention to lose its status as a 
fundamental convention of international law.84 
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2.2 SUMMARY  
The legacy of the Genocide Opinion is the introduction of the ‘object and purpose’ 
test as a method of evaluating reservations to multilateral treaties. The failure of the 
opinion to address the legal status of a reservation once it is determined incompatible 
under the test created a lacuna in the law surrounding reservations. Despite expressly 
limiting its opinion to reservations to the Genocide Convention the ICJ set an 
arbitrary judicial standard for the evaluation of reservations to treaties that has been 
applied to all multilateral treaties as a default mechanism as a result of the rule’s 
subsequent adoption as part of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 
3 INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION DEVELOPS THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
In the very same resolution initiating the request for an advisory opinion by ICJ in 
1950, the UNGA also invited the International Law Commission (ILC) to ‘study the 
question of reservations to multilateral conventions both from the point of view of 
codification and from that of the progressive development of international law.’85 
The Law of Treaties had been chosen as one of threeopics for study with a view 
toward codification at the first meeting of the ILC which was held from 12 April – 9 
June 1949.86 Having been tasked previously with examination of international law, 
the inclusion of reservations followed naturally and, as the reservations to the 
Genocide Convention illuminated, there was no settled international practice thus the 
area was ripe for consideration in the progressive development of international law.87 
During the initial development of the International Bill of Human Rights,88 it 
was noted that by making human rights international the UN Charter had imposed 
upon member states positive obligations.89 These positive obligations would 
eventually be codified in the various human rights treaties concluded throughout the 
following sixty years. As introduced by the situation surrounding the Genocide 
Convention, reservations would continue to be a pivotal issue in the context of norm-
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developing multilateral treaties. The value of normative treaties would be shaped 
definitively by the creation of a concrete international rule of law for evaluating and 
interpreting reservations.   
Professor James L. Brierly, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 
and Sir Humphrey Waldock were the successive Special Rapporteurs appointed to 
study not only the Law of Treaties but, more importantly for focus of this research, 
the specific question of reservations. It should be pointed out that membership on the 
ILC is voluntary and entirely unremunerated with the exception of costs. Thus, 
though there are continuous reports covering the Law of Treaties and reservations 
within that remit, the nature of the Commission does not lend itself to continuous 
attention to a subject-matter. Each change in Special Rapporteur brought with it 
slight differences in attitude toward reservations. Their personal views, as well as 
those of the sitting ILC throughout the process, are evident throughout the successive 
reports filed on the topic leading up to the adoption of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. Despite knowing the final product of their years of study, the 
following examines the approaches of the successive rapporteurs and their influence 
on the Vienna Convention reservations regime.   
Following the 1950 UNGA request, the ILC commenced its systematic 
review of the practice surrounding reservations to multilateral treaties under the 
supervision of the initial Special Rapporteur, Brierly, who was appointed during the 
first session of the ILC.90 As noted above, the special topic of reservations within the 
overall umbrella of the law of treaties was recognised prior to the request for a 
specific review by the UNGA. The ILC’s study was limited to multilateral treaties 
and to those reservations made at the time of signature, ratification or accession. In 
his first report, Brierly was careful to note that his findings on reservations were 
tentative pending the final outcome of the ICJ advisory opinion.91 The preliminary 
report found an unhelpful ‘lack of unanimity’92 among treaty law observers and 
writers. State practice was also unsettled on the matter and it was noted that the 
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existing UN and Pan-American practices were both of recent growth in light of the 
fact that multilateral conventions were a relatively new phenomenon having only 
appeared in the latter part of the nineteenth century.  
Brierly contended that the ILC’s ultimate challenge in developing a rule of 
general applicability was reconciling the two main principles overshadowing the 
debate which were the desirability of maintaining the integrity of the convention and 
the desirability of the widest possible application.93 He also noted that ‘[n]o single 
rule on the subject of reservations [could] be satisf ctory in all cases because treaties 
are too diversified in character.’94 Brierly reported that the very nature of some 
treaties, such as the UN Charter, would not accommodate reservations at all because 
states must become parties on an equal and unqualified basis while conventions 
establishing ‘detailed regulations of a technical or humanitarian character’ might 
allow very narrowly limited reservations.95 Thus the Commission report provided 
model reservation clauses and also suggested that it provide ‘guidance as to the 
practice which should be followed…when the text of a treaty is silent on the subject’ 
as appropriate in light of the ICJ’s impending opinion.96   
After considering the initial ILC report on reservations together with 
Genocide Opinion, the UNGA requested that for future conventions the UN 
Secretary-General should ‘continue to act as depositary in connexion with the deposit 
of documents containing reservations or objections, without passing upon the legal 
effect of such documents’ and then to communicate the documents to concerned 
states leaving each of them ‘to draw legal consequences’ about the reservations, thus 
departing from the ILC’s suggestion to retain the UN Secretary-General’s former 
practice with minor modifications. 97 In light of this move by the UNGA, the ILC 
appears to have grabbed the opportunity to be proactive in its review of reservations 
and its subsequent reports indicated a greater depth of review of the topic. 
The ILC’s remit from the UNGA had asked for its opinion ‘both from the 
point of view of codification and from that of the progressive development of 
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international law’ thus, unlike the ICJ, it was not strictly limited to review of 
reservations to the Genocide Convention and the Commission therefore felt ‘at 
liberty to suggest the practice which it consider[ed] the most convenient for States to 
adopt for the future.’98 In its 1951 report to the UNGA following the delivery of the 
Genocide Opinion, the ILC indicated the difficulty in applying the subjective ‘object 
and purpose test’ created by the majority in the Genocide Opinion and determined 
that is was not suitable to apply generally to multilateral conventions due largely to 
the fact that it was ‘reasonable to assume that…parties egard the provisions of a 
convention as an integral whole, and that a reservation to any of them may be 
deemed to impair its object and purpose.’99 The intrinsically subjective nature of 
drawing such distinctions between provisions of a convention seemed, in 1951, an 
insurmountable obstacle to the application of the object and purpose test to the 
Commission with Brierly at the helm of its investigation into reservations.   
In the early days of the study the ILC proposed that negotiating states should 
include in the text of a treaty the following information: 
 
(a) How and when reservations may be tendered; 
(b) Notifications to be made by the depositary as regards reservations 
and objections thereto; 
(c) Categories of States entitled to object to reservations, and the 
manner in which their consent thereto may be given; 
(d) Time limits within which objections are to be made; 
(e) Effect of the maintenance of an objection on the participation in the 
convention of the reserving State.100 
 
There was a clear desire to put the onus of providing a detailed, treaty-specific 
reservation regime on the negotiating states. Notably absent from the list above was a 
facility for evaluating the compatibility of reservations. This omission reflects the 
inexperience of the international legal community with reservations. 
Lauterpacht succeeded Brierly in 1952 with the G nocide Opinion still fresh 
on the mind of the international community. Lauterpachts’s primary draft for a 
general reservations rule prohibited all reservations except those agreed to by all 
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parties to the treaty.101 This rule reflected the preference for integrity of a convention 
and encapsulated what Lauterpacht viewed as existing law in light of the Secretary-
General’s practice. However, recognising the ILC’s role in progressing international 
law he included alternative draft rules that offered a solution somewhere between the 
unanimity rule practiced by the Secretary-General and the absolute sovereignty 
principle advocated by many states. His draft rules provided greater safeguards 
against the misuse of power by states in formulating reservations. These safeguards 
were evident in the Pan-American rule and each of Lauterpacht’s alternative draft 
proposed a tacit acceptance rule whereby a state would be deemed to have accepted 
the reservation if it had not objected within three months.102 
Following Lauterpacht’s election to the ICJ, the Special Rapporteur mantle 
was taken up by Fitzmaurice in 1955. Unable to finde tirely common ground across 
the work already completed by his predecessors on the general topic of the Law of 
Treaties, he reviewed the same materials on reservations that had been utilised before 
to develop his own thoughts on the issue.  He specifically indicated that the previous 
work had been far too general in nature and would not suffice to handle situations 
that tended to arise in practice.103 Fitzmaurice had previous experience addressing 
the reservations issue as the agent for the United Kingdom who submitted its written 
statement to the ICJ on legal issues surrounding reservations to the Genocide 
Convention. The United Kingdom’s position was reflected in his initial report which 
indicated that as a fundamental rule, reservations should only be allowed if tacitly or 
expressly accepted by all interested states and under o circumstances should 
reservations pertaining to dispute resolution procedur s be allowed.104 Fitzmaurice 
also promoted the idea of ‘acquiescence sub silentio’, which equated to tacit 
acceptance in the absence of an objection within three months of circulating a 
reservation.105 Under his draft articles on reservations an objection would prevent the 
reserving state from becoming a party to the convention unless the reservation was 
withdrawn, thus though the time within which a non-reserving state could object was 
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shortened an objection had far greater effect. Fitzmaurice advocated the use of the 
ICJ or another named international tribunal as a mens of settling differences on the 
permissibility of reservations and his draft articles prohibited all reservations to 
dispute settlement procedures.106 
A key to determining the derivative value of a resevation is establishing 
what type of treaty is being subjected to the reservation. Of the Special Rapporteurs, 
Fitzmaurice was by far the most concerned with the idea of classifying treaties 
according to their form, subject matter or object as well as whether they were law-
making or normative,107 though his preoccupation seems to have stemmed from his 
micro-analysis of the legality of the object of a treaty. As noted by Fitzmaurice in his 
third report on the law of treaties there are three diff rent types of treaties: (1) treaties 
made up of reciprocal obligation ‘with rights and obligations for each [state] 
involving specific treatment at the hands of and towards each of the others [states] 
individually’108 (reciprocal treaties); (2) treaties made of interdependent obligations 
which were non-reciprocal ‘where a fundamental breach of one of the obligations of 
the treaty by one party will justify a corresponding on-performance generally by the 
other parties’109 (interdependent treaties); and (3) treaties whose entire schedule of 
obligations are integral to the agreement and non-recip ocal ‘where the force of the 
obligation is self-existent, absolute and inherent for each party, and not dependent on 
a corresponding performance by the others’110 (integral obligation treaties). Each of 
these was further dependent on considerations of the subject matter or object and 
whether they were law-making or normative. Human rights treaties today tend to be 
characterised as ‘collective interest’ treaties, which would fall into the final ‘integral 
obligation’ category outlined by Fitzmaurice. 
 Under Fitzmaurice the ILC also began to move away from the idea of a 
binding law on treaties as the end product of the years of study dedicated to the 
subject preferring instead ‘a code of a general character’111 which would embody 
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extremely detailed rules addressing every eventuality pertaining to the Law of 
Treaties. Other changes during Fitzmaurice’s tenure as Special Rapporteur included a 
reversion to the more liberal Pan-American rule with respect to the juridical effects 
of ratifications subject to reservations and the affirmation of reservations as acts 
inherent to state sovereignty,112 however, the Commission later changed its mind 
under Waldock and in 1962 reported that the Pan-American rule would not be 
suitable for application to multilateral conventions generally113. 
In 1961 Waldock was appointed the fourth (and what would be final) Special 
Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties following Fitzmaurice’s election to the ICJ. 
Concurrent with the appointment of Waldock, the ILC departed from the previously 
held idea that the Law of Treaties study would culminate in merely an expository 
statement on the law surrounding treaties and instead began to envisage that its 
efforts would serve as the basis for a multilateral convention.114 As Waldock 
immediately noted in his first report, the topic ofreservations was ‘of special 
complexity and difficulty’ as evidenced by the preoccupation of the ICJ, the ILC, the 
UNGA and the OAS with the topic for the previous eleven years. He also noted that 
despite limiting its opinion to the specifics of the Genocide Convention, the ICJ had 
expressed its general attitude on several issues surrounding reservations in its 
Genocide Opinion and these should be duly considered in the Commission’  work; 
the general points relevant for the present purposes were: 
 
(a) In its treaty relations a State cannot be bound withou  its consent 
and consequently no reservation can be effective against any State 
without its agreement thereto. 
(b) The traditional concept, that no reservation is valid unless it has 
been accepted by all the contracting parties without exception, as 
would have been required if it had been stated during the 
negotiations, is of undisputed value. 
(c) Nevertheless, extensive participation in conventions f the type of 
the Genocide Convention has already given rise to greater flexibility 
in the international practice concerning multilaterl conventions, as 
manifested by the more general resort to reservations, the very great 
allowance made for tacit assent to reservations and the existence of 
practices which, despite the fact that a reservation has been rejected 
                                                
112 ILC Yearbook, vol. I, UN Doc. A/CN.4/124 (1959), p. 116, para. 49. 
113 Waldock, 1962 Report on the Law of Treaties, p. 75.  
114 Ibid., pp. 29-30.  
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by certain States, go so far as to admit the reserving State as a party 
to the convention vis à vis those States which have accepted it. 
(d) In the present state of international practice it cannot be inferred 
from the mere absence of any article providing for reservations in a 
multilateral convention that the Contracting States are prohibited 
from making certain reservations. The character of a multilateral 
convention, its purposes, provisions, mode of preparation and 
adoption, are factors which must be considered in determining, in 
the absence of any express provision on the subject, the possibility 
of making reservations, as well as their validity and effect.   
(e) The principle of the integrity of the convention, which subjects the 
admissibility of a reservation to the express or tacit ssent of all the 
contracting parties, does not appear to have been transformed into a 
rule of law. The considerable part which tacit assent has always 
played in estimating the effect which is to be given to reservations 
scarcely permits it to be stated that such a rule exists; indeed, the 
examples of objections made to reservations appear to be too rare in 
international practice to have given rise to such a rule.115 
 
Using these general principles derived from the G nocide Opinion and the 
vast amount of views accumulated, Waldock quickly set about the task of finalising a 
draft convention on the Law of Treaties that would include default rules for the 
interpretation of reservations. The Law of Treaties study had been continually 
sidelined for the previous eleven years due to the urgency of other topics being 
considered by the ILC. However, in 1962 the first comprehensive draft convention 
was completed. Unfortunately for subsequently develop d human rights treaties, 
Waldock departed from Fitzmaurice’s concentration on the type of treaty except to 
the extent that the final document would address only multilateral treaties 
irrespective of whether they were made up of recipro al, interdependent or integral 
obligations and also without taking into account the subject matter or object or 
whether they were law-making or normative. 
 
3.1 SUMMARY  
The draft articles on reservations ultimately submitted to the UNGA in 1966 
addressed reservations in Articles 18 – 22, the complete text of which can be found 
in Annex I. In developing the rules guiding reservations, the ILC ultimately 
expanded the ICJ’s approach outlined in the Genocide Opinion by taking the Court’s 
                                                
115 Ibid., pp. 74-75.  
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tiered system under the object and purpose test and applying it to all multilateral 
treaties. Thus, the ILC rejected the idea that the subject-matter or type of treaty 
required different considerations and took the completely opposite view from its 
thoughts on the object and purpose test expressed a dec de before when it 
commenced its review of the law of treaties. The change in the views of the ILC that 
resulted in shifts in its approaches over the course of the study can be attributed to 
both the change of rapporteurs and also a change in state preferences.116 The 
Commission’s ultimate position specifically ignored the ICJ’s limitation of the 
Genocide Opinion to law-making treaties with a humanitarian subject-matter. The 
next section will introduce the residual reservations rules ultimately adopted as part 
of the new convention that would become the universal governor of the law of 
treaties. 
 
4 THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
The many years of research, analysis and debate within the ILC and UNGA 
culminated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties117 (Vienna 
Convention) and was followed by the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of 
States in Respect of Treaties118 and the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations119. Because the reservations 
regime as applied in the context of this research project deals with conventions 
between states, the analysis is limited to the 1969 Vienna Convention and will not 
address any particularities associated with the subsequent conventions. To be precise 
in defining the parameters of this project, the problems associated with reservations 
will rarely arise in the context of treaties embodying reciprocal obligations thus the 
treaties in which the gap in the reservation regime reveals itself are those types 
embodying non-reciprocal obligations which are typically social, law-making or 
institution building treaties where there are no rights or obligations owed between 
states. Non-reciprocal treaties often include the following subject-matter: 
environmental, human rights, organisational, etcetera, and generally fall into the 
                                                
116 Swaine, ‘Reserving’, 314; Redgwell ‘Universality or Integrity?, 253. 
117 1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969. 
118 1946 UNTS 3, 23 Aug. 1978. 
119 UN Doc. A/CONF.129/15, 21 Mar. 1986 (not yet in force). 
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‘integral obligation’ treaty as described by Fitzmaurice. As noted by the ILC in 
numerous reports leading to the development of the Vi nna Convention, its 
application is limited to multilateral treaties. Because bi-lateral treaty negotiations 
operate much like contract negotiations, the default regime of the Vienna Convention 
is not necessary, especially in the context of reservations as there is no question as to 
whether a reservation has been accepted or not becaus  a bi-lateral treaty will not be 
binding unless the other state party to the treaty accepts the reservation.   
 
4.1 THE VIENNA CONVENTION RESERVATIONS REGIME 
Vienna Convention Articles 19–23 constitute the modern approach to reservations 
under international law and are the rules that are the focus of this thesis in their 
application to reservations to human rights treaties. The term ‘modern’ is used 
because prior to the adoption of the Vienna Convention the rules of international law 
with respect to reservations were markedly different as discussed in the previous 
sections. It is also important to note that though the reservations rules are found in a 
treaty that does not have universal membership,120 the Vienna Convention is 
generally acknowledged as the codification of customary international law governing 
treaties.121 The Convention operates under the presumption that ‘a treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties and must be performed by them in good faith’ (Article 26). 
This presumption is based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda which is a general 
principle of international law.  
Reservations are generally not prohibited by the Vinna Convention—a state 
may seek to adjust certain provisions of a treaty in their application to itself. This is 
often a requirement of a domestic parliament or legis ature.122 If a treaty does not 
specifically address reservations then the fall-back rules are the Vienna Convention 
articles. Most pertinent to this study are the following articles, but the complete text 
of the reservations regime can be found in Annex II: 
 
                                                
120 As of Jul. 2011 there were 111 States Parties with Libya being the most recent to accede on 22 
Dec. 2008, see UN Treaty Collection at http://.treaties.un.org. 
121 W.A. Schabas, ‘Time for Innovation and Reform’, 46. 
122 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2d ed. (CUP, Cambridge 2007), pp. 133-34; Swaine, 
‘Reserving’, 312; O. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treati s Make a Difference?’ (2002) 111 Yale 
Law Journal 1935, 1952. 
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Article 19 – Formulation of reservations 
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding 
to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:  
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty; 
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do 
not include the reservation in question, may be made; or 
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the 
reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty. 
  
Article 20 – Acceptance of and objection to reservations 
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any 
subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty 
so provides. 
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States 
and the object and purpose of a treaty that the applic tion of the treaty 
in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the 
consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires 
acceptance by all the parties. 
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international 
organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the 
acceptance of the competent organ of that organization. 
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the 
treaty otherwise provides: 
(a) acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation 
constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to 
that other State if or when the treaty is in force for those States; 
(b) an objection by another contracting State to a reservation 
does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between 
the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is 
definitely expressed by the objecting State; 
(c) an act expressing a State’s consent to be bound by the treaty 
and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one 
other contracting State has accepted the reservation. 
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty 
otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted 
by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the 
end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation 
or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the 
treaty, whichever is later. 
 
Article 21 – Legal effects of reservations and of objections to 
reservations 
1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance 
with articles 19, 20 and 23: 
(a) modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other 
party the provisions of the treaty to which the rese vation relates 
to the extent of the reservation; and 
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(b) modifies those provisions to the same extent for that other 
party in its relations with the reserving State.  
2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the 
other parties to the treaty inter se.  
3. When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into 
force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions 
to which the reservation relates do not apply as betwe n the two States 
to the extent of the reservation. 
 
As can be seen from the text of the reservations rules, the Vienna Convention 
is indifferent to particular subdivisions of international law and creates a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach for addressing reservations. It specifically ‘attempts to enunciate 
principles of treaty law that are applicable to all types of treaty…and is concerned 
primarily with the instrument in which the obligation is expressed, rather than with 
the content of those obligations.’123 This thesis is specifically concerned with the 
following aspects of these reservation articles as it is the situation which results once 
they have been applied that facilitates the lacuna in the law that bears upon the 
ultimate answer as to whether the Vienna Convention rules adequately govern 
reservations to human rights treaties. Article 19 outlines that a state may generally 
formulate a reservation when the reservation is not pr hibited by the treaty and is 
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. Reflecting on the observations 
of Ruda,124 Redgwell points out that Article 19 is a restraint upon state action 
because a reservation that is incompatible cannot be made.125 In practice, however, 
this view has been less clear-cut than Redgwell observe .  
Acceptance of and objection to reservations are govrned by Article 20 which  
provides that an objection does not preclude entry i o force of the treaty between the 
objecting and reserving states unless expressly indicated by the objecting state 
(Article 20(4)(b)). Article 20(5) further notes that unless the treaty provides an 
alternative, all reservations will be deemed accepted if there are no objections at the 
end of twelve months thus incorporating the tacit aceptance rule. Article 21 governs 
the legal effect of reservations and provides that a reservation will modify the 
                                                
123 M. Craven, ‘Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International 
Law’ (2000) 11 EJIL 489, 494. 
124 J.M. Ruda, ‘Reservations to Treaties’ (1975-III) 97 Recueil d s cours 146. 
125 C. Redgwell, ‘The Law or Reservations in Respect of Multilateral Conventions’ in J.P. Gardner 
(ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections 
to Human Rights Conventions (BIICL, London 1997), p. 8; see also Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights 
Treaties Make a Difference?’, 1952 et seq. 
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relations between the reserving state and the state par ies accepting the reservation to 
the extent of the reservation and that the provision affected by the reservation will 
not apply between the reserving state and any objecting state not opposing entry into 
force of the treaty between the two, reflecting the Pan-American approach.   
The reservation articles adopted as part of the Vienna Convention made a few 
minor grammatical changes to several paragraphs and two important changes to the 
text that was proffered by the ILC.126 Article 20(4)(b) and Article 21(3) each 
reversed the presumption of admissibility of a resevation by placing the onus on the 
non-reserving states to formulate an objection in order to prevent a state that has 
formulated an impermissible reservation from becoming a party to the treaty and an 
incompatible reservation from being accepted. The draft text of Article 20(4)(b) 
(draft Article 17(4)(b)) proposed that ‘[a]n objection by another contracting State to a 
reservation precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the obj cting and 
the reserving States unless a contrary intention is expressed by the objecting State’ 
(emphasis added). The adopted text corresponding to this draft phrase inserted ‘does 
not preclude’ in place of the draft version using ‘precludes’. Therefore, a treaty will 
automatically enter into effect between reserving ad objecting states unless the 
objecting state specifically indicates the opposite.127 Similarly, the wording proposed 
by draft text of Article 21(3) (draft Article 19(3)) read ‘[w]hen a State objecting to a 
reservation agrees to consider the treaty in force between itself and the reserving 
state, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two 
States to the extent of the reservation,’ however, th  adopted text replaced ‘agrees to 
consider the treaty in force’ with ‘has not opposed the entry into force’. Both changes 
reflect the increasingly liberal view of the growing UNGA128 which diverged from 
the more conservative ILC though it, too, had radiclly changed its reservations 
stance over the course of its sixteen year review. This point as to whether a treaty is 
in force between two states and the ease with which a reserving state can become a 
treaty party is not particularly revolutionary, yet the impact of the reversed 
                                                
126 See Annex I for the Revised Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.117 and 
Add.1, reprinted in ILC Yearbook, Vol. II, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 (1966). 
127 Discussed in Chapter 3. 
128 110 states were represented at the second session of the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties 
held in Vienna, 9 Apr.- 22 May 1969. See Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the 




presumption (in the context of non-reciprocal treaties with a human rights focus) and 
its facilitation of incompatible reservations are very significant and will be examined 
in the following chapters. 
The Vienna Convention rules outline the object and purpose test as an 
objective test that must be employed in order to ascertain the compatibility of a 
reservation with Article 19(c). No direct guidance on what entity is to apply the test 
is provided by the Vienna Convention rules. Articles 20 and 21 illustrate the options 
inter se for non-reserving states and the legal effects of a reservation on the basis of 
an acceptance or an objection by another state. The effects, however, are premised on 
the fallacy that only valid reservations will produce such an effect. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapters Three and Four, this falseas umption has resulted in an 
evolution in the rules that may not have been intended and created a normative gap in 
the law related to reservations. Bearing in mind that no guidance on the application 
of the test is provided, it is interesting to note that states have assumed the role of 
final arbiter in light of the concept of objections to valid reservations and thereby, 
almost unwittingly, validated the existence of invalid reservations as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter Three. 
 
4.2 TERMS OF ART 
As defined by the Vienna Convention, a ‘reservation’ s: 
 
[A] unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, 
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, 
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain 
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.129 
 
Seemingly straightforward, this definition encompasses two elements that are 
essential to the undertaking of this research. First, the unilateral nature of a 
                                                
129 The definition of a ‘reservation’ as defined in the 1969 Vienna Convention, Art. 2(1)(d) was 
reaffirmed by the ILC as part of text of the guidelines constituting the Guide to Practice on 
Reservations to Treaties,  guideline 1.1, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.779 (2011) (Finalized Guidelines). A  the 
Guide to Practice is meant to serve international organisations as well, the definition is expanded to 
include such. See Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, with commentari s as provisionally 
adopted by the ILC at its 62nd session (see UN Doc. A/65/10 (2010)) at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/62/GuidetoPracticeReservations_commentaries(e).pdf (Draft Guide 
to Practice and references to ‘draft guidelines’), commentary to 1.1. Guideline 1.1.2 of the Finalized 
Guidelines clarifies that a reservation may be formulated in conjunction with any method of 




reservation means, just as the term implies, that it is n relation only to the state 
formulating the reservation that obligations under a t eaty will be modified, subject 
to the rules of acceptance and objection, not the treaty as a whole. Treaty law130 and 
ICJ jurisprudence131 outline that states accepting the reservations will also benefit 
from the reservation in dealings between the reserving and accepting states 
commensurate with the traditional concept of reciprocity.132 This situation results 
from the nature of multipartite treaties and their numeration of reciprocal 
obligations and consequential analogy to contract law. Due to the unique 
circumstances of human rights treaties and the facttha  the very nature of 
multilateral, inter-state treaties does not afford non-states negotiating power, the 
beneficiaries of human rights treaty obligations are immediately put at a 
disadvantage because they cannot counter the state’s modification of obligations.  
 The second element is that the statement must be made in concert with a 
state’s consent to be bound to the treaty. Thus, the act of the state binding itself to the 
treaty occurs simultaneously with its reservation of obligations. The significance of 
this point will be discussed in later chapters. 
To clarify exactly which reservations perpetuate thproblem addressed by 
this research it is necessary to illustrate the key terms of reference to reservations in 
light of Vienna Convention articles for without understanding the nuances of the 
terminology, which are oftentimes admittedly limiting, a technical analysis of treaty 
law related to a very fine point of law would be rend red somewhat futile. During its 
eighteen year study on ‘Reservations to Treaties’ there were exhaustive discussions 
within the ILC over the use of terms regarding resevations. While accepting the 
original Vienna Convention definition of ‘reservation’ (discussed above) it was made 
clear in the commentary on draft guideline 1.6 that any statement meeting the 
definition, whether valid or invalid, permissible or impermissible, would still retain 
                                                
130 Vienna Convention, Art. 21(1)(b). See Annex II for complete txt. 
131 Norwegian Loans, 1957 ICJ Reports 9, 6 Jul. 1957, p. 27: ‘The Court considers that the Norwegian 
Government is entitled, by virtue of the condition of reciprocity, to invoke the reservation contained in 
the French Declaration of March 1st, 1949.’ 
132 See also Finalized Guidelines, guideline 4.2.4 which reflects the principle of reciprocal application 
of the effects of reservations. 
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the designation of ‘reservation’.133 This is important in that it is necessary for a 
statement to be designated a ‘reservation’ as a precondition for the application of the 
Vienna Convention reservations regime established by Articles 19-23 or a treaty 
specific reservations regime. The designation as a reservation has no preconceived 
notion of its validity, permissibility or compatibility. 
In its re-examination of the Vienna Convention resevations regime, the ILC 
revisited the use of ‘formulate’ and ‘make’ and ultimately left these terms to be 
assessed as they have been throughout the existence of th  Vienna Convention. 
Remaining true to the definition of reservation under Article 2(1)(d) but 
contemplating its examination under Article 19, a st te ‘formulates’ a reservation at 
the time of signature or instrument ratification and this term has no bearing upon 
whether it will be otherwise acceptable under the other reservations rules. The 
Vienna Convention rules are automatically engaged if a treaty is silent as to the 
ability to formulate reservations. Therefore, the designation as a reservation must 
occur before a decision can be taken as to ‘whether it is valid, that its legal scope can 
be evaluated and its effect can be determined’134 under Articles 19-23.  
A reservation is ‘established’ or ‘made’ for purposes of Vienna Convention 
Article 21, thus inducing a legal effect, if three conditions are met: (1) it must meet 
the conditions of formal validity as set out in Vienna Convention Article 23; (2) it 
must be permissible pursuant to Article 19; and (3) it must have been accepted by 
another Contracting State.135 Thus, ‘established’ or ‘made’ reservations are valid, 
permissible and accepted. A notable problem with esabli hed or made reservations 
is that condition number two requires a definitive answer and condition three can be 
satisfied by silence. Thus from the outset of the rese vation question there are 
shortcomings with the ILC terminology.   
Once a statement has been identified as a reservation, the next step toward its 
establishment is to then determine whether the reservation is ‘valid’. There was 
                                                
133 A. Pellet, Tenth report on reservations to treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/558 (2005) (Tenth report on 
reservations), p.2, para. 3; see also J. Rainne, ‘Elements of Nordic Practice 2004: The Nordic 
Countries in Co-ordination’ (2006) 75 Nordic Journal of International Law 121, 134.  
134 Draft Guide to Practice, guideline 1.6, commentary, para. 4. See previous reports: Pellet, Tenth 
report on reservations, p.2, para. 3, recalling his observations in ILC Yearbook 1999, vol. II (Part 
Two), pp. 133-34, para. 3 of the commentary; ILC Yearbook 1998, vol. II (Part Two), para. 3 of the 
Third Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/491/Add.3 (1998), paras. 158, 179.  
135 ILC Yearbook 2010, UN Doc. A/65/10 (2010), ch. IV, para. 48; see, also, Guide to Practice, 3.1, 
commentary para. 6, and 4.1. 
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debate within the ILC regarding the use of ‘impermissible’ or ‘permissible’ to 
characterise reservations examined under the Vienna Convention due to a concern 
that the term ‘impermissible’ could be interpreted as leading to the author state’s 
responsibility as contemplated by the draft articles on the state responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts.136 In 2005 the Special Rapporteur opted to use the 
terms ‘invalid’ or ‘valid’ in lieu of ‘impermissible’ or ‘permissible’ to discuss the 
viability of reservations formulated and examined un er the Vienna Convention rules 
and it is the perceived neutrality of ‘valid’ that carried through to the final Guide to 
Practice.137 Validity is the objective standard of assessment as to whether a 
formulated statement is in fact a reservation pursuant to the definition found in 
Vienna Convention Article 2(1)(d). Validity/invalidity/valid/invalid are the terms 
adopted by the ILC to:  
 
…describe the intellectual operation consisting in determining whether 
a unilateral statement made by a State … and purporting to exclude or 
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State … was capable of producing the effects 
attached in principle to the formulation of a reservation.138 
 
The Vienna Convention operates from a presumption that all formulated reservations 
are valid.139 Validity of a reservation depends on whether it satisfies the procedural 
conditions stipulated by Articles 21(1) and 23 and is generally a non-issue as these 
preconditions are overseen by treaty depositaries and not subject to the will of other 
states. For a reservation to be valid it must also be permissible under Article 19. 
The permissibility test includes evaluating the rese vation under 19 (a), (b) 
and (c) as applicable.140 This is the basis of the flexible Vienna Conventio 
reservations system.141 Most pertinent to the present research is the determination of 
                                                
136 ILC Yearbook 2002, UN Doc. A/57/10 (2002), p. 114, para. 7; Pellet, Tenth report on reservations, 
paras. 1-9; Draft Guide to Practice, guideline 1.6, commentary, para. 2 and guideline 2.1.8, 
commentary, para. 7. The terms ‘admissible’ and ‘inadmissible’ induced equal debate over the 
assumption of the engagement of state responsibility, see Pell t, T nth report on reservations, p. 3,-4, 
paras. 5, 7. 
137 Pellet, Tenth report on reservations, p. 4, para. 8; Draft Guide to Practice, guideline 1.6, 
commentary, para. 2. 
138 ILC Yearbook 2006, UN Doc. A/61/10 (2006), p. 324, para. (2) of the general introduction to Part 
3 of the Draft Guide to Practice. 
139 Draft Guide to Practice, 3.1, commentary para. 5. 
140 Ibid., 3.1.3 and commentary. 
141 Ibid., 3.1.3, commentary paras. 2, 3. 
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compatibility pursuant to Article 19(c). A reservation must be compatible with 
Article 19(c) in order to be permissible. This is true even if the reservation is 
permissible with respect to Articles 19(a) or (b). Thus, if a reservation is 
incompatible with 19(c), it will be impermissible and, arguably, without legal 
effect.142 
In the literature on reservations the terms admissible, permissible and valid 
have all been used to describe those reservations that are not prohibited by a 
convention (Article 19(a)) or are not out-with the subject-matter of those specifically 
permitted by a convention (Article 19(b)). Conversely, inadmissible, impermissible 
and invalid have each been used to designate reservations formulated when a 
convention specifically prohibits reservations full-stop or where the reservation is 
outside the scope of those that are allowed by the convention and are per se void. 
The reservations encompassed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 19 are not the 
focus of this research therefore it will not address potential validity issues of 
reservations formulated under these circumstances ev n though the clarity of these 
rules is open to discussion as noted by Pellet.143  
It is Article 19(c) where the legal impasse persists when there is a reservation 
to a non-reciprocal obligation that is deemed permissible by some states and 
impermissible by others as there is no definite conclusion as to whether it will create 
the intended legal effect nor will there be concrete consequences as to what happens 
to the reservation. Reservations that are compatible144 with the object and purpose 
test are permissible and therefore the terms admissible, permissible and valid have 
been used by various authors to describe these reservations. Those reservations that 
do not overcome the test are incompatible and therefore have been described as 
inadmissible, impermissible or invalid.  For the purposes of this research, the terms 
‘permissible/impermissible’ or ‘compatible’/‘incompatible’ will be used to the extent 
possible when discussing reservations formulated and examined under Article 19(c). 
Clearly there will be many references to other works published prior to the ILC’s 
                                                
142 This is a contested point. Not all observers are convinced by the automatic nullity of an 
impermissible reservation, see, J. Klabbers, ‘Accepting the Unacceptable? A New Nordic Approach to 
Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’ (2000) 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 179; compare 
with D.W. Bowett, ‘Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties’ (1976-77) 48 BYBIL 67. 
143 Pellet, Tenth report on reservations, pp. 10-24. 
144 ‘Compatible’ is a term derived directly from Vienna Convention, Art. 19(c). 
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decision on terminology to be used in the Guide to Practice on Reservations to 
Treaties, however, where possible terms will conform to the terms indicated but no 
assumption as to legal effects should be derived unless expressly stated.  
In the context of reservations to human rights treaties it is not only 
reservations that are incompatible with Article 19(c) that lead to normative 
ambiguity. Sweeping reservations and reservations which subordinate treaty 
obligations to domestic law also cause incoherence i  the treaty system. These 
reservations are generally challenged on the basis of incompatibility with Article 19 
due to the imprecise reference to domestic law. These types of reservations will be 
referred to under the umbrella of ‘invalid’ reservations as necessary. To keep 
terminology in line with the current ILC position, throughout this work the term 
formulate and its derivatives will be used to identify any reservation regardless of 
this author’s preliminary thoughts on validity. Established or made will be used if the 
reservation is deemed valid and has been accepted in some form, a topic that will 
receive much attention in subsequent chapters due to issues surrounding the 
permissibility of reservations under Article 19(c) thus the use of ‘valid’ will not 
necessarily imply that the reservation is permissible due to the inconclusiveness 
surrounding this test. 
 
4.3 OTHER POINTS OF NOTE REGARDING THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
4.3.1 UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AS DEPOSITARY 
As noted previously, prior to the Genocide Opinion, the presumption exercised by 
the UN Secretary-General was that reservations werenot allowed unless there were 
specific references to them in the text of a treaty or where all previously ratifying 
parties accepted the proposed reservation. By including a default reservations regime 
to accommodate reservations made in the absence of tr aty-specific guidelines, the 
Vienna Convention effectively reversed the presumption.145 
  As depositary, the Secretary-General should allow the provisions of the 
specific treaty to guide his acceptance of an instrument of ratification, such as if all 
reservations are prohibited or specific reservations are allowed,146 however in 
practice these are not the instances which implicate the default reservations regime. 
                                                
145 Pellet, Tenth report on reservations, p. 5, para. 10. 
146 Aust, Modern Treaty Law, p. 157. 
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Where the reservations are specifically addressed by a treaty, the Secretary-General 
will allow the pertinent provisions to guide his practice.147 A more stringent practice 
is set forth in the Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General whereby the 
Secretariat will not accept (not allow deposit of the instrument containing the 
reservation) nor transmit any reservation to states parties if the treaty forbids any 
reservation or if the reservation has been made contrary to a specific prohibition 
against reservations but there must be prima facie evidence that the reservation 
specifically contravenes such a treaty-specific rule.148   
It is treaties without a specific reservations provision that create uncertainty 
and as recently as 1999 the Secretary-General question d whether it behoved the 
office to follow the ‘flexible’ system over a more ‘rigid’ system.149 Though 
technically the Secretary-General could question compliance of a reservation with 
the object and purpose test the reality is that state  have objected to this as a function 
of the depositary therefore the common practice is that all reservations are forwarded 
to states parties with no preliminary determination of compatibility or comment 
except as noted above.150 Though not necessary to evaluate for the purposes f this 
research, it is interesting to note that Secretary-General also seems to disregard the 
twelve-month time limit imposed by Vienna Conventio Article 20(5) on objections 
to reservations and continues to circulate those obj ctions made even after the time 
limit, though calling them ‘communications’.151 As noted by Swaine, this questions 
whether a lack of objection within the time limit is no more than a presumption of 
acceptance rather than actual acceptance.152 The Secretary-General also generally 
ignores the possibility that a potentially impermissible reservation could negate the 
reserving state’s consent to be bound and what this effect might have on the entry 
into force of a treaty.153 The possibility of consent to be bound to the treaty being 
                                                
147 UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1 (1999), paras. 189-96; 
148 Ibid., paras. 191-93.  
149 Ibid., paras. 165-167. For an overview of recent practice se  P.T.B. Kohona, ‘Some Notable 
Developments in the Practice of the UN Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties: 
Reservations and Declarations’ (2005) 99 AJIL 433.  
150 Aust, Modern Treaty Law, p. 158.  
151 See UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1 (1999), p. 49, para. 167.  
152 Swaine, ‘Reserving’, 319, relying on F. Horn, Reservations and Interpretive Declarations to 
Multilateral Treaties (North-Holland, Amsterdam 1988). 
153 Aust, Modern Treaty Law, p. 158 
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voided upon the determination that a reservation is i valid is another issue avoided 
by the Secretary-General.154   
 
4.3.2 RESERVATIONS BY ANOTHER NAME 
In addition to reservations states will often attach ‘declarations’, ‘understandings’ or 
‘explanations’ to their instruments of ratification. These sometimes complex 
statements do have a legitimate legal purpose and are typically meant to be 
statements of clarification or explain the state’s interpretation of the pertinent 
provision though they may amount to a reservation if the statement modifies the legal 
effect of the treaty in its application to that state (Article 2(1)(d)–definition of a 
reservation).155 States often have political reasons for not referring to a statement 
attached to its instrument of ratification as a ‘reservation’, 156 which is why the key to 
determining whether a statement is a reservation or a genuine interpretative 
declaration,157 understanding or explanation is to examine the substance. These 
statements by another name that result in a reservation in practice are sometimes 
referred to as ‘disguised reservation’ or a ‘qualified interpretative declaration’.158 
Rather than parsing the legal nomenclature of particular statements, using the 
ordinary rules of interpretation this research focuses on the substantive content and 
effect of unilateral statements that alter the obligations of states when acceding to or 
ratifying a treaty and will collectively refer to these statements as ‘reservations’ in 
keeping with the Vienna Convention definition.  
 
4.3.3 DEROGATION 
‘Derogation’ is a term of art and effectively refers to a legal manoeuvre by a state 
seeking to suspend its obligations once a treaty is already in force between states 
                                                
154 Ibid., p.129; C. Redgwell, ‘Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General 
Comment No. 24(52)’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 390, 410. 
155 See M. Coccia, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Treatis on Human Rights’ (1985) 15 California 
Western International Law Journal 1, 10. 
156 R.St.J. Macdonald, ‘Reservations under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1988) 21 
Revue belge de droit international 429, 439. 
157 The ILC addresses the distinction between a reservation and an interpretative declaration in the 
Finalized Guidelines, guidelines 1.2 and 1.3.  




parties159 due to an extreme situation within its borders such as a national emergency. 
Derogation is a matter of treaty interpretation and there is no test to determine at 
what point the threshold necessary to warrant derogati n is met. In the UN human 
rights treaty system states appear to have an unfettered right to decide what 
constitutes an emergency for purposes of derogation. There are no specific articles 
governing derogation in the Vienna Convention. However, Articles 41 (modification 
between certain parties) and 53 (peremptory norms) do mention derogation though 
the more pertinent articles are Articles 57 (suspenion of treaty obligations), 61 
(supervening impossibility of performance) and 62 (fundamental change of 
circumstances). Derogation is mentioned here becaus the act of derogation suffers a 
similar predicament to that of reservations in that t ere is no defined mechanism for 
review for determination as to whether derogation is unlawful under a treaty.160 In 
fact, at least one Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, Fitzmaurice, considered 
derogation as an integral part to determining exactly what constituted a 
reservation.161 
 
5 FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
Because all domestic ‘legal systems correspond to some extent to the prevailing 
climate of opinion in the society in which they operat ’162 there is a valid and 
essential role played by reservations in order for g vernments to participate in the 
international arena which is increasingly regulated by treaties. It might even be said 
that reservations are an absolute necessity in the multilateral treaty process. 
However, the reservations regime that exists today w s built upon a series of missed 
opportunities to provide greater guidance to facilitate the appropriate use of 
reservations. Employing one general rule to evaluate treaties of all types fails to take 
into account the nuances between different types of multilateral treaties.  
The ICJ played a seminal role in establishing the current regime with its 
introduction of the arbitrary object and purpose test in the Genocide Opinion. This 
                                                
159 A. Aust, Handbook on International Law, 2d ed. (CUP, Cambridge 2010), pp. 228. 
160 See generally R. Higgins, ‘Derogations under Human Rights Treaties’ (1976-77) 48 BYBIL 281. 
161 Fitzmaurice, 1956 Report on the Law of Treaties, p.115-16, Art. 37, para. 1 and Art. 40. 
162 J.F. Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs (CUP, Cambridge 
2004), p. 71, quoting M. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law, 5th ed. (Allen and 
Unwin, London 1984), p. 8. 
 
 81
test was all but absent from ILC reports during the years that it studied the Law of 
Treaties with the exception of the concluding reports under the final Special 
Rapporteur, Waldock. Notwithstanding, the object and purpose test ultimately played 
a pivotal role in the draft reservation articles that were submitted as part of what 
would become the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Unfortunately, the 
application and effects of the test were not continued to their logical end and this 
created a lacuna in the rules governing reservations. In the next chapter the Vienna 
Convention rules are examined specifically in their application to non-reciprocal, 
normative treaties that were developed as part of the UN human rights treaty regime 
in order to determine whether this regime adequately governs reservations to human 







RESERVATIONS IN PRACTICE  
 
The previous chapter introduced the rules which are applicable to reservations to all 
multilateral treaties, including human rights treati s. The current chapter serves to 
illuminate the uncertainty surrounding the application of these rules to the core UN 
human rights treaties. Specifically it will examine different types of reservations and 
the response to each in light of the application of the default reservations regime in 
order to assess whether the Vienna Convention adequt ly governs reservations to 
human rights treaties. Applying the Vienna Convention rules to the different types of 
commonly made reservations to human rights treaties reveals that in many instances 
there is no clear legal effect and no consequence for a determination of 
impermissibility, both essential issues in pursuit of an answer to the primary research 
question: does the Vienna Convention adequately govern reservations to human 
rights treaties? 
Many commentators have declared that reservations are a necessary evil and 
one that the human rights movement must learn to accept as at least treaty 
membership brings many countries into the fold that would otherwise be out-with 
any margin of accountability for human rights protection.1 However, this view fails 
to consider the reality that many states, even withtreaty ratification, remain largely 
outwith the accountability regime specifically due to reservations. To appreciate the 
magnitude of the systematic problems associated with reservations it is necessary to 
examine not only the number of reservations made but also, and arguably more 
importantly, the types of reservations being made. Many reservations currently in 
place are phrased so that the extent of a state’s commitment is entirely unable to be 
ascertained.  
                                                
1 A. Seibert-Fohr, ‘The Potentials of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties with Respect to 
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties’ in I. Ziemele (d.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties 
and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict, Harmony or Reconciliation (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Lieden/Boston 2004); M. Morris, ‘Few Reservations about Reservations’ (2000) 1 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 341; J. McBride, ‘Reservations and the Capacity to Implement Human Rights 
Treaties’ in J.P. Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: 





Despite declarations that human rights are ‘universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated’2 it cannot be claimed that all provisions of human 
rights treaties carry the same weight, which was a primary contention in the ICJ’s 
Genocide Opinion.3 However, there is a strong argument that in order to accomplish 
the goal of a human rights treaty there must be adherence to a large number of 
separate provisions and a reservation to even one of the obligations might thwart this 
goal.4 Before a reservation can be evaluated it is essential to determine the nature of 
the right protected and the extent to which this obligation of protection may be 
altered by a reservation. Once the right affected is etermined, the most obvious 
problematic situation is where a reservation is clearly contrary to the object and 
purpose of the related convention. No less troublesome are reservations which are 
sweeping or generally cite the incompatibility of a certain obligation with domestic 
law and/or custom. Additionally, as indicated in Chapter Two, specifically indicated 
‘declarations’ will often actually be disguised reservations5, which adds a further 
layer of jargon through which reservations must be assessed. Thus reservations 
practice must be concerned with the rights subject to the reservation and the 
formulation of the reservation, as well as the legal effect of a determination on the 
permissibility of a reservation which will be address d in Chapter Five.  
The first section of this chapter introduces the various types of rights set forth 
in human rights treaties and is followed by an analysis of different reservations and 
how they affect these rights. The third section provides a brief overview of the 
reservations attached to the core human rights treaties. Section four considers the 
sovereignty conundrum which bears on the effect of invalid reservations. For the 
purposes of developing the primary research question addressed by this thesis, 
                                                
2 See, for example, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN World Conference on Human 
Rights, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), Art. 5. 
3 See, generally, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ Reports 15, 28 May 1951 (Genocide Opinion); P.-H. Imbert, 
‘Reservations and Human Rights Conventions’ (1981) 6 Human Rights Review 28, 28. 
4 F. Hampson, Specific Human Rights Issues, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, Final working 
paper, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42 (2004) (2004 Final working paper), para. 50. 
5 The ILC has suggested that no less than one-third of ‘interpretative declarations’ were actually 
disguised reservations. See ILC Yearbook 1995, UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), para. 447, but has 
attempted to clarify the distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations in its Guide to 
Practice, see Reservations to Treaties, Text and title of the draft guidelines constituting the Guide to 
Practice on Reservations to treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.779 (2011) (Finalized Guidelines), 





particular attention in this chapter is paid to which types of reservations violate the 
Vienna Convention and whether the rules provide finality with respect to an invalid 
reservation?  
 
1   GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS AND PROTECTIONS 
Inherent in the international human rights regime is a level of flexibility which is 
necessary so that the expression of rights can be succe sfully integrated into the 
various structures of government and society. Recogniti n of this flexibility is 
typically expressed by permissible limitations to rights, protections and freedoms as 
set forth by the wording of the obligation or the absence of wording indicating 
restrictions may be made. The majority of rights, protections and freedoms found in 
human rights treaties fall into this category of general human rights. Thus they will 
be susceptible to limitation pursuant to the domestic laws of the state party as long as 
the general object and purpose of the treaty is not con ravened and the limitation is 
no greater than necessary. Additionally, these rights may be subject to derogation 
during states of emergency that threaten the life of a nation and they may be the 
subject of a reservation. 
There is a great deal of overlap among the core treaties with respect to a large 
number of rights. This is no doubt a reflection of the overlapping and interrelated 
characteristics of human rights as envisioned by the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights. Non-discrimination and equal recognition befor  the law are threaded into 
the text of each of the treaties. Equality between men and women was established as 
a free-standing international right by the ICCPR, as well as ICESCR, many years 
prior to the conclusion of CEDAW.  Freedom from torture, in addition to being a 
peremptory norm enshrined in customary international law, is a recurring obligation 
and is protected not only by the CAT but also by ICCPR Article 7, CRC Article 37, 
CRPD Article 15, and ICRMW Article 10. Protection of the freedoms of thought 
conscience and religion are found in CERD Article 5(vii), ICCPR Article 18 and 
ICRMW Article 12. Though these are just a few of the rights repeatedly appearing in 
the core treaties, the message is clear:  human rights considerations permeate every 





In many instances it is not enough for the state to refrain from violating a 
right. It must also actively work to imbed human rights obligations into domestic law 
and prevent third parties from violating these rights. This idea is typically referred to 
as the difference between positive and negative obligations of the state and this idea, 
as well as the fact that obligations are imposed on states, not individuals, must be 
recognised. A positive obligation will require the state to take action with a statement 
framed similar to the following: ‘State parties shall accord to women equality with 
men before the law’ (CEDAW Article 15(1)). Thus it is incumbent on State Parties to 
take action, most likely in the form of introducing or repealing legislative measures, 
to ensure equality among the sexes. Alternatively, a negative obligation will mandate 
that a state refrain from engaging in certain behaviour, for example: ‘State parties 
shall ensure that: (a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’ (CRC Article 37). The state in this example must 
not engage in behaviour amounting to that which is prohibited and it must also 
prevent third parties from engaging in such behaviour. Recognising the difference 
between positive and negative obligations owed by the state reinforces the reality 
that states must be proactive in preventing violatins on both the public and the 
private level.6    
 
1.1  NON-GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
There are several ways to classify rights set forth in uman rights treaties. The ICJ 
initiated the idea that all rights were not equal in the 1951 Genocide Opinion when 
contemplating reservations to obligations under the Genocide Convention. The Court 
ultimately determined that rights could be classified as major or minor.7 As indicated 
                                                
6 See, for example, the discussion by the CAT Committee, General Comment No. 2, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/GC/2 (2008), para. 15: ‘The Convention imposes obligations on State parties and not on 
individuals. States bear international responsibility for the acts and omissions of their officials and 
others, including agents, private contractors, and others acting in official capacity or acting on behalf 
of the State, in conjunction with the State, under its direction or control, or otherwise under colour of 
law. Accordingly, each State Party should prohibit, prevent and redress torture and ill-treatment in all 
contexts of custody or control, for example, in prisons, hospital , schools, institutions that engage in 
the care of children, the aged, the mentally ill or disabled, in military service, and other institutions as 
well as contexts where the failure of the State to intervene encourages and enhances the danger of 
privately inflicted harm. The Convention does not, however, limit the international responsibility that 
States or individuals can incur for perpetrating torture and ill-treatment under international customary 
law and other treaties.’ 





previously in Chapter Two, this distinction was important with respect to 
reservations for the simple fact that major rights were those against which no 
reservation could be made. However, as further human rights treaties were concluded 
the simplicity of this two-tiered distinction developed in response to the Genocide 
Opinion proved untenable.   
Rights, protections and freedoms are expressed independently and, also, as 
inter-related, tangible obligations. While it is obvious that there are a number of 
stand-alone rights that could be termed ‘major’ and‘minor’, a much more attractive 
method of distinction lays in categorising by the nature of the potential limitations. It 
is by assessing this potential that the significance of the right can be framed within 
the reservations debate. Absolute rights and non-derogable rights, and the variations 
within both categories, provide important points of re erence against which the 
validity of reservations can be measured. 
 
1.2  ABSOLUTE RIGHTS 
As with all legal writing, each word of a human rights treaty is carefully chosen in 
order to convey a certain legal meaning. The flexibility found in general human 
rights obligations does not, however, extend to all rights. There are certain rights 
which states may not limit in any way, make reservations which would vitiate the 
right, nor from which they may derogate even in a state of emergency. It is these 
‘absolute’8 rights that citizens of the world rely upon in times of peace and, more 
importantly, in times of crisis. The key to assessing whether a right is absolute is 
found in the wording as it will be phrased so that it will be incapable of being 
interpreted in a way that allows any limitation upon the right.9 ICCPR Article 8 
presents a definitive example of an absolute right from which there is no deviation 
allowed in any form whether by reservation or derogation: ‘No one shall be held in 
slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.’10 The 
wording leaves no room for alternative interpretation and it is clear that slavery in 
                                                
8 Many commentators also refer to these as fundamental rights but for the sake of clarity and to avoid 
confusion with preconceived notions based on the idea that all human rights are fundamental this 
category of rights will be discussed as ‘absolute’ rights. 
9 A. Conte and R. Burchill, Defining Civil and Political Rights: the Jurisprudence of the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, 2d ed. (Ashgate Publishing, Surry, UK 2009), p. 41. 





any form is prohibited. The same conclusion must be drawn from the wording of the 
positive obligation found in ICCPR Article 16 which provides that ‘[e]veryone shall 
have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.’ ICCPR State 
Parties are therefore obligated to ensure that all persons are given legal recognition. 
Absolute rights are most prominent within the ICCPR but there is no lack of 
examples in other conventions.11    
 In General Comment No. 2of 2008, the CAT Committee, the treaty body 
which oversees the CAT, addressed several issues regarding the implementation of 
the CAT including the status of the absolute rights protected by Article 2, the 
positive obligation on states to prevent torture, and Article 16, the positive obligation 
to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Committee 
reiterated that the CAT specifies that there are no circumstances, no matter how 
exceptional or exigent, which will justify the use of torture, including a state of 
emergency or a state of war, and that torture may never be used to protect the public 
safety or avert emergencies.12 Largely inspired by the treatment of individuals 
pursuant to post-11 September 2001 anti-terrorism measures, the CAT Committee 
left no room for movement on the issue of this absolute right by unambiguously 
stating that torture can never be employed even if the aim is to prevent a terrorist 
inspired catastrophe. Whether in regard to the CAT, the ICCPR or another 
convention, absolute rights as set forth in human rights treaties may not be 
compromised for any reason. 
 
1.3  NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTS 
A non-derogable right must be distinguished from an absolute right. Non-derogable 
rights may not be suspended in any situation, including states of emergency, though 
certain non-derogable rights may be limited by law in some circumstances when it is 
necessary to protect other members of society or the life of a nation. It must be noted 
that absolute rights are also non-derogable but are not subject to limitation. In the 
instance that a right is termed non-derogable but may be subject to limitation, the 
term may seem somewhat a misnomer; however, the full right may not be suspended 
and the limitations must be included in any notice of derogation filed with the UN 
                                                
11 Further examples include CRPD, Art. 15; CAT, Art. 2(1); CRC, Art. 37; ICCPR, Arts. 15, 16. 





Secretary-General, the depositary for all of the core human rights treaties. The core 
treaties will often indicate non-derogable rights within one of the treaty articles as 
exemplified by ICCPR Article 4(2) which specifies eight non-derogable obligations 
under that covenant.13 Other treaties also contain these provisions yet some give far 
less guidance regarding derogation, such as ICESCR Article 5(2) which provides: 
 
No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human 
rights recognized or existing in any country in virtue of law, 
conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that 
the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes 
them to a lesser extent.  
 
Not all of the core treaties include a derogation provision thus those which are silent 
on the issue, such as CRC and CEDAW, must resort to Vienna Convention 
provisions14 and address the topic as necessary on a case-by-case basis. Due to the 
nature of these rights they are most often the subject of complaints.   
Outwith the treaty texts themselves the concept of non-derogable rights was 
tackled by the 1984 Siracusa Principles15 and though they primarily addressed rights 
protected by the ICCPR the general idea is easily transferable to each of the core 
treaties. In part, the Siracusa Principles outlined the basic non-derogable rights: 
 
No State Party shall, even in time of emergency threatening the life of 
the nation, derogate from the Covenant's guarantees of the right to life; 
freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, and from medical or scientific experimentation without 
free consent; freedom from slavery or involuntary servitude; the right 
not to be imprisoned for contractual debt; the right not to be convicted 
or sentenced to a heavier penalty by virtue of retroactive criminal 
legislation; the right to recognition as a person before the law; and 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. These rights are not 
derogable under any conditions even for the asserted purpose of 
preserving the life of the nation. 16 
 
                                                
13 No derogation is permitted from Arts. 6, 7, 8(1), 8(2), 11, 15, 16 or 18. 
14 Vienna Convention Arts. 41 (modification between certain parties) and 53 (peremptory norms) 
specifically mention derogation, however, more pertinent articles are Arts. 57 (suspension of treaty 
obligations), 61 (supervening impossibility of performance) and 62 (fundamental change of 
circumstances).  
15 Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisi ns in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (1984) Annex. 





A further attempt to clarify the concept of non-derogable rights was made by 
the CAT Committee in 2008 in the aforementioned General Comment No. 2 (above, 
section 1.2). Though the CAT contains no derogation provision, the CAT Committee 
took up the non-derogation issue declaring the non-derogable status of Article 2 
(prohibition against torture, which is also an absolute right), Article 15 (prohibiting 
confessions extracted by torture from being admitted as evidence, except against the 
torturer) and Article 16 (the positive obligation to prevent cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment).17 The Committee’s main emphasis was that 
certain rights, no matter what the situation or the cost, were not to be trodden upon 
and, therefore, were non-derogable.   
On the relationship between non-derogable obligations and reservations it has 
been viewed as ‘reasonable to assume…that if derogations are not permitted, 
reservations are not permitted either,’18 however, this has not proved to be the case in 
practice and it cannot be said that ‘reservations are prohibited because derogations 
from the article in question are not permitted’19 unless a treaty specifically indicates 
such a rule. In her report on reservations to human rights treaties, Hampson concedes 
that equating non-derogable rights to non-reservable rights is an 
‘oversimplification’.20 The fact that a right may be non-derogable at its core will not 
necessarily preclude a reservation to the application of the right.  
In 1983, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights opined that a reservation 
that would suspend a non-derogable fundamental right must be deemed incompatible 
with the American Convention on Human Rights yet it conceded that restrictions to 
non-derogable fundamental rights would not necessarily f il the object and purpose 
test.21 Where a derogation provision exists it will be important to determine whether 
the obligations indicated as non-derogable are capable of limitation. Non-derogable 
rights which may not be limited will include absolute rights that may also be 
                                                
17 UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2008), para. 6.  
18 Imbert, ‘Reservations and Human Rights Conventions’, 31. Imbert ultimately rejects the automatic 
correlation between non-derogability and incompatibility, see next ote. 
19 Ibid., 32 (emphasis original). 
20 Hampson, 2004 Final working paper, para. 52. 
21 Restrictions on the Death Penalty (Articles 4(2) and (4) of the American Convention on Human 





peremptory norms,22 such as the prohibition against slavery, while other rights, such 
as the right to life23 protected by ICCPR Article 6, will be susceptible to limitation 
during states of emergency despite being non-derogable.   
Limitations contemplated during derogation from a trea y must be 
distinguished from those limitations already allowed pursuant to conditions set forth 
in an article. In General Comment No. 29 the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the 
treaty body which oversees the ICCPR, noted the importance of recognising the two 
distinct concepts involved in a limitation pursuant to derogation and a limitation 
pursuant to normal implementation of an obligation.24 Article 18 of the ICCPR 
illustrates the point in paragraph 3 which indicates hat the non-derogable right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion may be limited by law as necessary to 
protect the public and the freedom of others at any time; however, in the event of a 
state of emergency, this particular right may be th subject of further limitations 
though it cannot be discarded entirely. Thus, in a proclaimed and recognised state of 
emergency, the derogating state may place restrictions upon a non-derogable right 
but only as far as necessary and in proportion to the exigencies of the situation when 
the right is not also an absolute right. It is this idea of proportionality, an all but 
unchecked limitation, which has given the HRC pause in many instances where past 
derogations have been irreconcilable to the circumstances and this has been noted in 
their views and observations on State Parties’ reports. Regardless of the limitations 
or the proportionality factor, the HRC has stressed that the primary goal of a 
derogating state should be the ‘restoration of a state of normalcy where full respect 
for the Covenant can again be secured,’25 a goal which is applicable to all of the core 
treaties in the event of derogation. An interplay between non-derogability and 
reservations is not an entirely untenable assertion despite some commentators’ views 
                                                
22 This thesis does not enter the debate specifically on the ability of states to make reservations to rules 
of customary international law or peremptory norms. See the ILC discussion in the Draft Guide to 
Practice, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, with commentari s s provisionally adopted 
by the ILC at its 62nd session (see UN Doc. A/65/10 (2010)) and can be found at  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/62/GuidetoPracticeReservations_commentaries(e).pdf (Draft Guide 
to Practice), 3.1.9 and commentary. See also Finalized Gui elines, 4.4.3. 
23 The right to life is also protected by CRC, Art. 6; ICRMW, Art. 9; CRPD, Art. 10.  
24 UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, (2001). 





to the contrary,26 however it is not a topic to be taken further here and has been 
introduced only to reinforce the difficulty in clarifying which obligations may 
legitimately be subject to reservations. 
 
1.4  DEROGABLE RIGHTS 
The alternative of a provision expressly defining a non-derogable right is one which 
permits derogation during a state of emergency where the life of a nation is expressly 
threatened. ICCPR Article 4(1) presents one example wh re a human rights treaty 
expressly recognises derogation to general rights during a state of emergency but 
emphasises the caveat that the derogation may only be to the extent absolutely 
necessary for the exigent situation. Derogation must al o adhere strictly to the 
principle of non-discrimination in that no distinction may be made solely on the basis 
of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin though distinctions based on 
citizenship may be allowed. The concepts of necessity and non-discrimination 
pertaining to derogation extend to the remaining core treaties even where derogation 
is not specifically addressed. If and when derogatin is proposed by a state party, 
notice of precisely which rights the derogation will affect and the duration of the 
derogation must be communicated to the treaty depositary so that it may be 
circulated to all state parties. 
 
1.5 SUMMARY  
The range of rights enumerated in human rights treaties is highly varied with some 
being subject to limitation while others are, arguably, not. With this simplified 
explanation of the different types of rights susceptible to reservations, the different 
types of reservations made to such rights will next be examined. Particular attention 
must be paid to the fact that the validity of a rese vation is often questionable for a 
variety of reasons, not the least being the existence of contrary views on 
compatibility with Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention. As will be revealed in the 
following section, structural ambiguity, as well asunascertainable effect, also mar 
                                                
26 C.A. Bradley and J.L. Goldsmith, ‘Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent’ (2000) 149 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 399, 425, ftn. 121. The HRC also addressed this in General 
Comment No. 24 and rejected an automatic conclusion of incompatibility of reservations made to non-
derogable provisions, see UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), para. 10. The ILC has attempted 





the determination of reservation validity when applying the Vienna Convention rules 
to reservations to human rights treaties. 
 
2 RESERVATIONS27  
It is generally accepted that the law of treaties is premised on reciprocal contractual 
relationships between state parties.28 However, because human rights treaties 
embody obligations towards individuals, whose well-b ing is the responsibility of the 
state, rather than obligations between state parties, th re has been a general apathy by 
states in their duty to guard the integrity of these instruments.29 Where states 
anticipate difficulty in guaranteeing every article of a human rights treaty the 
possibility of making reservations presents the opportunity for them to join the treaty 
without being held responsible for compliance with the agreement in its entirety.30 
As noted by the HRC, full compliance is more desirable ‘because the human rights 
norms are the legal expression of the essential rights that every person is entitled to 
as a human being’.31 Acknowledging that reservations facilitate agreement on many 
levels, it has also been suggested that they splinter multilateral agreements into a 
network of bilateral and plurilateral agreements.32 Though true when considering 
general multilateral treaties, the picture is not en ir ly accurate in the context of 
human rights treaties. The beneficiaries of human rights treaties are people, not 
states, thus there are no revised reciprocal agreements and states will not treat 
reserving states differently from non-reserving states. This is true even in the event 
that an invalid reservation is formulated, as will be discussed below. 
 Conceding that the practice of making reservations cannot be entirely 
eliminated it is important to understand how various types of reservations work in 
                                                
27 Unless otherwise noted, all reservations and objections introduced in this chapter can be found in 
the UN Treaty Collection under Status of Treaties at http://treaties.un.org (UN Treaty Collection). 
28 E.T. Swaine, ‘Reserving’ (2006) 31 Yale Journal of Inter ational Law 307, 342; C. Redgwell, ‘The 
Law or Reservations in Respect of Multilateral Conventions’ in J.P. Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as 
General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections to Human Rights 
Conventions (BIICL, London 1997), p. 18; L. Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties: 
Ratify and Ruin? (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1995), pp. 65-72; Imbert, ‘Reservations and Human 
Rights Conventions’, 33. 
29 Noted by Theo van Boven, member of CERD in the forward of Lijnzaad, Ratify and Ruin, p. v-vi. 
30 McBride, ‘Reservations and the Capacity to Implement Human Rights Treaties’. 
31 HRC, General Comment No. 24, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), para. 4. 
32 D. Hylton, ‘Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Inadequate 





practice within the current international regime. Practice has shown that acceptance 
of reservations to human rights treaties is entirely by tacit acceptance, not by a 
positive statement of acceptance.33 The legal tension exists where a reservation has 
been both the subject of an objection and an acceptance by tacit acceptance.  
International law is ‘characteristically diffident as to the peculiarities of human rights 
conventions as a specific class of treaties’34 despite the fact that international human 
rights law is generally accepted to be a distinct sub-discipline of international law. 
This must be understood from both the point of view of the reserving state and the 
other state parties, including those who object to a reservation. The interrelationships 
between the obligations, reservations and states’ tr atment of both represents an 
amalgamation of rules of customary international law, treaty law, state practice, and, 
an aspect that must not be forgotten, international rel tions. Changing the domestic 
status quo is decidedly easier said than done. This is reflected by states in a multitude 
of situations including failure to ratify a treaty and anticipatory implementation 
problems as evidenced by reservations. A genuine cofli t arises when states use 
reservations as a means of avoiding the obligations altogether.35 Recognising that the 
status quo is not easily changed, the overarching purpose of a human rights treaty is 
to advance these rights on the domestic level and this objective is clear to all 
potential state parties from the outset thus change should be anticipated.    
The Vienna Convention reservations regime recognises that not all 
reservations are prohibited and states are free to make permissible reservations. 
Permissible reservations may, however, still be the subject of an objection though 
this will generally be a political objection rather than a substantive objection based 
on invalidity. It is objections to permissible reservations that are envisioned by 
Articles 20 and 21 of the Vienna Convention regime. States often make reservations 
in order to bide time until changes on the domestic level can be implemented or to 
maintain specific features of domestic law and provided there is ample specificity, 
these will not necessarily offend the object and purpose of a treaty. The Vienna 
Convention only proscribes reservations which are prohibited by the treaty itself, 
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reservations made contrary to a treaty provision indicating only specified 
reservations may be made and reservations which contravene the object and purpose 
of the treaty.36 The initial and second conditions placed upon a state’s ability to make 
reservations are rather easily recognised and explicitly fail for want of compliance 
with the rules of treaty law as well as the treaty itself. It is the third condition 
provided by Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention that breeds multifarious 
permutations of reservations that either blatantly contravene the object and purpose 
of a treaty–even in the eye of the most casual observer–or that, on their face, appear 
not to violate specific reservations rules but in practice present dilemmas as to actual 
obligations owed and, consequently, enforcement issues.   
In light of the various categories of rights, the application of specific types of 
reservations to the various rights reveals the interes ing lacunae in reservations 
practice with respect to human rights. Initially there are those reservations which can 
easily be said to violate the object and purpose of a treaty and are the reservations to 
which objections are most often made. Two further dtrimental categories of 
reservations to human rights treaties include those broad or vague references to 
application of a treaty only so far as it will be in concert with domestic law or local 
custom and those which subordinate specific obligation to existing domestic laws or 
customs. For clarity’s sake, the former category will be classified as ‘sweeping’ 
reservations and the latter as ‘subordination’ reservations. The various assessment 
difficulties resulting from states’ reservation practices, however, are not limited to 
these two reservation categories. The following presents a text based assessment of 
reservations juxtaposed against various rights and highlights examples of how the 
disarray resulting from applying the Vienna Conventio  reservations rules to human 
rights treaties undermines the international human rights regime. 
 
2.1 TREATY GUIDANCE ON RESERVATIONS 
Before analysing the different types of reservation it is important to introduce the 
guidance, or lack thereof, provided by the core human rights treaties on reservations. 
CERD Article 20, CEDAW Article 28, CRC Article 51, ICRMW Article 91 and 
CRPD Article 46 each impose restrictions on the ability of states to make 
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reservations to those treaties while the remaining four treaties are silent on the issue. 
These five reservation provisions generally prohibit reservations that are contrary to 
the object and purpose of the treaty. However, CERD goes a step further to include 
any reservation ‘which would inhibit the operation f any of the bodies established 
by this Convention’ or that is considered incompatible by two-thirds of the State 
Parties (the mathematical test). For treaties without a reservation provision, the 
Vienna Convention articles will be the fall-back guide as to how to interpret 
reservations. Regardless of whether there is a treaty-specific article guiding 
reservation evaluation or, as is the case with four f the treaties, the Vienna 
Convention rules serve as the fall-back rules, the test is the same: reservations 
contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty are prohibited.   
Thus it is left to the states to work out what the object and purpose of a treaty 
is because, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, it is rarely explicitly defined. It can 
therefore be said that the guidance offered by the treaties that do have reservation 
provisions is not particularly useful. Considering the various types of rights a logical 
assumption would be those rights framed as absolute would go directly to the heart 
of the treaty–the raison d’être37–and therefore be incapable of being the subject of a 
reservation. Distilling the raison d’être, which practically speaking is another term 
referring to the object and purpose of the treaty, is generally guided in large part by 
the preamble and the wording of the obligations thems lves. When evaluating the 
CAT, for example, the object and purpose, or raison d’être, is easy to ascertain. The 
purpose is the prevention of torture and cruel, inhuman or otherwise degrading 
treatment or punishment and each of the obligations is designed to further the 
objective of the CAT to eliminate these activities. Thus, reservations affecting rights 
framed in absolute terms, or those rights that are more peripheral but important in 
providing a means of fulfilling the over-arching obligations, are equally important.   
Contrasting CEDAW with the CAT, it is clear that the raison d’être is to 
establish equality among women and men. To realise this aim, the first sixteen 
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articles set out a veritable laundry list of areas where governments should be 
compelled to eradicate discrimination pursuant to the Convention. Depending on the 
state, a particular obligation, such as equal access to social security programmes 
(Article 14(c)), may decidedly be a goal to which a st te aspires, not only in the 
context of women, but also of men; however, it may be entirely unobtainable at the 
time of ratification, thus the state will make a reservation against said article. If the 
state maintains the other obligations then it would seem to be sustaining the object 
and purpose of the treaty. Other obligations, however, such as Article 10 on equal 
access to education, is an obligation that is tenabl  if the state has a functioning 
education system already in place but it has previously limited access to males, such 
has often been the case in developing countries. Allowing females equal access 
would be essential to achieving gender equality and reservations against this 
obligation would not be acceptable. The notable point regarding the treaties use of 
the object and purpose test as a ‘guide’ on reservations is that the test has effectively 
been ignored in practice, as states continue to formulate reservations without regard 
for the object and purpose of the treaty, which will be demonstrated below. 
 
2.2 PERMISSIBLE RESERVATIONS 
Though universal acceptance and implementation of all obligations set forth in 
human rights treaties is the goal to which the human rights movement aspires, the 
reality is that perfect compliance cannot always be immediately effected. Permissible 
reservations are those which do not offend Vienna Convention Article 19 or any 
other provision of the convention that might render the reservation invalid. To this 
extent the ILC’s proposal to ensure reservations are detailed sufficiently so as to give 
guidance as to the implications on the domestic level must be observed.38 This 
accommodates reservations made by states which have legitimate domestic reasons 
for reserving against an obligation, such as the will of the domestic population or 
compliance with specific laws enacted by a legitimae, functioning government. 
The reservation made by Belize to ICCPR Article 12(2) is a good model of 
this practice: ‘The Government of Belize reserves the right not to apply paragraph 2 
of Article 12 in view of the statutory provisions requiring persons intending to travel 
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abroad to furnish tax clearance certificates.’ Belize thus provides the precise 
domestic legal reason why it cannot comply with the obligation in full. The 
restriction is minimal and corresponds to a legislative measure in operation in the 
state. Austria also provides a succinct and detailed reservation to ICCPR Article 
10(3) whereby it reserves the right to detain juvenile prisoners together with adults 
under 25 years of age who give no reason for concern as to their possible detrimental 
influence on the juvenile. Both examples are detaild enough to provide complete 
information as to how the state will comply with the obligation. In these instances, 
the state party’s compliance is altered but the object and purpose of the treaty 
remains intact. 
 
2.3 CLEARLY INCOMPATIBLE RESERVATIONS 
Though typically rare in other types of multilateral treaties, there are instances in the 
area of human rights treaties where a state formulates  reservation that is clearly 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and is therefore impermissible. 
Such was the case with one of the reservations made by Pakistan when it ratified the 
ICCPR on 23 June 2010. Among its reservations to nine articles of the ICCPR, 
Pakistan included the following reservation to Article 40: ‘The Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereby declares that it does not recognize the 
competence of the Committee provided for in Article 40 of the Covenant.’ Article 40 
establishes the periodic reporting supervision of the HRC and outlines the 
requirements of the State Parties to submit reports. The establishment of the periodic 
reporting system is a core feature of the UN human rights treaty system therefore 
there can be no doubt as to the incompatibility of this reservation with the object and 
purpose of the treaty. As stated by Austria: 
 
…the Committee provided for in Article 40 of the Covenant has a 
pivotal role in the implementation of the Covenant. The exclusion of the 
competence of the Committee is not provided for in the Covenant and in 
Austria’s views incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Covenant.39 
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Other objections40 echo the fundamental and essential role of the periodic reporting 
system in the implementation and overall operation of the ICCPR and question 
Pakistan’s commitment to the Covenant.  
Pakistan also reserved against Articles 6, 7 and 18, which according to 
ICCPR Article 4(2), are non-derogable and, as indicated above in section 1.3, also 
raises the spectre of incompatibility. Several states have objected to this catalogue of 
reservations made by Pakistan based on incompatibility with the object and purpose 
of the treaty.41 The largest number of objections made to any formulated reservation 
to the ICCPR have been recorded against Pakistan’s reservations and the objecting 
states include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. None of the objecting states precluded the 
entry into force of the treaty with Pakistan and four states, Canada, Latvia, Slovakia 
and Sweden, indicated that Pakistan would not benefit from its reservations in its 
relations with these states.42 Herein lays the most significant problem in practice, the 
ICCPR obligations are not for the benefit of the State Parties but instead flow 
directly to the citizens of the State Party. Therefo , there is no change in the 
relations between the states. Notably, notwithstanding its objection based on the 
incompatibility of the reservations with the object and purpose of the ICCPR, the US 
included that the treaty would be enforce between the two ‘except to the extent of 
Pakistan’s reservations’43 which effectively places Pakistan in the same position in 
which it would be if the reservations were valid.44 This introduces another of the 
inconsistent effects of the application of the Vienna Convention rules to reservations 
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to human rights treaties. It must be noted that Pakist n made a similar catalogue of 
reservations to CAT which met with almost identical tide of international rebuke as 
discussed here.45 
Even without the objections by states it would be difficult to argue that a 
reservation to ICCPR Article 40 is consistent with the object and purpose of the 
treaty. Pakistan has not responded to the objections n r has it withdrawn any of the 
reservations despite the overwhelming opposition. While the objecting states have in 
some instances detailed their views on the legal effect of the reservations on the 
relations inter se, the Vienna Convention lacks any guidance on the consequence for 
such determinations of incompatibility when the benefits and obligations do not flow 
between state parties. 
 
2.4 SWEEPING RESERVATIONS  
A frequently used reservation formula is a brief statement limiting the application of 
the treaty as a whole insofar as the obligations are compatible with domestic law or 
customs, including religion and religious law. These are often referred to as 
‘sweeping’ reservations.46 As noted by the ILC in 2007, states often put these 
forward to preserve the integrity of specific norms of their internal law despite the 
fact that reservations based on general reference to internal law, or sections of the 
law, make determining compatibility of the reservation with the treaty impossible.47 
Sweeping reservations prohibit any successful analysis by another state party as to 
whether the reservation complies with the object and purpose of the treaty. These 
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reservations effectively result in the reserving state taking on no actual international 
obligations, which is one of the serious problems with the practice.48  
El Salvador’s reservation to the CRPD represents a prime example of a 
sweeping reservation that thwarts any determination as to the extent to which it 
complies with the object and purpose of the treaty:  
 
The Government of the Republic of El Salvador signs the present …to 
the extent that its provisions do not prejudice or vi late the provisions 
of any of the precepts, principles and norms enshried in the 
Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador, particularly in its 
enumeration of principles.49  
 
The indeterminate scope of such a reservation is unacceptable for many 
reasons but most importantly because it would be almost impossible for another state 
party or a treaty body, not to mention a person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
author state, to ascertain precisely how the obligations will be recognised on the 
domestic level.50 Despite the aforementioned commentary by the ILC and the 
obvious difficulty resulting from trying to interpret such a reservation, a large 
percentage of reservations to human rights treaties rely precisely on broad 
reservations invoking general domestic laws as a commitment escape route. These 
sweeping reservations denote an apathetic approach t  treaty observance and have 
been employed time and again by a multitude of state p rties to the core UN human 
rights treaties.   
Almost as frequent as the sweeping reservation limiting compliance as far as 
allowed by domestic law are reservations limiting application of all treaty obligations 
to the extent they are permitted by local customs and/or religious practices. As 
pointed out by Lijnzaad, reservations based on traditional custom or religion are 
detrimental because they leave compliance up to the author state’s discretion.51 One 
example is Malawi’s original reservation to CEDAW ind cating that it would not 
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49El Slavador, Reservations to the CRPD, UN Doc. A/61/611 (2006). Austria, Czech Republic, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden objected to El Salvador’s reservation. 
50 W.A. Schabas, ‘Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Time for Innovation and Reform’ (1994) 
32 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 39, 56-57. 





consider itself bound to certain articles of the Convention due to the deep-rooted 
nature of certain practices of Malawians where obligations would require immediate 
eradication of those traditional customs and practices.52 This sweeping reservation 
exemplified the indefinite nature of Malawi’s commit ent to CEDAW. Fortunately, 
Malawi withdrew the reservation following Mexico’s objection noting that the 
reservation impaired the treaty’s purpose.   
In predominantly Islamic states a sweeping reservation will often employ 
domestic law in conjunction with religious practice as an exception to obligation 
implementation. Reservations made by Oman and Malaysia to CEDAW clearly 
illustrate the problematic vagueness intrinsic to sweeping reservations combining the 
two contingencies. The first of five reservations made by Oman indicates that it will 
reserve the application of ‘[a]ll provisions of the Convention not in accordance with 
the provisions of the Islamic Sharia and legislation n force in the Sultanate of 
Oman’.53 Any CEDAW State Party wishing to evaluate the resevation for purposes 
of objection would need to be well-versed in the intricacies of both Sharia and the 
laws of Oman in order to make an informed decision as to whether Oman is 
upholding its treaty obligations. An equally ambiguous reservation is the initial 
reservation made by Malaysia to CEDAW:  
 
The Government of Malaysia declares that Malaysia’s accession (to 
CEDAW) is subject to the understanding that the provisi ns of the 
Convention do not conflict with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia 
law and the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.54 
 
Malaysia went on to further specific that in light of this general reservation it was 
specifically not bound to a multitude of articles.55 In both instances, such sweeping 
references to general domestic law and Sharia law cearly cannot be viewed as an 
attempt to fulfil CEDAW gender equality commitments, e pecially when it has been 
acknowledged by Morocco, also a primarily Islamic country, that ‘[e]quality of this 
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kind is considered incompatible with the Islamic Sharia’56 and in most situations 
these states’ ‘representative’ voices are those of males.  
To illustrate the perplexity caused by sweeping reservations consider the 
Malaysian reservation and its application to the right of equality of women before the 
law found in CEDAW Article 15. Malaysian federal and civil law applies to all but 
Sharia applies only to the country’s Muslim population and the civilian authorities 
readily hand Sharia violators over to the Islamic court57 for adjudication and the 
meting out of punishment. Under Sharia law women and men do not have equal 
rights in many areas of the law including marriage and divorce. Women may only 
marry Muslim men while Muslim men may marry any woman ‘of the book’ and a 
woman must have the consent of her husband to divorce while a man may divorce 
his wife at any time. Thus because a woman is Muslim he does not appear to be able 
to obtain relief in the instance that she wishes to divorce her husband and the 
husband will not consent. This specifically contravenes CEDAW Article 16 which 
establishes the equality of women and men in matters related to marriage and family. 
In the context of Malaysian civil law the discrepancy would be an obvious violation 
of CEDAW Article 16 (though it also specifically made reservations against most of 
the provisions of this article), and also Article 15; however, the country’s deference 
to Sharia law, a law which does not recognise this type of equality, for a Muslim 
woman seeking a divorce would clearly not afford her equal recognition before the 
law. It must also be pointed out that Sharia law is not uniform across Muslim 
communities and has countless interpretations, thus f rther complicating 
interpretation of such reservations. CEDAW Article 2(f), against which Malaysia 
also reserved, mandates that State Parties abolish law  and customs which constitute 
discrimination against women but it is clear that a reservation necessitating Sharia 
compliance is used to avoid addressing discriminatio  in countries practising Sharia 
law. Finland and France, as well as other State Parties, objected to the Malaysian  
reservation on the basis that invoking internal lawwas a violation of international 
law58 and because the reservation violated the object and purpose of the treaty. With 
or without the objections, it would be a difficult, albeit impossible, task to compare 
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each CEDAW obligation with the entirety of Sharia and general domestic law to 
determine exactly where the conflicts occur. Therein lays the primary problem with 
sweeping reservations. Malaysia’s reservation to Article 2(f) was ultimately 
withdrawn, along with reservations to Articles 9(1), 6(b), 16(d), 16(e) and 16(h), in 
1998 and at the same time it also modified certain of its previous reservations.59 
However, as will be demonstrated in the next paragrph, the extent to which these 
reservation withdrawals have made a difference are questionable, though outwith the 
limits of this thesis.  
 A further problem with sweeping reservations is that the state itself may not 
have a hold on how to delegate certain rights within its own domestic system. Once 
again referring to the Malaysian reservations to CEDAW, a recent court ruling there 
indicates that Malaysian federal law appears to defer to the Islamic courts when a 
party to a case is Muslim. Religious freedom is onesuch instance as seen in the case 
of Lina Joy, a Malay born Muslim who converted to Christianity in 1998. In May 
2007, the Federal Court of Malaysia rejected her appe l to have her religion changed 
on her national identity card stating that renouncing the Islamic religion was a matter 
specifically for the Islamic court to decide.60 Freedom to profess and practice religion 
is specifically protected by Article 11(1) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution, 
however, Article 160 of the same assigns all Malays the requirement of professing 
Islam. How then, will the Malaysian government, theentity which owes its people 
the obligations protected by CEDAW, approach issues of equality for Muslim 
women when it sends issues relating to Muslims to the Islamic courts and, as noted 
by Morocco, gender equality is considered incompatible with Islam? It appears from 
the federal ruling that Muslim women in Malaysia will not enjoy any equality that is 
not envisioned by the Islamic faith.   
CEDAW is not the only treaty to suffer under the burden of such 
reservations. Qatar made a virtually identical reservation to CAT prohibiting any 
interpretation of the Convention that is incompatible with Islamic law. One must 
again beg the question how the provisions pertaining to the prohibition against 
torture might be qualified by Islamic law, especially considering the fact that the 
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prohibition is not only an absolute right but is also enshrined in customary 
international law. The CAT Committee has addressed using religion or tradition as a 
justification for the use of torture or ill-treatment and has definitively indicated that 
these excuses will not in any way alter the absolute prohibition against their use.61 
While it has been argued that this type of reservation is not a true 
reservation,62 the reality is that it is precisely this formulation that is often used by 
states when ratifying human rights treaties. Sweeping reservations permeate the core 
treaties and Bayefsky has noted the substantive quandary presented by sweeping 
reservations related to Islamic Sharia law as they specifically counter the main 
purpose of human rights treaties which is to identify universal international human 
rights standards.63 Sweeping reservations requiring compliance with domestic 
constitutions are no less problematic. Determining whether such reservations are 
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty is all but impossible in these 
instances and is highly contingent on each treaty obligation in relation to every law, a 
potentially infinite number of tangents.  
Addressing the importance of detailed references to distinct domestic laws 
that must be distinguished by the reservation is one f the aims of ILC’s proposed 
Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties.64 The types of reservations 
contemplated by the ILC have historically provided critical information about the 
constraints imposed by domestic audiences in the context of human rights, such as 
Islamic states’ Sharia reservations and constitutional reservations made by the 
federated states. Sweeping reservations seriously inhibit efforts to determine how 
treaty obligations play out on the domestic level. While a state may argue that its 
sweeping reservation is in keeping with the object and purpose of a treaty it is 
difficult to see how any review mechanism, whether another state party, a court or a 
treaty body, could exercise its judgment in any way except to conclude that these 
types of reservations are invalid as a result of incompatibility with the object and 
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purpose of a treaty or based on the general principle of law that prohibits a state from 
invoking internal law as a justification for non-performance of treaty obligations. 
 
2.5   SUBORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
In addition to sweeping reservations, another common reservation formula entails 
reservations subordinating specific treaty obligations to domestic law and represents 
another defeatist reservation practice plaguing human rights treaties. This practice is 
an ongoing challenge due in large part to the uncertainty inherent in some domestic 
systems and their lackadaisical approach to recogniti n of international obligations 
and it contributes to the reservations chasm.65 Vienna Convention Article 27 
specifically provides that ‘[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law 
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’; thus when reservation is so 
imprecise in its reference to internal law as to make the extent of the reservation 
unascertainable, objecting states will invoke Article 27 in addition to incompatibility 
under Article 19(c). Though reliance on Article 27 as a basis for objecting to a 
reservation is contested,66 it is worth noting that it is not an uncommon practice67. 
Vienna Convention Article 26 reiterates the ‘good faith’ element inherent in the 
treaty law concept of pacta sunt servanda. Reading these two articles together it 
follows that a state party invoking a domestic law to avoid the application of a 
particular human rights treaty provision might not only be contrary to Article 27 but 
also violate the good faith principle. This obvious reading, however, is precisely that 
which is ignored repeatedly by a large number of state . Conflict with internal law is 
the incompatibility that forms the basis of many reservations.68   
Subordination reservations effectively water down the reserving state’s 
obligations and, depending on the actual realisation of the reservation on the 
domestic level, could equate to non-performance of treaty obligations. These policy 
decisions evidence the fact that states are wary of commitments that would 
necessitate changes to their constitutions or existing laws when in reality if becoming 
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a state party in both name and practice was truly the ambition of the governments 
they would push through the necessary changes prior to ratification.69 Otherwise, the 
state’s participation in the treaty is likely more a mere formality rather than an 
attempt to bring its legislation into conformity with the treaty.70 
Fiji’s reservation to CERD presents a common example of a subordination 
reservation and illustrates the blatant disregard for adherence to the Vienna 
Convention principles: 
 
To the extent, if any, that any law relating to elections in Fiji may not 
fulfil the obligations referred to in Article 5 (c), that any law relating to 
land in Fiji which prohibits or restricts the alienation of land by the 
indigenous inhabitants may not fulfil the obligations referred to in 
Article 5 (d) (v), or that the school system of Fiji may not fulfil the 
obligations referred to in Articles 2, 3, or 5 (e) v , the Government of 
Fiji reserves the right not to implement the aforementioned provisions 
of the Convention. 
 
Under the umbrella of this reservation, Fiji may still discriminate based on race in the 
areas of elections, alienation of land and in the school system. In this example, Fiji 
does not contemplate a future change in the law and appears unwilling to entertain 
progressive development in these areas though it clearly recognises the opportunity 
to do so as reflected in another reservation it made to CERD.  
The Peruvian delegation at the UN Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties noted the ‘inadmissibility’ of these types of reservations and it proposed that 
a subparagraph addressing this type of reservation be added to what would become 
Article 19, though this clearly did not find support despite early concerns that these 
reservations ‘were tantamount to a negation of the consent to be bound’.71 Shelton 
points out that ‘general subordination reservations are the most questionable because 
they deny the very reason for adoption of human rights treaties: the establishment of 
minimum standards with which domestic laws should be brought into conformity.’72 
Pellet has reiterated that a state ‘should not use its domestic law as a cover for not 
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actually accepting any new international obligations’73 in his commentary on the 
draft guideline on reservations relating to the application of domestic law despite the 
guideline allowing such reservations as long as the obj ct and purpose of the treaty is 
not contravened.74  
In theory, this problem should be dealt with by enacting the appropriate laws 
on the domestic level in order to provide at least the minimum protections set forth in 
the relevant treaty. When this objective is not achieved, however, it is more a wait-
and-see approach that must be taken. Issues of compatibility are not always initially 
obvious and this is true in all legal systems. Reservations subordinating obligations 
to domestic law create a ‘smoke screen’ between the treaty bodies and actual 
implementation on the domestic level.75 Therefore, the importance of having proper 
violation review procedures in place becomes imperative.   
 It must be acknowledged that some subordination reservations will be in 
place only as long as it takes the state to enact the appropriate domestic measures to 
bring the law into conformity with international obligations, sometimes referred to as 
a ‘transitional’76 reservation. Barbados’ reservation to the ICCPR exemplifies this 
particular situation:  
 
The Government of Barbados states that it reserves th  right not to 
apply in full, the guarantee of free legal assistance in accordance with 
paragraph 3 (d) of Article 14 of the Covenant, since, while accepting the 
principles contained in the same paragraph, the problems of 
implementation are such that full application cannot be guaranteed at 
present.  
 
By its reservation Barbados intimates that at some point in the future it will pursue 
full implementation of Article 14. 77 Redgwell notes that:  
 
A temporary derogation from the full rights and obligations of the State 
under the treaty pending the realignment of national law does not fall 
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foul of the basic international law prohibitions, embodied in Article 27 
of the Vienna Convention, against invoking the provisions of internal 
law as justification for the failure to perform international 
obligations…78 
 
Legislation on the domestic level is clearly outside the scope of international law 
though pursuant to the obligations set forth by human rights treaties there is generally 
a positive obligation on state parties to develop new laws or repeal existing laws in 
order to bring domestic law into conformity with the international agreement. 
Though the aim of a human rights treaty is to improve protection, new legislation 
also presents a difficulty in that its implications will be more complex to assess 
compared to existing legislation with a track-record f implementation.79 
One of the many problems arising from state parties indicating that treaty 
obligations will be carried out to the extent possible under the existing domestic 
constitution or federal law is the fact that the law on many issues will be unclear.   
Consider Botswana’s reservation against CAT Article 1, the prohibition against 
torture: ‘Botswana considers itself bound…to the extent that ‘torture’ means the 
torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or other reatment prohibited by 
Section 7 of the Constitution of…Botswana.’ Botswana made an almost identical 
reservation to ICCPR Article 7, the prohibition against torture. Section 7 of the 
Constitution of Botswana provides no definition of t rture and allows treatment done 
under the authority of any law as long as the punishment was lawful in the country 
immediately before the Constitution went into effect.80 The prohibition against 
torture is an absolute right and is non-derogable under both the CAT and ICCPR. 
The problem with subordinating international obligat ons is evident in this instance 
as it is unclear exactly the extent to which treatment engaged in under the cloak of 
the state authority of Botswana operating pursuant to past lawful action will be 
considered in conflict with the prohibition on the international level. There is nothing 
to indicate whether victims of torture under international standards have the right of 
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redress if the activity was considered lawful in the recent history of Botswana. The 
HRC has urged Botswana to withdraw the reservation to the ICCPR due to its 
incompatibility with the object and purpose of the tr aty and the fact that it offends 
the peremptory norm prohibiting torture.81 There have also been multiple objections 
to the reservations based on the principle reflected in Vienna Convention Article 27; 
however, the reservations remain today because ther is not a procedure in place 
under the Vienna Convention reservations regime to force Botswana’s hand to 
comply with an incompatibility determination by another state party. 
A corroborating example demonstrating the tenuous situation created by 
subordination reservations is the reservation made by Bangladesh (though framed 
and titled a declaration) against CAT Article 14 (1) indicating that it would only 
apply Article 14(1) in consonance with the existing laws and legislation in the 
country. Several states, including Finland, France and Sweden, among others, 
objected to this reservation based on its incompatibility with the object and purpose 
of the Convention. Article 14 ensures the right of victims of torture the right in law to 
redress, compensation and rehabilitation. Bangladesh ratified the CAT on 5 October 
1998 and its constitution prohibits torture under Article 35(5) but to date there has 
been no availability of redress for victims of torture. A bill82 aimed at correcting this 
legal void was introduced at the Bangladesh National Parliament in early 2009 
though it was subsequently shelved in September of that year.83 Encouragingly, the 
bill was revived and eventually pushed through the parliamentary approval 
committee; it was recommended for passage in March 2011 with special note taken 
of Bangladesh’s commitments under CAT.84 This example supports the contention 
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that pressure from the international community can have a positive impact on 
effecting change on the domestic level, of course, th re must also be a will on the 
part of the nation. The above examples, of which there are many more, substantiate 
the undermining effect that subordinating an international obligation to domestic law 
has on absolute rights but general rights are also left in a state of uncertainty in these 
instances of subordinating reservations. 
Despite the fact that incompatible reservations made to general rights receive 
less attention in the context of reservations it isstill worth noting that these, too, are 
important in the grand design of human rights. If only absolute and non-derogable 
rights are the focus of objections, the overall aims of the UDHR and the international 
human rights system will be threatened, but the human rights regime is also 
susceptible to failure if subordination reservations persist to general rights. The 
evaluation of a general right in a domestic context is just as difficult to assess when it 
is subordinated to domestic law. The reservation by Mauritius to CRPD Article 11 
specifies that it does not consider itself bound to take measures under the Article 
unless permitted by domestic legislation. Article 11 obligates the state to ensure 
protection of persons with disabilities in situations of risk and humanitarian 
emergencies. Though Article 11 constitutes a general right, the realisation of the 
right is entirely contingent on domestic law on the matter, if there is one. 
Subordinating international obligations to domestic law creates a ping-pong effect 
where the right is volleyed perpetually between thelevel of an international 
obligation and potential recognition on the domestic level. 
Federal states typically make reservations subordinating treaty obligations to 
domestic law as it is restricted in a federal-state system. As indicated by the US in 
one of its reservations to the ICCPR, the federal government only obligates itself to 
the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters 
covered by the treaty. Covenant obligations are othrwise left to the state and local 
governments to implement. The difficulty with this type of subordination is that the 
bound party is the US federal government, not the fed rated states.85  
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Recognition of the problematic situation with distribution of powers between 
the federal government and state governments in the context of international 
obligations has been the subject of prior international disputes as noted in the 
LaGrand86 case. Though LaGrand was not directly related to a human rights treaty,87 
the premise upon which the US sought to obviate its obligations to comply with ICJ-
issued provisional measures implicates the major prblem inherent in a federal law 
subordination reservation. The US argued that ‘the c aracter of the United States of 
America as a federated republic of divided powers’88 constrained the ability of the 
federal government to act, even where an internatiol bligation was implicated. In 
this instance, the State of Arizona failed to heed an order of the ICJ indicating a stay 
of execution for Walter LaGrand, a German citizen, but it is not a great leap to see 
how this argument could be applied in the context of human rights obligations 
subordinated by a federal reservation. A similar fact pattern based on a consular 
rights violation was addressed more recently in the case of Medellín v. Texas89. 
Following the 2004 ICJ decision in Mexico v. United States90 the President of the 
United States issued an order to the State of Texas to comply with the ICJ decision 
and therefore give effect to Article 36(1)(b) of Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations91 which would result in a stay of execution and the possibility of 
reconsideration of Medellín’s case. Texas resisted and the case ultimately went to the 
US Supreme Court which in a six to three decision held that a non-self-executing 
treaty without the necessary implementing legislation could not bind state courts 
unless the compliance was in some other way recognised through Constitutional 
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measures, thus reinforcing the legal conundrum of hw to apply international 
obligations in federal states particularly when there is a reservation based on the lack 
of ability to bind states due to the nature of a federation.  
As one of the most latterly convened treaties, the CRPD picked up on the 
federal state reservations to previous conventions and explicitly included in Article 
4(5) that all provisions would ‘extend to all parts of federal states without any 
limitations or exceptions’. This purports to take a strong stance against those states 
relying on the excuse that certain obligations are not supervised on the federal level; 
however, the reality seems to be that there is little that can be done to alter the 
practical implications of the federal system in light of these types of reservations as 
the issue is really one that must be dealt with on the domestic level. 
A further impediment to protection resulting from subordination of 
international human rights obligations to domestic law arises in the context of 
derogations. Due to serious discrepancies between dfinitions found in the 
conventions and those that exist under domestic laws, either incorporating the treaty 
or otherwise, there exists a potential loophole for impunity, as pointed out by the 
CAT Committee.92 This potential loophole is underlined by the reservation made by 
Botswana. The Committee has specifically called upon State Parties to give 
assurances that domestic definitions, in its case for torture and cruel, inhuman or 
other degrading treatment, are at a minimum in concert with those as contemplated 
under the CAT. 
In considering subordination reservations states have rgued that these 
reservations are invalid due both to the contravention of Vienna Convention Article 
27 and for incompatibility with the object and purpose test.93 Both arguments yield 
the same result due to the non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties; reserving 
states maintain the offending reservation and there is no legal effect or consequence 
that results.  
 
2.6 NUMEROUS RESERVATIONS TO A SINGLE TREATY 
It is not merely sweeping or incompatible reservations based on general references to 
domestic laws that are a concern. State parties whorec rd a high number of 
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reservations to specific rights due to incompatibili y with identifiable domestic laws 
or local customs create the same concern wherein an unwillingness to entertain 
progressive human rights protections evidences aimscontrary to those embodied in 
the treaty. Because human rights treaties contain multifarious obligations, in 
applying the object and purpose test it is often difficult to tell exactly which 
obligation will tip the scale in the event that a reservation is made against it. Even 
more difficult is assessing at what point a large number of otherwise marginal 
reservations will, by the sum of their parts, violate the object and purpose of the 
treaty. If the object and purpose is contravened thre is no definitive path of action to 
take to rectify the offending reservation other than to urge the author state to 
withdraw it. 
The Republic of Niger demonstrates the multiple rese vations practice by 
making such a large number of obligation specific reservations to CEDAW that it 
creates a serious threat to the realisation of human rights obligations and prompts the 
question, why join? CEDAW Article 28 prohibits reservations incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Convention; yet more reservations have been made to it 
than any other human rights convention. Niger reserved against eighteen of the 
commitments pointing to its ‘regard to the modificat on of social and cultural 
patterns of conduct of men and women’ and due to the fact that the indicated 
provisions were contrary to the existing customs and practices within the country 
which could be modified only with the passage of time and the evolution of society 
and thus, could not be abolished by and act of authority.94 Article 5 of CEDAW 
specifically identifies the purpose of the treaty is: 
 
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped 
roles for men and women.   
 
With the purpose of CEDAW being the elimination of all forms of discrimination 
against women, reserving against a large number of the commitments does nothing to 
support Niger’s status as a State Party as it appears to exist only in name. Niger’s 
                                                





blatant contravention of CEDAW aims was challenged by objections by both France 
and the Netherlands.95 The objections have thus far had no effect on the government 
of Niger as it appears that its only commitment is he perpetual non-attainment of 
gender equality. In 1987 and 1992, CEDAW Committee General Recommendations 
addressed the acute problem with reservations to the Convention in light of the 
perceived invalidity and detrimental legal effect of a large number of the existing 
reservations.96 Urging states to evaluate the reservations of other State Parties and 
reconsider their own reservations, the Committee suggested a move toward a 
common procedure on reservations commensurate with other human rights treaties.97 
Unfortunately, the other core human rights treaties appear to be in the same situation. 
Perhaps a better alternative approach is that taken by Chile in its declaration 
made upon signing CEDAW in 1980 where it contended that at the current time 
many provisions of CEDAW were not compatible with Cilean legislation but that it 
had established a law reform committee to assist in rectifying the incompatible terms. 
Chile did not ratify the Convention until 1989 but when it did it made no reservations 
indicating persisting incompatibility issues.   
 
2.7 SUMMARY  
There are several types of reservations that hinder the fulfilment of obligations set 
forth in the core human rights treaties. Pursuant to the Vienna Convention 
reservations regime as well as other principles espou ed by the Vienna Convention, 
reservations must not contravene the object and purpose of a treaty nor may they 
employ domestic law as a justification for failure to comply with international 
obligations. These conditions for reservation validity have yielded patchy 
compliance with the core human rights treaties due to the ambiguity and 
incompleteness of the Vienna Convention regime. Theabove analysis of different 
types of reservations attests to the difficulty in defining exactly which reservations 
are invalid and alluded to the gaps in the rules even in the event of an invalidity 
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determination by another state party. The following section presents an overview of 
the reservations attached to the core UN human rights treaties.   
 
3 OVERVIEW OF THE CORE TREATIES98 
Every one of the 193 UN Member States is a party to wo or more of the core human 
rights treaties. This wide-subscription mandates some attention to detail in the field 
of reservations. Though not all of the treaties elicit a large number of incompatible 
reservations, focusing on the regularity of the problem misses the point. If human 
rights are to be realised every effort must be made to curtail any potential loophole 
states may use to ignore international obligations. Briefly reviewing the core human 
rights treaties it is clear that universal compliance is the exception, rather than the 
rule, when it comes to reservations. The implication f such manipulation of 
obligations is not a testament to the aim of advancing human rights no matter what 
justification is given. 
The following provides an overview of the reservations to the core human 
rights treaties in order of entry into force of each treaty. CERD currently catalogues 
reservations by fifty-three of the 174 State Parties. There are objections by twenty-
six states to one or more of the reservations. Of the 167 State Parties to the ICCPR, 
forty-six maintain reservations with twenty-two objecting states. There are forty-one 
reserving State Parties to the ICESCR with only fourteen objecting states out of a 
total of 160 State Parties. CEDAW currently has 186 State Parties and it is the 
second most subscribed to human rights treaty following the CRC. Though the 
number of parties to CEDAW is great, the level of agreement is far from it. Of the 
186 states ratifying or acceding to the agreement, fifty-nine retain a combined 
number of over 180 reservations despite an unusually high number of objections to 
those deemed incompatible with the treaty. This number excludes the dozen or so 
states which have withdrawn their reservations either unilaterally or subsequent to 
objections by other State Parties. 
Despite reinforcing a customary rule of international law, the CAT retains 
thirty-eight reservations among its 147 State Parties, the majority of which address 
procedural issues such as automatic referral of dispute  to the ICJ and the necessity 
                                                





of state approval before procedures of inquiry may t ke place within a state’s 
territory. The CRC is subject to reservations by sixty-two of its 193 State Parties with 
twelve objecting states. The ICRMW has forty-four State Parties with thirteen states 
maintaining reservations and no objections. The CRPD maintains the lowest 
reservation numbers in relation to its number of parties with only fourteen of the 103 
State Parties maintaining reservations though there are also several interpretative 
declarations. The ICED boasts the lowest number of reservations but this 
corresponds to the fact that it has the smallest number of parties and only entered into 
force in December of 2010. Only three of its twenty- ine State Parties have made 
reservations, two of whom titled them as ‘declarations’. 
The acute problem surrounding reservations to CEDAW was the focus of 
general recommendations made by the CEDAW Committee in 1987 and 1992. The 
HRC and CAT Committee have also addressed the issueof reservations in general 
comments. The main problem is that to ascertain the specific obligations undertaken 
by each of the reserving states it is necessary to evaluate each individual reservation 
and any objections thereto, a task that the average man, or woman in the case of the 
protections created by the reservation-riddled CEDAW, is unlikely to be able to 
decipher on his/her own. These instances are when state parties must rebut the 
presumption that they ‘care little about reservations affecting how another state treats 
its own citizens’ and object to reservations that thwart the ‘high purpose’ of the 
treaty.99 
 
4 THE SOVEREIGNTY CONUNDRUM 
It is obvious from the outset that the 193 Member States of the UN are highly diverse 
on cultural, religious, political and economic levels. However, in the face of diversity 
it is still important to acknowledge that there aresome rights which exist by virtue of 
being born a human being, no matter where that might be. As with all concepts in 
international law, each advance in universality is limited by the sovereignty of states. 
Peculiar to human rights is that the heart lies with the people while the head lies with 
the sovereign. Thus it is a great conundrum how to reconcile the advancement of 
human rights treaty obligations with the current reservations practice. 
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One of oldest rules of international law is the concept that a state may only be 
bound to a treaty to the extent to which they have gi n consent. This is based of the 
long-standing concept of absolute sovereignty. However, implicit to international 
human rights is the challenge to the traditional Westphalian concept of state 
sovereignty. It can be framed no other way when one f the primary aims of the 
movement is to create a less state-centric basis for ndividual protections by ensuring 
that states be held accountable for violations of rights. As noted by Claude and 
Weston, the classical international law doctrine of state sovereignty and its corollary 
of non-intervention are the central props of the state-centric system that this 
generation has inherited.100   
 
The values associated with this doctrine (a legal license to ‘do your own 
thing’) and corollary (an injunction to ‘mind your own business’) rest in 
uneasy balance with human rights concerns (which seem to tell us that 
‘you are your brother’s and sister’s keeper’).101 
 
This makes it difficult to determine when it is appro riate for one state to criticise 
another for its human rights performance. What must be curbed is the idea that 
human rights recognition involves a set of choices b tween sovereignty and rights. 
Though to some extent this will always be marginally true, if the current prolific 
reservation practice is not curtailed there is no hope of building an effective 
protection system.  
Many states persist in treating human rights agreements as, in the words of 
Boyle and Chinkin, an à la carte menu which results in very different agreements 
when it is time for ratification.102 The inability of some states to break-away from the 
stalwarts of complete, self-effacing sovereignty is evident not only by the 
modification of obligations pursuant to reservations but also in blatant statements 
made in various declarations such as those of Cuba and Indonesia made upon 
ratifying the CAT indicating that Article 20 would have to be invoked in strict 
compliance with the principle of the sovereignty of states. Article 20 concerns CAT 
Committee inquiries into systematic torture and could include territory visits with the 
consent of the State Party. Understandably, territorial integrity is one of the 
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cornerstones of state sovereignty however this particular show of reluctance in the 
face of grave treaty violations seems incongruous fr states claiming to deplore acts 
of torture. 
Some authors view the pursuit of universal compliance with identical human 
rights treaty obligations as a waste of time and prefer to adopt instead a ‘margin of 
appreciation’ that provides flexibility on marginal issues while maintaining a 
stronger compliance agenda with respect to core rights.103 This ill-advised path tends 
to focus on the rights in a national context but misses the point that state parties 
rarely have the facilities to explore the scope of obligations of other state parties on 
that level as they are already burdened with ensurig that their own house is in order. 
The further states depart from the agreed treaty tex s, the less meaningful the human 
rights treaty system as a whole becomes. 
 
5 FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
Whether reservations are essential to international tre ty practice is a non-issue due 
to the fact that they are here to stay. The true issue lays in the lacuna that exists in 
guidance when these residual reservations rules are applied to reservations to human 
rights treaties due to the normative ambiguity that is created. Human rights 
obligations, in all of their forms, necessitate a concerted effort on the part of states to 
realise the protections embodied in the core human rights treaties. The objects of 
these obligations, the people, deserve nothing less. 
 Recognising the different types of rights protected by human rights treaties 
and the categories of reservations that manipulate these rights illuminates discordant 
state practice. Sweeping reservations create an indeterminable maze that can in no 
way be navigated by other state parties. Reservations subordinating obligations to 
domestic law or custom also blind other states as to how obligations are actually 
implemented on the domestic level, thus depriving them of a true view into human 
rights protections by other treaty members. States rely upon the promotional aspect 
of ratification because on an international level that is what will be remembered, 
regardless of the shoddy implementation on the domestic l vel.104  
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It is the lack of guidance on reservations that enables substandard 
implementation on the domestic level yet it is not merely the implementation that 
suffers. The corpus of international law is also affected by the disjointed practice 
because the meagre rules that currently exist can be easily disregarded by states 
choosing their own interpretation of Vienna Conventio  articles. Though it would 
seem that the Vienna Convention reservations rules are ill-suited to govern 
reservations to human rights treaties in light of the reservation practice illustrated 
above, the next chapter will highlight that designated review mechanisms, including 
states and judicial organs, are capable of applying the rules to evaluate reservations if 






M ECHANISMS OF REVIEW  
 
The previous chapter illustrated the variety of rese vations made to human rights 
treaties and the normative uncertainty caused by many of them. The acceptability of 
reservations as envisioned by the Vienna Convention–based on the acceptance or 
objection to reservations by other state parties–presents another unsettled aspect of 
the Vienna Convention regime. The Vienna Convention prohibition of reservations 
incompatible with Article 19 has done nothing to quell the stream of arguably invalid 
reservations to human rights treaties. The Vienna Convention recognises two options 
for resolving the acceptability of reservations. The first is the opportunity for states 
to either accept or object to reservations formulated at the time of ratification by new 
state parties; the second is a general principle of international law which provides 
resort to a dispute settlement body, such as the ICJ,1 in the event of a dispute 
between states as to the fulfilment of treaty obligations. To be clear, however, there 
is a difference between acceptability of a reservation and permissibility of a 
reservation, a point that will be examined in more detail below.   
The current practice of states making objections based on incompatibility is 
not specified in the Vienna Convention rules yet it has developed as the primary 
policing mechanism for reservations. Due to the lack of guidance on such a practice, 
objections have provided relatively little impetus to reserving states to remove 
offending reservations. Recalling Chapter Two, invalid reservations include those 
that are impermissible due to incompatibility with Vienna Convention Article 19 as 
well as those reservations that fail for other reasons, whether structural or procedural, 
and include reservations that violate other principles of treaty law set forth in the 
Vienna Convention. Some observers argue that impermissible reservations are void 
ab initio2 and therefore objections are unnecessary, however, this view does not have 
universal acceptance as will be discussed in Chapter Fiv . Reserving states have only 
been compelled to act on their invalid reservations when the issue has been addressed 
                                                
1 Recognised in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969 (Vienna 
Convention), Art. 66; Statute of the ICJ, 26 June 1945, Art. 36. 
2 E.T. Swaine, ‘Reserving’ (2006) 31 Yale Journal of Internatio l Law 307, 315; D.W. Bowett, 
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by an alternative dispute settlement mechanism, such as a court of law. However, 
history has proven that states are reluctant to bring court actions against other states 
when they have no vested interest at stake even where a reserving state seems to be 
violating the object and purpose of a treaty. An inter-state application requesting the 
ICJ to evaluate the permissibility of a reservation using the object and purpose test as 
outlined in the Genocide Opinion has yet to materialise. Regional human rights 
systems are the more probable fora for a reservation challenge to arise as it is before 
the regional supervisory organs that individuals have been invested with an 
international personality which enables them to apply to have their rights enforced. 
Nonetheless, the contribution of international organs has assisted in shaping the 
debate surrounding reservations to human rights treaties by proving that the Vienna 
Convention reservation rules can be used to render an opinion on reservation 
validity.  
This chapter reviews states and international organs as mechanisms of review 
of reservation validity. Section one will examine the contemporary practice of states 
as self-declared arbiters of reservation permissibility. The role of the judiciary in the 
development of reservations practice and the potential of the courts to provide review 
will be explored in section two. 
 
1   REGULATING RESERVATIONS THROUGH STATE OBJECTIONS 
Just as states have the right to make reservations they also have the right to object to 
reservations made by other states. The Vienna Convention reservations regime sets 
up a state-policing system in an effort to keep reservations in check. Article 20 
outlines the parameters of acceptance and objection to reservations but it is Article 
21 that has been interpreted as the loose basis of the state-policing system by 
delineating the legal effect of reservations and objections (see Annex II). Present 
practice allows states to object on any grounds, including political considerations or 
incompatibility with the convention. The striking omission in the actual reservations 
rules is the lack of acknowledgement of invalid rese vations, thus the practice of 
objecting to reservations based on invalidity has developed in conjunction with the 
rules rather than as the exercise of a specific rule. Article 19 attempts to stave off any 





as the basis of the problems surrounding reservations  human rights treaties as the 
subsequent reservations articles address the legal effect of valid reservations and only 
in the context of relationships between states which has little relevance to human 
rights treaties.   
The focus of this research deals expressly with reservations to which 
objections based on incompatibility have been made but, as pointed out by Seibert-
Fohr, objections to admissible reservations might also be formulated.3 She logically 
contends that Article 21 applies only to objections made to admissible reservations as 
it expressly states in paragraph 1 that it applies to reservations made ‘in accordance 
with articles 19, 20 and 23’.4 This contention is also supported by Aust as he points 
out that ‘[t]he rules in Article 21 on the legal effects of reservations refer to 
reservations ‘established’ in accordance with Articles 19, 20 and 23, and it is hard to 
see how one could validly establish a reservation when it is prohibited by Article 
19’.5 This point highlights that there is no contemplation of how to resolve 
competing views on incompatibility in the Vienna Convention regime. Article 21 is 
the only provision addressing the legal effect of reservations and objections thus 
there remains nothing but silence on the issue of incompatible reservations. The 
apparent assumption that incompatible reservations would be null and void has 
proved to be an ill-conceived notion as will be discussed in Chapter Five.   
The lack of guidance in Article 19 as to who is thearbiter on permissibility 
and in Article 21 on the ‘Legal effects of reservations and of objections to 
reservations’ gives birth to the wide-ranging problems which exist with reservations 
to the non-reciprocal obligations found in human rights treaties. Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that Article 20 is not contingent upon the object and purpose test and 
therefore states may accept reservations even if the reservation fails the object and 
purpose test,6 which is another contingency that exacerbates the normative 
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Lieden/Boston 2004), p. 203.  
4 Ibid., p. 204. 
5 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2d ed. (CUP, Cambridge 2007), p. 146, citing R.D. 
Kearney and R.E. Dalton, ‘The Treaty on Treaties’ (1970) 64 AJIL 495, 512. 
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Treaties’ (1993) 64 BYBIL 245, 276; C.A. Bradley and J.L. Goldsmith, ‘Treaties, Human Rights, and 





ambiguities addressed by this thesis. In theory, the Vienna Convention allows state 
parties to come to their own conclusion regarding the acceptability of reservations,7 
and a contraindication on acceptability is articulated by issuing an objection to the 
offending reservation. Under this system, objections serve as a form of insurance 
whereby non-reserving states are able to ‘recapture some of the insurance benefits 
that reserving states capture in exempting their future conduct’.8 This is the basis of 
the reciprocal function of treaty obligations envisioned by the Vienna Convention. 
However, this practice, as previously noted in Chapter Two, has developed 
on the back of the fallacy imbedded in the Vienna Convention that reservations 
formulated are valid–compliant with Article 19–and otherwise cannot be made and 
that the obligations of the treaty are reciprocal. Objections based in invalidity or 
impermissibility were not specifically addressed by the Vienna Convention, thus 
tangential doctrines9 on the legal effects of objections based on invalidity have also 
developed as a form of lex ferenda, though practice has proved that these doctrines 
produce less than definitive results. For the most par , states have been reluctant to 
address the normative lacunae in the reservations system due largely to contentions 
grounded in sovereignty debates. Bayefsky has stressed that the current reservation 
mechanisms are relics of the past and were created when the arguments about 
interference in domestic jurisdiction, a necessary sacrifice in the human rights 
regime, were at their peak and to which there are still a large number of states who 
advocate the persisting loopholes.10   
Therefore the purpose and value of objections based on invalidity must be 
considered. The Vienna Convention text does not conemplate what happens to a 
reservation in the instance it has been the object of an objection based on 
incompatibility with Article 19 or invalidity based on another general principle of 
law. It has been suggested that an objection creates a bilateral relationship between 
                                                
7 Swaine, ‘Reserving’, 311. 
8 Ibid., 311. 
9 The effect of these state judgments typically play out under one of three doctrines—permissiblity, 
opposability or severability—that purport to address the legal ffect of the opposed reservation and 
will be examined in Chapter 5. 
10 A.F. Bayefsky, ‘Making Human Rights Treaties Work’ in R.P. Claude and B.H. Weston (eds.), 
Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action, 3rd ed. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 





the reserving and objecting states,11 however this point is not necessarily felicitous 
when considering reservations to human rights treaties since the states receive no 
reciprocal benefits from one another. In fact, Swaine cites the communicative value 
of objections as a main reason for objecting in light of the inadequate legal incentives 
to do so in a human rights treaty.12  
The legal effect anticipated by the Vienna Convention is the entry into force 
(or not) of the treaty between the reserving state and other state parties and the 
exemption of obligations to the extent of reservations between states based on 
acceptance or objection. As indicated in Article 21(3), if the objecting state has not 
opposed entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving state then the 
subject provisions of the reservation will not be applied between the two states in 
their relations with one another to the extent thate reservation has limited them. 
For an accepting state, the treaty will be modified between the two states to the 
extent of the reservation in its relations with thereserving state (Article 21(1)(b)), 
which creates the form of ‘insurance’ for the accepting state suggested by Swaine.13 
This is an ideal and logical outcome when there are mutual obligations between 
states. However, when the treaty type is not one which establishes mutual obligations 
or duties owed between states the significance of the reservation pales for the class of 
potential objecting states. There is no legal duty to a potential objector that is being 
curtailed, nor will the objector’s legal obligations be affected. As noted by Schabas: 
 
Where the legal value of objections is discounted, he real issue is not 
whether a human rights instrument enters into force between reserving 
and objecting states, or between a reserving state and all other parties. 
Rather, it is whether the instrument enters into force between the 
reserving state and ‘all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction,’ to cite the formulation used in the [ICCPR] and employed 
with slight variation in the other human rights instruments.14  
 
                                                
11 C. Chinkin, ‘Reservations and Objections to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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12 Swaine, ‘Reserving’, 340. 
13 Ibid., 311. 
14 W.A. Schabas, ‘Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Time for Innovation and Reform’ (1994) 
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Under the Vienna Convention and the practice that has developed in light of 
its reservations regime, it is entirely incumbent upon state parties to review and 
object to reservations that do no more than perpetuat  non-attainment of human 
rights obligations whether it be by reservations that clearly contravene Article 19(c), 
are sweeping or which subordinate international obligations to domestic law or 
customs. Whether states will actually take the time and political step of monitoring 
reservations to human rights treaties is the prevailing question. Despite the increasing 
number of objections to such reservations, Hylton notes the tacit acceptance 
provision of Vienna Convention Article 20(5) ensures that reserving states, even 
those authoring incompatible reservations, will almost always become a party to the 
treaty because most states lack the resources and official capacity to object.15 
Furthermore, because ‘objections to reservations may be viewed as politically 
unfriendly acts which States may be unwilling to make (objections) towards States 
with whom they have significant trading, strategic or other interests’.16 
Fortunately, time is proving that states are slowly taking up the task and the 
ILC has observed that ‘[i]t is the area of human rights that the most reservations have 
been made and the liveliest debates on their validity have taken place.’17 Despite the 
lively debate, the 2007 ILC Report to the General Assembly pointedly referred to the 
small number of states which actually formulate objections to reservations and it 
sought input from a broader swath of states as part of its research in preparation for 
its proposed general guidelines on reservations.18 Ultimately, the ILC received 
minimal input from states, signifying apathy for the topic.19 The typical situation 
surrounding treatment of reservations by most state, as summarised by Aust, fails to 
accommodate the practical constraints of the domestic administrative system: 
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17 ILC, Commentary on Draft Guideline 3.1.12 on Reservations to Treaties, R port to the General 
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Every week foreign ministries will be notified of new reservations. 
They will have to consider whether they are acceptable nd, if not, what 
to do about them. Officials, including legal advisers, can be hampered 
by the misunderstandings and uncertainties which surround the 
subject...The other side of the coin is that foreign ministries will also 
have to consider carefully whether their state should make reservations 
to treaties which they wish to ratify.20 
  
The reality is that most states do nothing to contradict an invalid reservation because 
they have little incentive to do so21 and, thus, invalid reservations stand. Under the 
Vienna Convention there is no designated final arbite  on the compatibility of invalid 
reservations. States claim that determining validity is their right alone. Treaty bodies, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Six, insist that rese vation evaluation is integral to 
their remit. The point is that exactly who should, and who does, evaluate reservations 
is ambiguous therefore reservations have no common reference point against which 
they can currently be measured. This is undoubtedly a reflection of the nature of 
human rights treaties and the fact that the obligations are not reciprocal between state 
parties. States lose nothing when another state party makes an incompatible 
reservation to a human rights treaty whether they object or not. The true losers are 
those subjects of the reserving state.  
 
1.1 OBJECTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS IN CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE22 
It must be acknowledged that the number of objecting states and frequency of 
objections to incompatible reservations is steadily increasing as states begin to take a 
more human rights-centred approach to policy decisions. This section provides 
examples of state objections in contemporary human rights treaty practice in order to 
illustrate the normative gaps persisting in the Vienna Convention system. It is by no 
means exhaustive but intended primarily to reflect the wider problem associated with 
the normative value of the state-policing system. 
Despite the traditionally apathetic treatment of rese vations by many states, 
the power of objections cannot be overlooked. The reservation made by Yemen to 
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CERD Article 5 elicited objections from fourteen State Parties on the basis that it 
was incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty because the provisions it 
reserved were fundamental rights and would result in discrimination to the detriment 
of certain sectors of the population.23 Though this does not invoke the two-thirds 
minimum necessary to automatically invalidate a reservation pursuant to CERD 
Article 20(2), the point was made and Yemen withdrew the reservation. This is not 
the only example where a concerted effort has result d in the withdrawal of a 
reservation viewed as failing to pass the object and purpose test and though the 
examples are few and far between, efforts by states to encourage withdrawal of 
offending reservations can be seen across the core treaties.  
Upon ratifying the CAT, Chile made a reservation indicating that it would not 
apply the provisions of Article 2(3) to subordinate personnel where a superior officer 
insisted on continuing with acts referred to in Article 1 following a challenge by the 
subordinate, pursuant to the Chilean domestic law princi le of ‘obedience upon 
reiteration’ as enshrined in the Chilean Military Code of Justice. The purpose of 
Article 2(3) is expressly to prevent any officer, at any level, recourse to a defence 
that he was acting under orders to perpetrate torture and it is a fundamental 
obligation expressed in the Convention. The Chilean reservation to Article 3 claimed 
the article was drafted in a ‘discretionary and subjective nature’. The Article 3 
reservation further left the door open for Chile to implement obligations on a whim, 
contrary to the purpose of the CAT. Twenty State Parties objected to Chile’s 
reservations indicating that they were incompatible with the object and purpose of 
the CAT and several noted that the reservations also violated Article 19(c) of the 
Vienna Convention. Chile ultimately withdrew its reservations to Articles 2(3) and 3 
of the CAT which was the goal of the objecting states.  
The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden each objected to a reservation made 
by Djibouti to the CRC which professed the state’s intent to not consider itself bound 
by any of the articles that were incompatible with its religion or traditional values. 
With only three objections Djibouti withdrew the reservation in December 2009.24 
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Questions will clearly remain as to whether this has had any impact on the 
implementation on convention rights in Djibouti, or any other state which withdraws 
a reservation, however this question is outwith the scope of the current thesis and 
generally rests with the treaty bodies as monitors f convention rights. These 
examples indicate that objections have a tangible va ue, especially when the invalid 
reservation is withdraw, however, when an invalid reservation is not withdrawn, 
there is no hard and fast rule to indicate where the reservation and its author stand in 
the wake of an invalidity determination by another state party. 
 Unfortunately, the successful campaigns to get incompatible reservations 
withdrawn are overshadowed by the large number of incompatible reservations that 
remain attached to the core treaties. Botswana’s reservation against the CAT, as set 
forth in Chapter Three, section 2.5, was the object of an objection by Denmark, 
among others, impressing the unacceptability of the vague nature of the reservation 
due to the fact that Botswana gave no information rega ding what constitutes torture 
in Botswana. Denmark included that the Convention wuld be in force in its entirety 
between the two states without Botswana benefiting from the reservation, an 
assertion of the severability doctrine which will be discussed in Chapter Five. The 
statement indicating that Botswana will not receive th  benefit of the reservation 
implies that Demark is the final arbiter of the extent to which Botswana consents to 
be bound by the CAT. However, this does not align with contemporary rules of 
international law whereby a state has the sole power to determine the extent of its 
consent to be bound. The importance of this point is hat the recognised treaty 
obligations of Botswana and the validity of the reservation are left in limbo. 
  Finland’s objection to Bangladesh’s reservation t CAT Article 14 echoed 
the position that the reservation violated the principle that a state may not invoke the 
provisions of its domestic law as justification for a failure to perform its treaty 
obligations and that the treaty would remain in force between the two without 
Bangladesh benefiting from the reservation.25 It is apparent from the nature of the 
rights reserved against that reservations affecting absolute rights, especially the 
prohibition against torture, attract the highest number of objections. As Aust has 
pointed out, the compatibility test must be applied objectively and if a reservation 
                                                





has been objected to by even one state on the grounds of failure to satisfy the object 
and purpose test then the reserving state is obliged by the principle of good faith to 
reconsider the reservation.26 However, observation of the good faith principle is 
rarely, if ever, responsible for the withdrawal of a reservation.  
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is one of the most active 
reservation monitoring states and particularly is the state most attentive to CEDAW 
reservations it deems contrary to aims of the treaty h ving objected to reservations 
made by thirty states. In short, the Netherlands objected to reservations–or 
interpretive declarations resulting in reservations–it deemed vague and centred on the 
idea that national law or Islamic Sharia law would prevail in any instance where 
these may be in conflict with CEDAW. To underline its point, the Netherlands 
stated: 
 
[T]hat such reservations, which seek to limit the responsibilities of the 
reserving State under the Convention by invoking the general principles 
of national law and the Constitution, may raise doubts as to the 
commitment of this State to the object and purpose of the Convention 
and, moreover contribute to undermining the basis of international 
treaty law. It is in the common interest of States that treaties to which 
they have chosen to become parties should be respect d, as to object 
and purpose, by all parties.27 
  
The Netherlands’ objection to general references to I lamic Sharia law were echoed 
by a many CEDAW State Parties, however, to date none f the State Parties 
maintaining reservations based on general incompatibility with Sharia law have 
withdrawn these reservations. In each instance, the Netherlands specified that the 
objection would not prevent the treaty from going ito force between it and the 
reserving state. There the situation remains. Reservations which are clearly contrary 
to the object and purpose of the treaty are maintained despite objections. In light of 
the reservation being maintained, the question of purpose and value must be asked. 
Clearly the Netherlands does not intend to exclude the provisions against which the 
other states have reserved, however all states have been put on notice that 
Netherlands does not consider these types of reservations valid which could, if a 
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dispute was ever taken to a dispute settlement body, provide support for a final 
decision on the invalidity of the reservations.  
Of the two options for legal effect provided by the Vienna Convention, the 
first allows the reserving state to become a party to the treaty when there are no 
objections since in the absence of objections states r  deemed to have accepted the 
reservation;28 the second option is that the objecting state can negate entry into force 
between itself and the reserving state.29 In the above example it is inconsequential in 
a practical context for the Netherlands to preclude entry into force of the treaty 
between it and a reserving state because the Sharia reservation in no way affects the 
people of the Netherlands. Additionally, the Vienna Convention gives no guidance as 
to what happens to the reservation in the event of objections. In the Netherlands 
example, the incompatible reservations have been maintained. These examples 
demonstrate that the law governing reservations is violable at its best and, at its 
worst, is in complete disarray due to lack of guidance. 
 
1.2 FORWARD THINKING EFFORTS 
Several European states have put in place special monitoring arrangements in order 
to normalise responses to invalid reservations, particular the Nordic states.30 The 
Council of Europe (COE) has also called upon its Memb r States to take a 
coordinated approach in objecting to reservations.31 In 1999, out of concern over ‘the 
increasing number of inadmissible reservations to in ernational treaties, especially 
reservations of a general character,’ the COE adopte  a recommendation on 
responses to inadmissible reservations to internatio l treaties highlighting that the 
Vienna Convention did not envisage ‘the formulation f reservations of a general 
character’.32 The recommendation set out model responses to both reservations of a 
general nature, including sweeping and subordinatio reservations, and those that 
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were specifically deemed to contravene the object and purpose of the treaty. 
Subsequently, COE states do seem to have adopted this general approach as 
evidenced in the formulation of the objections to Pakistan’s ICCPR reservations to 
the ICCPR and CAT. The effect of the concerted efforts on the withdrawal of 
reservations remains to be seen. 
 
1.3 SUMMARY  
While it is clear in practice that objections often serve a valuable communicative 
purpose and occasionally lead to the withdrawal of invalid reservations, the fact is 
that the practice of making objections to invalid reservations to human rights treaties 
has developed outwith the Vienna Convention rules. The Vienna Convention did not 
envision invalid reservations as the subject of the acceptance and objection system 
set up in Articles 20 and 21, thus states have adapte  the rules as necessary to convey 
their views on the validity of reservations. This has increased the normative 
uncertainty surrounding invalid reservations as state  tend to have their own views 
on the legal effect of invalid reservation. Nonetheless, objection activity does signal 
a desire on the part of states to keep invalid reservations in check which can only 
strengthen the human rights treaty system. 
 
2 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ORGANS 
There are relatively few cases that have required a court to evaluate the validity of a 
reservation. This is not surprising considering that e primary way that a reservation 
would come under the examination of a court is in the course of a contentious case 
which on the international level can happen only where a state has consented to the 
jurisdiction of the adjudicating organ. Political considerations combined with the fact 
that states are not the beneficiaries of human rights treaties have created an apathetic 
atmosphere where states are not willing to bring concerns about invalid reservations 
to the fore outwith the closed treaty system where a state can freely make an 
objection with minimal effect. Thus, while in theory an international court is the 
ideal forum for reservations review, the reality of the practice once again reveals that 
the Vienna Convention default system stymies any corre tive procedure because 





Together, the ICJ, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights have contributed to the reservations debate not 
only with their decisions but also because their decisions have inspired prolific 
academic writing on the issues taken up when considering reservations to 
international conventions. Though not entirely on the point of UN human rights 
treaties examined by this thesis, the region-specific treaty organs have enriched the 
arguments surrounding the evaluation of reservations pursuant to the Vienna 
Convention and its application to human rights treaties.  
It has been suggested that ‘the right of a tribunal to determine the validity of a 
reservation is not completely clear in international law because of the possibility of 
infringement on a state’s sovereignty’.33 However, if state sovereignty was an 
automatic and complete bar to judicial review neither the ICJ nor regional human 
rights courts would have cause to exist since their purpose is to adjudicate disputes 
among states, including those involving treaty interpr tation. As will be discussed 
below, the question of the right of a judicial organ to determine the validity of 
reservations is largely resolved by state consent to the jurisdiction of one or more of 
the judicial organs examined herein. The past three d cades of adjudication by 
international tribunals has advanced the law of reservations and also provided 
precedents for interpreting particular aspects of rese vations. Unfortunately, the 
capable international courts are limited by the refusal of states to hold fellow 
sovereigns to account. 
 
2.1 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
There are issues that should not be left to the stat to decide, especially when there is 
a dispute between states, and the interpretation of the terms of a reservation is one of 
these instances.34 On the international level, the ICJ is the primary judicial organ 
competent to entertain disputes between states regardin  interpretation of a treaty 
and/or a breach of an international obligation, such as breach of a human rights treaty 
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obligation.35 Special Rapporteurs on the topic of treaty law–recall the discussion of 
Brierly, especially, in Chapter Two–as well as many uthors and governments at the 
time of the preparation of the Vienna Convention favoured resort to the ICJ to settle 
disputes over the validity of reservations36 but this desire was not a harbinger of 
practice that would come to pass. Five of the core UN human rights treaties 
incorporated articles designating the ICJ as the automatic forum for dispute 
resolution in the instance that state parties have unr solved issues regarding one of 
these treaties.37 Disputes arising under the treaties without express di pute provisions 
may still be referred to the ICJ pursuant to Article 36 of the Statute of the Court.  
The cornerstone of ICJ jurisdiction is state consent. Because states must 
consent to ICJ jurisdiction either ipso facto38 or on an ad hoc39 basis, a state 
formulating an invalid reservation will not necessarily be subjected to review by the 
ICJ even if another state attempts to bring an action o have the validity of a 
reservation determined. Regardless of the type of right being violated, the legal 
personality of the holder of the right or the nature of obligation, there can be no 
review of a reservation affecting these at the international level unless the allegedly 
violating state has consented to jurisdiction.  
The ICJ has played a relatively small role in the rese vations debate since 
delivering its Genocide Opinion in 1951. It is not that the ICJ has not addressed 
                                                
35 Statute of the ICJ, Art. 36(2). 
36 See P.-H. Imbert, ‘Reservations and Human Rights Conventions’ (1981) 6 Human Rights Review 
28, 45. 
37 CERD, Art. 22; CEDAW, Art. 29; CAT, Art. 30; and ICED, Art. 42, all contain clauses similar to 
the following as outlined in the ICRMW, Art. 92:  
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present Convention that is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of 
one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for 
arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organizatio  of the arbitration, any one of 
those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in 
conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or ratification of the present Convention or 
accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of the present 
article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect to any State 
Party that has made such a declaration. 
The CERD does not contain an equivalent para. 2. It must also be noted that there are often steps 
taken to resolve disputes prior to resorting to the ICJ, for example, the inter-state dispute mechanisms 
set forth in CERD, Arts. 11-16. 
38 Statute of the ICJ, Art. 36(2).  





reservations in any form as reservations have featur d in several decisions40 by the 
Court; however, for the purpose of this research, the principles of law discussed in 
relation to reservations in many of these cases departs from that which is under 
examination here. More relevant to the subject under review are the cases in which 
the Court has had occasion to reinforce its opinion that reservations to human rights 
treaties are permitted as long as they do not contravene the object and purpose of the 
convention. These occasions have thus far arisen in the form of reservations to 
Article IX of the Genocide Convention (compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ over 
disputes arising under the Convention). Most recently, the Court upheld the validity 
of the Rwandan reservation to Article IX thereby dism ssing a petition by the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo due to ‘a manifest lack of jurisdiction’41 despite 
the fact that the alleged violations breached not only the Genocide Convention but 
also customary international law.42  
Other examples include the 1999 dismissals of Yugoslavia’s complaints 
against the United States and Spain for alleged genocide in connection with the 
Kosovo conflict. The Court reiterated its 1951 opinion that reservations to the 
Genocide Convention are generally permitted and that reservations to Article IX are 
not contrary to the Convention’s object and purpose.43 Though these cases dealt with 
the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Genocide 
Convention the decisions gave little guidance on the application of the object and 
purpose test. This is not a shocking revelation considering that the ICJ had already 
contemplated just such a reservation in the G nocide Opinion. Furthermore, the 
response to a reservation against the automatic jursdiction of the ICJ was not 
unforeseen as it is a reservation which is quite ofn repeated to both the Genocide 
Convention and the other human rights treaties with automatic dispute resolution 
clauses. Thus, while setting the stage for the tumultuo s story of reservations, the ICJ 
has in the past sixty years had no occasion to actually tilise the test it developed to 
                                                
40 e.g. Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua; North-Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases (Germany v. Denmark/Netherlands), 1969 ICJ Reports 3, 20 Feb. 1969; Interhandel Case 
(Switzerland v. United States), Preliminary Objections, 1959 ICJ Reports 6, 21 Mar. 1959. 
41 Armed Activities (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), New Application: 2002, 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2006 ICJ Reports 6, 3 Feb. 2006, para. 25. 
42 Ibid., paras. 66, 67 
43 Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, 1999 
ICJ Reports 916, 2 Jun. 1999, paras. 22, 25; Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), 





ascertain the validity of a reservation to one of the obligations found in the core UN 
human rights treaties. It has only repeated the fundamental point of its Genocide 
Opinion that states may make reservations that do not contravene the object and 
purpose test, such as with regard to an Article IX reservation.  
Were a state not to have made a reservation to Article IX, the next issue to 
consider would be the nature of the obligation and to whom the obligation is owed. 
When considering the viability of a claim in international law it must be recalled that 
‘only the party to whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in 
respect of its breach’.44 As discussed in previous chapters, human rights obligations, 
with a few exceptions, are due to individuals under th  jurisdiction of the state, not 
other states. Though ‘the principles underlying the(Genocide Convention) are 
principles which are recognised by civilised nations as binding on States even 
without any conventional obligation’45 it is clear that all human rights obligations as 
set forth in the many UN human rights conventions are not of the same 
unquestionable nature. This idea was a primary contention of the Court in its 
opinion.46 Thus the nature of the right allegedly violated should be examined to 
ascertain whether an inter-state suit could be brought to the ICJ in the event that 
consent to jurisdiction is given. 
The proliferation of human rights treaties has increased the catalogue of 
obligations and it is untenable to suggest that there are not differences among these. 
In the Barcelona Traction case the ICJ made clear that some obligations are owed 
towards the international community as a whole because the nature of the rights are 
so important as to concern all states–obligations erga omnes.47 As outlined by the 
Court, erga omnes obligations are derived from international law and i clude the 
prevention of the crime of genocide and the obligation o protect people from slavery 
and racial discrimination,48 though not all derived from peremptory norms.49 While 
                                                
44 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ 
Reports 174, 11 Apr. 1949, pp. 181-82. 
45 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ Reports 15 (Genocide Opinion), p. 23. 
46 Ibid., p. 29. 
47 Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain, Second Phase), Judgment, 1970 ICJ Reports 3, 5 Feb.1970, 
p. 32, para. 33. 
48 Ibid., p. 32, para. 34. These particular obligations are derived from the Genocide Opinion, the 





breach of these particular rights allow any state to invoke the breach of erga omnes 
obligations as a basis for a contentious case, many of the rights protected by the core 
UN human rights treaties do not qualify as obligations erga omnes outwith the 
relationships established under a self-contained treaty regime thus the ability to bring 
an action to resolve a dispute will be limited accordingly. As pointed out by the 
Court, ‘the instruments which embody human rights do not confer on States the 
capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of their 
nationality’.50 Unless the complaining state is the entity to which the allegedly 
offending state owes a duty,51 which is rarely the case in the context of reservations, 
there will be no basis upon which the state may successfully bring a complaint at the 
ICJ. Furthermore, Zemanek observes that the existence of differing opinions 
evidenced by a reserving state and an objecting state makes it ‘doubtful which 
obligations the reserving state has accepted erga omnes, and in respect of which 
contracting parties relations under the convention exist’.52 This point underscores the 
difficulty in determining invalid reservations since many states may have different 
views about the same reservation. 
The ‘erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction 
are two different things’53, a legal reality that makes the issue of impermissible 
reservations no easier to address. The requisite consent to jurisdiction will not be 
ignored simply because the right allegedly violated is one that is a matter of jus 
cogens or an obligation erga omnes. Though the ‘crucial aspect of erga omnes 
obligations is…the manner in which they may eventually be enforced’54 in 
international law, in practice the opportunity is not taken up by states in the context 
of human rights. The separate opinion filed in Armed Activities (Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma) sought ‘to draw ttention to the 
significance of certain recent aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence in the matter of 
                                                                                                                           
that other erga omnes rights ‘are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-
universal character’.  
49 K. Zemanek, ‘New Trends in the Enforcement of Erga Omnes Obligations’ [2000] Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 1, 6-8 
50 Barcelona Traction, p. 47, para. 91. The Court was referring specifically to the protection against 
denial of justice. 
51 Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion, pp. 181-82, as relied upon in Barcelona Traction, p. 33, 
para. 35. 
52 Zemanek, ‘New Trends in the Enforcement of Erga Omnes Obligations’, 4. 
53 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1995 ICJ Reports 90, 30 Jun. 1995, para. 29. 





reservations’55 and implied that perhaps consent based jurisdiction d es not square 
with the evolving concept of obligations that are owed to the world community at 
large. Specifically the separate opinion pondered ‘the underlying reason for the 
Court’s repeated finding that a reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention 
is not contrary to the object and purpose of that treaty’.56 The consideration shown by 
the five judges seems to reflect a growing unease with the nonchalant attitude of 
states toward reservations to human rights treaties, especially those embodying jus 
cogens norms.57  
There have been efforts by various UN bodies to get th  ICJ to issue an 
advisory opinion on the validity and legal effect of reservations.58 The Women’s 
Committee has been particularly proactive in this campaign during the past twenty 
years, due in large part to the vast number of reservations to CEDAW. As of yet, 
neither the UNGA nor the Security Council has been p rsuaded to authorise such a 
request. An advisory opinion could provide states and treaty supervisory organs with 
much needed guidance on this issue though it is unlkely that it would resolve all of 
the issues that trouble reservations to human rights treaties. 
With rights and obligations of varying a nature being implemented in 
multifarious states it is logical to conclude that an independent court would be better-
placed to evaluate the positions of states to a disagreement about treaty interpretation 
and implementation. However, states have shown no enthusiasm for resort to the ICJ 
for a determination of reservation validity. Disputes over reservation validity seem to 
be battles not worth fighting at the ICJ level. In summary, the primary contribution 
of the ICJ was to introduce the object and purpose text, a test that seems to be a 
faceless judge whose rulings have yet to be defined ev n by its maker. 
                                                
55 Armed Activities, Separate Opinion, 2006 ICJ Reports 63, 3 Feb. 2006, para. 3. 
56 Ibid., para. 3. 
57 Especially with respect to Judge Higgins whose publications prior to her election to the Court 
tended to take a dim view of reservations to human rights treaties. See, for example, R. Higgins, 
‘Introduction’ in J.P. Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: 
Reservations and Objections to Human Rights Conventions (BIICL, London 1997); R. Higgins, 
‘Human Rights: Some Questions of Integrity’ (1989) 15 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 598. 
58 H.B. Schöpp-Schilling, ‘Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women: An Unresolved Issue or (No) New Developments’ in I. Ziemele 
(ed.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict, Harmony 
or Reconciliation (Martinus Nijhoff, Lieden/Boston 2004), pp. 16-17; Chinkin, ‘Reservations and 
Objections to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women’, p. 
81; W.A. Schabas, ‘Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1996) 18 Human 






2.2 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Unlike the ICJ, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has compulsory 
jurisdiction over disputes arising under the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms59 (ECHR). The ECHR was the first 
multilateral treaty to feature compulsory jurisdiction of its treaty organs over disputes 
arising under it and also to provide the opportunity for individuals to act on the 
international level to have their ECHR enumerated human rights enforced. Primarily 
the court has reviewed individual applications,60 however inter-state cases61 are 
allowed by ECHR Article 33 though they make up only a small percentage of actual 
applications, unlike the ICJ which only reviews inter-state cases.62 Thus, the issue of 
consent to jurisdiction that might thwart a case at the ICJ is not a problem for ECtHR 
with respect to adjudicating upon rights protected by the ECHR and, importantly, its 
decisions are automatically binding63 on the State Party. 
The automatic jurisdiction of ECtHR has enabled thecourt to enrich the 
reservations debate through several cases where it was necessary to evaluate a 
reservation. Much of the attention by the ECHR treaty organs has focused on the 
non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties. In Ireland v. the United Kingdom, the 
ECtHR emphasised that: 
 
…unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the [ECHR] 
comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between Contracting 
States. It creates over and above a network of mutual, bilateral 
undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of the Preamble, 
benefit from a ‘collective enforcement’.64 
                                                
59 ETS No. 005, 213 UNTS 221, 4 Nov. 1950, as amended by Protocol Ns. 11 and 14, entry into 
force 1 Jun. 2010 (ECHR). Art. 32 (1) provides: ‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto 
which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47.’  
60 Prior to the entry into force of Protocol 11 to the ECHR on 1 Jun. 2010, individual applications 
were first reviewed by the European Commission on Human Rights. Between 1959 and 2010 the 
ECtHR reached 13,697 judgments. See Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, European 
Court of Human Rights Annual Report 2010 (COE, Strasbourg 2011), p. 157. 
61 For example, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Series A, No. 25, 18 Jan. 1978; Cyprus v. Turkey 
[GC], No. 25781/94, § 78, ECtHR 2001-IV.   
62 R. Higgins, ‘Speech to the European Court of Human Rights on he occasion of the opening of the 
judicial year’ (30 Jan. 2009) in European Court of Human Rights Annual Report 2009 (COE, 
Strasbourg 2010), p. 42. 
63 ECHR, Art. 46. 






In other words, the obligations are important not only because the individual states 
bind themselves but also because the collective of states has undertaken to promote 
and protect the entirety of the ECHR. The Court disinguishes human rights treaties 
from other types of treaties based on the subject mat er and non-reciprocal nature, an 
argument common to those who oppose unfettered reservations to human rights 
treaties.65  
The basis of reservation analysis under the ECHR is found in Article 57–
formerly Article 6466–which requires that reservations not be of a ‘general character’ 
(Article 57(1)) and must ‘contain a brief statement of the law concerned’ (Article 
57(2)). The structural requirements of ECHR Article 57 have allowed the Court to 
declare reservations impermissible for want of Article 57 compliance rather than 
having to always engage the object and purpose test. The Court has continued to 
impress upon states the necessity of complying withthe structural requirements of 
Article 57 most often finding that those reservations that do provide references to the 
specific law as well as an indication of the subject matter of the law will not be 
adjudged invalid. Chorherr v. Austria exemplifies the ECtHR’s application of 
Article 57 where it found no violation of either article complained about because 
Austria’s reservation made it ‘possible for everyone to identify the precise laws 
concerned and to obtain…information regarding them’67.68 
Most notably the ECtHR has continued to advocate the severance principle69 
in the context of establishing the consequence of an invalid reservation. In Belilos v. 
Switzerland,70 the Court succinctly outlined that if a reservation was determined 
invalid then it was without effect and would be severable with the result that the 
obligation against which the invalid reservation was directed would still be in effect 
                                                
65 e.g. C. Redgwell, ‘Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 
24(52)’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 390; L. Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties: Ratify and 
Ruin? (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1995); Imbert, ‘Reservations to the ECHR Before the Strasbourg 
Commission’, 585. 
66 The change of article number was effected with the amendmts adopted in Protocol Nos. 11 (ETS 
No. 155) and 14 (CETS No. 194) which entered into force 1 Jun. 2010. 
67 ECtHR Series A, No. 266-B, 25 Aug. 1993, para. 21. 
68 See S. Marks, ‘Three Regional Human Rights Treaties and Their Experience of Reservations’ in 
J.P. Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: Reservations and 
Objections to Human Rights Conventions (BIICL, London 1997), p. 45. 
69 Discussed in more depth in Chapter 5, section 4.1. 





in its entirely for the reserving state.71 The case was, in fact, the first time an 
international tribunal had determined a reservation t  be invalid.72 Despite 
Switzerland’s contention that the ECHR State Parties had accepted the 
declaration/reservation by virtue of their silence th  Court pointedly clarified that 
‘[t]he silence of the depositary and the Contracting States does not deprive the 
Convention institutions of the power to make their own assessment.’73 The Court 
ultimately determined that the reservation in question (to ECHR Article 6(1)) was 
invalid and severable because it was not only of a general nature, contrary to Article 
57(1), but also because there was no ‘brief statement of the law concerned’ as 
required by Article 57(2).74  
Marks notes that in Belilos the ECtHR had four options once it determined 
that the Swiss reservation was invalid: firstly, the invalidity would have no effect; 
secondly, the invalid reservation would cause the applicable article (ECHR Article 6) 
to be inapplicable to Switzerland; thirdly, the invalid reservation would be ignored 
(severed) with Article 6 remaining applicable to Switzerland; or, finally, the Swiss 
ratification would be treated as a whole invalid resulting in Switzerland no longer 
being considered a party to the ECHR.75 Choosing the third option, the Court 
gambled that membership to the ECHR was more important to Switzerland than the 
exclusion of the provision against which it had rese ved and thus severed the 
reservation76 from its ratification.77 Counsel for Switzerland had actually admitted 
the prevailing importance of ECHR membership during the hearing,78 which 
arguably made the Court’s decision easier. The application of the severability 
                                                
71 Ibid., para. 60. For a discussion, see generally, H.J. Bourguignon, ‘The Belilos Case: New Light on 
Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’ (1988-89) 29 Virginia Journal of International Law 347; 
Macdonald, ‘Reservations under the European Convention on Human Rights’. 
72 Bourguignon, ‘The Belilos Case’, 380. 
73 Belilos, para. 47. 
74 The Court referred to then Art. 64 as was in force in 1988. See Bourguignon, ‘The Belilos Case’, 
362 et seq. 
75 Marks, ‘Three Regional Human Rights Treaties’, pp. 48-49. 
76 The reservation was actually titled a declaration however as applied it created a reservation. For an 
analysis of the distinctions, see D.M. McRae, ‘The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations’ (1978) 
49 BYBIL 155. For further comment on terminology distinction see S. Marks, ‘Reservations 
Unhinged:  The Belilos Case Before the European Court of Human Rights’ (1990) 39 ICLQ 300; I. 
Cameron and F. Horn, ‘Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights: The Belilos 
Case’ (1990) 33 German Yearbook of International Law 69; Imbert, ‘Reservations to the ECHR 
Before the Strasbourg Commission’. 
77 Belilos, para. 60. 





doctrine ultimately led to the state’s culpability in Belilos. Switzerland subsequently 
redrafted and resubmitted an amended reservation to the same article. This exercise 
in reformulation of reservation introduced a novel approach to rectifying 
impermissible reservations that will be discussed in the Chapter Five.  
The severance principle was confirmed by two subsequent European cases. In 
Weber v. Switzerland79 the Court examined the revised Swiss reservation to Article 
6(1) and found that due to the failure of the Swiss government to append ‘a brief 
statement of the law concerned’ as required by then-Article 64(2), the reservation 
was invalid.80 Recalling its Belilos judgment, the Court severed the reservation and 
applied the ordinary meaning of Article 6.81 Loizidou v. Turkey82 further cemented 
the Strasbourg approach83 when the ECtHR noted the special character of the ECHR 
and stated that the Convention regime ‘militates in favour of severance’84 and that 
Turkey’s ‘impugned restrictions [could] be severed from the instruments of 
acceptance…leaving intact the acceptance of the optional clauses’85.  These 1990 and 
1995, respectively, decisions put all ECHR State Parties on notice that a reservation, 
or any statement amounting to a reservation, must comply with the structural 
requirements for reservations as set forth in the Convention. 
Higgins notes that while some viewed the Loizidou case as departure from the 
ICJ jurisprudence on reservations,  
 
…any perceived bifurcation depends on what one believ s to have been 
the scope of the International Court’s judgment in he 1951 advisory 
opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, in particular 
whether it precluded a court from doing anything other than noting 
whether a particular State had objected to a reservation. 86 
 
Her opinion supports the reality that each case where a court must address the issue 
of reservations to a human rights treaty is an opportunity to further refine the 
                                                
79 Weber v. Switzerland (App. No. 10/1989/170/226), ECtHR Ser. A, No. 177, 22 May 1990. 
80 Ibid., paras. 37, 38. 
81 Ibid., para. 38. 
82 Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, (App. No. 40/1993/435/514), ECtHR Series A, No. 
310, 20 EHRR 99, 23 Mar. 1995. 
83 Severability is often referred to as the ‘Strasbourg approach’ as a result of the Court’s continued 
stance on continued applicability of reserved articles of the ECHR when a reservation to the article is 
deemed invalid. 
84 Loizidou, para. 96. 
85 Ibid., para. 97. 





application of the vague test created by the Genocide Opinion and promulgated by 
the Vienna Convention reservations regime. 
It must be pointed out that the ECtHR’s approach of severing an invalid 
reservation and leaving the reserving state bound to the reserved article is different 
from the Vienna Convention approach typically applied to the UN treaties examined 
in this thesis. Under the Vienna Convention approach, because only states determine 
validity amongst themselves, the invalid reservation may be applicable between the 
reserving state and accepting states while simultaneously being inapplicable between 
the reserving state and an objecting state. In the second scenario, the entirety of the 
article that is the object of the reservation will not be in effect as between the 
reserving and objecting states. This, however, proves an irrelevant point between the 
states in the context of non-reciprocal treaties, a point discussed earlier in Chapter 
Three and which will be further addressed in Chapter Five. 
The Belilos decision signified a crucial moment in the reservations debate as 
it departed from the state-centric view of states as the sole arbiters of validity. 
Furthermore, despite the recognition in both customary international law and the 
Vienna Convention of a state’s role in assessing a reservation either by acceptance of 
or objection to, the Belilos Court also excluded consideration of other Contracting 
Parties’ reactions, or lack thereof, when it, as a convention organ, was evaluating the 
validity of a reservation.87 With these decisions the ECtHR has been effective in 
bolstering the idea that when a supervisory organ is created specifically to oversee a 
convention, states are relieved of absolute control over reservation compatibility.  
 
2.2.1 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 
The reservations cases addressed by the now defunct88 European Commission on 
Human Rights (the Commission) merit consideration primarily because they laid the 
groundwork for the ECtHR’s seminal reservations decisions. As the organ to which 
individual applications alleging violations of the ECHR were first submitted, the 
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Commission was not only a supervisory organ set up specifically to oversee aspects 
of the ECHR but it also served as the gateway to the ECtHR. 
Some of the decisions by the Commission can be bestd cribed as 
inconsistent with both the ECtHR and its own catalogue of precedents. However, in 
the 1982 Temeltasch v. Switzerland case the Commission was successful in 
reinforcing its competence to evaluate reservations even in the event that other states 
may have accepted a reservation pursuant to Section III f the ECHR stating: 
 
…even assuming that some legal effect were to be attributed to an 
acceptance or an objection made in respect of a reservation to the 
Convention, this could not rule out the Commission’s competence to 
decide the compliance of a given reservation or an interpretative 
declaration with the Convention.89 
 
This principle was cemented five years later by the ECtHR’s Belilos decision and 
reinforced in the Commission when in 1991 it ruled that Turkey’s reservation to 
ECHR Article 25 was illegal in the joined cases Chrysostomos, Papachyrysostomou, 
and Loizidou,90 which ultimately found their way to the ECtHR as the Loizidou case. 
The Commission also used Temeltasch as an opportunity to firmly establish 
the concept of a disguised reservation. Relying on the definition of a reservation in 
Article 2(1)(d), the Commission held that the interpr tative declaration made by 
Switzerland regarding ECHR Article 6(3)(e) was in fact a reservation due to its effect 
on the rights protected by the article.91 This paved the way for the Belilos Court to 
employ McRae’s definition of a ‘qualified declaration’ and hold Switzerland’s 
‘declaration’ to have the same effect as a reservation.92 
Marks suggests that the Belilos and Temeltasch decisions indicate that 
acceptance and objection to a reservation will have no bearing on the validity of a 
reservation regardless of whether grounds are based on ECHR Article 57 or 
                                                
89 Temeltasch v. Switzerland, (App. No. 9116/80), ECommHR, 5 EHRR 417, 5 May 1982, para. 61 
(emphasis added). 
90 Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou, Loizidou v. Turkey, (Joined App. Nos. 15299/89, 15300/89, 
15318/89), ECommHR, 3 Rev. U.D.H. 193, 68 ECommHR Dec. & Rep. 216, 242 (1991), 4 Mar. 
1991. 
91 It is interesting to note that the Federal Court of Switzerland had also come to the same conclusion 
and used this determination to dismiss the domestic appeal brought by Mr Temeltasch in its judgment 
of 30 Apr. 1980. See Imbert, ‘Reservations to the ECHR Before the Strasbourg Commission’, 559. 





incompatibility with objects and purposes,93 a conclusion that is supported by the 
dicta in both cases. Though not a central feature of the case, ECHR State Parties 
were put on notice that the convention organs, not the states, had the final authority 
on reservation compatibility.   
Imbert points out that the assessment of the validity of reservations was 
tantamount to the interpretation of reservations as far as the Commission was 
concerned, though he questions the basis of the presum d competency and insists 
that they are two unrelated questions.94 For its part, the Commission noted that it had 
on previous occasions interpreted reservations95 and that this function was part and 
parcel to assessing validity, an argument echoed by the treaty bodies as will be 
discussed in Chapter Six. Key to the Commission’s competency argument was that 
the ECHR did not embody ‘reciprocal rights and obligat ons in pursuance of their 
individual national interests’ coupled with the existence of supervisory organs 
specific to the Convention.96 Imbert concludes that ‘it is essentially the objective and 
non-reciprocal nature of the obligations undertaken by the Contracting Parties that 
justifies the competence of the supervisory organs’.97  
Non-reciprocity of the ECHR was established previously in the 1961 
Commission decision of Austria v. Italy98. In the case Italy argued that Austria could 
not bring the claim because at the time of the alleged violation Austria had not yet 
ratified the ECHR. The Commission deftly sidestepped the issue by noting the 
purpose of the ECHR was to establish a common public order under which State 
Parties undertook obligations 
 
…essentially of an objective character, being designed rather to protect 
the fundamental rights of individual human beings from infringements 
by any of the High Contracting Parties than to create subjective and 
reciprocal rights for the High Contracting Parties themselves.99 
 
This mantra of non-reciprocity of the ECHR was reinforced by subsequent ECtHR 
decisions and has been reflected in a multitude of decisions outwith the European 
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94 Imbert, ‘Reservations to the ECHR Before the Strasbourg Commission’, 583-84. 
95 Temeltasch, para. 65. 
96 Ibid., para. 63. 
97 Imbert, ‘Reservations to the ECHR Before the Strasbourg Commission’, 585. 
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system. The framework of the ECHR and its supervisoy mechanisms is reflected in 
the international treaties and a concept easily transferred to the broader system. This 
thesis argues that it is precisely the combination of the non-reciprocal nature of 
human rights treaties and the fact that specific supervisory organs exist to oversee 
these treaties that allows the supervisory organs as a reservation review mechanisms.  
 
2.3 INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Inter-American system set forth in the American Convention on Human 
Rights100 (ACHR) is more procedurally complex than the European system with only 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR) receiving 
individual applications101 if its competency to do so is recognised by a State Party.102 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) receiv s applications either 
referred by the IACommHR or direct applications from State Parties103. Both the 
IACommHR and the IACtHR have had the occasion to issue rulings or advisory 
opinions on reservations. While the main contributions of the ECHR supervisory 
organs were to strengthen the legal effect of invaldity (severance) and to ferment 
their roles as mechanisms of reservation review regardless of state reaction to 
reservations, their Inter-American counterparts have primarily reinforced the fact that 
non-reciprocal human rights treaties fall out-with the normal reservations regime and 
the parameters used to evaluate validity.   
Recalling the debates surrounding terminology of incompatible reservations 
in the introductory chapter, it must be noted that e Inter-American system typically 
opts to discuss reservations in terms of ‘permissibility’ rather than ‘validity’. Article 
75 of the ACHR indicates that the Convention ‘shall be subject to reservations only 
in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Conve tion on the Law of Treaties’. 
Thus reservations to the ACHR must conform to Vienna Convention Article 19, 
including the object and purpose test.   
Though the IACommHR has shown a tendency to defer to states on the 
subject of reservations by treating reservations questions as interpretation issues 
                                                
100 1144 UNTS 144, 22 Nov. 1969 (ACHR). 
101 ACHR, Art. 44. This is similar to the original system followed in the European system. 
102 ACHR, Art. 45. 





rather than a validity question,104 the IACtHR has been more inclined to take up the 
issue of reservations and views the interpretation of reservations integral to 
interpreting a treaty.105 In 1982, the IACtHR issued an advisory opinion noti g 
especially 
 
…that modern human rights treaties in general, and the American 
Convention in particular, are not multilateral treai s of the traditional 
type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the 
mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the 
protection of the basic rights of individual human beings irrespective of 
their nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other 
contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the States 
can be deemed to submit themselves to a legal orderwithin which they, 
for the common good, assume various obligations, not i  relation to 
other States, but towards all individuals within their jurisdiction.106 
 
The effect of the non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties on reservations was 
reinforced the following year in another advisory opinion by the IACtHR when it 
reiterated that ‘the question of reciprocity as it relates to reservations…is not fully 
applicable as far as human rights treaties are concerned’ in the Restrictions on the 
Death Penalty Advisory Opinion.107 Reciprocity of obligation is the cornerstone of 
the Vienna Convention regime and the IACtHR has repeatedly insisted that this 
aspect of the reservations is questionable in the context of human rights treaties. The 
Court further concluded that ‘any meaningful interpr tation of a treaty also calls for 
an interpretation of any reservation made thereto…by reference to relevant principles 
of general international law and the special rules s t out in the Convention itself’.108 
Thus not only does the IACtHR look to the ACHR, but it also pulls from other 
sources of international law, which leaves room for progressive interpretation as 
international law itself evolves. 
Interestingly, the IACtHR outlined a reservation’s compatibility with the 
object and purpose test of the Vienna Convention, not the acceptance of the 
                                                
104 Marks, ‘Three Regional Human Rights Treaties’, p. 56. 
105 Restrictions on the Death Penalty (Articles 4(2) and (4) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights),Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 (8 Sept. 1983), IACtHR (Ser. A) No. 3 (1983), para. 62. 
106 Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 (24 Sept. 1982), IACtHR (Ser. A) No. 2 (1982), para. 29; see also Hilaire 
v. Trinidad and Tobago, Preliminary Objections, (1 Sept. 2001) IACtHR (Ser. C) No. 80 (2001), para. 
95. 
107 Restrictions on the Death Penalty, para. 62. 





reservation by another State Party, as the key to evaluating reservations. The 
distinction between using the state to evaluate a reservation and the outlined 
adjudicatory and advisory mechanisms established by the ACHR was important in 
that the Court’s dicta suggested that the Convention supervisory organs, not the 
states, would have the final say on the compatibility of reservations.109 For purposes 
of this particular advisory opinion, the Court was merely indicating that a 
reservation, even without an evaluation of compatibility, would not preclude the 
entry into force of a treaty for a state whose instrument of ratification was 
accompanied by a reservation. This supports the sevrability principle as the IACtHR 
did not contemplate that a later determination of incompatibility would invalidate the 
state’s consent to be bound without the benefit of the reservation.  
The severability principle was affirmed in the 2001 Hilaire case despite 
Trinidad and Tobago’s argument that if its reservation o the Court’s jurisdiction was 
determined to be invalid then the state’s declaration accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction would be void ab initio.110 The counter-argument highlighted that the 
reservation was excessively vague and made it impossible to determine its scope.111 
Further supporting the concept of severance, the IACommHR argued that if the 
state’s consent was voided rather than simply severing the reservation then the rights 
of the applicant would not be guaranteed, which is the point of the ACHR.112 The 
IACtHR ultimately agreed with the IACommHR and severed the reservation thereby 
holding Trinidad and Tobago bound to the ACHR without the benefit of the 
reservation which enabled them to proceed to an examination of the merits of the 
case.113 
This is somewhat contradictory to the long-standing tradition premised on 
states using the object and purpose test to make a validity determination. However, 
that tradition is not expressly outlined in the Vienna Convention regime and thus in 
adopting the residual rules but also specifying that it is compliance with the test, 
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110 Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 49. 
111 Ibid., para. 53. 
112 Ibid., para. 67.  
113 The IACtHR came to the same conclusion on invalidity of Trinidad and Tobago’s reservation to 
the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the Court in several cases: Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and 
Tobago, Preliminary Objections, (1 Sept. 2001) IACtHR (Ser. C) No.81 (2001); Constantine et al. v. 





assumingly as determined by the Court, rather than e acceptance by States Parties 
that bears on validity the IACtHR has successfully asserted its position as the final 
authority on compatibility of reservations to the ACHR. It also insists that states 
‘have a legitimate interest…in barring reservations incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention’ and that they should assert this interest through the 
ACHR mechanisms, such as the inter-state complaints procedure.114  
In the Restrictions on the Death Penalty Advisory Opinion the IACtHR also 
weighed in on the relationship between non-derogable rights and reservations. 
Article 27 of the ACHR expressly allows for certain derogations. However, out-with 
the derogations outlined in the article, the IACtHR stated that a reservation (a 
reservation by Guatemala in this instance) to ACHR Article 4 (right to life)–an 
article from which no derogation is permitted–would be incompatible with the 
Convention: ‘a reservation which was designed to enable a State to suspend any of 
the non-derogable fundamental rights must be deemed to be incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Convention and, consequently, not permitted by it.’115 The 
Court conceded, however, that a mere restriction to a n n-derogable right that did not 
deprive the right as a whole would not necessarily by incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the ACHR.116 
Though the Inter-American system is specific to the ACHR, it has propagated 
the ideological distinction inherent in human rights treaties as treaties which 
encompass non-reciprocal obligations. The IACtHR also affirmed that states are not 
the final adjudicators on reservation compatibility when a human rights treaty is 
coupled with a specific supervisory mechanism, similar to the position of the ECtHR 
except that the IACtHR employs the object and purpose test of the Vienna 
Convention rather than a convention-specific regime. The other primary contribution 
of the IACtHR to the reservations debate is its contention that non-derogable rights 
                                                
114 Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, para. 
38. The Court did, however, indicate that the opinion was limited to reservations in the context of the 
question at hand: whether a reservation must be accepted before the instrument of ratification was 
considered valid and binding in order to determine the effective date of entry into force of the ACHR 
for a state ratifying with a reservation attached to its instrument of ratification. 
115 Restrictions on the Death Penalty, para. 61. 
116 In this particular opinion, the Court did not find Guatemala’s reservation impermissible but noted 





should also be non-reservable.117 In light of the special situation of human rights 
treaties as reflected by both the ECtHR and the IACtHR, the traditional reservations 
rules as tempered by the concept of reciprocal obligations does not square when an 
invalid reservation is at issue.   
 
3 FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
Slowly states are taking up the task of policing rese vations to human rights treaties 
but this practice has developed haphazardly as the Vienna Convention does not 
specify this role for states nor does it address the legal effect of invalid reservations. 
The interplay between invalid reservations and objections thereto leaves the status of 
the treaty between various parties and the status of an invalid reservation hanging in 
the balance. The current catalogue of reservations reveals that even incompatible 
reservations remain attached to the core treaties despite objections because there is 
no guideline indicating the consequence of an invaldity determination by a state. 
The overarching problem with the current system is that there is no definitive final 
arbiter unless the reservation is reviewed by a competent dispute settlement 
mechanism capable of defining the legal effect and consequence of an invalidity 
determination. 
The obvious alternative review mechanism under the Vienna Convention is 
the judiciary. The ICJ, ECtHR and IACtHR have had occasion to review the validity 
of reservations at some point albeit often in a cursory fashion and most often simply 
to determine claim admissibility. Each of these courts was either expressly created to 
serve in this type of capacity or, in the case of the ICJ, is the ultimate authority on the 
interpretation of international obligations, including treaty law. The primary 
drawback, however, to sole reliance on a judiciary to evaluate the validity of 
reservations is that review can only take place if the judicial organ has competency to 
evaluate a dispute either based on automatic or consent-based jurisdiction. Due to the 
limits of ICJ jurisdiction and the reluctance of states to institute proceedings against 
one another when there is no compelling interest to seek redress of another state’s 
reservations, the opportunity to assess the validity of a reservation to one of the core 
                                                





UN human rights treaties using the object and purpose test has not availed itself at 
the ICJ subsequent to the Genocide Opinion.  
Though the regional systems do not specifically address the reservations 
quagmire suffered by the UN human rights treaties dalt with by this research, they 
do enrich the debate by progressing the discussion of reservations to human rights 
treaties in general and by drawing important parallels between the regional treaties 
and the treaties in the UN system. Both the ECtHR and the IACtHR have taken great 
pains to outline their reasons for concern over the non-reciprocal nature of human 
rights treaties, the role of a treaty-specific organ in reservation evaluation, and they 
have further refined ancillary issues related to invalid reservations. Though the 
regional human rights courts are conspicuously silent on many aspects of customary 
international law and the application of the Vienna Convention rules, these topics 
which evoke great concern in the context of human right treaties have also been 
largely neglected by general international law. As noted by Higgins both in the 
separate opinion to Armed Activities and in her 2009 speech to the ECtHR, the 
jurisprudence of the various courts on the issue of reservations to human rights 
treaties is ‘developing the law to meet contemporary ealities’.118 Thus the decisions 
not only of the ICJ, but also of the regional human rights courts can only generate 
more information regarding reservations to human rights treaties and therefore 
contribute to the developing corpus of customary international law on the subject as 
the international community continues to navigate th  strengths and weaknesses of 
the treaty system.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
ANALYSIS OF VIENNA CONVENTION RESERVATIONS RULES 
 
The previous chapters examined the development of the default reservations regime 
and how the regime works in practice with respect to human rights treaties. In 
Chapters Three and Four, examples from the core human rights treaties revealed the 
normative gaps inherent in the default reservations regime particularly in relation to 
assessing the most common forms of reservations to those treaties using the object 
and purpose test as well as the indefinite effect these assessments yield in the context 
of the state-to-state relationship of state parties. This chapter will narrow the focus to 
the actual lacunae in the reservations rules and evaluate the primary thesis research 
question in light of contemporary state practice, academic writings, the ILC study on 
reservations to treaties and the work of treaty bodies on reservations.1 
Drawing upon positions formulated in the previous chapters and the 
contemporary efforts to address reservations to human rights treaties, this chapter 
will respond to the following question: does the Vienna Convention reservations 
regime adequately govern reservations to human rights treaties? To evaluate this 
question the following features of the ‘one-size-fits all’ approach are analysed in 
general and in specific relation to human rights treaties:  
a.   The object and purpose test 
b.   The legal effect of invalid reservations 
c. The consequence of invalid reservations  
 
In light of broad support for maintaining the reservations regime established 
                                               
1 The effectiveness of the Vienna Convention reservations regime has been thoroughly examined by 
both the ILC and the treaty bodies. These studies, introduced in Chapter 1, incorporate, to the extent 
possible, the practice and views of states from both general law and human rights perspectives. 
Though several ILC reports leading to the ILC’s Finalized Guidelines on Reservations to Treaties will 
be referenced, both the draft Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties with commentary and the 
finalized document produced at the 63rd session of the ILC adopting the text and title of the draft 
guidelines will be referenced. The former document r fers to the Guide to Practice on Reservations to 
Treaties, with commentaries as provisionally adopted by the ILC at its 62nd session (see UN Doc. 
A/65/10 (2010)) and can be found at  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/62/GuidetoPracticeReservations_commentaries(e).pdf (Draft Guide 
to Practice) and the latter to ILC, Reservations to Treaties, Text and title of the draft guidelines 
constituting the Guide to Practice on Reservations to treaties, as finalized by the Working Group on 
Reservations to Treaties…, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.779 (2011) (Finalized Guidelines). References to the 
treaty body documents will be to individual reports, including those studies concluded by François 
Hampson.   





by the Vienna Convention, enthusiasm for the regime as a whole must be checked 
with the recognition of the flaws in the rules both generally and as applied to human 
rights treaties. While these flaws are not insurmountable obstacles to utilising the 
default system, they do highlight the unique nature of human rights treaties and the 
obligations they are designed to protect. The following will initially examine the 
viability of the Vienna Convention rules and highlight aspects of the rules which lack 
widespread common agreement or practice, including the application of the object 
and purpose test and the legal effect of invalid rese vations. Finally, the potential 
consequences of a ruling of invalidity will be examined with special note taken that 
consequences are only ensured when there is a final determination on the validity of 
a reservation to a human rights treaty.  
 
1 RECOGNISING THE NORMATIVE AMBIGUITIES IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Vienna Convention reservations rules are rules of 
general applicability. The overarching purpose serves to balance the tension between 
two counterpoints, both of which are goals of interational treaty law: universal 
treaty membership and the integrity of the treaty. The reservations rules are not 
concrete nor are they without flaws, two points underscored by the ILC’s extensive 
Draft Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties and its commentary:  
 
[T]he 1969 Vienna Convention has not frozen the law. Regardless of 
the fact that it leaves behind many ambiguities, that it contains gaps on 
sometimes highly important points and that it could not foresee rules 
applicable to problems that did not arise, or hardly arose, at the time of 
its preparation (...), the Convention served as a point of departure for 
new practices that are not, or not fully, followed with any consistency at 
the present time.2  
 
Despite the fact that ‘[t]he default rules governing reservations in the [Vienna 
Convention] are complex, ambiguous, and often counterintuitive,’3 each of the major 
studies on reservations concluded under the ILC and the treaty bodies has concluded 
that the general Vienna Convention reservations rules are the rules to be applied to 
                                               
2 Draft Guide to Practice, 4.5, commentary para. 17, quoting A. Pellet, First report on the law and 
practice relating to reservations to treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/470 (1995), para. 161. 
3 L.R. Helfer, ‘Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk and Treaty Design’ (2006) 31 Yale Journal 
of International Law 367, 367. 





all treaties, including human rights treaties.4 However, as will be examined in the 
following sections, neither the ILC nor the treaty body work reconciled the disparate 
treatment of reservations by states in applying the Vienna Convention rules to human 
rights treaties.  
The following sections consider the lacunae in the rul s in their general 
application to multilateral treaties and pinpoint the further difficulties inherent in the 
specific interaction between the Vienna Convention rules and human rights treaties. 
Not only is there no settled approach to the object and purpose test or how it is to be 
applied, there are certain reservations to normative human rights treaties which cause 
just as many problems as reservations deemed impermissible under the Article 19(c) 
test. As submitted in Chapter Three, sweeping reservations and reservations which 
subordinate international obligations to domestic law cause a particular problem in 
determining the extent to which obligations are altered either by modification or 
abrogation. The de minimis effect of objections under the state-to-state reservation 
policing practice, examined in Chapter Four, will be riefly revisited to link the 
ambiguity of the object and purpose test to the inconclusive legal effect of an invalid 
reservations as determined by state parties.  
Analysis of the gaps related to rules on legal effect r veals that there is no 
clear consequence resulting from a determination of i validity when there is no clear 
final view taken on reservation validity. In examining this situation the most 
widespread views on the consequence of an invalid reservation, including nullity and 
severance, will be discussed as well as more nuanced approaches. Ultimately, the 
analysis concludes that if the residual rules of the Vienna Convention are widely 
accepted as those that should be applied to evaluate the validity of all reservations, 
including those to human rights treaties, then the s ortcomings must be identified 
and a ‘best practice’ suggested. 
 
 
                                               
4 See e.g., ILC, UN Doc. A/64/10 (2009), para 53; F. Hampson, Specific Human Rights Issues, 
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, Final working paper, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42 (2004) 
(2004 Final working paper), paras. 6-7; see also Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
(Chairpersons of the HRTBs), Report on Reservations, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2007/5 (2007) (2007 
Report on Reservations), para. 16(3). 
 





2 THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE TEST 
The primary problem with the Vienna Convention is that regardless of treaty type the 
text imposes the very vague and subjective object and purpose test to determine the 
object and purpose of a treaty and therefore assess th  validity of a reservation that is 
not covered by Article 19(a) or (b). Initially, there is an obvious difficulty in 
applying a subjective test to determine whether reservations defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty especially considering that ‘[i]  is not normal practice in treaty 
drafting to spell out the “object and purpose” as if one were defining technical 
terms.’5 Lijnzaad has characterised the object and purpose test as ‘both transparent 
and opaque at the same time’ because though the wording seems to provide a clear 
indicator of what reservations will be acceptable under a treaty, it is actually unclear 
in practice.6 Due to the large amount of existing literature on the perceived short-
comings of the object and purpose test the arguments will not be fully rehashed here 
except to lay the foundation for the focus of this re earch.7    
There is no clear definition as to exactly what is meant by ‘object and 
purpose’ and the Draft Guide to Practice does not elaborate. Scholars8 have 
attempted to define it without success through the years and the ILC ultimately 
deferred to the other less-than-successful attempts by acknowledging that there was 
little assistance from the Vienna Convention preparatory notes to determine the 
intended meaning of ‘object and purpose’.9 Recalling that the object and purpose test 
stems from the Genocide Opinion and the Genocide Convention, a convention that 
was unique unto its own with an easily determinable o j ct and purpose, it is difficult 
to accept that the object and purpose test remains without further guidance. The test 
                                               
5 W.A. Schabas, ‘Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Time for Innovation and Reform’ (1994) 32 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 39, 47. 
6 L. Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties: Ratify and Ruin? (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht 1995), p. 4. 
7 For discussions regarding the object and purpose test see the following: I. Buffard and K. Zemanek, 
‘The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: an Enigma?’ (1998) 3 Austrian Review of International and 
European Law 311; D. Hylton, ‘Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
Inadequate Framework on Reservations’ (1994) 27 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 419; B. 
Clark, ‘The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against 
Women’ (1991) 85 AJIL 281. 
8 e.g., C.A. Bradley and J.L. Goldsmith, ‘Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent’ (2000) 
149(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 399, 429-39; Hylton, ‘Default Breakdown’, 429-32; 
Buffard and Zemanek, ‘The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty’, 342; G. Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to 
Multilateral Conventions’ (1953)  2 ICLQ 1, 12. 
9 A. Pellet, Tenth report on Reservations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (2005), paras. 75-76. 





is reflected Article 19(c) though at no point in the Vienna Convention is the test 
defined,10 nor is this concept limited to reservations–it appears in six11 other 
provisions of the Convention. The negotiating states appear to have embraced the 
complete vagueness of the concept and applied it in every instance where agreement 
on a more refined standard could not be reached. There as never been a settled 
approach to applying the object and purpose test in the context of reservations but 
generally most commentators have interpreted the test as focusing on the essence or 
overall goal of the treaty rather than parsing the individual articles, thus, the test has 
proven difficult to apply.12  The ILC acknowledges that treaty parties might not be 
able to make the determination themselves thus theyshould resort to a dispute 
settlement body for a definitive determination,13 though, despite their ready 
availability, in practice these have rarely been used to settle reservation disputes 
except in the context of regional human rights systems and even then only as a 
jurisdictional question or ancillary matter. 
With no clear definition, perhaps deducing a method f r determining the 
object and purpose of a treaty is the next best thing. Pellet, the Special Rapporteur 
leading the ILC study, went as far as to try and distil a ‘method’ for employing the 
test pursuant to ICJ interpretations of the test through the years in an attempt to 
provide guidance on determining the object and purpose of a treaty. Noting that this 
‘method’ is at best disparate in its application by the Court, he also points out that it 
is largely based on empirical data from the treaty in question and includes such 
obvious considerations as the title, the preamble, th  introductory articles, articles 
that demonstrate the major concerns of the Contracting Parties, the preparatory work 
and the overall framework of the treaty.14 While Pellet is undoubtedly correct that the 
object and purpose ‘can be determined only by reference to the text and particular 
                                               
10 Pellet, Tenth report on Reservations, para. 77; Hylton, ‘Default Breakdown’, 450. 
11 Reference to the object and purpose of a treaty is also made in Arts. 18, 31, 33, 41 and 58. It also 
appears in Art. 20(2), which is part of the reservations regime, however this article deals with the 
distinct situation where the application of the trea y in its entirety between all the parties is an 
essential condition of the consent and is not the back one of the reservation rules against which 
compatibility is assessed. 
12 D. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 7th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010), p. 
653;  Helfer, ‘Not Fully Committed?’, 367; J. Klabbers, ‘Accepting the Unacceptable? A New Nordic 
Approach to Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’ (2000) 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 179, 
181. 
13 ILC Yearbook 1995, UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), para. 454. 
14 Pellet, Tenth report on Reservations, para. 81. 





nature of a treaty’ and that there is ‘some degree of subjectivity’ in each case that 
must be limited,15 the finalised guidelines on the test do not provide more than a 
recap of what has gone before. What is obvious is that the object and purpose is not 
static and thus must not be closed to review.16  
The product of the treaty bodies added to the empirical elements set forth by 
Pellet. In Hampson’s 2004 working paper there are three characteristics she 
designates as important when determining compatibility of a reservation to a human 
rights treaty under the object and purpose test: (1) the relationship between separate 
articles and the whole treaty, (2) the alleged jus cogens character of some of the 
norms, and (3) the distinction between derogable and non-derogable rights.17 These 
additions to Pellet’s method track the consistent sta ements of the treaty bodies in 
their evaluations of reservations. Hampson18 and the treaty bodies19 ultimately 
deferred to Pellet in anticipation of him developing a way to apply the object and 
purpose test to a human rights treaty. Unfortunately, as indicated above, this special 
test did not materialise. There remains a black-hole as to any definitive use of the test 
other than for those employing it to take into account all circumstances related to the 
reservation and treaty under consideration.   
The situation is decidedly more bleak when the object and purpose test is 
applied to human rights treaties. Despite the ILC’s inability to produce a definition 
for the object and purpose test, there was a nod of consideration extended to human 
rights treaties in the Draft Guidelines: 
 
3.1.12 Reservations to general human rights treaties 
To assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose 
of a general treaty for the protection of human rights, account shall be 
taken of the indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of the 
rights set out in the treaty as well as the importance that the right or 
provision which is the subject of the reservation has within the general 
thrust of the treaty, and the gravity of the impact the reservation has 
upon it.20 
 
                                               
15 Note by the Special Rapporteur on draft guideline 3.1.5, UN Doc. A/CN.4/572 (2006), para. 5. 
16 Pellet, Tenth report on Reservations, para. 83. 
17 Hampson, 2004 Final working paper, para. 49. 
18 Ibid., para. 72. 
19 Chairpersons of the HRTBs, 2007 Report on Reservations, para. 16(6). 
20 Original text adopted at the 59th session of the ILC, ILC Yearbook, UN Doc. A/62/10 (2007), p. 65. 





As noted by the original commentary on this guidelin , Pellet uses the three elements 
most often deemed indicative of a human rights treaty–indivisibility, 
interdependence and interrelatedness–in an attempt to strike a delicate balance 
between the right that is the subject of the reservation and the effect that a reservation 
to the provision produces, including the impact of the reservation.21 In a nutshell, 
states should consider the fact that a human rights treaty is a human rights treaty. 
This guideline specifically addressing reservations to human rights treaties was 
replaced by finalized guideline 3.1.5.6 which expunged direct reference to human 
rights treaties opting, instead, for more general terms and urging consideration of the 
specifics of the treaty under consideration.22 In a similar vein, Seibert-Fohr argues 
that the Vienna Convention is well-suited to handle th  ‘special exigencies’ of 
international human rights treaties as it encourages accommodation by noting that 
reservation evaluation is largely dependent on the typ of treaty being considered.23   
Bearing in mind the vast number of reminders about the indivisibility, 
interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights as well as the importance of 
the rights addressed and the negative effect that certain reservations might produce, 
the guidelines are not particularly instructive. Furthermore, it is widely recognised 
that these treaties ‘are essentially objective in character and are not based on 
reciprocal undertakings.’24 Reciprocity is the cornerstone of the multilateral treaty 
system and is acknowledged as the first line of defence against states attempting to 
shirk convention obligations.25 States gain no legal rights or protections by becoming 
                                               
21 Ibid., p. 113, Commentary on Draft Guideline 3.1.12 on Reservations t  Treaties. 
22 Oral report by the Chairman of the Working Group on Reservations to Treaties, ILC, 63rd sess. (20 
May 2011), p. 7, at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/session /63/ReservationstoTreatiesReport20May2011.pdf 
<accessed 1 Sept. 2011> (2011 Reservations Working Body Report). 
23 A. Seibert-Fohr, ‘The Potentials of the Vienna Conve tion on the Law of Treaties with Respect to 
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties’ in I. Ziemele (ed.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties 
and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict, Harmony or Reconciliation (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Lieden/Boston 2004), p. 207. 
24 P.-H. Imbert, ‘Reservations and Human Rights Conventions’ (1981) 6 Human Rights Review 28, 
35, citing H. Golsong, ‘Les reserves aux instruments i ernationaux pour la protection des droits de 
l’homme’ in Les clauses échappatoires en matière d’instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de 
l’homme, Fourth Colloquy of the Human Rights Department of the Catholic University of Louvain (7 
Dec. 1978) (1982); see also C. Chinkin, ‘Reservations and Objections to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women’ in J.P. Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as 
General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections to Human Rights 
Conventions (BIICL, London 1997), p. 64; Schabas, ‘Time for Innovation and Reform’, 65; R.St.J. 
Macdonald, ‘Reservations under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1988) 21 Revue belge 
de droit international 429, 434. 
25 Lijnzaad Ratify and Ruin,p. 67. 





a member of a human rights treaty as the benefits flow solely to the human beings 
subject to the jurisdiction of the state.  
In light of the one-size-fits-all approach employed by the Vienna Convention 
to assess reservations for all treaty types, the difficulties in using the test specifically 
in response to reservations to human rights treaties must be evaluated. The first 
difficulty develops when states disagree on the intgral nature of specific articles 
and, therefore, disagree as to the validity of certain reservations. Practice has shown 
that treaties do not tend to outline which articles are central to the object and purpose 
of the treaty, especially when the various obligations contained within a treaty are 
viewed as inter-related and inter-dependent as is the case with the core human rights 
treaties.  
Reflecting on General Comment No. 2426 Hampson argues that human rights 
treaties have a ‘single goal (respect, protection and promotion of human rights) 
which is to be achieved by adherence to a large number of separate provisions’ 
therefore ‘[a] reservation to one provision may … be incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the treaty.’27 States tend to decide for themselves which articles ar  
integral and this is evidenced by their reservations a d/or objections. Even prohibited 
reservations will go into effect where states do not object to them because there is 
nothing in the Vienna Convention’s reservation scheme that prevents this situation.28 
As noted previously in Chapter Four, in the context of non-reciprocal treaties, states 
are less likely to expend energy evaluating other state’s reservations because their 
legal obligations remain unaffected. Thus, the one-siz fits-all approach applying the 
object and purpose test to treaties made up of non-reciprocal obligations has been 
particularly detrimental in the field of human rights.  
As summarised by Hampson, when states apply the object and purpose test to 
reservations to human rights treaties results in ‘fragmentation of the treaty 
commitment’:  
 
A reservation that some States object to on the grounds that it is 
incompatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty may appear to 
be accepted, expressly or through silence, by others. A question which 
                                               
26 UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) (General Comment No. 24). 
27 Hampson, 2004 Final working paper, para. 50. 
28 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2d ed. (CUP, Cambridge 2007), p. 144. 





ought to have only one answer (whether a reservation is incompatible 
with the object and purpose of a treaty) appears to eceive a variety of 
answers. Most of these questions arise in relation to any multilateral 
normative treaty.29 
 
Though these questions may arise in a variety of multilateral treaties, the sections 
below will demonstrate the particular ill-effects for human rights treaties. Almost 
two decades of study by the ILC and the treaty bodies has not produced concrete 
guidance on the application of the object and purpose test. Thus, it seems that there is 
nothing new to contribute to the paralysis created by applying the central feature of 
the Vienna Convention reservations rules  
 
2.1 THE DE MINIMIS EFFECT OF STATE OBJECTIONS 
When the object and purpose test is applied to evaluate the reservations of state 
parties, states notify their opposition to reservations by depositing an objection with 
the treaty depositary. In Chapter Three the Article 21 objection system was 
examined. The Vienna Convention regime largely favours reserving states over non-
reserving states.30 The burden of examining appended reservations fall, in the first 
instance, entirely upon the states which are already p rty to the convention. Articles 
20 and 21 rely on states to be vigilant in the assessm nt of reservations, yet the 
assessment contemplated is that of valid reservations. As evidenced by the examples 
given in Chapter Three, it is clear that objections have a de minimis effect on 
incompatible reservations.   
Objections to reservations to non-reciprocal multilateral treaties have never 
prevented a state from becoming a party to this type of convention and rarely do they 
produce a tangible effect. Even in the event that a state objects to a reservation for 
being incompatible with the object and purpose of a tre ty there is nothing but a 
positive expression by the objecting state to prevent the treaty from entering into 
force between the reserving and objecting states and there is no guidance on how to 
treat the remnant reservation that is considered invalid as other states may have 
accepted the same reservation. It is the situation surrounding a reservation which has 
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Reservations’ in Menno T. Kamminga and Martin Scheinin (eds.), The Impact of Human Rights Laws 
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been objected to on the basis of invalidity that presents the normative puzzle that 
remains to be solved. Where there are competing views on the validity of the 
reservation it is unlikely that the disagreement will ever go to independent 
adjudication for a final view on validity due to the fact that human rights treaties do 
not engage reciprocity in the same way as other multilateral treaties. 
Though nothing in the Vienna Convention specifies that states are the 
primary or solitary arbiters of permissibility practice has created this commonplace 
order and as a result states have adopted it as the norm under the auspices of state 
sovereignty. Schmidt, and many of his contemporaries, agree that ‘[i]n the final 
analysis, it must be for each State party to decide wh ther a certain reservation meets 
that test (the object and purpose test of [Vienna Convention]19(c)).’31 The Secretary-
General circulates all reservations, even those deemed contrary to the convention, to 
the existing state parties. Thus the reserving state clears the first hurdle of becoming 
a state party and maintaining its reservation withou  effort as soon as the instrument 
of ratification is filed. Once the reservation is circulated, it can then sit back and 
await potential objections by state parties for whom the treaty is already in force. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, depending on the complexity or vagueness of a 
reservation, not to mention lack of familiarity of the law in another jurisdiction, it 
may be impossible for a state to determine the true depth of the obligations modified 
by a reservation therefore in many cases states simply take a passive view of 
reservations when its rights and obligations are not impacted, such as with a non-
reciprocal human rights treaty.  
 
2.2 SUMMARY  
There is no settled definition of the object and purpose of a treaty. Due to the nature 
of the obligations enumerated in the core human rights treaties states often disagree 
as to which provisions are essential to the object and purpose of a treaty. The 
incoherence resulting from the ambiguous nature of the object and purpose test is 
exacerbated by the fact that the state-policing of reservations yields little result when 
state parties determine that a reservation is invalid under the Vienna Convention.  
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 3 LEGAL EFFECT OF INVALID RESERVATIONS 
The uncertainty about how to apply the object and purpose bleeds into the next 
critical difficulty in the application of the Vienna Convention reservations rules to 
human rights treaties. The lack of determinable legal ffect of an invalid reservation 
represents another gap in the reservations rules as there is no clear guide as to how to 
categorise the legal effect of an invalid or impermissible reservation. Recall that 
‘invalid’ reservations include those that are impermissible for failure to clear Article 
19 hurdles as well as those reservations that are deficient for procedural or structural 
reasons32 and those reservations that violate other aspects of the Vienna Convention. 
If a reservation is invalid for structural or procedural deficiencies, the issue can be 
dispensed with more easily as it cannot be ‘established’ and therefore cannot have 
legal effect pursuant to Vienna Convention Article 21. Impermissible reservations, 
however, present a more difficult problem due to the imprecise nature of object and 
purpose test as noted above. Though the primary concern of this section is 
reservations that are impermissible specifically due to incompatibility with the object 
and purpose test of Article 19(c), the problem of determinable legal effect in the 
context of reservations to human rights treaties is also prevalent for sweeping33 
reservations and reservations that subordinate34 international obligations to domestic 
law, both of which have been acknowledged to be contrary to Article 19(c) 
(impermissible) as well as structurally deficient (invalid) due to the indeterminable 
scope and breadth.  
As examined in Chapter Two, Article 21 of the Vienna Convention 
specifically addresses the legal effect of a valid reservation and its modification of 
treaty relations between the reserving state and another state party based on its 
acceptance or objection thereto.35 The article is premised on the fact that the 
reservation is valid as the ability of states to object to valid reservations is the 
political feature of the flexible reservations regime. There is no firm position on the 
legal effect of an invalid reservation in the Vienna Convention. The travaux 
                                               
32 See Chapter 2, section 4.2. 
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34 See Chapter 3, section 2.5. 
35 N.B. this thesis does not address the separate issu of the effect of an acceptance or objection of a
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preparatoires of the Vienna Convention do not make clear whether a reservation 
which has ‘fallen at the hurdle of Article 19(c) because of incompatibility with the 
object and purpose of the Convention is nonetheless open to acceptance or rejection 
by States under Article 20(4).’36 According to the ILC, a reservation can only have  
legal effect if it is established, which means that the reservation is valid (and 
permissible) and has been accepted37 otherwise it is a nullity.38 In other words, the 
legal effect is established between the reserving and accepting state to the extent the 
treaty obligations are modified or excluded (released from compliance)39 inter se to 
the extent of the reservation.40 Alternatively, between the reserving and objecting 
state the treaty obligations which are subject to the reservation will not be applicable 
between the two or the convention will be applicable in its entirety between the two–
‘super-maximum effect’41–if the objecting state has indicated this effect. Thus, a 
reservation’s legal effect, or lack of legal effect, under the Vienna Convention rules 
is based on the reaction, whether an acceptance or objection, by another state party. 
For the purposes of examining legal effect in this section there is an assumption that 
a state has taken a view that a formulated reservation is invalid.   
Under the Vienna Convention regime, if multiple states object to a 
reservation on the basis of invalidity, the fall-out for the reserving state will be 
tangible as it would be unlikely that the reserving state would be able to maintain the 
invalid reservation due to the reciprocal nature of rights and responsibilities in treaty 
law. The same cannot be said of normative human rights treaties; the obligations 
contained therein create a state-human being relationsh p and human beings do not 
get a look-in at the treaty formation process. The state-human being relationship, 
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recognised in the Draft Guide to Practice,42 suffers detriment because individuals are 
unable to invoke the legal effect flowing normally from the traditional concept of 
reciprocity. Thus a determination of invalidity under the Vienna Convention system 
deprives the beneficiary of a human rights treaty from any benefit or redress such as 
that enjoyed among state parties. This is an uninteded effect of the investing of the 
human being with rights under international law. The reserving state is the only party 
to enjoy the benefit of the reservation as the legal ffect is only applicable to itself. 
The state-human being relationship is at the mercy of the state-to-state relationship 
that the Vienna Convention falsely assumes to be important in a human rights treaty. 
The potential legal effect of a sweeping reservation p ses a great threat to 
human rights treaties. There is little to remedy the effect of sweeping reservations 
which could deprive the treaty of its object and purpose primarily because it is 
difficult to ascertain the extent to which obligations are modified by these 
reservations. Pellet acknowledges that there are a number of such reservations to 
which no objections have been made thus, in theory, the reserving state has modified 
all aspects of the treaty which fall under the resevation and these effects could be 
enjoyed reciprocally by an accepting state.43 This potential situation results from the 
establishment of the reservation through tacit acceptance, or silence, on the part of 
other state parties.44 As noted by Boerefijn, ‘the ILC’s primary concern about vague 
and general reservations is that these cause problems for other contracting states in 
assessing the extent to which the reserving state is bound’ but it avoids addressing 
the consequences for the human beings affected by a reservation.45  
Reservations that subordinate international obligations to domestic laws also 
create a problem as to the determinable effect of the reservation on the obligation. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, Vienna Convention Article 27 prohibits states from 
using internal law as a justification for failing to perform a treaty. Most authors 
employ Article 27 specifically in response to states attempting to use overly-broad 
references to internal law as a cover for not actually accepting new obligations.46 The 
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44 Vienna Convention, Art. 20(5). 
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ILC points out that it should ‘be borne in mind that n tional laws are “merely facts” 
from the standpoint of international law and that the very aim of a treaty can be to 
lead States to modify them.’47 Once again, applying the object and purpose test is 
difficult for state parties if they are unfamiliar, which will most likely be the case, 
with the domestic laws of the reserving state. Therefore, the state policing system is 
underutilised and a great number of these reservations remain attached to the core 
human rights treaties.  
The ILC suggests that reciprocity of legal effects may serve as a deterrent 
role because a reserving state ‘runs the risk of the reservation being invoked against 
it’ and thus this helps resolve the tension between fl xibility and integrity.48 This 
suggestion is moot, however, in the context of a human rights treaty as never has 
state attempted to invoke reciprocity of legal effect in relation to a reservation under 
this category of treaty. The Finalized Guidelines attempt to address the legal effects 
of treaties embodying non-reciprocal obligations: 
  
4.2.5 Non-reciprocal application of obligations to which a reservation 
relates 
Insofar as the obligations under the provisions to which the reservation 
relates are not subject to reciprocal application in view of the nature of 
the obligations or the object and purpose of the treaty, the content of the 
obligations of the parties other than the author of the reservation 
remains unaffected. The content of the obligations f those parties 
likewise remains unaffected when reciprocal application is not possible 
because of the content of the reservation. 
 
This attempt, however, only underscores that fact that treaties embodying non-
reciprocal obligations are different while doing nothing to remedy the lack of 
concrete effect. As noted by the commentary,49 the nature of human rights 
obligations do not engage the concept of reciprocity among the state parties and 
therefore the only logical conclusion even in the absence of the guideline is that an 
accepting (most likely in the form of tacit acceptance) state party would not seek to 
limit its obligations to the extent that the reserving state has done. Logic, however, 
does not clarify the legal effect of sweeping reservations or reservations that 
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subordinate obligations to domestic law as there is no guidance on how to assess 
their validity outwith the normal state-to-state application of the Vienna Convention 
rules. 
To rectify questions about tacit acceptance, which is the primary way that 
invalid reservations have become ‘valid’, the Draft Guide also points out that an 
individual state’s acceptance of an impermissible rese vation is a nullity.50 
Hampson’s expanded working paper of 2003 also concluded that states could not 
formulate reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of a human 
rights treaty nor could incompatible reservations be accepted.51 This is in line with 
the view advanced by Pellet throughout the Draft Guide to Practice. The ILC 
insistence that acceptance, even of an invalid reservation, is a nullity is, however, 
practically inoperable as it fails to recognise the contemporary practice that the state 
initially determines permissibility under Article 19(c) unless an alternative rule 
requires otherwise. Even noting the ‘impossibility’52 of accepting an impermissible 
reservation there is nothing outlined to counter the fact that by virtue of tacit 
acceptance, just this situation has arisen despite Pellet’s claim that ‘acceptance 
cannot change…impermissibility’.53 Furthermore, this position lacks a basis in 
customary international law as noted by Germany in its response to the draft 
guidelines on reservations.54  
Furthermore, the hard and fast nullity proposition posited by both Pellet and 
Hampson is contradicted almost immediately after its laborious introduction in the 
Draft Guide to Practice. The Draft Guide clearly indicates that acceptance can 
change impermissibility when, in guideline 3.3.3, it inserted an off-the-wall 
exception to the hard rule that it is impossible to accept an impermissible reservation 
by offering that collective acceptance of an impermissible reservation will render the 
reservation permissible. The commentary details that acceptance must be positive 
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and cannot be satisfied by silence, in other words tacit acceptance. This nod toward 
‘progressive development of law’55 only serves to confuse matters. If all of the 
parties to the treaty envision an amendment to the treaty which would mitigate the 
intervening impermissibility, the option already exists under Vienna Convention 
Article 3956 and need not be addressed as part of the reservations regime. The 
commentary suggests that this guideline contemplates th  situation whereby all other 
treaty members give their ‘express’ consent to the impermissible reservation. 
However, there is a discrepancy in the wording of the guideline as it says only it will 
‘be deemed permissible if no contracting State…objects to it after having been 
expressly informed thereof’.57 A simple reading of the guideline, without the 
commentary, suggests that the simple act of not objecting on the part of every other 
party to the treaty would fulfil the hitherto existing legal effect of tacit acceptance, 
thus creating further uncertainty and perpetuating he problematic situation most 
closely associated with reservations to human rights treaties. Several states expressed 
confusion as to the applicability of draft guidelin 3.3.3 and the inconsistency it 
creates in relation to the other guidelines on imper issibility.58 As a result, the 
guideline is ultimately not included in the Finalized Guidelines.59 Over the years, the 
lack of settled approach has led some to call for an advisory opinion by the ICJ on 
the issue of the ability of states to accept impermissible reservations, though to date 
this idea has not come to fruition.60  
The prevailing opinion for the ILC and treaty bodies61 seems to suggest that 
no invalid reservation can create a legal effect that would modify or exclude 
otherwise binding obligations. Regardless of the reaction, or inaction, of a state to an 
impermissible reservation, the Draft Guide commentary reiterates that the view taken 
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by a state on the reservation–holding the reservation impermissible or permissible–
will not prevent the reservation from being subjected o other normal mechanisms of 
review.62 The problem with this idea is that a cyclical argument is advanced by the 
guidelines. An impermissible reservation is a nullity without regard to state 
acceptance or objection but determination of impermissibility is a competence shared 
equally by states, dispute resolution mechanisms and treaty bodies.63 The opportunity 
for different bodies to assess permissibility seems to negate the idea that 
impermissibility exists without regard to state opinion or, at the very least, it 
minimises the role of states. Redgwell has commented that it precisely the lack of ‘a 
treaty mechanism for determining compatibility…or a supervisory organ competent 
to determine validity’ which perpetuates ‘the general inertia of States manifesting 
itself in tacit acceptance ensur[ing] that reserving States become parties to treaties 
even in circumstances where they have formulated incompatible reservations’.64 As 
noted above, not all states accept the ILC’s assertion that an invalid reservation is a 
nullity that cannot be accepted as this has never been a confirmed rule under 
customary law65 and the state practice of maintaining invalid resevations, detailed in 
Chapter Three, clearly counters the idea of reservation nullity and embraces the 
principle that ‘a state cannot be bound without its consent’.66 
If the nullity of invalid reservations was such an obvious legal certainty then 
there should not be so many invalid reservations attached to the core human rights 
treaties. In the Draft Guide, the issue of states’ objections to invalid reservations is 
ultimately wheedled down to serving the singular purpose of initiating a reservations 
dialogue and calling the invalidity to the attentio f potential assessors of validity, 
including courts and treaty bodies.67 Thus it appears that the final word on legal 
effect of invalid reservations under the rules set forth in the Vienna Convention is 
that there is no final word. 
State practice has developed two primary approaches addressing the legal 
effect of reservations, the principles of permissibility and opposability. In early 
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reports on reservations Pellet suggested that regardless of whether the permissibility 
or opposability doctrine was applied, the reserving state could not invoke an 
impermissible reservation to produce a legal effect: in he first instance, because the 
permissibility principle was based on the fact that an impermissible reservation is 
null and void regardless of the view of other states while under the opposability 
doctrine the reserving state could not invoke an imper issible reservation even if it 
had been accepted.68 Either way, both doctrines proceed from the idea th t a 
reservation that violates the object and purpose tet is null and void regardless of 
state response and can, therefore, have no legal effect. In theory, the only difference 
between the doctrines occurs when the reservation is val d and therefore the state-to-
state relationships will be modified as outlined below. Reflecting this idea, finalized 
guideline 4.5.1 indicates that ‘[a] reservation that does not meet the conditions of 
formal validity and permissibility…is null and void, and therefore devoid of legal 
effect.’ This was the ILC’s attempt to fill one of the major practical gaps in the 
Vienna Convention in that it suggests that ‘nullity is not dependent on the reactions 
of other contracting States’.69 While an ideal legal outcome for those opposed to 
invalid reservations to human rights treaties, neither the Vienna Convention, 
customary international law, the ILC Guide to Practice nor the work of the treaty 
bodies provide a clear answer despite the practices that have emerged among states.  
 
3.1 PERMISSIBILITY 
The permissibility doctrine argues that a reservation incompatible with the object and 
purpose test is invalid and without legal effect–and therefore a nullity–regardless of 
whether other states object. This view stems from the natural reading of Vienna 
Convention Article 19(c) and suggests that incompatible reservations are void ab 
initio or are not proper reservations.70 However, the issue is not as clean-cut as the 
permissibility doctrine makes it seem.    
Recalling the general wording of reservations articles found in several of the 
UN core human rights treaties that ‘a reservation incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the convention shall not be permitted’ is seems natural that a reservation 
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not compatible with the convention will not alter a state’s obligations. If the 
reservation does not survive the object and purpose test then the reservation should 
not be up for debate full stop. The nullity is established regardless of objections or 
acceptances by other state parties and will have no bearing on the status of the 
reserving state as a party to the treaty. However, this neglects the fact that 
incompatibility is one of the primary reasons given when states object to reservations 
to human rights treaties,71 thus intimating that some assessment must be made. This 
is problematic as reservation practice has demonstrated that not all states agree on the 
invalidity of reservations.  
Austria illustrated its preference for the permissibility approach in its 1994 
objection to the reservation to CEDAW made by the Maldives: 
 
The reservation made by the Maldives is incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Convention and is therefore inadmissible under 
article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and shall 
not be permitted, in accordance with article 28 (2) of the [CEDAW]. 
Austria therefore states that this reservation cannot alter or modify in 
any respect the obligations arising from the Convention for any State 
Party thereto.72 
 
The objection employs the language of permissibility and leaves no doubt as to the 
consequence anticipated in relations between the two parties from Austria’s point of 
view. Though strictly speaking, under the permissibility approach an objection is 
unnecessary. A similar objection asserting the permissibility doctrine was lodged by 
Portugal in 1994 also with regard to the reservations by the Maldives.73 
 Another notable point is that under the permissibility doctrine the twelve-
month rule that facilitates tacit acceptance of rese vations should have no effect if a 
reservation is deemed impermissible.74 States should not be able to accept 
impermissible reservations vis-à-vis other states yt tacit acceptance results in 
precisely this result.75 The coupling of the twelve-month rule with the arbitrariness of 
the permissibility doctrine is a key practice that has added to the reservations 
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quagmire. Members of the ILC acknowledge that while th  permissibility approach 
is probably theoretically correct, it is the opposability approach that more accurately 




The opposability doctrine in traditional treaty law proposes that if a reservation is 
objected to by another state party to an agreement th  the reserving state will not be 
considered a party to treaty, the ‘super-maximum’ effect. The result is the same 
regardless of reservation validity–no treaty relations are established between the 
reserving and objecting state. Thus, the situation w uld seem to present one set of 
states, those who do not object to an reservation, with whom the reserving state will 
seen as being a treaty party and another set of states, those who object to the same 
reservation either based on invalidity or another reason, for whom the reserving state 
will not be a party to the treaty. Historically, this was the position in the normal 
application of treaty law as discussed in Chapter Two.  
Due to the nature of human rights treaties there is no pressing need to 
determine that the author state of an objected-to reservation be considered a non-state 
party.77 The ‘super-maximum’ effect is rarely invoked and, most often, objecting 
states specifically articulate that the objection will not inhibit the entry into force of 
the treaty between the two states,78 thus specifically discarding the opposability 
approach. Only rarely does any state articulate its adherence to the traditional 
opposability doctrine. As demonstrated in its reservation to CERD, Fiji purports to 
follow the opposability doctrine:   
 
In addition it interprets article 20 and the other r lated provisions of 
Part III of the Convention as meaning that if a rese vation is not 
accepted the State making the reservation does not become a Party to 
the Convention.79 
                                               
76 ILC Yearbook 1995, UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), para. 457. 
77 Though this was clearly a consideration of the UN Secretary-General and one of the reasons for 
referring the question regarding reservations to the Genocide Convention to the ICJ. See Chapter 2. 
78 Including a sentence that the objection will not prevent entry into force of the treaty between the 
reserving and objecting state is technically unnecessary due to the automatic assumption established 
by Vienna Convention, Art. 21(3). 
79 UN Treaty Collection, Fiji, Reservations to CERD. 






Fiji may take this position but no states have publicised whether or not they agree 
with this interpretation of CERD. Anther example of a state invoking traditional 
opposability comes from Sweden. Its objections made to numerous states’ 
reservations to CEDAW specified that the reservations to which it objected 
‘constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Convention between Sweden and 
[the Maldives, Kuwait, Lebanon and Niger]’.80 Proponents of the opposability 
approach are adamant that the Vienna Convention invests non-reserving states with 
the determinative function of assessing compatibility of reservations.81 
The lack of objections to incompatible reservations utilising the opposability 
doctrine results in the unintended and illogical consequence that the reserving state 
always becomes a party to the treaty despite the unacceptable reservation which, as a 
result of the reserving state becoming a state party, becomes an acceptable 
reservation if there is no objection under the doctrine of tacit acceptance as set forth 
in Vienna Convention Article 20(5). Considering the unilateral actions of ratification 
and reservation formulation relating to human rights treaties and the fact that these 
actions are entirely independent of the other state p rties, ‘it makes little sense then 
to suggest that the reservation may be opposable,’82 a view supported by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in the 1982 Effect of Reservations on the Entry 
into Force of the ACHR83 advisory opinion.   
Even in the face of one objection, the opposability doctrine implies that the 
reserving state would not become a party to the convention. The ‘super-maximum’ 
effect envisioned by the opposability doctrine is rarely invoked and, most often, 
objecting states specifically articulate that the objection will not inhibit the entry into 
force of the treaty between the two states.84 Thus, the opposability approach does not 
                                               
80 UN Treaty Collection, Objections to Reservations to CEDAW, objections by Sweden made in 1994, 
1996, 1998 and 2000, respectively. 
81 See Swaine, ‘Reserving’, 315; J.M. Ruda, ‘Reservations to Treaties’ (1975-III) 146 Recueil des 
cours 95, 101. 
82 M. Craven, ‘Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International 
Law’ (2000) 11 EJIL 489, 508. 
83 Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 (24 Sept. 1982), IACtHR (Ser. A) No. 2 (1982), para. 29. See discussion 
in Chapter 4, section 2.3. 
84 Including a sentence that the objection will not prevent entry into force of the treaty between the 
reserving and objecting state is technically unnecessary due to the automatic assumption established 
by Vienna Convention, Art. 21(3). 





effectively solve the problem of invalid reservations and, as noted by Craven, it ‘has 
little salience in the context of human rights treai s’,85 especially in light of the goal 
of achieving universal ratification. The application f the opposability doctrine is 
indecisive and fails to give serious consideration o the issue of invalidity since the 
practice produces the same result no matter what the basis of the objection.86 The gap 
in the Vienna Convention on the legal effect of an invalid reservation is not cured by 
this doctrine, especially in response to non-reciprocal human rights treaties. 
 
3.3 SUMMARY  
The Vienna Convention rules are difficult to apply in light of the vagueness of the 
object and purpose test as well as the lack of a leg l ffect if a reservation is 
determined to be invalid by another state. The uncertain validity of sweeping 
reservations and reservations which subordinate interna ional obligations to domestic 
laws further diminishes the effectiveness of the rules and contributes to the 
unwillingness of states to take a view on reservations. Furthermore, the nature of 
human rights treaties renders the Vienna Convention’s self-policing reservation and 
objection system of little use even when states do fulfil their monitoring roles. One of 
the primary reasons is that there is no clear legal effect that results from a 
determination by a state that a reservation is invalid. The doctrines of permissibility 
and opposability have traditionally been used to define the legal effect of a 
reservation however these have little resonance in the context of human rights 
treaties. 
 
4 CONSEQUENCES OF INVALIDITY  
Reservation practice has shown that the legal effect b tween state parties and the 
legal effect on the state-human being relationship created by human rights treaties 
are not necessarily one and the same. The present analysis is concerned with the 
actual legal effect, or more accurately the consequence, produced as a result of a 
determination of invalidity by other state parties. Initially part four of the Draft 
Guide to Practice points out that reservations ‘aredefined in relation to the legal 
                                               
85 Craven, ‘Legal Differentiation’, 497. 
86 Under the opposability doctrine, objections to invalid reservations generate the same effect as 
objections to validly formulated reservations. See waine, ‘Reserving’, 315. 





effect that their authors intend them to have on the treaty’87 despite the fact that the 
statement may not produce the intended legal effect.   
Recognition of the lack of consequences for an inval d reservation in the 
Vienna Convention is one unifying theme in the resevations debate. Both Pellet and 
Hampson concede that a determination of impermissibility under Vienna Convention 
Article 19(c) is ‘deprived of concrete effect’88 and Pellet submits that the Guide will 
resolve this.89 States also recognise the failure of the Vienna Convention to address 
the effect of invalid reservations as the major lacuna of the reservations regime.90 
The lack of consequence stems from the fact that nothing in the Vienna Convention 
compels a state to take view on a reservation and states rarely take issue with 
reservations to human rights treaties, as noted in Chapters Three and Four. Even 
where a state does determine a reservation to be invalid there is nothing in the 
Vienna Convention outlining a legal effect capable of creating a concrete 
consequence; as a result, a state formulating an invalid reservation simply maintains 
the invalid reservation and contributes to the continued variable interpretations of its 
treaty obligations.  
Current reservation practice tends to favour either nullity or severance as the 
consequence of invalidity, though the effectiveness of both are limited in their 
application to human rights treaties due to the futility of such in the state-to-state 
relationship and the lack of complaints brought on the international level. On the 
international level, it is accepted that another state may assert the nullity of a 
reservation to which it has objected on the basis of nvalidity and that this assertion 
may potentially prohibit the reserving state from benefiting from the reservation. 
Alternatively, some states adhere to the severability principle, or Strasbourg 
Approach, which also results in the consent of a reserving state remaining intact with 
the reservation severed as though it had never been formulated.   
Determining a concrete consequence is a vital functio  of rules governing 
treaty interpretation so that obligations owed inter se can be determined. However, 
                                               
87 Draft Guide to Practice, 4, commentary para. 2. 
88 Draft Guide to Practice, 3.3, commentary para. 7; F. Hampson, Working paper submitted pursuant 
to Sub-Commission decision 1998/113, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/28 (1999) (1999 Working 
paper), paras. 24, 31. 
89 Draft Guide to Practice, 4, commentary para. 19. 
90 Observations by El Salvador, Finland, Norway and Portugal in ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/639 (2011), 
paras. 119, 121, 129 and 130. See also Swaine, ‘Reserving’, 322. 





the third-party beneficiaries of the core human rights treaties, human beings, are less 
protected by assertions of nullity or severability when the reserving state disagrees 
and refuses to withdraw the reservation. From the domestic level the full expression 
of an obligation owed by the reserving state remains obscured by the reservation and 
recourse is limited without the intervention of another state or dispute resolution 
mechanism.  
Finalized guideline 4.5 introduces the topic of consequences of an invalid 
reservation. It is this particular aspect of the rese vations rules that is ripe for the 
progressive development of law especially in light of the adverse effect on human 
rights treaties. Pellet acknowledges that the lack of consequences is ‘one of the most 
serious lacunae in the matter of reservations in the Vienna Conventions’.91  The ILC 
suggests that the normative gap may ‘have been deliberately created by the authors 
of the [Vienna] Convention.’92 Whether deliberate or not, the current state of 
reservations, especially in the context of human rights treaties, necessitates that more 
pronounced rules be introduced to detail the consequence of an invalidity 
determination. 
Though legal nullity is the desired consequence, particularly in a human 
rights treaty, the lack of finality on who decides permissibility destabilises the actual 
consequence intended by declaring a reservation a legal nullity. The ILC contends 
that nullity based on the impermissibility of a reservation is objective and not 
dependent on the reactions of other state parties,93 yet this only addresses the state-
to-state relationship. Furthermore, it fails to recognise that the acceptance and 
objection interplay is the entire basis of the resevation monitoring system created by 
the Vienna Convention and precisely the reason why so many invalid reservations 
remain attached to the core human rights treaties today. States claim the right to 
determine validity yet in the case of the normative human rights treaties the status of 
reservations has proved to be unclear even when one or multiple states have objected 
to reservations on the basis of invalidity.94 The reserving state benefits from the 
presumption of validity and there is no legal imperative to withdraw a reservation 
                                               
91 Draft Guide to Practice, 4.5, commentary para. 16. 
92 Draft Guide to Practice, 3.3, commentary para. 2. 
93 Draft Guide to Practice, 4.5.1, commentary para. 10.  
94 This stems largely from the fact that the reservations rules also represent a political feature to be 
optimised by states. 





deemed invalid by another state as it is highly unlikely that an objecting state will 
press the issue. 
The ILC’s cautious approach to impermissible reservations during the early 
years of its study favoured the reserving state and placed the onus upon the reserving 
state to take action to redress the inappropriate res rvation such as modifying or 
withdrawing the reservation or relinquishing membership in the treaty altogether.95 
The necessity of placing the burden on states to bring about a consequence, such as 
withdrawing the reservation, is because the Vienna Convention system lacks a 
control and annulment mechanism. Without an identifiable and tangible consequence 
the effect of the invalid reservation still hangs in the balance. As the Vienna 
Convention is silent on the issue of consequences, the potential to develop the 
subject should be viewed as an opportunity.96 More detailed rules on what happens to 
a reservation that has been declared invalid would go a long way toward rectifying 
the ambiguity surrounding invalid reservations to the core human rights treaties. 
Presently, there exist two options establishing the legal consequence of an invalid 
reservation. The first is nullity which, as discussed above, results in the invalid 
reservation being void ab initio. Nullity by definition is both the legal effect and the 
consequence of an invalid reservation. Reiterating the argument above, the problem 
with nullity in the current context of the Vienna Convention regime is that the nullity 
is only invoked among states in their treaty relations with one another. In its relations 
with other states nullity equates to a reserving state ‘shooting blanks’, reservations 
which will never have a consequence for another state p rty to the treaty. Because 
invalid reservations to human rights treaties affect the state-human being relationship 
and human beings cannot invoke nullity, severability provides a more concrete 
consequence in response to a reservation that is deermined to be invalid.  
 
 
                                               
95 Text of the Preliminary Conclusions of the ILC on Reservations to Normative Multilateral Treaties 
Including Human Rights Treaties, Report of the ILC on the Work of its 49th Session, UN Doc. 
A/52/10 (1997), Ch. V, para. 86. See discussions by R. Baratta, ‘Should Invalid Reservations to 
Human Rights Treaties Be Disregarded?’ (2000) 11 EJIL 413, 418-19; Redgwell, ‘Reservations and 
General Comment No. 24(52)’, 408. 
96 Seibert-Fohr, ‘The Potentials of the Vienna Convention’, p. 209. 





4.1 SEVERABILITY 97 
The concept of severability of reservations has been developed both through court 
and treaty body jurisprudence, as well as observations by states. This doctrine 
articulates the idea that if an invalid or incompatible reservation is made then the 
author state will be bound to the treaty without the benefit of the reservation. 
Redgwell highlights that: 
 
Severance is conceptually closer to the regime envisaged by the 
Genocide [Opinion], where the International Court of Justice, in 
departing from the unanimity rule, was at pains to ensure that complete 
freedom to make reservations did not include the ability to formulate 
reservations striking at the core of the treaty; hence the compatibility 
test.98  
 
The Vienna Convention, however, provides no guidance on the issue of severability. 
The ICJ’s Genocide Opinion concluded that even in the event that a reservation had 
been objected to by a state party to the Genocide Convention the reserving state 
would still become a party to the Convention unless the reservation was not 
compatible with its object and purpose. The Court offered little guidance other than 
to suggest that an incompatible reservation would be severable. The advantage to this 
approach is that the state will remain bound to the treaty.99  
Though case law on the subject of reservations is scant, the European Court 
of Human Rights solidified the principle of severability in the1988 Belilos case, as 
discussed in Chapter Four. Opting to follow the severability principle in lieu of the 
opposability doctrine, in Belilos the Court found that Switzerland was bound to the 
ECHR despite having made an invalid reservation. The Court effectively severed the 
reservation100 and held Switzerland bound without the benefit of he reservation and, 
therefore, unable to claim the reservation to avoid the ECHR obligation against 
                                               
97 All reservations and objections in the remainder of this chapter can be found in the UN Treaty 
Collection, Status of Treaties, unless otherwise indicated. 
98 Redgwell, ‘Reservations and General Comment No. 24(52)’, 410. 
99 Ibid., 407. 
100 The reservation was actually titled a declaration h wever as applied it created a reservation.  See S. 
Marks, ‘Reservations Unhinged: The Belilos Case Before the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(1990) 39 ICLQ 300. 





which it had reserved. The application of the severability doctrine ultimately led to 
the state’s culpability in Belilos.101  
The HRC rallied behind Strasbourg in the highly contr versial General 
Comment No. 24 (discussed in Chapter Six) supporting the position that ‘a 
reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will be 
operative for the reserving party without the benefit of the reservation’ in the event 
that an invalid reservation is made.102 Not surprisingly, the severability principle has 
been refuted by many governments, particularly the US, UK103 and France, as a 
violation of the fundamental principle of international law which conditions an 
international obligation on consent.104 This is reflected in their objections to invalid 
reservations in that none of these states ever indicates that the reserving state will be 
bound without the benefit of its reservation.  
The primary difficulty with severability is where a state’s consent to be 
bound is tied to the acceptance of its reservations. For those states whose consent to 
be bound is facilitated through their domestic legislature and contingent upon the 
acceptance of  reservations attached to instruments of ratification, the current system 
offers no governing principles on how to treat resevations that are invalid but 
integrally tied to consent to be bound. This lacuna is both a practical roadblock in 
                                               
101 Severability is also followed by the IACtHR, see, for example, Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, 
Preliminary Objections, (1 Sept. 2001) IACtHR (Ser. C) No. 80 (2001), paras. 78-95, discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
102 HRC, General Comment No. 24, para. 18. 
103 In the late 1970s and early 1980s and outwith the cor human rights treaties the UK demonstrated a 
penchant for the principle of severability when it objected to the reservations of several states to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions. In its ratification to the G neva Conventions the UK declared that it held 
certain reservations to be invalid and therefore ‘regard[ed] any application of any of those reservations 
as constituting a breach of the Convention to which the reservation relates’ while also regarding the 
reserving states as parties to the Geneva Conventions. See UK ratification of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, 75 UNTS 973 (1949), ratification at 278 UNTS 259 (1957), pp. 266-268. The UK 
reiterated this position when objecting to subsequent r servations to the Geneva Conventions made by 
South Vietnam and Guinea-Bissau in 1976 and by Angola in 1985. Objection by the UK to 
reservations made by the Republic of South Vietnam and Guinea-Bissau, 995 UNTS 394 (1976), pp. 
394-97, and to reservations made by Angola to the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, 1404 UNTS 337 (1985). See discussion by Hampson, 2004 Final working paper, paras. 16-
17. 
104 Observations by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on Human Rights 
Committee General Comment No. 24 (52) relating to rese vations, UN Doc. A/50/40 (1995); see also 
K. Korkelia, ‘New Challenges to the Regime of Reservations under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights’ (2002) 13 EJIL 437, 462 et seq.; Baratta, ‘Should Invalid Reservations to 
Human Rights Treaties Be Disregarded?’, 417; E.A. Baylis, ‘General Comment 24: Confronting the 
Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties’ (1999) 17 Berkeley Journal of International Law 
277, 318-22. 





interpretation in the event of a violation and detrimental to determining overall 
compliance with treaty obligations. States such as the US and the UK will often 
condition their consent to be bound to treaties upon ratification subject to the 
reservations as contemplated by their respective legislature and parliament. Under 
the severability principle the state would become a party without the benefit of any 
invalid reservation but this expressly ignores the conditional consent to be bound. It 
seems that states are cognizant of such conditional consent and are willing to 
maintain reservations without specifying severance. Consider the reservations to 
ICCPR made by the US which indicate that the ratification of the treaty is expressly 
subject to acceptance of the reservations attached to the instrument of ratification.105 
In 1993 Sweden objected to six of the reservations made by the US indicating that 
‘reservations made by the United States of America include both reservations to 
essential and non-derogable provisions, and general references to domestic 
legislation’ and therefore contrary to the treaty.106 The US reservations have not been 
removed and Sweden included in its statement that the objection did not preclude 
entry into force between the two countries. Sweden id not specifically cite that the 
US would not benefit from the reservations, as it did when objecting to reservations 
by a multitude of states to CEDAW. Where does this leave the status of the 
reservations made by the US? Under the current regime there is no straightforward 
answer. 
It could be argued that the nuanced approach to the US reservations 
compared to the objections to CEDAW reservations where Sweden specified that 
‘[t]he Convention enters into force in its entirety between the two States, without 
                                               
105 Three of the reservations read as follows: (1) That Article 20 does not authorize or require 
legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and 
association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States. (2) That the United States 
reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person 
(other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition 
of capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen 
years of age. (3) That the United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent that `cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment 
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States.  
106 Declaration by the Government of Sweden with respect to reservations made by the United States 
of America (18 Jun. 1993) to ICCPR.  Many others states, including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain also objected. 





Bahrain [and others]107 benefiting from its reservation’, took into account the 
conditioned US consent factor. However it is more lik ly a simple fact of timing in 
the development of the severability doctrine.108 Prior to 1994 Sweden generally only 
noted the incompatibility of reservations and their undermining effect on 
international law in the course of objecting to reservations without specifying any 
legal effect but in all cases noting that the reservations would not prevent the entry 
into force of the treaty between itself and the rese ving state.109 However, between 
1994 and 2001 Sweden generally opted to follow the opposability doctrine, at least in 
relation to states making reservations to CEDAW.110 The notorious General 
Comment No. 24 whereby the HRC indicated that it would sever incompatible 
reservations was published in 1994 and possibly opened the eyes of states to the 
option. Interestingly, Sweden did not readily subscribe to the severability approach 
until 2001,111 but has since remained true to the principle,112 though it did technically 
indicate severance of Kuwait’s reservation to the ICCPR in 1997 albeit in a less clear 
formula than that subsequently used. Sweden’s practice is merely used by way of 
example to note the development of the doctrines of legal effect and eventual 
recognition that a more concrete consequence must be a tached to states’ objections.  
In reviewing reservations to the ICCPR it is evident that Sweden is not alone 
in moving toward the severability approach. Objections to reservations to the ICCPR 
made by Denmark (to Botswana, 2001), Finland (to Maldives and Pakistan, among 
others), Greece (to Turkey, 2004), Latvia (to Mauritania, 2005; to Pakistan, 2011), 
Norway (to Botswana, 2001), Slovakia (to Pakistan, 2011), to identify a few,113 
indicate that states are gradually opting for a more clear indication of the 
                                               
107 The same statement was made mutatis mutandis in response to reservations made by Saudia 
Arabia, North Korea, Mauritania, Syria, Micronesia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Brunei 
Darussalam and Qatar.  
108 There is also a strong argument that political considerations play into the use of severance, and 
objections generally, but it is not a theme to be pursued in this thesis. 
109 See particularly its objections to reservations to CEDAW. 
110 Prior to 1994 Sweden had generally only noted the incompatibility of reservations with the object 
and purpose test.  
111 The same can be said generally of the other Nordic states. See Klabbers, ‘Accepting the 
Unacceptable?’; L. Magnusson, ‘Elements of Nordic Practice 1997: The Nordic Countries in Co-
ordination’ (1998) Nordic Journal of International Law 350. 
112 Sweden has indicated severance of incompatible reservations to the ICCPR by Botswana, Turkey, 
Mauritania, Maldives and Pakistan; and in response to incompatible reservations made to CEDAW by 
Micronesia, United Arab Emirates, Syrian Arab Republic, Bahrain, Mauritania, among others 
113 See UN Treaty Collection, Objections to Reservations to the ICCPR. 





consequence of invalidity in the form of severability. The same uptake of the 
approach can also be seen in the patterns of states’ objections to reservations to 
ICESCR,114 CEDAW,115 CAT116 and, to a lesser extent, in CERD117.  
A review of states which frequently file objections reflects the progression 
between more stringent approaches, sometimes between permissibility to 
opposability to severance (Sweden, for example), other imes simply jumping from 
permissibility to severability, as evidenced by Austria’s 1994 objection to the 
reservations by Maldives to CEDAW (purporting permissibility) contrasted against 
subsequent objections to reservations to CEDAW by Pakistan, Lebanon, North 
Korea, among others (opting for severance). The delay in adherence to the 
severability approach is not surprising as it reflects the reticence with which states 
accept the concept especially in light of its direct challenge to a reserving state’s 
sovereignty. Responding to the early uptake of the severance approach, Bradley and 
Goldsmith argue that it is incorrect to conclude that a state continues to be bound by 
articles to which it has made reservations even if the reservations are deemed by 
some states to violate the object and purpose test.118 Their position basically asserts, 
for example, that if the offending US reservations were actually treated as severed in 
an adversarial procedure, the literal application of the US position, pursuant to its 
ratification and reservation, would be that consent to reaty membership would be 
nullified, thus mooting any cause of action brought under the treaty.  
It has been suggested that the invalidation of the res rvation negates consent 
to be bound to the treaty thus the state is not longer bound to the treaty at all or, less 
drastically, the invalidation negates the obligation that was the subject of the invalid 
                                               
114 See objection to reservations to the ICESCR by Denmark (to Pakistan, 2005), Finland (to 
Bangladesh, 1999; Pakistan, 2005), Greece (to Turkey, 2004), Italy (to Kuwait, 1997), Latvia (to 
Pakistan, 2005), Netherlands (to Pakistan, 2005), Norway (to China, 2002; to Pakistan, 2005), 
Pakistan (to India, 2005), Slovakia (to Pakistan, 2009), and Sweden (to Bangladesh, 1999; to China, 
2002; to Turkey, 2004; to Pakistan, 2005). 
115 The objections to reservations to CEDAW are numerous thus the following is only a small sample 
and does not include those states noted for advocating severance in their objections to reservations t 
the ICESCR (previous footnote): Austria (examples in text); Belgium (to Brunei Darussalam and 
Oman, 2007; to Qatar, 2010); Canada (to Brunei Darussalam, 2007), Czech Republic (to Oman and 
Brunei Darussalam, 2007; to Qatar, 2009), and Estonia (to Syria, 2004; to Qatar, 2010). 
116 Czech Republic (to Pakistan, 2011), Denmark (to Botswana, 2001), Finland (to Bangladesh, 1999; 
to Qatar, 2001; to Pakistan, 2011), Latvia (to Pakist n, 2011), Norway (to Qatar and Botswana, 2001; 
to Pakistan, 2011), Slovakia (to Pakistan, 2011), Sweden (to Qatar, 2000; to Botswana, 2001, to 
Thailand, 2008; to Pakistan, 2011). 
117 See specifically Sweden’s objections. 
118 Bradley and Goldsmith, ‘Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent’, 436. 





reservation, effectively erasing it from the catalogue of obligations owed.119 
Goodman and Macdonald argue that completely invalidating the consent to be bound 
to the treaty gives disproportionate weight to the invalid reservation and invalidating 
the entire obligation that was subjected to the resrvation is not appropriate when the 
obligations are non-reciprocal.120  
In a bid to fill the consequences gap and with the support of the treaty 
bodies,121 the ILC put forth their most progressive guideline detailing the status of a 
state that has formulated an invalid reservation. Departing from previous views on 
regional human rights approaches to invalid reservations,122 the Finalized Guidelines 
indicate that the reservation will be severed.  
 
4.5.3 Status of the author of an invalid reservation n relation to the 
treaty 
1. The status of the author of an invalid reservation in relation to a 
treaty depends on the intention expressed by the res rving State or 
international organization on whether it intends to be bound by the 
treaty without the benefit of the reservation or whether it considers that 
it is not bound by the treaty.  
2. Unless the author of the invalid reservation has expressed a contrary 
intention or such an intention is otherwise established, it is considered 
a contracting State or a contracting organization without the benefit of 
the reservation. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, the author of the invalid 
reservation may express at any time its intention nt to be bound by 
the treaty without the benefit of the reservation. 
4. If a treaty monitoring body expresses the view that a reservation is 
invalid and the reserving State or international organization intends not 
to be bound by the treaty without the benefit of the reservation, it 
should express its intention to that effect within a period of twelve 
months from the date at which the treaty monitoring body made its 
assessment. 
 
                                               
119 R. Goodman, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent’ (2002) 96 AJIL 
531, 535 et seq; Macdonald, ‘Reservations under the European Convention on Human Rights’, 448. 
120 Goodman, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent’; Macdonald, 
‘Reservations under the European Convention on Human Rights’, 449. 
121 Chairpersons of the HRTBs, 2007 Report on Reservations, para. 16(7). 
122 ILC, UN Doc. A/52/10 (1997), para. 84. In the report Pellet suggested that the Strasbourg approach 
was a form of regional customary law that did not otherwise impact customary law on reservations. 





In essence, this guideline applies a rebuttable presumption that the author state 
formulating an invalid reservation will remain bound by the treaty without the 
benefit of the reservation unless the state expresses an alternative intention.123  
Thus the guideline adheres to the principle of severability, without using the 
specific term except in the commentary, but allows room for movement in the 
instance that the author state’s consent to be bound is tied to the acceptance of its 
reservation. This position pays great deference to the practice of regional human 
rights courts124 as well as the HRC125 and marks a sharp departure from Pellet’s early 
views on severability. It also reflects the growing recognition of the principle by 
states. The commentary also advocates the doctrine of ‘divisibility’ or ‘severability’ 
if a reservation is formulated which clearly contravenes Article 19(a) or (b).126 There 
is increasing support for severance among observers as well.127 
While this step to cure the consequences lacuna perpetuated by the Vienna 
Convention is undoubtedly one in the right direction, there is still a question as to 
whether the proposal will pass muster in the larger int rnational community of states. 
Early indicators suggest that a ‘severance rule’ will not sit easily with all states.128 
The lack of a consistent practice by states as to how invalid reservations should be 
handled has consistently impeded resolution of the issue despite the clear growth in 
the recognition of the severability principle by states noted above. Outwith the ILC 
and the treaty bodies the one point that is undisputed about the consequence of an 
invalid reservation is that there is no settled practice or common agreement on how 
to resolve the issue particularly in the context of state-to-state treaty relations.  
  There is another cause for hesitation regarding the ILC’s new predilection for 
severance. Notably, in the intervening period betwen adoption of the draft 
guidelines and the finalized guidelines several state  commented on the 
consequences of an invalidity determination on a state’s consent to be bound, a 
                                               
123 See Draft Guide to Practice, commentary to 4.5.2. 
124 See Chapter 4.  
125 HRC, General Comment No. 24. 
126 Draft Guide to Practice, 3.3, commentary para. 6. 
127 Goodman, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent’; Redgwell, 
‘Reservations and General Comment No. 24(52)’, 411.
128 Comments by Germany and the United States in ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/639 (2011), paras. 149-50 
and 170-82 and compare with, Comments by El Salvador nd Finland, in paras. 135-36 and 138-45; 
UN Treaty Collection, Sweden’s objection to El Salvador’s reservation to the Disabilities Convention; 
Observations by the Governments of the United States nd the United Kingdom on Human Rights 
Committee General Comment No. 24 (52) relating to rese vations, UN Doc. A/50/40 (1995). 





problem that has been recognised throughout the debate on severability. From the 
viewpoint of states, the main concerns envision issue  with the status of the reserving 
state,129 which would be evaluated following severance of a reservation under 4.5.3. 
Reading finalized guideline 4.5.3 alone there seems to be at least initial closure on 
the issue of consequence for an invalid reservation. However, in the commentary to 
draft guideline 4.3.7 Pellet makes clear that a state may not be compelled to comply 
with a treaty without the benefit of its reservation. Relying on the logical application 
of the principle of mutual consent he insists that a state cannot be bound–the 
reservation severed–any further than it is willing to be.130 Both the draft guideline 
(4.3.7) and the finalized guideline (4.3.8) specifically address valid reservations, 
however the commentary to draft guideline 4.3.7 implies that due to the principle of 
mutual consent even an impermissible reservation can ot be severed. In an attempt to 
reconcile the existence of invalid reservations andthe principle of mutual consent 
Pellet relies on the permissibility doctrine to establish that the concrete consequence 
of an impermissible reservation is that it is null and void,131 a position supported by 
the treaty bodies132 as previously indicated. Thus the ILC guidelines provide a 
dizzying cyclical debate that continues the question definitive consequence.  
The work of the treaty bodies has not proved to advance an alternative 
resolution to the consequences issue as it follows the views of the ILC. In multiple 
reports, the working group on reservations, which was established to examine the 
practice of human rights treaty bodies, discarded other options for consequences of 
an invalidity determination and voiced solidarity with the ILC conclusion that the 
invalid reservation would be severed unless a contrary intention could be proved:  
 
The consequence that applies in a particular situaton depends on the 
intention of the State at the time it enters its ree vation. This intention 
must be identified during a serious examination of the available 
information, with the presumption, which may be refut d, that the State 
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would prefer to remain a party to the treaty without the benefit of the 
reservation, rather than being excluded.133  
 
Despite fervent commitment to the issue in the late 1990s, the treaty bodies seem to 
have happily let the ILC maintain the lead in sorting out the problems with the 
Vienna Convention.    
Schabas points out that there is an ambiguity to severability principle in that it 
does not always clearly state, at least as evidenced by states’ objections, that the 
reserved provision will actually be enforced as part and parcel of the treaty.134 The 
exception would be those objections indicating thate treaty in its entirety will be in 
effect without the benefit of the offending reservation which is the phrasing used 
most often in the years subsequent to Schabas’s observation. Without specifying that 
the invalidly reserved provision was to be enforced, severability would actually give 
full effect to the reservation.135 States appear to have noted this incongruous 
approach and remedied it to the extent possible in their objection formulation.  
Ultimately, the consequence of an invalid reservation remains unsettled. The 
ILC, the treaty bodies and many states favour severability. While this is a welcomed 
result for human rights advocates, it remains to be seen whether a majority of states 
will fall in line with this point of view. One thing is clear and that is that unless a 
definitive view is taken on invalidity of a reservation, it seems that there can be no 
resolution of the issue of consequence. The competing ideas signify uneasiness with 
the rules as they exist and a lack of settled practice on the international level, 
highlighting an area ripe for development.   
The best way to easily address concrete consequences is to establish a final 
arbiter on reservation validity. Clearly the first step will be the most difficult in light 
of the competing organs which are competent to assess reservations. Reconciling the 
potential organs will be addressed in Chapter Six. Here, in specific relation to invalid 
reservations, it is more important to note that thestark position of nullity and 
severance could benefit from more nuanced approaches. The following procedural 
options draw upon the work done by Hampson and others136 and offer simple ways 
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to cure invalid reservations while encouraging adherence to treaties in the aftermath 
of a concrete consequence being determined. In turn, curing the hanging invalid 
reservation and alleviating normative ambiguity will help better define human rights 
obligations in the context of the state-human being relationship. 
 
4.2 ADDRESSING THE HANGING RESERVATION: ALTERNATIVES 
Ultimately, even reservations viewed as invalid will often remain attached to 
multilateral treaties due to the lack of guidance as to whether the conclusion of 
invalidity by one state will defeat the reservation. Validity is not always easily 
determined especially in the confines of the state-to-state treaty relationship. This is 
recognised by Lijnzaad’s astute observation that ‘the claim that a particular 
reservation is contrary to the object and purpose is easier made than substantiated’.137 
Had a mandatory dispute mechanism for evaluating reservations been included in the 
Vienna Convention the problem of the ‘hanging reservation’ could have easily been 
avoided because a clear determination would be adjudged and definite consequence 
outlined. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, Brierly’s suggestion of mandatory 
resort to the ICJ as a dispute mechanism when there was disagreement on the 
admissibility of a reservation was resoundingly defeated and treaty articles requiring 
mandatory resort to the ICJ as a mechanism of review for treaty disputes are 
typically reserved against.  
Nonetheless, when a court is given the opportunity to rule on reservation 
validity several options to cure the invalid reservation have been suggested: firstly, 
the state may withdraw the offending reservation; secondly, the state may amend the 
defective reservation a posteriori so as to comply with the opinion of the 
adjudicating court; or, finally, the state may denou ce the convention (where 
possible) with the possibility of re-acceding with a compliant reservations (where 
possible).138 These options offer a more nuanced approach to strict everance by 
allowing the state to choose how to resolve the unacceptable reservation which 
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allows the state to maintain its claims to sovereignty while keeping any questions 
about invalidating the consent to be bound at bay.  
  
4.2.1 WITHDRAWAL  
Vienna Convention Article 22 (Annex II) outlines the procedural aspects for 
withdrawing reservations. These guidelines are mere practicalities in the event that a 
state chooses to withdraw a reservation following an objection. I  the event that a 
final determination is made on invalidity, nullity and severance are clearly preferred 
yet the same result can be achieved by inviting the res rving state to withdraw its 
reservation. Withdrawal is the more state-sensitive approach to eliciting a 
consequence for a reservation and is most often employed by the treaty bodies when 
they review periodic reports. Though the legal effect is precisely the same as 
severance, the more genteel terminology allows the res rving state to take control of 
the situation and ‘elect’ to withdraw the invalid reservation rather than have it 
severed.  
During the third inter-committee meeting of the human rights treaty bodies in 
2004 it was decided that treaty bodies could request withdrawal of a reservation 
deemed incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty just as they could 
generally make this request even with regard to a cmpatible reservation pursuant to 
their monitoring function.139 By limiting the number of reservations the process of 
moving human rights obligations into the realm of customary law is facilitated, a 
point which has not gone unnoticed.140 States have withdrawn a number of 
reservations to the various treaties as noted in Chapter Four. It is not possible to 
hypothesise as to the reasons behind withdrawals but the efforts of states in their 
objections as well as treaty bodies reiteration of the need to withdraw reservations 
can only underscore the preference of this option over the potential of strict 
severance. A state would surely elect to withdraw rther than to have its reservation 
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4.2.2 REFORMULATION  
While no rule exists in either the Vienna Conventio141 or customary international 
law to support reformulation, practice has shown that is is a viable option. This was 
the approach followed by the ECtHR inBelilos142 and on another occasion by 
Liechtenstein143 to amend reservations to the ECHR. Despite the ‘bizarre novelty’144 
of this approach, reformulation seems the most viable lternative to the strict rule 
that a reservation must be formulated simultaneously with the consent to be bound.145  
This approach would create a ‘new rule of international law’ which would allow for 
‘subsequent modification of reservations in order to ender them compatible with the 
object and purpose of the instrument.’ 146  
Allowing reformulation of a reservation following a declaration of 
incompatibility would ‘promote ratification of human rights treaties by assuring new 
parties a degree of certainty as to the consequences and effects of any reservations’147 
in that a state would have the opportunity to correct any deficiencies. Both the 
CEDAW Committee148and the Children’s Committee149 have voiced support for the 
prospect of modifying the errant reservations and the potential of the practice has 
also been recognised by ICCPR State Parties in their objections to invalid 
reservations150. Even without a binding protocol, the treaty bodies could adopt this 
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practice and see how states react. As recognised by Vienna Convention Article 
31(3)(b), it could become a subsequently agreed practice that assists in interpreting 
the treaty. Some treaty bodies seem to have done just this.  
The reformulation approach was employed by Malaysia in relation to the 
original reservations it made to CEDAW. On 6 February 1998 it notified the UN 
Secretary-General that it was withdrawing its reservations to CEDAW Articles 2(f), 
9(1), 16(b), 16(d), 16(e) and 16(h) and at the same ti  modifying its reservations to 
Articles 5(a), 7(b), 16(1)(a) and 16(2).151 The Secretary-General’s response to the 
modifications suggests that reformulation is a potential despite no acknowledgement 
in the Vienna Convention: 
 
In keeping with the depositary practice followed in similar cases, the 
Secretary-General proposed to receive the modification in question for 
deposit in the absence of any objection on the partof any of the 
Contracting States, either to the deposit itself or to the procedure 
envisaged, within a period of 90 days from the date of its notification 
(21 April 1998), that is to say, on 20 July 1998.152 
 
On 20 July 1998, France filed its objection to the modifications on the basis of 
incompatibility with the object and purpose of the tr aty and as a result the 
modifications were not accepted. The Netherlands also fi ed a response but did not 
expressly reject the modifications. Neither objection addressed the actual procedure 
of reformulating or modifying existing reservations, thus it seems that reformulation 
is a viable option.  
 The following year the Maldives also submitted a modification to its original 
reservations to CEDAW. Responding in the same vein as to the Malaysian 
modification, the Secretary-General set a date of 23 June 1999 as the final date upon 
which objections to the modification could be received. No objections were received 
by the deadline and the reformulated reservations were accepted for deposit. 
Subsequent to the deadline, both Finland and Germany responded by way of 
objection but only Germany specifically indicated its rejection of the modification 
insisting that the modification was in fact a new reservation to Article 7. However, in 
light of the expiration of the deadline for objections, the reformulated reservations 
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are now in place. Notably, the reservations for which both Malaysia and the 
Maldives sought modification were ones to which objections highlighting their 
incompatibility had previously been filed. 
 Surprisingly, the ILC has had little to say on theconcept of reformulation. In 
draft guideline 2.5.11 indicates that states may not object to a partial withdrawal 
unless it is discriminatory.153 Most importantly the ILC recognises, at least in relation 
to the succession of states, that the Vienna Convention is flexible enough to 
accommodate a wide variety of practices and has generally allowed states succeeding 
in interest to treaties to reformulate reservations originally made by their 
predecessors in interest.154   
Though technically a reservation must be made at the time of ratification or 
accession, a progressive dimension seems to slowly be creeping into reservations 
practice with regard to modification as indicated both by the reaction to notices of 
modification by the UN Secretary-General as well as practice within the European 
regional system. As noted by the Council of Europe Secretariat it must be understood 
that the reformulation cannot expand the original rese vation.155 The ILC view aligns 
with this restriction as noted in draft guideline 2.3 which outlines that after a state 
has consented to be bound it may not ‘by means of the interpretation of a reservation 
shirk certain obligations established by a treaty’.156  
Reformulation is a particularly appealing possibility in light of the individual 
complaints procedure within the treaty body system whereby a state may only be 
notified of the invalidity of its reservation years after making it. Reformulation 
would provide the state the opportunity to refine its reservation in order to achieve 
the original or narrowed objective of the reservation though this will not preclude 
any existing claim falling under the umbrella of aninvalid reservation. These 
modifications would obviously remain subject to theexisting standards of review on 
validity and, unlike reservations made at the time of ratification, would not be 
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accepted by the depositary in the event of a single obj ction, as was the case with 
Malaysia’s reformulated reservation.  
 Another technical point is that reformulation could only apply to previously 
validly formulated reservations. From a procedural standpoint this includes only 
those reservations made simultaneous to ratification of a treaty and does not include 
late reservations. Bahrain attempted to file a reservation to the ICCPR over two 
months after it ratified the Covenant in September 2006. Fifteen State Parties157 
objected to this attempt to file a late reservation158 and the objections were primarily 
based on the violation of the Vienna Convention requirement that a reservation be 
made upon ratification (Article 2(1)(d)) but most also noted the general 
incompatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty.  
Marginally departing from the traditional Vienna Convention approach, the 
ILC appears to accept the possibility of formulating late reservations in its Finalized 
Guidelines.  
 
2.3. Late formulation of a reservation 
A State…may not formulate a reservation to a treaty after expressing its 
consent to be bound by the treaty, unless the treaty otherwise provides 
or none of the other contracting States…opposes the la e formulation of 
the reservation.  
 
However this is a separate concept and simply filing a reservation as an afterthought 
is not contemplated in the context of the reformulation option discussed here even if 
the option of filing a late reservation has not been completely ruled out in theory. 
This distinction between a reformulation and a late reservation may seem like 
splitting hairs but in light of the existing lacunae in the Vienna Convention 
reservations regime there is a compelling reason to avoid deviations from the strict 
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4.2.3 DENUNCIATION  
The least attractive option, but an option nonethelss, would be denunciation of the 
treaty if the reserving state deemed the reservation an essential feature of its consent 
to be bound but it could not otherwise prove such using the ILC guidelines indicated 
above. If the state formulating an invalid reservation chooses not to withdraw or 
reformulate the offending reservation then the state could denounce or the 
reservation will be severed. The obvious problem for the denunciation option will be 
that not all human rights treaties include a provisi n for denunciation, such as the 
case with the ICCPR. For this reason, the legality of a denunciation pursuant to 
international law is questionable for those treaties not contemplating the potential of 
denunciation.159 
 On 25 August 1997, North Korea notified the Secretary-General of its intent 
to withdraw completely from the ICCPR. Having no denunciation provision to guide 
it, the following month the Secretary-General informed North Korea via an aide-
mémoire that its withdrawal would only be valid if all other State Parties to the 
Covenant agreed to the withdrawal.160 This exchange reflects the practice of the 
Secretary-General to allow the treaty provisions to guide its responses to instruments 
deposited in relation to the treaties for which it is gate-keeper. To date the required 
unanimous consent has not been granted and it follows the North Korea is still bound 
by the ICCPR.161 However, it has not since provided a periodic repot to the HRC.162  
 The potential to denounce and re-accede with a reservation has been bandied 
about and has been done at least once in practice. In 1998, Trinidad and Tobago 
denounced and re-acceded to the Optional Protocol t the ICCPR with a reservation 
that the HRC would not be competent to consider communications by any prisoner 
under the sentence of death in respect of any matter relating to the prosecution, 
detention, trial, conviction, sentence or carrying of the of the sentence.163 Seven State 
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Parties objected to the reservation on the basis of inc mpatibility with the ICCPR as 
well to the ‘propriety of the procedure’ used by Trinidad and Tobago to make the 
reservation.164 In a divided opinion, the HRC declared the application by Kennedy, a 
prisoner on death row, admissible despite the reservation thus severing the 
reservation in Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago.165 It is not clear if the 
reservation had been valid that it would have been unacceptable on otherwise 
‘proprietary’ reasons. Following this, Trinidad and Tobago once again denounced the 
Optional Protocol, this time without re-accession. Bates notes that at the cost of 
Trinidad and Tobago’s membership in the Optional Protocol, ‘the HRC arguably 
upheld the integrity of the system of human rights supervision’.166 Though it may be 
questionable167 whether this course is preferable to accepting an invalid reservation it 
must not be forgotten that there are many reasons fr joining human rights treaties 
and thus it is ultimately up to the individual state to determine which sacrifices are 
most important, a reservation or treaty membership. 
 These instances of denunciation led the HRC to issue General Comment No. 
26 on issues relating to the continuity of obligations to the ICCPR.168 The HRC 
outlined that denunciation was guided by the provisi n  of each specific treaty and 
where there was no provision on denunciation the applicable rules of international 
law as reflected in the Vienna Convention were applicab e. It pointed out that while 
the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR did specifically a low denunciation, as did other 
conventions such as CERD, as part of the ‘Internatio l Bill of Human Rights’ the 
ICCPR does ‘not have a temporary character typical of treaties where a right of 
denunciation is deemed to be admitted’169 where no such provision is provided. It 
continued: 
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The rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people living in the 
territory of the State party. The Human Rights Committee has 
consistently taken the view, as evidenced by its long-standing practice, 
that once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the 
Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and continues to 
belong to them, notwithstanding change in government of the State 
party, including dismemberment in more than one State or State 
succession or any subsequent action of the State par y designed to 
divest them of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant. 
 
Thus the HRC closed the door on the potential of denouncing the ICCPR even if 
accompanied by re-accession. 
The experience of the HRC with Trinidad and Tobago can be contrasted with 
the ECtHR which took the same gamble in the Belilos decision but with the opposite 
result. As noted previously, Switzerland took the position that membership in the 
ECHR was more important than maintaining its reservation thus it reformulated its 
reservation rather than denouncing the treaty. Actual denunciation and re-accession 
with a reservation may constitute an abuse of rights,170 though the topic remains 
unsettled. The human rights system has strong support and there are decidedly more 
reasons for a state to remain a treaty party than to give up that membership.  
 
4.3 SUMMARY  
Following determining the validity of a reservation, establishing the consequence of 
an invalid reservation is the most important issue wh n the reservation is to a human 
rights treaty. To date there has been no internatiol rule of law mandating 
severance, withdrawal or any alternative consequence, for an invalid reservation. The 
ILC and the treaty bodies assert nullity as the single consequence of a determination 
of invalidity and stipulate that this will be achieved by severing the reservation. 
Though legal nullity and severance may abrogate the invalid reservation in the state-
to-state relationship when an invalidity determination is made by another state party, 
it is less clear the impact it will have on the protection of rights-holders unless there 
is a final determination on validity. Furthermore, due to questions regarding the 
impact of severing a reservation from an instrument of consent other options should 
                                               
170 Polakiewicz, Treaty-Making in the Council of Europe, p. 96; see also Bates, ‘Avoiding Legal 
Obligations Created by Human Rights Treaties’, 783-86. 





be proffered, such as withdrawal and reformulation s  that a state may maintain 
control of its consent to obligations.  
 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The flexibility of the default reservations regime has led some to suggest an 
‘overhaul’171 of the Vienna Convention. This chapter set out to analyse the Vienna 
Convention reservations regime in order to assess whether it could adequately govern 
reservations to human rights treaties. Rather than an overhaul, this thesis insists that 
stock be taken of the lacunae in the system and posits avenues by which these 
lacunae might be resolved. This chapter advances th heretofore undefined object 
and purpose test as the first challenging feature of the reservations regime which is 
reflected by the disparate treatment of problematic reservations by state parties to the 
core UN human rights treaties. The second challenge lies in the lack of defined legal 
effect for a reservation that has been determined ivalid, particularly in the context of 
the reservation-policing practice whereby states object to reservations. The final 
challenge is the failure of the Vienna Convention t specify a consequence for an 
invalid reservation. 
 Despite the ambiguity of the object and purpose tet, states have proven that 
they can apply the test to determine the validity of a reservation. Unfortunately, due 
to the lack of guidance on legal effect and the consequence of an invalid reservation, 
reserving states have largely ignored other state prties’ determinations of invalidity. 
The ILC asserts nullity and severance as the legal ffect and consequence of an 
invalid reservation, however, in practice there remains resistance to these concepts 
especially in the state-to-state relationships created in the course of accepting and 
objecting to reservations. States that have formulated invalid reservations continue to 
maintain the validity of their reservations because th re is no definitive rule 
enunciating at what point the validity of a reservation can no longer be in doubt. 
Unfortunately, even objections purporting to sever the incompatible reservations 
rarely bear effect on the reserving states as it is unlikely that an objecting state would 
pursue a reserving state in an international arena, such as the ICJ, merely to have 
confirmation that the reservation is invalid and, therefore, severable.  
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While the increased acknowledgement of severability is a boon to the human 
rights system as a whole, its actual impact is rather limited in the state-to-state 
context as states do not enjoy reciprocal rights and obligations under the core human 
rights treaties. The rights-holders who are affected are not recognised under the 
Vienna Convention. This situation illuminates the ineffectiveness of the objection 
practice for producing a tangible legal effect or cnsequence in the face of an invalid 
reservation. As outlined by Swaine,  
 
…the suggestion that states are inadequate [to be the sole arbiter of 
reservations] calls into question a premise more or less common to the 
permissibility and opposability approaches–the acceptance of state 
appraisals, through objections or otherwise, govern the acceptance of 
reservations–and creates doubt as to whether the Vienna Convention is 
a complete regulatory system.172 
 
While the Vienna Convention regime may not be complete, the flexibility of the 
system and the recognition that the tools for interpr ting a treaty might expand 
(Article 31) suggests that progressive practices have the potential to better guide the 
effects of invalid reservations to human rights trea ies. The ambiguities of the Vienna 
Convention reservations regime could be more appropriately addressed if an arbiter 
of reservation validity outwith the state parties were designated to provide final 
review of questionable reservations. The core UN human rights treaties are uniquely 
situated to designate a competent reservation review mechanism in light of the 
treaty-specific supervisory mechanisms which already play a central role in 
monitoring treaty implementation by state parties.  
Reservations to human rights conventions should not, in the words of 
Golsong, be left to ‘the play of objection and acceptance on the part of other 
Contracting States’.173 The beneficiaries of obligations established by the core human 
rights treaties are deprived of the full benefits of these treaties due to the normative 
gaps in the Vienna Convention regime. As will be examined in the next chapter, 
recognising the treaty bodies as competent arbiters of reservation validity would be a 
step-forward in providing coherence in the normative order that oversees 
international human rights. Therefore, while it is clear that the Vienna Convention 
                                               
172 Swaine, ‘Reserving’, 322. Recall the discussion of permissibility and opposability in Chapter 3. 
173 Golsong, ‘Les reserves aux instruments internationux pour la protection des droits de l’homme’, 
cited in Imbert, ‘Reservations and Human Rights Conventions’, 35. 





reservations regime can adequately regulate reservations to human rights treaties, 
this conclusion is only correct as long as the specific nature of human rights treaties, 






CHAPTER SIX  
TREATY BODIES: AN EVOLVING OPPORTUNITY  
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, the monitoring model of state objections 
developed alongside the Vienna Convention for controlling incompatible 
reservations has not been effective because states rar ly object to reservations and 
even states that do object to reservations on the basis of incompatibility with Vienna 
Convention Article 19(c) generally accept the reserving state as a treaty member 
despite the invalid reservation. This acceptance perpetuates the existence of invalid 
reservations as practice has shown that the reserving state will not necessarily 
withdraw an invalid reservation even in the face of an objection because there is no 
tangible legal effect due to the non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties and the 
ambiguities of the Vienna Convention regime. This situation is a direct result of the 
fact that there is no final determination of validity contemplated by the state 
monitoring system in the Vienna Convention. 
As concluded in Chapter Five, the Vienna Convention rules can adequately 
govern reservations to human rights treaties despit the gaps that persist in the 
reservations regime. Responding to the second research question posed at the outset 
of this thesis, this chapter examines whether the treaty bodies are competent to 
determine the validity of reservations. It begins with a review of the specific role for 
which the treaty bodies were designed and briefly contemplates their perceived 
legitimacy. This is followed by an introduction to each of the bodies associated with 
the treaties examined by this thesis with the aim of substantiating the monitoring 
purpose of these bodies. The crux of the analysis is reached by examining the 
involvement of the treaty bodies in the reservations debate to date and the 
international response to this involvement. Specifically this chapter will reply to the 
following question: are the treaty-specific supervisory mechanisms competent to 
serve a determinative function with respect to reservations to the core UN human 
rights treaties? 
 
1 THE ROLE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES 
The primary purpose of the treaty-specific monitoring organs of the core UN human 
rights treaties (the treaty bodies) is the review of state parties’ fulfilment of treaty 
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obligations pursuant to their remits as indicated by their respective treaties. In the 
first instance, all of the treaty bodies examine state parties’ periodic reports. 
Additional quasi-judicial functions have been established and widely accepted as part 
of the UN human rights regime in an effort to further realise the rights set forth in the 
UDHR and the core UN human rights treaties. The point f contention between 
states and treaty bodies is who between them has the ul imate power to determine 
whether a state party is fulfilling its obligations. Treaty interpretation is integral to 
the treaty bodies’ remits if they are to legitimately valuate state compliance with 
treaty obligations. These bodies were designed withthat very purpose in mind and 
the constitution of the bodies, including both the el ctoral processes and mandatory 
multicultural considerations, serves to ensure thatst te parties receive an unbiased, 
treaty-centric review in their interaction with the tr aty bodies. 
Using arguments and realisations from other fields of international law, the 
following will briefly address concepts of legitimacy surrounding the growing use of 
international institutions in implementing cross-cultural standards and governing 
increasingly complex societies. The next section sets forth the remits of the treaty 
bodies and the acceptance of their competencies throug  ratification of treaty texts, 
thereby grounding their functions in law.  
 
1.1 INDICATORS OF LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy in governance has been simply described y Franck as ‘the aspect of 
governance that validates institutional decisions as emanating from right process’.1 
Therefore if the correct processes are established and followed, then the execution of 
those processes will be deemed legitimate even if the outcome is not that about 
which all people agree. Institutions, on the other and, are generally viewed as 
legitimate if the people over whom they exercise authority accept that authority. 
Thus combining the two it could be argued that a governing institution must both be 
established by, and operate pursuant to, the correct p o ess and be accepted by the 
governed. At the domestic level these are widely establi hed socio-political concepts, 
especially in the context of representative democracies. When the focus turns to 
international institutions, however, these simplistic indicators are less tenable. 
                                               
1 T.M. Franck, ‘Democracy, Legitimacy and the Rule of Law: Linkages,’ (1999)  New York 
University School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper 2, 1. 
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Decisions on the international level are often viewed as too remote from the ordinary 
citizen and thus out-with the indicators that are essential to assess legitimacy.2 In the 
context of international human rights treaties, the ordinary citizen benefits from state 
recognition of the international law as set forth therein despite not directly being the 
object of governance. The purpose of this section is ot to debate the origins and 
theoretical concepts of legitimacy, rather the following serves as a back-to-basics, 
positivist use of simple indicators, including proper process, evidenced by legal texts, 
and consent to governance, evidenced by voluntary ratification of treaties, to evaluate 
human rights treaty bodies as mechanisms for review.   
 
1.1.1 PROPER PROCESS:  ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Human rights treaty bodies are the embedded international institutions of the UN 
human rights treaties and the primary enforcement mechanism of the texts’ 
obligations. Each of the treaties provides processes for the execution of the 
competencies of its respective treaty body, which may include review of periodic 
reports, receipt of inter-state and/or individual communications and procedures of 
inquiry. Prior to becoming a state party, states spend a great deal of time assessing 
how the obligations included in the text will affect the status quo in their jurisdiction. 
Thus, the choice to become a party to a human rights treaty necessarily implies 
consent to the obligations found therein, including the exercise by a treaty body of its 
enumerated functions.   
In addition to the specific supervisory remits of the treaty bodies, each of 
their membership election processes are crafted to guarantee that an unbiased 
authority exercises oversight. Each of the treaties s eks to achieve equitable 
geographical distribution in addition to representation of different types of 
civilisations and legal systems among the state parties, which helps ensure that no 
one region or culture dominates. Essential to the ex cution of their duties is the 
requirement that members act in their personal capacities, not as representatives of 
their governments despite being nominated by them. The language establishing 
                                               
2 S. Picciotto, ‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?’ (2008) 6 International Journal of 
Constitutional Review 457, 458-59, noting Robert A. Dahl, ‘Can International Organizations Be
Democratic?  A Skeptic’s View’ in I. Shapiro and C.Hacker-Cordón (eds.) Democracy’s Edges 
(CUP, Cambridge 1999), p. 19. 
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human rights treaty bodies, both the physical make-up of the bodies and their 
supervisory attributes, is painstakingly drafted to avoid any confusion as to their 
purpose. Though no two of these treaty bodies are identical, they each play an 
essential role in ensuring the realisation of the obligations under the treaties and their 
specific remits will be detailed in section 2. 
 
1.1.2 CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED 
Contrasted with international institutional legitimacy, the traditional theory of treaty 
legitimacy is embodied in the fact that treaties are representations of consensual, 
mutually reciprocal obligations between parties, a concept known as ‘consent of the 
governed’.3 It is a long-accepted principle that states are bound only to those 
obligations to which they have consented.4 In the context of non-reciprocal human 
rights treaties, however, this model takes on a newlife. Unlike treaties governing 
other aspects of international law, human rights treaties are created for the benefit 
and protection of third parties–the people affected by actions of the state parties–who 
do not have a direct role in negotiating the obligations, nor are they the subjects 
which are directly governed. The state parties are manifestly ‘the governed’ as they 
are the objects that must fulfil the obligations embodied in the treaty articles and the 
‘beneficiary’ is the world at large in the form of the human beings in each state 
party’s jurisdiction. From a purely normative view of treaty law, the reciprocity 
deficit largely facilitates the relaxed approach to human rights compliance by many 
state parties, a phenomenon not as obvious in othertyp s of international treaties. It 
is the lack of reciprocal beneficial obligations, a concept which is integral to 
traditional treaty law, which require human rights treaties to look out-with 
reciprocity as a legitimising factor.  
Fortunately, ‘consent of the governed’, at the most basic level, rests on an 
easily identifiable factor which is, incidentally, the key to engaging duties pursuant 
to a treaty: consent, which in treaty law equates to becoming a state party. It has been 
argued that ‘[s]tates consent to commit themselves (to treaties) because doing so is 
                                               
3 D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: a Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 AJIL 596, 597. 
4 S.S. Lotus case (France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10 (7 Sept. 1927), p.18: ‘The rules of 
law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will…’ 
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the only way to achieve certain goals.’5 Treaty ratification or accession by definition, 
and pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, demands that a state party fulfil 
all obligations set forth in the treaty text, save those to which it has made 
reservations. A UN commissioned study determined that t e threat to the status quo 
is the most common reason for non-ratification of human rights treaties while 
ratification alternatively suggests that a state is willing to increase access to 
information on domestic human rights practices which simultaneously increases the 
legitimacy of human rights concepts.6 As pointed out by Bodansky in 1999 when 
examining legitimacy in international environmental law, the legitimacy of 
international institutions and their ability to influence states was not a bigger issue 
before the late 1990s due to the weakness of institutions coupled with the fact that 
their authority derived from the consent of the states to which they applied.7 Thus, 
outwith the narrow purview of the institution the idea of influence upon non-
consenting parties was relatively obsolete. The difference in 2011 is that the number 
of states consenting to oversight of treaty bodies is growing, thus their sphere of 
influence is also growing. 
Despite the increasing level of consent to treaty body practice, detractors 
from the treaty body phenomenon include states opposed to any institution which 
might challenge aspects of sovereignty and individuals who view them as acting 
something akin to world government. In reality, human rights treaty bodies do 
neither. In the aftermath of the collapsed Third WTO Ministerial Conference, Mike 
Moore, the former secretary of the World Trade Organis tion (WTO), delivered a 
very apt summary of the relationship between the WTO and state governments which 
is mutually applicable to the relationship between human rights treaty bodies and 
states: 
 
We are not a world government in any shape or form. People do not 
want a world government, and we do not aspire to be ne. At the WTO, 
government decides, not us. But people do want global rules. If the 
WTO did not exist, people would be crying out for a forum where 
                                               
5 O. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935, 
1950. 
6 R. Goodman and D. Jinks, ‘Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties’ (2003) 14(1) EJIL 171, 
176, noting Heyns and Viljoen, ‘The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the 
Domestic Level’ (2001) 23 HRQ 483, 487-88. 
7 Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance’, 596-97. 
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governments could negotiate rules, ratified by national 
parliaments…And they would be crying out for a mechanism that helps 
governments avoid coming to blows over trade disputes. That is what 
the WTO is. We do not lay down the law. We uphold the rule of law. 
The alternative is the law of the jungle, where might makes right and the 
little guy doesn’t get a look in.8  
 
Human rights treaty bodies do not lay down the law. States have negotiated 
and debated the intricacies of the treaty texts and chosen to include mechanisms 
which apply the rule of law equally to those states that have chosen to recognise the 
authority of these bodies by consenting to become stat  parties. This does not equate 
to ‘world government’ as has been forecasted by opposition to the treaty body 
system. The aim has never been to create a world government that is an adjudicator 
above the state; it is to ensure that there is a rights-centric forum that can serve as a 
check system to ensure all state parties are abiding by their human rights 
commitments.   
  
1.1.3 FOCUSED EXPERTISE 
In addition to proper process and consent to authority, the expertise factor must not 
be overlooked when evaluating human rights treaty bodies as mechanisms of review.  
It has been suggested that experts working together in the international context ‘can 
facilitate the resolution of global policy issues by narrowing the range within which 
political bargains could be struck’.9 In addition to expertise being a requirement for 
committee membership generally, human rights treaties often deal with very specific 
rights and a thorough knowledge of the field covered by the treaty is essential in 
order to ascertain the realisation of these rights on the ground. Thus, for example, 
members of the Women’s Committee have been active in the areas of gender 
equality and women’s issues and this is reflected by their curriculum vitae. The same 
may be said for members of the Migrants Committee, etcetera. Picciotto observes 
that ‘delegating specific issues to specialists who w uld deal with them in a 
depoliticized fashion…is a means of implementing policies that have been 
                                               
8 M. Moore, ‘The Backlash against Globalization?’ (speech presented in Ottawa, Canada on 26 Oct. 
2000) at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm39_e.htm <accessed 31 Aug. 2011>.  
9 Picciotto, ‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governace?’, 459. 
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formulated through political processes…[and] understood as a response to the 
problems of governing ever more complex societies’.10   
Treaty bodies serve an essential function as the guardians of their individual 
treaties. They alone are completely devoted to monitori g state implementation of 
obligations undertaken as treaty members. The flexibility of the Vienna Convention 
warrants some form of a back-stop to prevent the rul s from being bent too far. As 
argued by Åkermark and Mårsäter, ‘the more treaty flexibility is available, the more 
important it is to have institutionalised mechanisms…for a continuous re-evaluation 
of the flexibility devices’.11 Treaty bodies are the independent, institutionalised 
mechanisms that were created specifically to fulfil such a role.12 As noted by Alston, 
the treaty bodies are distinguished by  
 
…a limited clientele, consisting only of State parties to the treaty in 
question; a clearly delineated set of concerns reflecting the terms of 
the treaty; a particular concern with developing the normative 
understanding of the relevant rights; a limited range of procedural 
options for dealing with matters of concern; caution in terms of setting 
precedents; consensus-based decision-making to the greatest extent 
possible; and a non-adversarial relationship with State parties based on 
the concept of a ‘constructive dialogue’.13 
 
The treaty bodies exist to ensure specific rights are implemented into a variety of 
social, cultural and political arenas. The combination of a highly varied membership 
and specialists in the field, both mandated by committee election guidelines, further 
                                               
10 Ibid., 459. 
11 S. S. Åkermark and O. Mårsäter, ‘Treaties and the Limits of Flexibility’ (2005) 74 Nordic Journal 
of International Law 509, 509. 
12 The independence of the treaty bodies is an essential characteristic and integral to successfully 
fulfilling their duties. See Poznan Statement on the Reforms of the UN Human Rights Treaty Body 
System, Poznan, Poland, 28-29 Sept. 2010 (Poznan Statemen), paras. 19-21; CEDAW Committee, 
Report on its 41st session, Decision 44/1, UN Doc. A/63/38, Supp. 38 (2008), chap. I, p. 88;CERD 
Committee, General Recommendation No. 9: Independence of Experts, (1990), UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9: ‘Alarmed by the tendency of the representatives of States, organizations and 
groups to put pressure upon experts…Strongly recommends that they respect unreservedly the status 
of its members as independent experts of acknowledged impartiality serving in their personal 
capacity.’  The author acknowledges that the independence and expertise of treaty body members has 
been questioned. However, this examination is limited to the indicia set forth by the treaties 
themselves thus the line of inquiry into the true nature of those who sit on the treaty bodies is outwith 
its scope. 
13 P. Alston, ‘Appraising the United Nations Human Rights Regime’ in P. Alston (ed.), The United 
Nations and Human Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992), p. 5; see also, ‘Chapter 10: Treaty 
Bodies: The ICCPR Human Rights Committee’ in H. Steiner, P. Alston, R. Goodman (eds.), 
International Human Rights in Context, 3d ed. (OUP, Oxford 2008), pp. 845 et seq. for a discussion of 
the powers and function of the HRC in particular. 
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legitimises the work of the treaty bodies. As legal institutions and the products of 
‘rational design through codification’ treaty bodies can be viewed as ‘rational, 
negotiated responses to the problems international actors face’.14 
 
1.2 LEGITIMACY SUMMARY  
Legitimacy on the international level depends on expertise of the decision makers 
and the increased legalisation of the institutions in which they operate.15 Within the 
context of international human rights treaty bodies, the adopted texts of the treaties 
not only specify the various authoritative procedures for the treaty bodies, but also 
establish election processes designed to ensure equitable representation by experts 
amongst the state parties to the treaties. Furthermor , these texts are ratified by states 
which indicates consent to those processes as detailed by the treaties. Admittedly, the 
treaty bodies only oversee the implementation of rights by state parties to their 
respective treaties, however, several of these treaties enjoy the membership of a 
super-majority of the states of the world thus the opportunity to influence cannot be 
ignored. 
 
2 TREATY BODY REMITS16 
The embedded oversight bodies comprised of experts in he field specific to each 
treaty is a unique feature of the core UN human rights treaties. Their main purpose is 
to ensure that the standards established by the texts are upheld. As noted in previous 
chapters, unlike traditional treaties which draw their strength from the existence of 
reciprocal obligations, human rights treaties are standard-setting and non-reciprocal. 
The necessity of supervisory mechanisms for human rights treaties results from the 
absence of substantive reciprocal obligations.17 Without the treaty bodies supervising 
implementation, human rights treaties would be in danger of becoming merely 
aspirational and without a compelling legal reason for states to act. Each treaty body 
will be examined in subsequent sub-sections, including a cursory comment on the 
                                               
14 B. Koremenos, C. Lipson and D. Snidal, ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’ (2001) 
55 International Organization 761, 768. 
15 Picciotto, ‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governace?’, 459. 
16 All information on treaty body activity can be found on the UN Treaty Collection website, 
http://treaties.un.org (UN Treaty Collection), and is current as of 30 Jul. 2011. 
17 L. Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties: Ratify and Ruin? (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht 1995), p. 110. 
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treaty body’s approach to reservations, after the following general introduction about 
the potential functions of the treaty bodies.   
The texts of the various human rights treaties outline the respective treaty 
body competencies, including reviewing periodic reports, consideration of individual 
communications, consideration of inter-state communications and/or initiation of 
inquiries. For state parties recognising a treaty body’s competencies there is a general 
duty of good faith to cooperate with the treaty body as recognised by general 
principles of treaty law.18 To determine whether the treaty has been effectively 
implemented commensurate with the obligations of each state party, it is essential 
that treaty bodies interpret the obligations in light of the domestic situation on the 
ground, including introduction of new law or reconciliation with existing law.   
Reviewing periodic reports of the state parties and issuing general comments 
are the common features shared by all of the treaty bodies. The importance of 
reviewing periodic reports must not be undervalued; it creates an avenue for the 
treaty bodies to develop a dialogue with state parties. Thus, at the very least, each of 
the treaty bodies is obligated to do the following: 
1. Receive reports on measures [the state parties] have adopted which give 
effect to the rights recognized by the corresponding treaty; 
2. The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the State parties…It 
shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may consider 
appropriate. 
The italicised language above is taken directly from ICCPR Article 40 but is 
repeated almost verbatim in the other eight treaties, with the most notable difference 
being that in a majority of the treaties the use of ‘general recommendations’ is 
substituted for ‘general comments’. The practice of issuing general comments has 
developed into perhaps one of the most significant, d subsequently controversial, 
functions of the treaty bodies. The value of the general recommendation/comment 
must be identified as a distinct form of communication from the other ways in which 
the treaty bodies engage with a state. Unlike monitori g reports or reviewing 
individual communications, these represent the primary opportunity of the treaty 
bodies to enunciate their interpretation of treaty obligations to the entirety of states, 
                                               
18 Vienna Convention, Art. 26. Also typically noted within each of the treaty texts. 
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rather than in a bi-lateral communicative process.19 General comments are directed to 
all state parties, summarise the experience the committee has gained reviewing the 
periodic reports and focus the attention of the state parties on matters that would 
improve implementation of the treaty obligations.20 Though several general 
comments have been issued on the specific topic of reservations, as will examined in 
section 3, reservations are most often a feature of viewing periodic reports21 as this 
is the only mandatory supervisory function of each treaty body in its relation to the 
state parties that does not require a further recogniti n of competency by the states. 
Without the reporting mechanisms of the human rights treaties, it would be difficult 
to begin to determine compliance and its effects on the law and people within a state 
party’s jurisdiction and/or territory, therefore this primary function is indispensable.   
 One of the key problems for the over eighty-percent22 of states that have 
ratified more than four of the core treaties is the various forms of periodic reporting 
required by each treaty. Multiple separate reports create a burden on states, 
especially smaller or developing countries with limited resources, which stymies the 
essential monitoring feature of the treaties. In 2009, the culmination of years of 
studying this problem were addressed when the UN Secretary-General issued the 
Harmonized Guidelines on Reporting Under the International Human Rights 
Treaties, Including Guidelines on a Core Document and Treaty-Specific 
Documents.23 The Harmonised Guidelines not only provide a method of easing the 
paperwork strain on states but at the same time create more stringent reporting 
standards which address reservations and require that s ates provide the following 
information on reservations when submitting their ha monised report: 
1. The nature and scope of reservations 
                                               
19 On this point see N. Rodley, ‘United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures 
of the Commission on Human Rights: Complementary or C mpetition?’ (2003) 25 Human Rights 
Quarterly 882, 887; E.A. Baylis, ‘General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to 
Human Rights Treaties’ (1999) 17 Berkeley Journal of International Law 277, 282. 
20 P. Alston, ‘The Historical Origins of the Concept of “General Comments” in Human Rights Law’ in 
H.J. Steiner, P. Alston and R. Goodman, I ternational Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, 
Morals. 3d ed.  (OUP, Oxford 2008), p. 876. 
21 I. Boerefijn, ‘Impact on the Law on Treaty Reservations’ in M.T. Kamminga and M. Scheinin 
(eds.), The Impact of Human Rights Laws on General Internatio l Law (OUP, Oxford 2009), p.63. 
22 OHCHR website: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx <accessed 
31 Aug. 2011>. 




2. The reason why such reservations were considered to be necessary 
and have been maintained; 
3. The precise effect of each reservation in terms of national law and 
policy; 
4. In the spirit of the World Conference on Human Rights and other 
similar conferences which encouraged States to consider reviewing 
any reservations with a view to withdrawing it, any plans to limit 
the effect of reservations and ultimately withdraw them within a 
specific time frame.24 
 
The guidelines specific to reservations seek to achieve that which the treaty bodies 
have thus far not been equally successful in doing: getting states to elaborate upon 
and withdraw their reservations. The reporting rounds for the next few years will be 
telling as to whether the Harmonised Guidelines achieve this goal and produce a 
more effective periodic report monitoring system. 
Consideration of individual communications is a quasi-judicial function 
available to eight of the nine treaty bodies upon the requisite recognition of 
competency.25 This authorises the treaty body to receive communications–also 
termed ‘complaints’–from individuals or groups of ind viduals (such as those 
brought by NGOs). Generally, this competency must be affirmed by a state party by 
a declaration of consent pursuant to the articles of the treaty or by the ratification of 
an optional protocol that supplements the original treaty. It is in the process of 
evaluating individual complaints that a treaty body might also have occasion to 
evaluate the validity of a reservation.  
Though the language varies slightly from treaty to treaty, the general 
requirements that must be met in order for a treaty body to consider an individual 
communication admissible are: 
1. The state party alleged to have violated the right w ich is the subject of the 
communication must have declared that it recognises th  competency of the 
respective committee to receive individual communications;  
                                               
24 Ibid., p. 10. 
25 Due to the high volume of individual communications received, three of the Committees’ petitions 
are filtered in the first instance through the Petitions Team of the OHCHR.  The Petitions Team 
services the HRC, the CAT Committee and the CERD Committee. See Report of the Human Rights 
Committee to the General Assembly, 63rd Session, Supp. 40, (Vol. I), UN Doc. A/63/40 (2 08), p. 92, 




2. All domestic remedies available must have been exhausted prior to filing the 
communication except where the application of domestic remedies is 
unreasonably prolonged or unlikely be bring effective relief (exhaustion 
rule); 
3. The fact(s) alleged must not have been the subject of a prior or current 
international investigation or settlement;  
4. The communication must not be anonymous;  
5. The facts of the subject of the communication must not have occurred 
before recognition of the committee’s competence took effect for the state 
party (the ratione temporis rule). 
The individual communications feature allows advocates, lawyers and victims to 
frame violations in the international language of human rights law and seek redress 
when domestic remedies are ineffective or unavailable. The HRC’s summary of its 
role in receiving individual communications effectively communicates the purpose of 
this procedure for the treaty bodies:              
While the function of the Human Rights Committee in considering 
individual communications is not, as such, that of a judicial body, the 
views issued by the Committee under the Optional Protocol exhibit 
some important characteristics of a judicial decision. They are arrived 
at in a judicial spirit, including the impartiality and independence of 
Committee members, the considered interpretation of the language of 
the Covenant, and the determinative character of the decisions. 26 
 
The individual communications regime has evaluated over 2500 complaints since its 
inception.27                                                                                   
The inter-state communications procedure provides a method by which a 
state party may bring a complaint alleging violations of treaty obligations by another 
state party. The communication will only be allowed if both the complaining state 
and the alleged violating state have made positive declaration that they recognise the 
competency of the treaty body to receive such communications. The other 
admissibility requirements for an inter-state communication are identical to those of 
the individual communication. Inter-state communications proceedings are 
confidential and the details are not made public without the consent of all involved 
                                               
26 General Comment No. 33, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (2008), para 11. 
27 Specific figures by treaty body will be given in sub equent sections. 
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state parties. To date this procedure has never been used under any of the treaties. 
 A procedure of inquiry is the final of the four standard functions available to 
assist treaty bodies in assessing the fulfilment of treaty obligations. Only three 
treaties, CEDAW, CAT and ICED, present the opportunity to carry out a procedure 
of inquiry. The competency of the treaty body to initiate a procedure of inquiry must 
have been either affirmed or not denied, depending on the relevant text, by the state 
party alleged to be violating the treaty rights. Upon receipt of reliable information 
indicating ‘grave and systematic violations’ of treaty obligations, treaty bodies with 
this competency may unilaterally initiate an investigation into the alleged violations.  
Initially, the treaty body will invite cooperation by requesting the allegedly offending 
state party to submit information on the situation within its territory. Upon review of 
the information, including observations by the state party on its domestic situation, 
an inquiry may be initiated with the request to ‘urgently’ report back to the treaty 
body. The findings will be communicated to the state party along with 
recommendations. All proceedings made under the inquiry will be confidential and 
only the state party being investigated will be notified. The findings are not made 
public except in the instance that the state party subject to the investigation consents 
to the findings being published in the committee’s annual report. In some instances, 
the treaty body may visit the territory to gather first hand information when the 
circumstances so require, however this will be limited according to territorial 
sovereignty of a state. Even where some state parties have accepted the competency 
of a treaty body to utilise this procedure they often file a reservation prohibiting the 
entry of investigators without the specific consent. This procedure has had success of 
late and will be reviewed below under the pertinent treaty body.    
The election procedures, committee make-up and specific remits firmly 
ground the authority of the treaty bodies in international law as set forth by their 
respective treaties. The following treaty bodies will be discussed below according to 
the date of entry into force of the parent treaty: Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, Human Rights Committee, Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, Committee Against Torture, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the 
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Committee on Migrant Workers, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and, finally, the Committee on Enforced Disappearances.  
 
2.1 COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee) was 
established under part II, Article 8, of the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination28 (CERD), which entered into force in 1969. It is 
composed of ‘eighteen experts of high moral standing and acknowledged 
impartiality’ elected by secret ballot. Each State Party may only nominate one person 
for consideration and the person must be a national f the nominating state. A 
quorum–two-thirds in the case of the State Parties to CERD–must participate in the 
vote and the candidates must receive the largest number, as well as an absolute 
majority, of the votes cast in order to be elected. Equitable geographical distribution 
in addition to representation of different types of civilisations and legal systems are 
also taken into consideration. The members act in their personal capacities, not as 
representatives of their governments. 
The CERD Committee’s primary function is to review reports submitted by 
State Parties as outlined by Article 9. The article further provides that the CERD 
Committee ‘may make suggestions and general recommendations based on the 
examination of the reports and information received from the State Parties’ which are 
then reported to the UN General Assembly and often published as general comments. 
The Committee has published thirty-three general comments since issuing its first on 
State Parties’ obligations under Article 4 in 1972.  
Articles 11 and 12 set forth the procedure for receipt of inter-state 
communications. No positive declaration is necessary for this competency to take 
effect and no State Party has made a reservation denying the CERD Committee’s 
competency in this area. Article 11 initially encourages bilateral negotiation between 
the State Parties on either side of the communication, but provides for the 
establishment of an ad hoc Conciliation Commission if the matter is not resolved 
within six months after the initial communication is made to the alleged violating 
State Party. For the communication to be admissible it must be ‘ascertained that all 
                                               
28 660 UNTS 195, 7 Mar. 1966. 
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available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in conformity with the 
generally recognized principles of international law’.29   
Unlike inter-state communications, State Parties must make a positive 
declaration in order for the CERD Committee’s competency to receive individual 
communications.30 Fifty-four of the current 174 State Parties have declared the 
competency of the CERD Committee to receive individual communications pursuant 
to Article 14.31 Upon receipt of any communication the CERD Committee will 
confidentially notify the State Party against whom the communication is directed, 
which triggers procedural time frames within which the exchange of observations 
surrounding the facts alleged must be concluded. Thoug  the communication may 
not be made anonymously, in the case of alleged CERD violations the complainant 
will not be identified to the State Party without their consent. Forty-five individual 
communications have been reviewed by the Committee.32 In both the case of inter-
State and individual communications the proceedings are closed, which means only 
communications which have been fully considered and upon which 
recommendations have been made by the CERD Committee will be reported to the 
UNGA. As will be discussed in section 3, the CERD Committee was initially reticent 
to show strength on the issue of reservations to CERD. However, over time it has 
more aggressively addressed reservations and urged the withdrawal of such as was 
evidenced in General Recommendation No. 33.33 
 
2.2 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) was established to carry out the functions set 
forth in Articles 28 through 45 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights34 (ICCPR), which entered into force in 1976. Mirroring the CERD 
Committee, the HRC is composed of eighteen nationals from State Parties to the 
Covenant who serve in their personal capacity and are of ‘high moral character and 
                                               
29 Art. 11, para 3. 
30 Art. 14. 
31 See UN Treaty Collection, CERD, eclarations and Reservations. 
32 Statistical survey of individual complaints considered under the procedure governed by Art. 14 of 
the CERD, 14 Mar. 2011, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/CERDSURVEYArt14.xls <accessed 30 Jul. 2011>. 
33 UN Doc. A/64/18, (2009), p. 161. 
34 999 UNTS 171, 16 Dec. 1966.  
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recognized competence in the field of human rights’.35 Each State Party may 
nominate up to two persons to stand for the election and choice is made by secret 
ballot. A quorum–two-thirds in the case of the ICCPR–must participate in the vote 
and the candidates must receive the largest number, as well as an absolute majority, 
of the votes cast in order to serve on the Committee. No two Committee members 
may be of the same nationality and geographical distribution, as well as legal 
experience, is taken into consideration. Each selected Committee member must also 
take an oath to perform his duty impartially and conscientiously.36   
ICCPR Article 40 enumerates the powers of the Committee as a mechanism 
for review of periodic reports that are required of State Parties. In addition to the 
initial report required by the ICCPR, State Parties are required to submit reports 
‘whenever the Committee so requests’ pursuant to Aricle 40(1)(b). This implies a 
sense of flexibility and autonomy of the HRC. Thus the initial function provided by 
Article 40 is that the Committee receive and examine periodic reports then ‘transmit 
… such general comments, as it may consider appropriate, to State parties.’ Having 
published thirty-four General Comments since 1981, the HRC is the most prolific, 
and also most controversial, in exercising its review and comment role.  
Article 41 outlines the second function of the Committee by allowing for 
State Parties who so choose to declare the competency of the Committee to receive 
and consider inter-state communications. For this function to be triggered, State 
Parties must be proactive and declare their acceptance of this function of the 
Committee.37 To date, forty-eight38 of the 167 State Parties have so declared. Once a 
matter is referred to the HRC, it will first determine whether all available domestic 
remedies have been exhausted in accordance with principles of international law. 
The Committee’s involvement is only triggered in the instance that the involved 
State Parties do not come to a satisfactory resolution of the alleged failure to fulfil 
ICCPR obligations during bilateral negotiations.    
The adoption of the Optional Protocol39 to the ICCPR further expanded the 
HRC as a mechanism for reviewing fulfilment of treay obligations by establishing 
                                               
35 Art. 26.  
36 Art. 38. 
37 Art. 41 entered into force 28 Mar. 1979 in accordance with paragraph 2. 
38 UN Treaty Collection. 
39 999 UNTS 171, 16 Dec. 1966 (OP-ICCPR). 
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its competency to receive and review communications f alleged victims of 
violations of any of the ICCPR rights. The Optional Protocol will only be applicable 
to State Parties taking the affirmative step of becoming a party to the Optional 
Protocol, in addition to the ICCPR, and the complainant must have first exhausted all 
available domestic remedies as well as fulfilled the other general requirements of 
admissibility. Proceedings are closed and communications confidential though final 
views will be published in the Committee’s annual report. Including the most recent 
accession of Brazil, deposited on 25 September 2009, the Optional Protocol is widely 
supported by 11140 State Parties. 
The individual communications process strengthens the position of individual 
subjects of the State Parties’ jurisdiction by allowing them an unbiased forum for 
review of the obligations as applied by the State Parties. Since 1977, the Committee 
has received 2,034 individual communications regarding eighty-two State Parties of 
which 867 made it to final views with 718 concluding that a violation had taken 
place.41 Except for the cases still under consideration, the remaining communications 
were either dismissed as inadmissible or were discontinued42 and thousands more 
that have been received by the Petitions Team have been sent back with requests for 
further information. The HRC has played a notable rol  in the development of the 
reservations dialogue in the international community, particularly through its general 
comments and individual communications which will be discussed in section 3. 
 
2.3 COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
When the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights43 
(ICESCR) entered into force in 1976, it did not have its own specialised committee.  
Article 16 of the ICESCR details State Parties’ periodic reporting requirements and 
indicates that they are to be submitted to the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). Under Article 19, the Council may submit general recommendations 
                                               
40 Two states, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, denounced the OP-ICCPR and the denunciations 
went into effect in 1998 and 2000 respectively, thus the number of participating states was 113 at its 
highest.  
41 Statistical survey of individual complaints dealt wi h by the HRC under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR, 6 Apr. 2011. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/SURVEYCCPR101.xls 
<accessed 30 Jul. 2011>. 
42 Ibid. 
43 993 UNTS 3, 16 Dec. 1966. 
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based on the State Parties’ reports to the Commission on Human Rights44 and Article 
21 provides that the Council may also submit ‘recommendations of a general nature’ 
to the UNGA. Article 23 further provides that the State Parties agree that ‘adoption 
of recommendations’ is necessary to achieve the rights set forth in the ICESCR. 
None of the 160 State Parties to the ICESCR have negated this obligation by 
reservation. Unlike the eight other treaty bodies the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) was established in 1985 by an ECOSOC 
resolution45 in order to assist the Council in fulfilling its role as an advisory organ to 
the UNGA with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, 
health, and related matters as indicated by Chapter X of the UN Charter. The 
‘general recommendation’ language of Article 19 was repeated in the resolution 
establishing the ESCR Committee.  
The ESCR Committee consists of eighteen members who are competent in 
the field of human rights and serve in their personal capacities. Pursuant to the 
resolution establishing the ESCR Committee, during election of the members, due 
consideration is given to equitable geographical distribution and to the representation 
of different forms of social and legal systems. To achieve the optimal representation, 
fifteen seats are equally distributed among the regional groups and the three 
additional seats are allocated in accordance with the increase in the total number of 
State Parties per regional group.46 Under the ICESCR the Committee’s only existing 
supervisory function is to review and comment upon eriodic reports. 
On 10 December 2008, the Optional Protocol to the Int rnational Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights47 was adopted by the UNGA as it 
celebrated the 60th anniversary of the UDHR. The Optional Protocol establishes the 
parameters under which the ESCR Committee would gain competency to initiate 
procedures of inquiry and to review both individual and inter-state 
communications.48 To date there are thirty-three signatories and three ratifications of 
the Optional Protocol.  
                                               
44 Now the Human Rights Council. 
45 ECOSOC, Resolution 1985/17, 28 May 1985. 
46 Ibid. 
47 UN Doc. A/63/435 (2008). 
48 Though Art. 10 requires that a further declaration of competency is required for the inter-State 
competency to be triggered. 
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The adoption of the Optional Protocol reflects the reality that the treaty body 
regime is here to stay despite past opposition. Small tweaks to the new remit of the 
ESCR Committee confirm that the Working Group on the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR was paying attention to historical sticking points for State Parties in regards 
to treaty body functions. The most progressive aspect of the Optional Protocol is the 
specification of interim measures when deemed necessary prior to a determination on 
the merits. This feature has previously been establi hed in Committees’ rules of 
procedure, such as the HRC, but the incorporation into the treaty text will 
significantly bolster the recognition of this measure. It is also important to note that 
the Working Group’s composition–including China, Poland, India, Korea, Russia, 
Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Serbia, Austria, Ghana, Italy and Senegal, just to 
name a few and all of whom have previously recognised and/or made a reservation 
against a treaty body function–signalled a concerted effort across the globe to 
establish a treaty body that is endorsed by the largest number of states while 
maintaining the integrity of the treaty body’s functions.49   
The telling aspect of the Optional Protocol is the reflection in its articles of 
the reservations that have been made to previously adopted treaty body 
communications regimes such as the CERD Committee and the HRC as discussed 
above. The rules regarding exhaustion of local remedies and the facts must not be the 
subject of a prior/current international investigaton or settlement from the previous 
individual communications regimes are mirrored here. In addition, Article 3 
explicitly limits competency to review by deeming inadmissible communications 
whose subject matter took place prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol 
for the alleged offending State Party–a rule that had not been explicit in past treaties–
and establishes a time bar on complaints whose exhaustion of local remedies was 
prior to one year before submission, except where the author can prove that it was 
impossible to submit the complaint within the one year time frame. The clarification 
that the mechanism would have no retrospective applicabi ity has been the focus of 
reservations to previous individual communications mechanisms.50 The inclusion of 
                                               
49 See e.g., Report of the Open-ended Working Group on an optional protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its fifth session, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/7 (2008). 
50 See e.g., UN Treaty Collection, OP-ICCPR, declarations/reservations by Chile, Croatia, El 




these items indicates that that negotiation process has considered the contentious 
topics associated with recognition of treaty body competencies in the past. However, 
the inclusion of the interim measures procedure indicates a more aggressive and 
authoritative role for the ESCR Committee. 
The additional competencies introduced by the Optional Protocol are inter-
state communications and the procedure of inquiry. Inter-state communications 
would be allowed pursuant to Article 10. State Parties must make a declaration of 
competency of the ESCR Committee to receive such communications in addition to 
joining the Optional Protocol however no minimum number of declarations is 
required for the provision to take effect. The procedure reflected in Article 10 
mirrors the inter-State procedures of other treaty bodies. An inquiry procedure is 
outlined in Article 11 which would allow the ESCR Committee to instigate an 
inquiry into alleged violations of ICESCR upon receipt of ‘reliable information 
indicating grave or systematic violations…of any economic, social and cultural rights 
set forth in the Covenant’.51 This competency also requires a further declaration of 
competence in the ESCR Committee over and above mer assent to the Optional 
Protocol. The Optional Protocol, and therefore the complaints and inquiry 
procedures, have yet to take effect as there are not the requisite number of 
ratifications. Thus, other than within the context of periodic reports the ESCR 
Committee has not yet addressed reservations. 
 
2.4 COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
The Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination against Women52 
(CEDAW) established the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW Committee) for the purpose of considering eports on legislative, 
judicial, administrative or other measures taken by State Parties to effect the 
obligations set forth in the treaty.53 In keeping with the remit of the previously 
established treaty bodies, Article 21 further compels the CEDAW Committee to 
annually report suggestions and general recommendatio s to the UNGA based on the 
State Parties’ reports. The CEDAW Committee consists of twenty-three experts of 
                                               
51 UN Doc. A/63/435 (2008), Art. 11. 
52 1249 UNTS 13, 18 Dec.1979. 
53 Art. 18. 
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‘high moral standing and competence in the field covered by the Convention’.54 
Other criterion, including nationality from among the State Parties, geographical 
distribution, representation of different civilisations and representation of different 
legal systems, echo prior treaty body requirements a d seek to take into account the 
various cultural differences among women.55 Each State Party may only nominate 
one individual to the list of candidates. Despite no requirement that CEDAW 
Committee members be female, only four men out of 104 experts have served since 
the first election in 1982, including one currently serving a term set to expire in 
December 2012.56 
Of the current 187 State Parties to CEDAW, 102 have subscribed to the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women57. The Optional Protocol entered into force on 22 
December 2000 and established the competency of the CEDAW Committee to 
receive individual communications. As of 2 March 2011, only twenty-seven petitions 
had been considered with six reaching final views.58   
Articles 8 and 9 establish the competency of the CEDAW Committee to 
initiate inquiries upon the receipt of reports of ‘grave or systematic violations’ of 
CEDAW rights by a State Party to the Optional Protoc l, however, these articles may 
be reserved against. Four states have made such reservations.59 Encouragingly, the 
Committee concluded its first investigation under Article 8 in July 2004 following an 
NGO complaint against Mexico and the state has responded positively to the 
procedure.60 The CEDAW Committee does not have a provision related to the receipt 
of inter-state communications. 
The vast number of reservations to CEDAW have been th  focus of much 
academic attention.61 Unlike other of the human rights treaties it has a ‘single, 
                                               
54 Art. 17, para 1. 
55 Ibid. 
56 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/membership.htm <accessed 30 Jul. 2011>. 
57 2131 UNTS 83, 6 Oct. 1999. 
58 CEDAW–Optional Protocol, Status of Registered Cases, 2 Mar. 2011.  
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/CEDAWOPSURVEY48th.xls <accessed 30 Aug. 2011> 
59 UN Treaty Collection. 
60 Report on Mexico, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (2005). The Committee is currently 
carrying out another inquiry according to one of its former members, however, in keeping with the 
confidential nature of the procedure, the state has not been named. 
61 e.g. H.B. Schöpp-Schilling, ‘Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women: An Unresolved Issue or (No) New Developments’ in I. Ziemele 
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paramount objective which is identified in its first five articles’ which makes 
evaluating reservations pursuant to the object and purpose test relatively easier by 
comparison with other more general human rights treaties.62 Primarily the Committee 
has voiced its concerns through response to periodic reports and has been able to 
keep the dialogue regarding reservations open throug  its questioning of State 
Parties.63 It has also made attempts through the years to instigate studies into the 
effect of Islamic reservations, one of the most common categories of reservations to 
CEDAW, on the status of women and to find out state’ views on these reservations, 
though both attempts proved unsuccessful.64 As will be discussed below in section 3, 
the CEDAW Committee has addressed reservations in three of the twenty-eight 
general recommendations it has issued. 
 
2.5 COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 
The Committee against Torture (CAT Committee) was created by Article 17 of the 
1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment65 (CAT). The treaty entered into force on 26 June 1987 and the first 
CAT Committee was elected66 in November of that year by the then twenty-nine67 
State Parties. As with the other human rights treaty bodies, its primary purpose is 
receive, consider and comment upon periodic reports of he State Parties regarding 
their implementation and observance of the obligations set forth in the CAT. The 
selection process is the similar to the process followed by the previously established 
                                                                                                                           
(ed.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict, Harmony 
or Reconciliation (Martinus Nijhoff, Lieden/Boston 2004); C. Chinkin, ‘Reservations and Objections 
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women’ in J.P. Gardner 
(ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections 
to Human Rights Conventions (BIICL, London 1997); B. Clark, ‘The Vienna Convention 
Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discriminatio  Against Women’ (1991) 85 AJIL 281. 
62 Chinkin, ‘Reservations and Objections to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women’, pp. 66, 68. 
63 See, for example, Concluding observations of the CEDAW Committee, Bangladesh, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/BGD/CO/7 (2011), paras. 11-12; Concluding observations…, Israel, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/5 (2011), paras. 8-9, ‘The Committee is of the view that the reservation to Art. 16 
is impermissible as it is contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.’ 
64 For a discussion of both initiatives, see Schöpp-Schilling, ‘Reservations to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women’, pp. 16-17; Chinkin, ‘Reservations and 
Objections to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women’, pp. 
77-78. 
65 1465 UNTS 85, 10 Dec. 1984. 
66 UN Doc. CAT/SP/SR.1 (1987). 
67 Report of the CAT Committee, Supp.No. 46, UN Doc. A/43/46 (1988). 
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treaty bodies, though there are only ten experts which serve on the Committee. The 
requirements that they serve in their personal capacity, are of high moral standing 
and are recognised as being competent in the field of human rights follows the treaty 
body archetype as does the nomination and election pr cesses–one nominee holding 
the nationality of the nominating State Party and secret ballot voting. 
An inquiry procedure is automatically established by CAT Article 20, thus 
the CAT Committee has automatic competency to initiate nquiry proceedings upon 
receipt of reliable information that ‘torture is being systematically practiced in the 
territory of a State Party’.68 Twelve of the 149 State Parties have either opted-out of 
the inquiry procedure completely by reservation or have qualified their acceptance of 
the article provisions by filing a reservation requiring that the article be, for example, 
‘implemented in strict compliance with the principles of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of States’.69 
The CAT Committee has concluded seven reports under th  Article 20 
inquiry procedure including inquiries into alleged torture in Brazil, former 
Yugoslavia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Peru, Egypt and Turkey. The final reports on 
Turkey, Mexico and Brazil, representing the first, fifth and seventh inquiries 
respectively, testify to the increased focus of the Committee on developing detailed 
recommendations as to how states can advance the implementation of CAT 
obligations as well as the growing sophistication of the treaty body.70 These reports 
facilitate a constructive dialogue on how states can improve their implementation of 
not only CAT obligations but also obligations relatd to other treaties. As noted by 
Brazil, the inquiry process creates an ongoing dialogue that will progress the 
realisation of human rights.71   
In keeping with the general rules regarding receipt of communications, the 
CAT Committee’s competency to receive both inter-State and individual 
communications, Articles 21 and 22 respectively, is limited to State Parties who have 
made affirmative declarations recognising the authority f the Committee to do so. 
                                               
68 Art. 20(1). 
69 See UN Treaty Collection, reservations by Indonesia and Cuba to CAT. 
70 See, respectively, UN Docs. A/48/44/Add.1 (1993), CAT/C/75 (2003) and CAT/C/39/2 (2009), 
incidentally these are the only full reports available. All other reports are summarised as part of the 
Committee’s annual report to the UNGA. 
71 UN Doc. CAT/C/39/2 (2009), para. 200. 
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State Parties may declare recognition of the competency for either or both inter-State 
and individual communications. Only sixty State Parties have declared the 
competency of the CAT Committee with respect to receiving inter-state 
communications and sixty-four regarding individual communications. Since the 
inception of the individual communications procedure, 462 complaints have been 
registered with sixty out of 181 admissible cases reaching final conclusions that a 
violation had occurred.72   
The bulk of the monitoring activity for the CAT Committee results from its 
receipt and review of periodic reports and its review of individual communications. It 
has, however, also issued two general comments.73 The vast majority of the 
reservations made to the CAT are in relation to the automatic dispute resolution 
system established in Article 30.74 There are, however, several reservations still in 
effect that have been addressed by the CAT Committee75 and also challenged by 
other State Parties,76 as discussed in Chapters Three and Four. Interestingly, the CAT 
Committee seems disinclined to invoke language of impermissibility under the 
Vienna Convention while the objecting states have almost uniformly referred to the 
incompatibility with the Vienna Convention either specifically referencing Article 
19(c) or employing the language of the object and purpose test. Of late, the 
Committee has also extended its observations about withdrawing reservations to 
other associated conventions but without pronouncing on compatibility.77  
 
2.6 COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (Children’s Committee) is the supervisory 
body attached to the Convention on the Rights of the C ild78 (CRC), which entered 
                                               
72 Status of Communications Dealt with By CAT under Art. 22 Procedure, 6 Jun. 2011, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/CATSURVEY46.xls <accessed 30 Jul. 2011>. 
73 General Comment No. 1, Refoulement and Communications (1996), reprinted in UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.II) and General Comment No. 2, the Implementation of Art. 2 by States 
Parties, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2008). 
74 As of Jul. 2011, twenty-two State Parties maintain reservations to Art. 30 which invokes automatic 
referral to the ICJ to resolve disputes related to implementing the CAT.  
75 For example, the CAT Committee addressed Qatar’s general reservation subordinating its 
obligations under the convention to Islamic law in the concluding observations following its initial 
periodic report in 2006, UN Doc. CAT/C/QAT/CO/1 (2006), para. 9. 
76 See UN Treaty Collection, reservation by Qatar and ssociated objections. 
77 See e.g, UN Doc. CAT/C/TUR/CO/3 (2010), para. 15(b), referring to reservations to the 1951 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
78 1577 UNTS 3, 20 Nov. 1989. 
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into force on 2 September 1990 and has 193 State Par ies, the largest of any of the 
core treaties. The eighteen members of the Children’s Committee must comply with 
the ‘high moral standing and recognised competence i  the field’ covered by the 
CRC according to Article 43 which sets forth the elction criteria. As with the other 
committees the members serve in their personal capacity nd are elected by secret 
ballot. 
 The Children’s Committee’s functions include only receipt and review of 
periodic reports and the transmission of general recommendations pursuant to 
Articles 44 and 45. As with the other committees, the Children’s Committee 
publishes its interpretation of the CRC obligations i  the form of general comments 
and has issued thirteen such comments with the mostrecent issued in April of 2011. 
In this recent comment it urged states to ‘[r]eview and withdraw declarations and 
reservations contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention or otherwise 
contrary to international law.’79 This is in keeping with the continued efforts of the 
Committee to get the sixty-two State Parties maintaining reservations to the CRC to 
withdraw them and provide greater adherence to the Covention. 
 
2.7 COMMITTEE ON MIGRANT WORKERS 
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families80 (ICRMW) entered into force on 1 July 2003 and has 
forty-four State Parties. The Committee on Migrant Workers (Migrants Committee) 
established pursuant to Article 72 has been active since March 2004. The fourteen81 
Committee members of ‘high moral standing’ are elect d by secret ballot and each 
State Party may nominate one person from among its na ionals. Specific to the 
Migrants Committee, equitable geographic distribution must also take into account 
states of origin and states of employment of the nomi ees. The only further 
consideration for membership is representation of the principal legal systems. 
Article 74 outlines the mandate of the Migrants Committee to review and 
‘transmit such comments as it may consider appropriate’ based on the periodic 
                                               
79 General Comment No. 13, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/13 (2011), para. 41(b). 
80 UN Doc. A/RES/45/158, 18 Dec. 1990. 
81 Pursuant to ICRMW, Art 72(1)(b) the number of the of Committee members increased from ten to 
fourteen upon the ratification of the forty-first Sate Party and this increase was effected at their 
meeting in Dec. 2009. 
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reports of the State Parties. Completing this functio  has proved difficult for the 
Committee due to the fact that as of their 2007 annu l report only seven of the State 
Parties had submitted their initial reports and all were a minimum of one year 
delinquent, with the exception of Syria which was only one month behind schedule,82 
though as of writing the Committee has reviewed a nineteen initial reports.83 The 
Migrants Committee adopted its first General Comment o  Migrant Domestic 
Workers in 2010.84 
A State Party may declare the competency of the Migrants Committee to 
receive inter-State communications under Article 76. The Committee will only 
review the communication if after six months of theinitial communication the State 
Parties concerned have not reached a satisfactory conclusion. The article goes on to 
provide more extensive guidelines for utilising this function. This competency is not 
currently effective as only one State Party, Guatemla, has made the Article 76 
declaration and the article will only be effective upon the tenth State Party declaring 
that it recognises this competency in the Migrants Committee in this capacity. 
The procedure outlining the Migrants Committee’s competency to receive 
individual communications is outlined in Article 77. Communications must comply 
with the general admissibility requirements. As with the inter-state communication 
function, the competency to receive individual communications will only be effective 
upon the tenth declaration by a State Party to the Migrants Convention recognising 
this competency. As of writing, only Guatemala and Mexico have made declarations 
recognising the Migrants Committee’s competency to receive individual 
communications. Thus far the Migrants Committee has only addressed the issue of 
reservations in the course of reviewing the initial reports it has received and, in 
keeping with its Guidelines, it does intend to question states on the basis of their 
reservations with the aim of moving them toward withdrawal.85 Following through 
with this intention, in response to the initial reports of Colombia and El Salvador the 
                                               
82 Report of the Migrants Committee, Supp. No. 48, UN Doc.A/62/48 (2007). 
83 See documents of the Migrants Committee, http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx <accessed 8 Feb. 2012>. 
84 UN Doc. CMW/C/GC/1 (2011). 
85 See Guidelines for the Periodic Reports to be Submitted by States Parties under Art. 73 of the 
Convention, UN Doc. CMW/C/2008/1 (2008) para. 5(c). 
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Committee urged both states to withdraw reservations it deemed contrary to the 
object and purpose of the Convention.86 
 
2.8 COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Disabilities Committee) 
was established under Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities87 (CRPD), which entered into force in 2008. It is composed eighteen88 
experts of high moral standing and experience in the field of disabilities who will 
serve in their personal capacities. In addition to equitable representation on the basis 
of geography, civilization and principal legal systems, State Parties should consider 
balanced gender representation and participation of experts with disabilities.89 
The primary function of the Disabilities Committee is to review the State 
Parties’ periodic reports and to ‘make such suggestion  and general 
recommendations on the report as it may consider appropriate’.90 Furthermore, where 
a State Party is significantly overdue in submitting a report Article 36 provides that 
the Disabilities Committee may notify the delinquent state that an examination of the 
State Party’s convention implementation is necessary and may initiate such if the 
State Party does not submit its report within three months of the notification of 
examination. This procedure loosely follows the procedure of inquiry though the 
trigger lies with a significantly overdue report, rather than a report of ‘grave and 
systematic violations’ of convention rights. This approach is somewhat a backdoor to 
monitoring the implementation of other human rights treaties and could prove to be a 
powerful tool. The Disabilities Convention also specifically encourages the 
Committee to maintain a working relationship with other treaty bodies and 
specialised agencies in order to ‘foster the effectiv  implementation’ of its 
obligations.91 
                                               
86 Report of the Migrants Committee–9th and 10th session , UN Doc. A/64/48 (2009). 
87 UN Doc. A/61/611, 13 Dec. 2006. 
88 Originally twelve members but increased to eighteen following the eightieth ratification, CRPD, 
Art. 34. 
89 Art. 34(4). 
90 Art. 36(1). 
91 Art. 38. 
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The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities92 establishes the competency of the Disabilities Committee to receive 
individual communications and to initiate inquiry procedures, pursuant to Articles 1 
and 6, respectively. The Optional Protocol entered into force simultaneous to its 
parent convention and sixty-two of the 103 State Parties to the original treaty have 
joined the Optional Protocol. Thus far, only Syria h s reserved against the Article 6 
ability of the Disabilities Committee to initiate inquiries based upon information 
alleging serious violations of the Disabilities Conve tion (as allowed under Article 
8). Due to the small number of reservations to the CRPD, the Committee has not yet 
dealt with reservations as none were made by any of the State Parties it has thus far 
reviewed.  
 
2.9 COMMITTEE ON ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES 
The most recent addition to the active human rights treaty body system is the ten-
member Committee on Enforced Disappearances (ICED Committee), established by 
Article 26 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance93 (ICED) which entered into force on 23 December 2010. 
As with the other committees, election of the ten experts is by secret-ballot from a 
candidacy list composed of nominees of high moral st nding and recognised 
competence in the field of human rights as outlined i  Article 26. Election also takes 
into account equitable geographical distribution and balanced gender representation. 
Recognising the inter-relatedness of the human rights treaties, Article 28 requires the 
Committee to consult with the other treaty bodies and in particular the HRC. Unlike 
the other committees, Article 27 indicates a review of the ICED Committee is 
anticipated between four and six years following the entry into force of the 
Convention to determine whether to transfer monitoring of ICED to another 
appropriate body. Due to the infancy of this Committee, its first meeting on 31 May 
2011 is the only one that has been held at the time of writing. 
 Article 29 sets up the periodic reporting requirement of the State Parties and 
as with the other committees the ICED Committee is bound to communicate its 
observations on the report. Pursuant to Article 31, State Parties may declare their 
                                               
92 UN Doc. A/61/611, 13 Dec. 2006. 
93 UN Doc. A/61/488.C.N.737.2008.TREATIES-12, 20 Dec. 2006. 
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recognition of the competency of the ICED Committee to consider individual 
communications. Article 32 sets out the inter-state communication function and 
Article 33 a procedure of inquiry. As outlined in Article 34, well-founded indications 
that enforced disappearances are being practised in a State Party’s territory could 
also lead the Committee to ‘urgently bring the matter o the attention’ of the UNGA 
after attempting to gather information from the State Party concerned.  
A unique function set forth in Article 30 allows the Committee to consider 
urgent requests for a disappeared person to be sought and found  and it may request 
the State Party to provide information on the situat on of the person sought if the 
request: 
(a) Is not manifestly unfounded; 
(b) Does not constitute an abuse of the right of submission of such 
requests; 
(c) Has already been duly presented to the competent bodies of the 
State Party concerned, such as those authorized to undertake investigations, 
where such a possibility exists; 
(d) Is not incompatible with the provisions of this Convention; and 
(e) The same matter is not being examined under another procedure 
of international investigation or settlement of thesame nature. 
The request may include time limits for state respon e and may be followed up with 
a request for interim measures as well as request for the state to follow up with the 
Committee. At the time of writing, the only reservations to ICED were those by 
Cuba and Venezuela to the automatic referral of disputes to the ICJ and the 
Committee had not yet received any initial reports thus the Committee has not yet 
addressed reservations. 
 
2.10 SUMMARY  
It has been suggested that treaty body effectiveness can be measured in relation to 
the different purposes they set out to achieve through their different functions which 
include: ‘doing justice in individual cases, creating a deterrent and encouraging 
behaviour modification, and interpreting and explaining human rights law beyond the 
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individual case or particular set of state actors’.94 Periodic report monitoring and 
concluding observations, issuing general comments and reviewing individual 
communications all play to the strengths of the treaty bodies which include their 
specific knowledge of the treaty obligations and their ability to create human rights 
dialogues with state parties. Though the opinions, comments and statements issued 
by treaty bodies are not binding, it has been acknowledged that these could be 
viewed as forms of soft law, a phenomenon that is be ng realised in a range of courts 
on both the international and domestic level.95 The documents produced by the treaty 
bodies are publicly available through the OHCHR, which provides an opportunity for 
states and their citizens to track the development of human rights law 
implementation. The body of work produced by the traty bodies does not stand 
alone and must be examined in conjunction with the work of the various UN human 
rights organs, including the OHCHR, the UNHRC and the international courts 
mentioned above. 
Mertus suggested that ‘treaty fatigue’ contributes o the negative attitude 
toward treaty bodies due to the multiple and often overlapping reporting processes 
which are often viewed as ineffective and inefficient.96 The recent implementation of 
the Harmonised Guidelines hould go a long way toward relieving this fatigue and 
encourage states who are party to multiple human rights conventions to submit more 
thorough reports, especially in the area of reservations. Time delays in processing 
individual applications, another procedural bugbear in the system, were significantly 
reduced when a dedicated Petitions Team was created in 2000 to deal with 
                                               
94 J. Mertus, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Guide for a New Era (Routledge, London 
2005), p. 113. 
95 A.E. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP, Oxford 2007), p. 156. The 
ECtHR, the European Court of Justice and the African Commission on Human Rights, as well as a 
multitude of other domestic courts, have made reference to treaty body jurisprudence, including 
general comments. See, for example, Riad and Idiab v Belgium, (App. Nos. 29787/03 and 29810/03), 
ECtHR, 21 Jan. 2008, para. 56, noting HRC, oncluding observations, Belgium, UN Doc. 
CCPR./CO/81/BEL (2004); Hirst v. United Kingdom, (App. No. 74025/01), ECtHR (GC), 6 Oct. 
2005, para. 27, specifically noting HRC General Comment No. 25; Öcalan v. Turkey, (App. No. 
46221/99), ECtHR (GC), 12 May 2005, para. 60; Bressol and Others v. Gouvernement de la 
Commuauté Française(of Belgium), (Case C-73/08) [2010] 3.C.M.L.R. 20 (ECJ-GC), 13 Apr. 2010, 
para. AG136; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Re Communication 155/96, 
ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, 27 May 2002; ZH (Tanzania) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2011] UKSCA (United Kingdom), para. 23; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western 
Cape v. Thubelisha Homes and Others (CCT 22/08) (2009) (South Africa), paras. 36-37, noting 
ESCR Committee general comments. 
96 Mertus, The United Nations and Human Rights, pp. 80-81. 
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applications specific to the ICCPR, CERD and CAT.97 With these administrative 
issues seemingly resolved it is hoped that the treaty bodies can perform their 
functions more consistently and economically.  
 
3 THE DETERMINATIVE FUNCTION OF TREATY BODIES 
Conceding that the problem of invalid reservations was not widespread in the early 
days of the UN treaty system, in 1983 in response to the passive approach being 
taken toward invalid reservations Shelton emphasised that ‘silence in the face of such 
cases undermines respect for international human rights law and impedes progress in 
implementing the rights guaranteed’.98 Since Shelton’s observation, the situation 
surrounding invalid reservations has only worsened an  the need for an alternative to 
the traditional model of state objections as the prima y mechanism of determining 
reservation validity has increased. When a treaty does not create reciprocal 
obligations and/or rights and has no specific reservation regime outlining the effect 
of a determination of invalidity there must be an alternative mechanism with the 
competency to access the permissibility of reservations.99 An alternative mechanism 
of review would combat the apathy of state parties who have no vested interest in the 
obligations avoided by other state parties as well as provide a clear indication of 
whether a state may rely on its reservation in the context of its state to state and state 
to human being relationships.   
Though human rights treaties do not warrant a special residual reservations 
regime outwith the Vienna Convention, they do represent a discrete category of 
treaties which necessitates resolving the question of reservation validity more 
directly. The problem with the system as it stands today is that there is no final 
arbiter, no hierarchy between states, treaty bodies or dispute resolution mechanisms 
and their views on validity or consequence of invalidity. As discussed above, the 
treaty bodies operate under mandates specific to each treaty but one role that they all 
                                               
97 Commission on Human Rights, Effective Functioning of Human Rights Mechanisms Treaty Bodies, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/98 (2004), para 13. 
98 D. Shelton, ‘State Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties’ (1983) 1 Canadian Human 
Rights Yearbook 205, 234. 
99 Boerefijn, ‘Impact on the Law on Treaty Reservations’, p.  84 et seq.; D. Hylton, ‘Default 
Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Inadequate Framework on Reservations’ 
(1994) 27 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 419, 448-49; P.-H. Imbert, ‘Reservations to the 
ECHR Before the Strasbourg Commission: the Temeltasch Case’ (1984) 33 ICLQ 558, 585. 
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share is the duty to monitor the compliance with trea y obligations. This function 
necessitates assessing the validity of reservations, the determinative function, as the 
treaty bodies interpret treaty obligations and state compliance therewith. When 
interpreting treaties, Vienna Convention Article 31(2)(b) requires consideration of 
‘any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty’, which should naturally extend to reservations as accompaniments to 
instruments of ratification or accession.100 The determinative function can be served 
in conjunction with the multiple roles carried out by treaty bodies as they examine 
periodic reports, initiate procedures of inquiry orevaluate individual or state 
communications. 
  As the ‘central pillars in the United Nations human rights system’101 it is 
crucial to the human rights system that treaty bodies actively fulfil their monitoring 
function since it is only recently that some states appear to have begun to 
systematically monitor reservations. As noted by Hampson, ‘the principal way of 
ensuring compliance [with human rights treaties] is through monitoring’ because the 
treaty bodies ‘are, in a sense, representing the interests of all States when they 
exercise their functions’.102 Thus, the state-policing system envisioned by the Vienna 
Convention is most often replaced by treaty body monitoring in the context of human 
rights treaties due to the problems which permeate the monitoring system envisioned 
by applying the Vienna Convention alone. 
 
3.1 VIENNA CONVENTION SILENCE ON TREATY BODIES 
Neither the ICJ in its Genocide Opinion nor the ILC in its development of the Vienna 
Convention contemplated the proliferation of treaty bodies and their potential as 
adjudicators of treaty compliance, including evaluating the validity of reservations. 
There is no mention of the function of treaty-specific monitoring mechanisms within 
the Vienna Convention.103 Treaty bodies had not begun to operate at the time the 
                                               
100 This point is noted by Baylis, ‘General Comment 24’, 314. 
101 Marrakech Statement on Strengthening the Relationshp between NHRIs and the Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies System, Marrakech, Morocco (2010) (Marrakech Statement), para. 5. 
102 F. Hampson, Specific Human Rights Issues, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, Final working 
paper, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42 (2004) (2004 Final working paper), para. 47. 
103 Noted by Shelton, ‘State Practice on Reservations t  Human Rights Treaties’, 229. 
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Vienna Convention was adopted thus it had no cause to address such mechanisms.104 
This underscores the point that international law and human rights law, particularly, 
are dynamic and evolving and thus updates must be considered in order to maintain a 
coherent system. The treaty bodies offer an alternaive to state parties in the policing 
of treaty obligations which is essential in light of the nature of human rights treaties 
and the reluctance of states to bring actions to enf rce the obligations therein.  
 
3.2 ANALYSIS OF EVOLVING PRACTICE 
Evaluating the validity of reservations is inherent i  the consideration of periodic 
reports as reviewed by all of the treaty bodies introduced above. In analysing the 
reports and recommendations of the treaty bodies from their inception to the present 
it is obvious that reservations were a domain approached with caution in the early 
days of the periodic reporting system. Time has increased the vociferousness of the 
treaty bodies in their assessment of reservations though it must be impressed that this 
increased sensitivity toward reservations has been extremely measured and, as will 
be explored below, in keeping with the general progression of the international 
community on the issue. 
In 1978, the CERD Committee considered the question of reservations and 
determined that it  
 
…must take the reservations made by the State parties a  the time of 
ratification or accession into account: [because] it had no authority to 
do otherwise. A decision–even a unanimous decision–by the 
Committee that a reservation is unacceptable could not have any legal 
effect.105 
 
The CERD Committee’s then-reluctance to assume competency over reservation 
compatibility was undoubtedly based on several factors prevailing at that time. 
Shelton points to the limiting text of the CERD with respect to the enumerated 
responsibilities of the Committee and the reservations compatibility test of CERD 
Article 20.106 She suggests that the treaty body was a ‘considerable innovation’ at the 
time, thus it was not surprising that the CERD Committee was subject to more 
                                               
104 Though the treaty bodies were functioning, albeit in their infancy, prior to the entry into force of 
the Vienna Convention in 1980. 
105 Report on the 17th Session, UN Doc. A/33/18 (1978), para. 374. 
106 Shelton, ‘State Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties’, 230. 
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stringent textual and interpretive restrictions than l tterly created human rights treaty 
bodies.107 Over time, however, the CERD Committee has developed a stronger 
position toward reservations and continues to call them to the attention of State 
Parties and urge them to ‘[c]onsider withdrawing their reservations to the 
Convention, if any, taking into account the evolution in the field of human rights 
since its adoption’.108  
Reservations were also addressed by the CEDAW Committee in its 1987 
General Recommendation No. 4 when it ‘[e]xpress[ed] concern in relation to the 
significant number of reservations that appeared to be incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Convention.’109 Seeing little progression on the issue it issued 
another call for states to reconsider withdrawing rese vations to CEDAW in 1992 in 
preparation for the World Conference on Human Rights.110 State objections 
specifically in relation to CEDAW reservations have intensified in the past decade by 
more than three-fold.111 This has been accompanied by the withdrawal of 
reservations by states such as Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, New Zealand and Switzerland, 
to name a few.112 
The competence of the treaty bodies to assess the validity of reservations is 
derived directly from the reporting procedure113 and is a concept that has been 
gaining momentum during the past two decades.114 Arguably, state parties, at least to 
the ICCPR, had generally accepted the HRC’s authority to evaluate reservations in 
the early 1990s as it had been engaged in such activity for several years without 
objection from states.115 The tipping-point that brought the issue to the fore was a 
controversial general comment issued by the HRC in 1994. General Comment No. 
24116 on issues relating to reservations to the ICCPR was the HRC’s ‘bold step 
                                               
107 Ibid., 230. 
108 General Recommendation No. 33, p. 161. 
109 General Recommendation No. 4, UN Doc. A/42/38 (1987). 
110 General Recommendation No. 20, reprinted in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (2008) (Vol. I), p. 200. 
111 UN Treaty Collection, Objections to reservations to CEDAW. 
112 UN Treaty Collection, see notes to CEDAW ratifications. 
113 Boerefijn, ‘Impact on the Law on Treaty Reservations’, p. 86. 
114 L. Magnusson, ‘Elements of Nordic Practice 1997: The Nordic Countries in Coordination’ (1998) 
67 Nordic Journal of International Law 345, 349 (recognising that the subject of treaty body 
competency should be further discussed). 
115 Baylis, ‘General Comment 24’, 278. 
116 UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994). The CEDAW Committee had issued a previous general 
recommendation on reservations to CEDAW but it did not take a view on its determinative role, see 
General Recommendation No. 4. 
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towards the articulation of a new and separate reservations regime in respect of 
human rights treaties’.117 While it is not advocated here that a new and separate 
regime is necessary, it is important to recognise that General Comment No. 24 stands 
as an identifiable point of departure from the traditional view that the Vienna 
Convention regime alone adequately addresses the nuances of analysing reservations 
to human rights treaties.   
General Comment No. 24 was formulated in specific response to the great 
number of reservations that were attached to the ICCPR, which was, at the time, 150 
reservations of varying significance made among forty-six of the then 127 State 
Parties.118 First addressing the types of reservations threatening the coherence of the 
treaty regime, the HRC indicated that reservations ffending peremptory norms or 
customary international law were not compatible with the object and purpose of the 
ICCPR and it provided a laundry list of ICCPR protections against which no 
reservation could be deemed valid.119 Specifically invoking principles of general 
international law and particularly the Vienna Convetion, the HRC then outlined that 
the traditional reciprocal nature of treaties was not present in human rights treaties 
and therefore ‘the role of State objections in relation to reservations is inappropriate 
to address the problem of reservations to human rights treaties,’120 which is an 
essential point of this thesis and a point that has been frequently reiterated. 
The most radical feature of the comment was the assrtion that treaty bodies 
were competent to determine the permissibility of reservations.  
 
It necessarily falls to the Committee to determine whether a specific 
reservation is compatible with the object and purpose f the Covenant. 
This is in part because, as indicated above, it is an inappropriate task 
for States parties in relation to human rights treaties, and in part 
because it is a task that the Committee cannot avoid in the 
performance of its functions. 121 
 
                                               
117 C. Redgwell, ‘Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 
24(52)’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 390, 392. 
118 HRC, General Comment No. 24, para. 1. 
119 Ibid., para. 8. 
120 Ibid., para. 17; an opinion echoed by many, see Baylis, ‘General Comment 24’; Boerefijn, ‘Impact 
on the Law on Treaty Reservations’, p. 85; 
121 HRC, General Comment No. 24, para. 18; The HRC reiterated this point in Rawle Kennedy v. 




By grounding the necessity of evaluating reservations in the enumerated functions 
they were created to serve, the Committee strengtheed their position as the legal 
basis of this competency was somewhat tenuous.122 States had accepted previously 
elaborated strictures of the Committee, such as the format and content of state reports 
as well as the practice of the HRC of inquiring about reservations,123 thus the HRC’s 
comment was partially aimed at further refining their monitoring function and in 
keeping with acknowledged state compliance with this function. Vienna Convention 
Article 31(3)(b) acknowledges ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties egarding its interpretation’ as a 
general rule of interpretation. As argued by Baylis, ‘the acquiescence of the states 
parties in this development of the Committee’s function bolsters the Committee’s 
claim to the role of evaluating reservations, on both functional and legal grounds’ in 
light of Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(b).124 
This development seemed to shock many observers and states yet by 
examining the purpose of treaty bodies as set forthin e treaties, the recognition of 
this competency should not have been such a revelation. The legacy of the HRC’s 
opinion is that it was singularly responsible for catapulting the debate surrounding 
reservations to human rights treaties into the foreground of international human 
rights law. It is from the ideas posited in General Comment No. 24 that much of the 
progress on the question of reservations has stemmed. 
Despite intense criticism of General Comment No. 24 by the US, UK and 
France,125 Redgwell noted in 1997 that it ‘should be welcomed as a constructive 
response to the real problem of reservations to human rights treaties’.126 It should 
also be acknowledged that the convention specific treaty bodies are increasingly 
taking great pains to ground their pronouncements o tate compliance in the terms 
of their respective treaties, unlike other Charter-based organs of the UN human rights 
                                               
122 See discussion by Baylis, ‘General Comment 24’, 296-300. 
123 Ibid., 299, 311.  
124 Ibid., 299.  
125 See Observations by the Governments of the US and the UK on General Comment No. 24 (52) 
relating to reservations, UN Doc. A/50/40 (1995); see also R. Baratta, ‘Should Invalid Reservations 
to Human Rights Treaties Be Disregarded?’ (2000) 11 EJIL 413, 417; Baylis, ‘General Comment 24’, 
318-22; A. Pellet, Second report on Reservations to Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/477/Add.1 (1996), 
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126 Redgwell, ‘Reservations and General Comment No. 24(52)’, 411. 
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regime, such as the Human Rights Council,127 which often fail to base their 
condemnation of human rights violations on any normative order.128 This reiteration 
of the accepted normative order strengthens the argument when there has been a 
view taken that reservation is invalid.129 It has been suggested that it is unnecessary 
for a treaty body to actually ‘determine’ validity as they can otherwise clarify their 
concerns over reservations through their dialogue,130 however, this suggestion serves 
to perpetuate the inactivity in the area of withdrawal of a reservation. The strength of 
the opinion on invalidity is that it provides a clear view on the shortcomings of the 
reservation. 
General Comment No. 24 led to an equally controversial decision taken by 
the HRC when exercising its function to review indivi ual communications in the 
1999 Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago131 case. The year before, Trinidad and 
Tobago had denounced and re-acceded to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR with a 
reservation that the HRC would not be competent to consider communications by 
any prisoner under the sentence of death in respect of any matter relating to 
prosecution, detention, trial, conviction, sentence or carrying of the of the 
sentence.132 In a divided opinion, the HRC declared the application by Kennedy, a 
prisoner on death row, admissible despite the reservation. Resorting to the Vienna 
Convention rules to determine the validity of the reservation, the HRC determined 
that the reservation was contrary to the object and purpose of the Optional Protocol 
to the ICCPR133 as the ‘function of the Optional Protocol is to allow claims in respect 
of the [ICCPR’s] rights to be tested before the Committee’134 and the reservation in 
question sought to lessen the procedural protections f a particular group of 
people.135 McGrory notes that the HRC ‘appeared to have abandone  the state-
                                               
127 The UN Human Rights Council was established by UNGA, Resolution 60/251, UN Doc. 
A/RES/60/251 (2006), to succeed the UN Commission on Human Rights. 
128 See Alston, The United Nations and Human Rights, p. 2. 
129 Marrakech Statement, para. 16(c). 
130 Boerefijn, ‘Impact on the Law on Treaty Reservations’, p. 86. 
131 Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, HRC Communication No. 845/1999, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999 (1999), 31 Dec. 1999. 
132 See UN Treaty Collection, OP-ICCPR, n. 1. Trinidad nd Tobago acceded to the OP on 14 
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133 Rawle Kennedy, para. 6.5. 
134 Ibid., para. 6.6, citing HRC, General Comment No. 24, para. 13. 
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centred, pre-General Comment 24 approach to assessing reservations to human rights 
treaties’.136 However, in abandoning the state-centred approach the Committee 
committed to maintaining the integrity of both the Optional Protocol and the 
ICCPR.137 It was just this type of controversial decision on the back of General 
Comment No. 24 that catapulted reservations, once again, into the lim light and gave 
a great sense of urgency to the ILC’s ongoing study on reservations.  
In addition to their individual efforts in the course of reviewing periodic 
reports, issuing general comments and assessing individual communications, the 
treaty bodies have driven other initiatives aimed toward redressing the effect of 
reservations to human rights treaties under the Vienna Convention regime. Through 
meetings of the chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies and Inter-Committee 
meetings of the human rights treaty bodies, the treaty bodies have further enhanced 
the understanding of reservations practice specific to each treaty as well as across the 
entire treaty regime.    
In 1997 the CERD Committee proposed that a study be undertaken on 
reservations to human rights treaties.138 A working paper questioning whether in 
applying the default Vienna Convention reservations regime to a particular 
reservation, are there special characteristics of human rights treaties which have an 
impact on the interpretation of the reservation was delivered to the ECOSOC Sub-
commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1999.139 
The author of the working paper, Hampson, was then appointed as Special 
Rapporteur for the purpose of preparing a comprehensiv  study on reservations to 
human rights treaties by the UNHCHR Sub-Commission on Human Rights. Relying 
on the Vienna Convention and customary rules of international law ten years after 
General Comment No. 24, Hampson paralleled the function of a treaty body to that 
of a judicial or quasi-judicial body that has the inherent jurisdiction to determine its 
                                               
136 G. McGrory, ‘Reservations of Virtue? Lessons from Trinidad and Tobago’s Reservation to the 
First Optional Protocol’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 769, 808. McGrory generally disagreed 
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763. 
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own competence to unequivocally conclude that a trety body has the inherent 
authority to determine: 
1. Whether a statement is a reservation or not: and 
2. If so, whether it is a valid reservation; and  
3. To give effect to a conclusion with regard to validity.140 
 
Thus confirming the HRC’s position that the treaty bodies are competent to 
determine compatibility of reservations with their specific treaties.141 
A working group on reservations was established at the request of the 
chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies and the inter-committee meeting of 
the human rights treaty bodies following the submission of Hampson’s final report 
on Specific Human Rights Issues, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties142 .143 From 
the beginning of the working group it was clear that there was little coordination 
among the treaty bodies on the issue of reservations hus it was determined that the 
working group should attempt to harmonise the treaty bodies’ approaches to 
reservations. The working group’s latest report on reservations, is ued in 2008, 
indicated that the treaty bodies were concerted in their efforts–especially in the 
course of reviewing periodic reports–to see impermissible reservations withdrawn.144 
Despite minor, temporary waivers145 since the adoption of General Comment 
No. 24, the treaty bodies have been increasingly vociferous about their competency 
to evaluate the validity of reservations. The initial reasons for asserting this 
competency were based largely on the theory that a quasi-judicial body has the 
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction and the fact that the Vienna Convention 
does not elaborate on what to do when a state maintains an invalid reservation 
following a determination of invalidity by another state party, both reasons advanced 
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in Hampson’s study.146 In keeping with this argument, the treaty bodies, both 
individually and through joint efforts, resolved to c mbat the existence of invalid 
reservations.147 
In 2008, the CEDAW Committee adopted decision 41/1 which discussed 
compatibility of reservations with the object and purpose of the Convention.148 The 
decision indicates that the issue of validity falls squarely within its function in 
relation to not only the reporting procedure but also in relation to the communication 
and inquiry procedures under the Optional Protocol. In its recent review of Israel 
under the periodic reporting scheme, the CEDAW Committee took the view that 
Israel’s reservation to Article 16 was impermissible due to it being contrary to the 
object and purpose of the Convention.149 There remains no guidance on what should 
happen if a complaint about a violation of Article 16 is brought in any forum but it 
appears that if the question was put to a competent dispute resolution organ then that 
organ would have the final word on validity regardless of the positions taken by the 
treaty body or state party, however, the CEDAW Committee’s opinion would 
undoubtedly provide guidance as would state objections. At present, there is no 
definite answer to the question as to whether Israel’  r fusal to remove the offending 
reservation prevails over the finding of impermissibility by the monitoring 
mechanism. The ILC Finalized Guidelines (guideline 3.2.3) indicates that the state 
should give ‘consideration’ to the view of the treaty body but ultimately, the 
guidelines are just that, a guide, and have no binding force. 
The most recent general comment by the HRC, or indeed any of the treaty 
bodies addressing reservations, was published in July 2011. Once again the 
Committee drew attention to reservations and the incompatibility of certain 
reservation with the object and purpose of the ICCPR. Specifically the HRC 
                                               
146 Hampson, 2004 Final working paper, para. 37; F. Hampson, Specific Human Rights Issues, 
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, Expanded working paper prepared in accordance to Sub-
Commission decision 2001/17, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/WP.2 (2003), p. 19. 
147 See, for example, Chairpersons HRTBs, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2007/5 (2007), para. 16(5). 
148 Report on its 41st session, UN Doc. A/63/38, Supp. 38 (2008), chap. I, p. 88 
149 Concluding observations…, Israel, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/5 (2011), paras. 8-9
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surmised that any reservation to Article 19(1)150 would be incompatible with the 
object and purpose test as would any general reservation to Article 19(2)151.152  
 The treaty body working group on reservations has endorsed reservation 
provisions in the Harmonized Guidelines that were developed to assist states in filing 
multiple reports under the range of core human rights treaties.153 The common core 
document does not address the competency of the treaty bodies to assess 
reservations. It does, however, mandate that state parties address sweeping 
reservations and calls on states to report on the interpretation and ‘precise effect’ of 
those particular reservations.154 This reflects calls previously made by both the HRC 
and the ILC. 155 
It has been suggested that the very fact that human rights treaty bodies still 
subject formulated reservations to the residual Vienna Convention rules implies the 
exclusion of the organs’ competency to evaluate the validity of reservations;156 
however, this blurs two separate questions. The first is what rules to apply when 
determining validity and the second is what organ is competent to make this 
determination. In response to the first question it is clear that in the UN human rights 
treaty regime there is no other rule available to assess reservation validity other than 
the object and purpose test found in the Vienna Convention. As noted in previous 
chapters, the Vienna Convention does not specifically invite only states to make this 
determination in the first instance, thus there is no reason to assume that a state’s 
acceptance (tacit or otherwise) or objection pursuant to the Vienna Convention rules 
will preclude a court or the attached treaty body from taking up the issue,157 a point 
                                               
150 ICCPR, Art. 19(1) reads: ‘Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.’ 
151 ICCPR, Art. 19(2) reads: ‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.’ 
152 General Comment No.34, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), para. 5. 
153 UN Doc. HRI/MC/2007/5 (2007), para. 8. 
154 UN Secretary-General, Compilation of guidelines on the form and content of reports to be 
submitted by States Parties to international human rights treaties, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6 
(2009), para. 41(b), Chp. 3(C.2), Chp. 4(A.4), Chp. 5(C.3), Chp. 7(I.10) 
155 See General Comment No. 24, para. 19; Commentary upon proposed Reservations to Treaties, 
Draft Guideline 3.1.11, UN Doc. A/62/10 (2007), p. 109.  
156 Imbert, ‘Reservations to the ECHR Before the Strasbourg Commission’, 585; see also, Chinkin, 
‘Reservations and Objections to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women’, pp. 78-79. 
157 The language of Vienna Convention, Art. 20(2), points to ‘states and the object and purpose’ but 
does not indicate that states alone determine compliance with the object and purpose (emphasis 
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noted frequently by the regional human rights organs s discussed in Chapter Four. 
Even if there was reluctance on the part of both the convention drafters and 
supervisory organs to address the reservations issue directly in the early days of the 
UN human rights regime, time has revealed the need to address the question of who 
is competent to adjudge the validity of reservations out-with the traditional state-
centred approach and treaty bodies have, in fact, in reasingly asserted their right to 
review reservations for compatibility. 
Part of the idea behind submitting the assessment of reservations to 
independent, specialist bodies is to avoid the inevitable political concerns of states.158 
It has been suggested that the state system of assessing reservations and the separate 
supervisory organ assessment of the same can not easily xist side by side as the 
possibility of review by the supervisory organ would weaken the consent given by 
other state parties to the treaty,159 however, this is not a plausible conclusion to draw 
in light of the reality that ‘consent’ to reservations to human rights treaties is 
generally facilitated by tacit acceptance evidenced by a lack of actual objections to 
reservations under the present regime. Shelton contends that the treaty bodies are 
best suited to serve as an alternative mechanism for review of reservations,160 and 
this position is easy to support when the other options are limited to states with their 
various political concerns and the judicial organs with varying jurisdictional 
impediments. The treaty bodies are the one constant for each of the human rights 
treaties. The processes of the treaty bodies are larg ly indifferent to the positions of 
other state parties as they, through their various functions, address states individually 
in relation to their obligations under specific treati s.161 The growing pains 
accompanying the development of the international human rights system indicate 
that when there are so many different views to be tak n into account independent, 
expert supervisory organs may provide the greatest opportunity for a competent 
                                                                                                                           
added). See full text in Annex II. See the discussion by the ECtHR and the IACtHR on this issue in 
Chapter 4, sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
158 Imbert, ‘Reservations to the ECHR Before the Strasbourg Commission’, 591, specifically referring 
to the ECHR. 
159 Ibid., 591, fn. 96. 
160 Shelton, ‘State Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties’, 228-29; see also Redgwell, 
‘Reservations and General Comment No. 24(52)’. 
161 M. Craven, ‘Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International 
Law’ (2000) 11 EJIL 489, 510-11. 
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assessment of treaty obligation implementation, which undoubtedly includes giving 
opinions on these ‘living instruments’162. 
 In 2009, the ILC affirmed the long-standing treaty body assertion that in 
addition to Contracting States, treaty bodies could serve in a determinative capacity 
in evaluating reservation permissibility.163 The Finalized Guidelines, however, took 
special care to not give precedence to one assessment organ over another: 
 
3.2 Assessment of the permissibility of reservation 
The following may assess, within their respective competences, the 
permissibility of reservations to a treaty formulated by a State or an 
international organization: 
• Contracting States or contracting organizations 
• Dispute settlement bodies 
• Treaty monitoring bodies 
 
Thus these organs share a determinative capacity and m y not determine validity to 
the exclusion of one another, which makes sense considering the varying 
relationships each will have with a reserving state. Unfortunately, the ILC attempt to 
provide guidance on the issue of legal effect flowing from a reservation assessment 
by a treaty body serves only to reinforce the current limits of any legal effect rather 
than to clarify:  
  
3.2.1 Competence of the treaty monitoring bodies to assess the 
permissibility of reservations 
1. A treaty monitoring body may, for the purpose of discharging the 
functions entrusted to it, assess the permissibility of reservations 
formulated by a State or an international organization.  
2. The assessment made by such a body in the exercise of this 
competence shall have no greater legal effect than th t of the act which 
contains it.164  
 
For treaties of general applicability composed of reciprocal obligations the even 
playing field envisioned by this guideline is suitable because the legal effect is more 
easily ascertained. However, in the context of human rights treaties, the absence of 
hierarchy coupled with the lack of concrete consequence for invalid reservations 
results in a futile confirmation of that which has been widely accepted without 
                                               
162 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 155. 
163 ILC, Reservations to Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.744 (2009), p. 3-4, draft guidelin  3.2. 
164 Finalized Guidelines. 
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addressing the more important question of how the different assessment organs 
should work together. By limiting the determinative function of each organ with the 
phrase ‘within their respective competences’ withou elaborating on the effect of a 
determination by a treaty body, the ambiguous situation of the human rights treaty 
bodies is perpetuated. Development of this aspect would have gone above and 
beyond a mere survey and analysis of existing law and ventured into ‘progressive 
development of the law’, however, the ILC chose to maintain the status quo which 
has not provided any resolution on the issue.165   
Thus, for example, if a treaty body takes the view the a reservation is 
impermissible in the course of assessing an individual complaint then it has the same 
impact on the reserving state as if it had made the same observation in the course of 
examining a periodic report. The two guidelines reflect the practice of the treaty 
bodies in that they are increasingly taking views on reservation validity in the course 
of carrying out all of their monitoring roles. To have taken any other view would 
have been to ignore the evolving practice of the treaty bodies and increased 
acceptance of the practice by states.166 The point made previously by the CEDAW 
Committee in relation to the determinative function being not only incidental to the 
reporting procedure but also to the communication and inquiry procedures167 is 
important to recall here in that it is a function necessary in relation to all monitoring 
and quasi-judicial roles of the treaty bodies, thus all treaty bodies, regardless of their 
individual remits, are competent in this respect.  
The obvious caveat in confirming that treaty bodies are competent to assess 
reservations but the effect is limited to that deriv d from the normal performance of 
its monitoring role is that not all states take heed of the monitoring mechanisms. The 
ILC guidelines remind states that have formulated rse vations to a treaty with a 
treaty monitoring body that they are ‘required to co perate with that body and should 
give full consideration to that body’s assessment of the validity of the 
reservations’.168 This requirement, easily derived from the concept of pacta sunt 
servanda,169 has always existed despite evidence to the contrary in the field of human 
                                               
165 As noted by Boerefijn, ‘Impact on the Law on Treaty Reservations’, pp. 87 et seq. 
166 On this point see, Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 193. 
167 See Report on its 41st session, UN Doc. A/63/38, Supp. 38 (2008), chap. I, p. 88. 
168 ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.744 (2009), p. 4, draft guideline 3.2.3. 
169 Vienna Convention, Art. 26. 
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rights. Hampson also notes that the principle should always guide states in their 
reactions to treaty body findings.170 There is no point in including a treaty monitoring 
body within a treaty framework if its views, at the v ry least, are not meant to be 
fully considered in good faith. Otherwise the existence of the treaty body is futile.  
Treaty bodies are clearly at liberty to assess reservations as part of the 
periodic reporting procedure. This is supported by Vienna Convention Article 31 as 
well as the evolving practice of the treaty bodies as recognised by states. Though this 
is an essential and effective role, in most cases it is clear from the reports issued by 
each of the bodies that compliance with the reporting procedures are far from perfect 
and their observations on the reports often fall on deaf ears. The disparity among the 
treaty bodies in their approaches to reservations over the past thirty years highlights 
the ambiguity of the Vienna Convention rules. The lack of options regarding legal 
effect available to the treaty bodies as constituent organs as opposed to state parties 
does not, without further clarification, leave them many options as permissibility and 
opposability are not available choices.  
The existence of the treaty bodies is more readily comparable to the 
supervisory organs of the ECHR and the ACHR addressed in Chapter Four. Thus the 
roles of the treaty bodies must be strengthened and this can only be done effectively 
by refinement and state recognition of their competencies. ‘[T]he integrity of human 
rights treaties calls for the recognition of the role that international supervisory 
machinery can play in monitoring reservations filed by states, as a step toward more 
effective implementation of human rights norms.’171 In her examination of the 
CEDAW Committee’s crusade on reservations during the past two decades, Schöpp-
Schilling notes that no actor was specified to deci on the compatibility of 
reservations and though ‘the Committee’s efforts…had proven successful in bringing 
the issue onto the agenda and into the final documents of the World Conference on 
Human Rights, the issue…remain[s] unresolved.’172 The tools exist to rectify 
decisions on reservation compatibility, but there are some progressive steps that must 
                                               
170 Hampson, 2004 Final working paper, para. 39. 
171 Shelton, ‘State Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties’, 234. 
172 Schöpp-Schilling, ‘Reservations to the Convention the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women’, pp. 17-18. 
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be taken in order for the entirety of states to recognise the value of the system 
already in place.  
As it stands with the ILC, a treaty body’s competence to assess reservations 
does not prejudice the competence of a contracting state,173 which returns to the 
cyclical debate between the state and a treaty bodyas to which decision trumps on 
the view of reservations invalidity. There has been state concern that allowing 
multiple entities to assess the validity of reservations will only cause more 
complications in interpreting obligations affected by reservations.174 Hampson, too, 
expressed trepidation over the potential problem of states (not the reserving state) 
and treaty bodies coming to different conclusions.175 This apprehension is grounded 
in the reality that separate entities operating in tandem to assess the same reservation 
are not strictly bound to recognise the findings of others, whether it be assessments 
by multiple states or a state and a treaty body. The overarching goal should be to 
reconcile the various entities. 
 
3.3 RESPONSE TO TREATY BODY OPPOSITION 
As with lack of universal views on resolutions for the lacunae of the Vienna 
Convention, there is also no universal agreement on the competency of treaty bodies 
to serve in determinative capacity. In the 1980s Imbert suggested that ‘[b]y 
committing themselves in the examination of [reservations]…the supervisory organs 
run the risk of weakening their authority and prestige’176 and that ‘pronouncing on 
the validity of reservations could be a cause of major inconvenience for the control 
organs of treaties’.177 It can no longer be said that addressing reservations will 
weaken the authority of the treaty bodies nor will it be an inconvenience. The haze 
surrounding the validity of certain reservations has undoubtedly done more to 
hamper the work of the treaty bodies and investing the treaty bodies with the ultimate 
authority to make these determinations would resolve these issues. The main 
                                               
173 Finalized Guidelines, 3.2.4. This point has been emphasised by others, see Boerefijn, ‘Impact on 
the Law on Treaty Reservations’, p. 87. 
174 See comments by Austria, Reservations to treaties, Comments and observations received from 
Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/639 (2011), para. 63. 
175 Hampson, 1999 Working paper, paras. 21-22. There also appears to be confusion within the treaty 
bodies themselves, see, for example, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2007/5 (2007), paras. 4-6. 
176 Imbert, ‘Reservations to the ECHR Before the Strasbourg Commission’, 589. 




opposition surrounding the investing of treaty bodies with the competency to 
determine the validity of reservations generally falls into one of the following 
categories: outright opposition based on state sovereignty arguments or positions 
based on the incoherence of the Vienna Convention system on the whole and the lack 
of guidance for reconciling state and treaty body views. 
Some question the idea that treaty bodies might have the final word on the 
validity of reservations and instead view them as mainly a repository for periodic 
reports.178 The US and UK have expressed absolute opposition to treaty bodies and 
their determinative function with respect to reservations.179 The most telling 
opposition to this idea, however, is evident in the lack of acknowledgement or action 
on the part of states once a treaty body indicates its opposition to a reservation as 
well as the large number of invalid reservations that remain attached to the core 
treaties. 
Another argument made against treaty bodies determining the validity of 
reservations is that by allowing them to review the validity of reservations years after 
ratification prejudices states which ratified in the early days of a convention without 
the benefit of time to better research the impact of a well-defined reservation.180 This 
argument may also be deflected by looking to the regional systems and their 
approach to reservations which have been ruled as impermissible. The positive 
aspect of the flexibility found in the Vienna Convetion is that it allows for the 
evolution of the law. This concept is reflected in Article 31(3)(b) where subsequent 
practice accepted by the parties is acknowledged as a tool of treaty interpretation. As 
human rights norms become more engrained in the mainstream international legal 
project it is logical to assume that reservations made in the early days of core human 
rights treaties will have lost their original purpose. 
It has been questioned whether interpretation necessarily implies competency 
to determine the validity of reservations. Attempting to draw a parallel between 
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domestic courts and the plausibility of international organs to assess the validity of 
reservations, Imbert claims that ‘[o]ne need only think of domestic judges who are 
often required to interpret texts without being competent to determine their 
validity.’181 This parallel is ill-conceived. Unlike domestic courts, the treaty bodies 
under discussion here are specifically invested with the power to monitor the treaties. 
Due to the flexibility inherent in the core human rights treaties, measuring adherence 
to treaty obligations is highly dependent on interpr tation of both the treaty and its 
implementation in the state. 
Swain suggests that it is the failure of the treaty bodies to develop an 
objective test for the object and purpose of a treaty that has led to confusion.182 This 
seems a banal argument as there is no compelling reason why the treaty bodies 
should develop a further test to apply a test, albeit a vague one, when there is ample 
evidence that despite its ambiguities, the object and purpose test can be successfully 
applied to determine reservation validity. The point f having a supervisory body in 
place to monitor and interpret treaty compliance is that all manifestations for 
implementing, or in the case of certain reservations failing to implement, treaty 
obligations must be examined outwith the state to state relationship. States 
individually opting for either the permissibility approach or opposability approach as 
an effect based on an objection to a reservation has no bearing on the fulfilment of 
human rights treaty obligations. It is fair enough to say that invalidly formulated 
reservations are impermissible and void ab initio but, as discussed in Chapters Three 
and Five,183 one would assume that states would not purposefully ormulate an 
impermissible reservation triggering a response that would prevent it from becoming 
a party to the treaty. Because the permissibility and opposability practices neither 
square nor solve the issue of the impermissible resrvation, the natural legal step 
would be to have the reservation evaluated by a designated mechanism that would 
not only determine validity but also pronounce on the legal effect of the reservation. 
It is a failure of both the permissibility and opposability approaches that neither 
designates a consequence and thus leave invalid reservations hanging in the balance. 
                                               
181 Imbert, ‘Reservations to the ECHR Before the Strasbourg Commission’, 584. Imbert was 
specifically referring to the European Commission on Human Rights in this instance.  
182 E.T. Swaine, ‘Reserving’ (2006) 31 Yale Journal of International Law 307, 317. 
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As many point out, an important purpose of the treaty bodies has always been 
and remains to open and maintain a human rights dialogue with states.184 However, it 
has been suggested that treaty bodies ‘play down’ their constructive dialogue 
approach when carrying out their remits and instead indicate stronger disapproval of 
a state’s behaviour.185 Whether discussing reservations in the context of periodic 
reports or determining validity in the course of reviewing an individual 
communication, treaty body competence to address reervations has yet to gain 
universal appeal though time appears to be on the side of the treaty bodies. 
 
4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
International human rights law and the competencies of the human rights treaty 
bodies are evolving to meet the demands of an expanding and inter-connected world 
society. The non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties coupled with the 
ambiguities of the Vienna Convention reservations rules necessitate resort to a 
review mechanism other than the state-policing objection system developed in 
conjunction with the Vienna Convention. The eighteen-y ar ILC study, the work of 
the treaty bodies, comments from observers and, to some extent, the acquiescence of 
states point to the treaty bodies as competent arbiters of the validity of reservations. 
What is less certain is the legal effect of a determination that a reservation is invalid, 
but this also appears to be the case for states in the context of reservations to human 
rights treaties.  
If treaty bodies are to serve their intended purpose, to interpret a treaty in 
order to monitor state parties, then the competency to determine the validity of 
reservations pertinent to the obligations must come within their purview. In the 
course of monitoring periodic reports states have accepted that treaty bodies will 
address reservations as is clearly evidenced by the stat -treaty body dialogues that 
have been taking place during last two decades. The Vienna Convention recognises 
that any instrument incidental to the conclusion of a treaty that is accepted by state 
                                               
184 See discussions by M. Scheinin, ‘International Mechanisms and Procedures for Monitoring’ in C. 
Krause and M. Scheinin (eds.) International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (Åbo Akademi 
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parties may be employed to interpret a treaty (Article 31(2)(b)). A reservation, by 
definition, squarely falls into this category as a ‘unilateral statement, however 
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or 
acceding to a treaty…’ (Article 2(1)(d)). The ambiguous nature of many reservations 
(discussed in Chapter Three) necessitates interpretation of the reservation in order to 
determine the obligations accepted by the reserving state. Furthermore, state practice 
recognises, or at the very least has acquiesced to, this function of the treaty bodies.186 
This point invokes another aspect of the Vienna Convention regarding treaty 
interpretation which recognises any subsequent practice in the application of a treaty 
to which the parties agree regarding its interpretation as a tool of interpretation 
(Article 31(3)(b)). State practice of engaging with the treaty bodies in the course of 
the periodic reporting process signifies acceptance of the determinative function of 
treaty bodies, albeit tacitly in most instances. As noted by Boerefijn, ‘[d]etermining 
the validity of reservations and attaching consequences to this finding is perfectly in 
line with other developments in the monitoring machinery.’187 Interpreting treaty 
obligations and the fulfilment of those obligations is part and parcel of every 
monitoring role recognised under the treaty body remits and, therefore, the 
determinative function extends to each of these whether reviewing a periodic report, 
commencing a procedure of inquiry or assessing an individual communication. 
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The international human rights system has evolved in many ways not contemplated 
at its inception. The most obvious evidence of thisevolution is the proliferation of 
core UN human rights treaties. Human rights treaties are designed to create tangible, 
legally enforceable human rights. In order to realise the full potential of this 
endeavour, the ambiguities resulting from invalid reservations must be 
acknowledged and a course of action taken to redress the normative gaps that result 
when the Vienna Convention reservations rules are applied to evaluate reservations 
to human rights treaties.  
 Using the core UN human rights treaties as a case study this research 
highlights that the past thirty years have revealed  practical impasse in treaty law 
when the default reservation rules are relied upon to regulate reservations to human 
rights treaties. Reservations of questionable validity gain the same status as valid 
reservations because the Vienna Convention rules do not address the consequence for 
a reservation determined to be invalid outwith the traditional inter se application of 
the reservation between the reserving and objecting s ates, which is not logical in the 
context of a human rights treaty.  
  States have a duty under international law to ensure that their domestic laws 
are consistent with their international obligations pursuant to both customary 
international law and treaty law. This includes incorporating into domestic law the 
norms established by the human rights treaties to which a state may be a party and 
often involves implementing changes to laws through legislative action or a change 
to administrative procedures.1 As well as ensuring obligation-appropriate minimum 
standards reflected in the treaties there must also be effective review and remedy 
procedures in place on the domestic level. Providing adequate and nonbiased review 
and remedy for breaches of these obligations is a fundamental aspect of all human 
rights treaties. Effectively, the onus lies on the state party to ensure that at a 
minimum domestic law ensures the same level of human rights protection as the 
                                               
1 General Comment No. 34, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.5 (2011), para. 7. 
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obligations they have accepted under international law both in the context of 
prevention and victim access to a remedy. 
 Reservations allow states to avoid taking on particular obligations under a 
treaty by unilaterally modifying the agreement which exculpates states from bringing 
domestic law into conformity with a treaty in its entirety. This practice is fraught 
with disparate views about the potential undermining effect it has both on the subject 
treaties and the international legal project as well as more practical debates about the 
technical legal effects of these exercises of state sov reignty. The unilateral nature of 
reservations is the one element that seems to achieve consensus among observers,2 a 
characteristic that rears its head time and again in the reservations debate. As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, reservations are often a highly political 
practice at the very least but they also represent the substantive constraints of many 
governments in their ability to effect change on the domestic level. This phenomenon 
has led reservations to be viewed as akin to a ‘tax on treaty integrity’3.  
From a practical standpoint, reservations provide a gre t deal of insight into a 
state’s true commitment to advancing the human rights agenda and information on 
the impact of reservations can only serve to allow a better grasp of the state of 
domestic human rights protections.4 Though at the outset of this thesis it was made 
clear that the reason why states make reservations w uld not be taken up in this 
analysis, it is worth noting that the potential reasons cover a broad spectrum of 
concerns ranging from internal politics to economic impossibility. Some reservations 
represent a complete failure to bring domestic laws into conformity with treaty 
obligations in the run up to ratification while others reflect a state’s unwillingness to 
enter into treaty relations with another state. Additional reasons why states may not 
be able to fully adhere to the articles of a treaty include the fact that the internal 
governmental system is disrupted, such as with a post-conflict state or because of the 
nefarious nature of the government in charge. It must also be acknowledged that 
there are certain obligations in human rights treaties hat would entail significant 
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monetary expenditures,5 thus allowing reservations to account for the gradual 
implementation of expensive changes to domestic systems is a legitimate use of a 
reservation.6 Complete compliance may also be prevented due to afunctioning 
governmental system, such as the United States, which, as demonstrated, often 
makes reservations pursuant to the restrictions imposed upon the legislative branch 
by its Constitution.7 
As a default regime, the Vienna Convention is designed to operate only in the 
absence of treaty-specific reservations regime. Clearly a treaty-specific regime is the 
ideal solution for addressing the legal effect and consequences of invalid reservations 
yet the inherently political process of treaty negotiation has yet to bow to this 
solution. CERD is the only core human rights treaty to have advanced a treaty-
specific reservations regime and that regime has proved untenable. The ‘collegiate’ 
solution to reservation evaluation set forth in CERD Article 20 seems to have failed 
for a multitude of reasons,8 not the least that the nature of the human rights treaty 
lends itself to ineffective application of the reservations rules. If the process of 
negotiating a treaty does not facilitate the adoption of a treaty-specific regime then a 
more nuanced approach to human rights treaty reservations could assuage the 
ambiguity presented by the Vienna Convention reservations regime.    
As noted in the introduction, the issue of reservations has been widely 
acknowledged as one of the most difficult to resolve in international treaty law. 
However, the strength of the law of treaties is its extreme flexibility and the fact that 
it can accommodate departures from normal practice providing there is a good reason 
                                               
5 J. McBride, ‘Reservations and the Capacity to Implement Human Rights Treaties’ in J.P. Gardner 
(ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections 
to Human Rights Conventions (BIICL, London 1997), p. 128. For example, the positive obligations 
pointed out by the ESCR Committee in General Comment No. 13, the Right to Education (Art. 13), 
UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), p. 63, para. 6, esp cially, and HRC, General Comment No. 20, 
Prohibition of Torture, etc. (Art. 7), UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), p. 200, paras. 10, 14, 
especially, are expensive and might require the creation of a completely new infrastructure. 
6 See, generally, discussion in McBride, ‘Reservations and the Capacity to Implement Human Rights 
Treaties’, pp.136-45 noting that in practice lack of resources is rarely given as the reason for a 
reservation 
7 Recall discussion in Chapters 3 and 5. For an overview of the US position see, for example, S. Grant, 
‘The United States and the International Human Rights Treaty System: For Export Only’ in P. Alston 
and J. Crawford (eds.), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (CUP, Cambridge 2000), 
pp. 317-29; D.P. Stewart, ‘U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The 
Significance of the Reservations, Understanding and Declarations’ (1993) 14 Human Rights Law 
Journal 77. 
8 Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Report of the working group on reservations, UN Doc. 
HRI/MC/2007/5 (2007), paras. 4-6. 
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for departure and it is done with the full knowledg and implications of such a 
departure.9  
 
1 THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
The 1951 Genocide Opinion introduced the concept of a tiered system of rights. The 
attendant test for determining into which category a right fell was the object and 
purpose test. The object and purpose test overturned the long-standing international 
practice requiring unanimous consent to reservations. This legacy was ultimately 
included in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and today remains 
the sole method of determining reservation permissibility in the absence of a treaty-
specific reservations regime. 
 The validity of the residual reservations regime of the Vienna Convention is 
challenged in several ways when applied to human rights treaties. Human rights 
treaties are comprised of a wide variety of rights and each category of rights 
protected throws up questions as to whether limitations or suspensions are possible. 
Initially there are numerous types of reservations which negatively impact human 
rights treaties. As examined in Chapter Three, in addition to clearly invalid 
reservations, sweeping reservations and reservations which subordinate treaty 
obligations to domestic law are most often deemed inval d due to the uncertain 
impact these reservations have on the reserving state’s obligations. Numerous 
reservations to a treaty also flag up the unwillingness of a state to actually implement 
a human rights treaty to which it has agreed. The current catalogue of reservations 
attached to the core UN human rights treaties suggests an indeterminable maze of 
obligations rather than a coherent system of protecti n. Due to the potentially far-
reaching scope of the most common types of reservations o human rights treaties, 
the Vienna Convention reservations rules are employed as an attempt to keep these 
reservations in check.  
 As examined in Chapter Four, states have slowly begun to take up the role of 
policing reservations through the objection system outlined in Vienna Convention 
Article 21. Though Article 21 technically appears to only apply to valid reservations, 
states have developed a practice of objecting to invalid reservations using this 
                                               
9 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2d ed. (CUP, Cambridge 2007), p. 16. 
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vehicle. Because the Vienna Convention rules operate f om an assumption that states 
will only formulate valid reservations the rules fail to outline the legal effect when a 
state objects on the basis of invalidity. As state objections to invalid reservations 
have increased over the past fifteen years, an obvious lacuna has become evident in 
the application of the residual regime to human rights treaties. The state-to-state 
‘remedy’ envisioned by the Vienna Convention objection system only outlines the 
legal effect of a valid reservation between the reserving and the objecting state. This 
outcome has no impact upon other state parties to a non-reciprocal obligation treaty, 
thus there is little incentive to object. Because th  obligations in human rights treaty 
are not reciprocal, the state-to-state modification of treaty relations is ineffective and 
has no bearing on the relationship that these treaties re designed to protect, the state-
to-human being relationship. Furthermore, when a non-reserving state objects on the 
basis of invalidity, there is no consequence defined by the Vienna Convention and no 
rule of customary international law mandates that te reserving state withdraw its 
invalid reservation. The continued existence of an invalid reservation contributes to 
the inability of states and rights-holders to asses xactly to which norms the 
reserving state has agreed. 
 While the Vienna Convention state-policing system has not yielded clearly 
defined legal effects or consequences for an invalid reservation, it is clear that the 
reservation/objection interaction serves an important communicative value. 
Objections to particular types of reservations or to reservations against particular 
rights enriches the international community’s understanding of human rights by 
helping to define rights in a way that transcends natio al borders. This serves to aid 
the recognition of rights as customary norms in addition to their recognition as treaty 
rights. This evolution of rights underpins the inter ational human rights system and 
is integral to the continued progress of rights-based governance.  
In some instances the reservation review deficit in the human rights system 
has been remedied by international tribunals exercising their competence to 
determine the validity of reservations. The ICJ, the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have each reviewed the validity of 
reservations at some point albeit often in a cursory fashion and most often simply to 
determine claim admissibility. In applying the residual rules, international tribunals 
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have reiterated the unique characteristics of human rights treaties in that they do not 
contain reciprocal obligations enforceable between state parties but instead 
enumerate the rights and obligations owed to third parties, human beings. This 
specific characteristic is that which curtails the effective execution of the state-
focused, self-policing rules flowing from the Vienna Convention reservations 
regime. The drawback to relying on international tribunals to evaluate the validity of 
reservations is that review can only take place if the organ has competency to 
evaluate a dispute either based on automatic or consent-based jurisdiction and rarely 
do states take action on the issue of an invalid reservation outwith the objection 
system. The purpose of Chapter Four was to highlight that both states and 
international tribunals have effectively applied the Vienna Convention rules 
successfully to determine the validity of reservations. The overarching problem, 
however, is that there is no definitive final arbiter unless the reservation is reviewed 
by a competent dispute settlement mechanism capable of d fining the legal effect 
and consequence of an invalidity determination. 
 The flexibility of the default reservations regime points to the necessity to 
reconsider the adequacy of the Vienna Convention rules. Chapter Five analysed the 
Vienna Convention reservations regime in order to assess whether it could 
adequately govern reservations to human rights treaties in light of the normative 
ambiguity evidenced by the core UN human rights treaties. The undefined object and 
purpose test is the initial challenge of the reservations regime which is reflected by 
the disparate treatment of problematic reservations by state parties to the core 
treaties. The second challenge is the lack of defined legal effect for an invalid 
reservation, particularly in the context of the state objection system. The final 
challenge of the Vienna Convention regime is its failure to specify a consequence for 
an invalid reservation. 
 Despite the inherent difficulty of applying the subjective object and purpose 
test, states have proven that they can and are willing to apply the test to determine the 
validity of a reservation. Unfortunately, due to the lack of guidance on legal effect 
and the consequence of an invalid reservation, non-reserving states’ views on 
reservations validity are largely ignored by reserving states. The doctrines of 
permissibility and opposability are clearly inadequate to resolve the issue of legal 
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effect of invalid reservation to human rights treati s because these doctrines 
singularly govern state-to-state relationships. TheILC asserts nullity and severance 
as the legal effect and consequence when a reservation is determined invalid, 
however, in practice there remains resistance to these concepts especially in the state-
to-state relationships created in the course of accepting and objecting to reservations. 
States that have formulated invalid reservations continue to maintain the validity of 
their reservations because there is no definitive rul enunciating at what point the 
validity of a reservation can no longer be in doubt. Even objections purporting to 
sever the incompatible reservations have little consequence for the reserving state as 
never has an objecting state pursued the sole issueof an invalid reservation in an 
international tribunal in order to establish a concrete consequence, as noted above. 
The increased recognition of severability as the remedy for invalidity is a 
boon to the human rights system as a whole, though its actual impact is limited in the 
state-to-state context as states do not enjoy reciprocal rights and obligations under 
the core human rights treaties. The state-to-human being relationship is that which is 
affected yet this relationship is not recognised uner the Vienna Convention. This 
situation illuminates the ineffectiveness of the Vinna Convention system to produce 
a tangible legal effect or consequence in response to an invalid reservation.   
While the Vienna Convention regime may not be complete, the flexibility of 
the system and the recognition that the tools for interpreting a treaty might expand 
(Article 31) suggest that progressive practices have the potential to better guide the 
effects of invalid reservations to human rights trea ies. The ambiguities of the Vienna 
Convention reservations regime could be more appropriately attended if an organ 
outwith the state were designated to provide a final view on the validity of a 
reservation. The core UN human rights treaties are uniquely situated to designate a 
competent reservation review mechanism in light of he treaty-specific supervisory 
mechanisms which already play a central role in monitori g treaty implementation 
by state parties. Therefore, while it is clear that t e Vienna Convention reservations 
regime can adequately regulate reservations to human rights treaties, this conclusion 
is only correct as long as the specific nature of human rights treaties, including their 
content and availability of monitoring mechanisms, is fully taken into account and a 
final arbiter on reservation validity is designated.  
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2 TREATY BODIES AS ASSESSORS OF RESERVATION VALIDITY   
International law and human rights law in particular are evolving to meet the 
demands of today’s world society. The competencies of the human rights treaty 
bodies have simultaneously been expanding in response to the paradigm shifts in the 
international community which sees human rights permeating all aspects of 
international and, arguably, domestic governance. The lacunae in the Vienna 
Convention reservations rules coupled with the non-reciprocal nature of human 
rights treaties necessitates resort to a review mechanism other than the state-policing 
objection system developed in conjunction with the Vienna Convention. The 
eighteen-year ILC study, the work of the treaty bodies, comments from observers 
and, to some extent, the acquiescence of states point t  the treaty bodies as 
competent arbiters of the validity of reservations.  
In order to serve their intended purpose, to interpret a treaty in order to 
monitor state parties, treaty bodies must be recognised as competent to serve in a 
determinative capacity so that the issue of invalid reservations can be fully 
addressed. Most states accept that treaty bodies will address reservations in the 
course of reviewing periodic reports as is clearly evidenced by the state-treaty body 
dialogues that have been taking place during last two decades. All indicators suggest 
that the treaty bodies are willing to exercise thiscapacity in relation to each of their 
monitoring functions.  
The Vienna Convention recognises that any instrument incidental to the 
conclusion of a treaty that is accepted by state parties may be employed to interpret a 
treaty (Article 31(2)(b)). A reservation, by definit on, squarely falls into this category 
thus treaty body interpretation of reservations seems a natural part of interpreting 
states’ obligations under a treaty. State practice re ognises, or at the very least has 
acquiesced to, this exercise by the treaty bodies. Vi nna Convention Article 31(3)(b) 
also recognises any subsequent practice in the applic tion of a treaty to which the 
parties agree regarding its interpretation can be used as a tool of interpretation. State 
practice of engaging with the treaty bodies in the course of the periodic reporting 
process signifies acceptance of the treaty-body driven reservations dialogue, albeit 
tacitly in most instances.  
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What is less clear is the effect a determination of invalidity by a treaty body 
will have. The lack of outcry from ICCPR State Parties (other than by Trinidad and 
Tobago) following the HRC decision in the Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago 
case suggests that the competence of the treaty bodies to determine a legal effect and 
consequence is not entirely unexpected by states. Interpreting treaty obligations and 
the fulfilment of those obligations is part and parcel of every monitoring role 
recognised under the treaty body remits and, therefore, the determinative function 
should extend to each of these whether it be reviewing a periodic report, 
commencing a procedure of inquiry or assessing an individual communication. 
Periodic report monitoring and concluding observations, issuing general comments 
and reviewing individual communications all play to the strengths of the treaty 
bodies which include their specific knowledge of the treaty obligations and their 
ability to create human rights dialogues with State Parties. Though the opinions, 
comments and statements issued by treaty bodies are not binding and generally 
viewed as forms of soft law, these products are increasingly being referenced in a 
range of courts and are available to examine by anyone with internet access.   
Treaty bodies must take advantage of the developments in reservations law, 
particularly those set forth in the ILC Finalized Guidelines. Exercising the 
determinative function and further developing their monitoring roles requires that 
they be very clear about the impermissibility of a reservation rather than resort to 
vague terms that are inconclusive as to the validity and legal effect of a reservation. 
More stringent pronouncements using the language of invalidity or impermissibility 
would better serve the ultimate goal—withdrawal—rather than perpetuate a stagnant 
reservation as has been the case for many arguably invalid reservations to the core 
human rights treaties. The strength of a clearly defined, convention-based opinion on 
impermissibility is that it provides an uncompromising view on the shortcomings of 
the reservation, a view that may be relied upon by those working to embed rights-
based governance. Failure to clearly invoke the langu ge of impermissibility has 
been a weakness of the treaty bodies, yet it can be viewed as a valuable step in the 
evolution of the determinative function and, more importantly, for the goal of 
bringing States on board; the heretofore measured appro ch to invalidity 
determinations reflects an awareness that rampaging like a rogue elephant with 
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unrestrained authority posturing would do more harm than good in the pursuit of 
encouraging global human rights. However, the time has come for the treaty bodies 
to collectively and unambiguously develop and entrench their views on reservation 
validity. It is only with clear guidance from the treaty bodies that states, human rights 
advocates and rights-holders can continue to progress the human rights project as the 
treaty bodies are solely responsible for ensuring that he core human rights treaty 
obligations are realised by states parties. 
 
3 FINAL REMARKS   
For many years there has been a lack of impetus to redress the problems with the 
Vienna Convention rules. The ILC and treaty body efforts, as well as objection 
activity on the part of states, indicate that the age of apathy has passed. There 
currently exists a palpable disparity between the ‘indivisible and inter-related’ 
obligations undertaken by states at the internationl level. As noted by Navi Pillay, 
‘We need to close the gap between rhetoric and good intent on the one hand, and 
measurable results on the other.’10 More nuanced approaches to evaluating 
reservations must be articulated to fill the normative gaps that exist when applying 
the Vienna Convention residual reservations rules to human rights treaties.  
The Vienna Convention’s underlying misconceptions regarding the power of 
an objection as well as the automatic nullification f an invalid reservation are 
particularly ill-suited to provide normative clarity for treaties formed of non-
reciprocal obligations as they do not involve the assumption of duties or obligations 
between states thus objecting states suffer no detriment as a result of a hanging 
reservation. Reservations to human rights treaties elicit even further challenges in 
light of the rights protected by these non-reciprocal, norm-creating treaties. 
There is tension over who decides whether reservations are compatible: 
states, international tribunals or treaty bodies. Unlike the Vienna Convention regime 
which has enabled states to evaluate reservations as a residual measure, international 
tribunals and supervisory mechanisms set up specifically by human rights treaties 
                                               
10 N. Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Introduction of the Annual 
Report at the 16th session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva, 3 Mar. 2011, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10794&LangID=E 
<accessed 30 Aug. 2011>. 
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have been steadfast in their recognition of the non-reciprocal nature of human rights 
treaties and the types of rights subjected to reservations. Unfortunately, the 
opportunity for tribunals to review reservations is curtailed by jurisdictional 
limitations and apathy on the part of states to pursue claims based on invalid 
reservations. Unlike tribunals, whether domestic or international in nature, treaty 
bodies are the natural offspring of treaties and thus, with the treaty-appropriate 
consent of the state parties, are the institutions of governance to which state parties 
have assented. These mechanisms offer viable and preferable alternative mechanisms 
of reservation review that can help normalise the treatment of reservations and 
establish the legal effects of invalid reservations. It is therefore essential that treaty 
bodies be recognised as competent to assess the validity of reservations.    
As indicated by the President of the Human Rights Council at the adoption of 
the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,  
 
…humanity today no longer lacks the human rights instruments to 
promote, protect and defend human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
However, what is sorely needed is for State parties to existing human 
rights instruments to take the practical steps necessary to implement 
their provisions for the benefit of all mankind.11   
 
The human rights treaty bodies were created by states upon ratifying the international 
treaties which constitute the corpus of state parties’ obligations to the common man. 
Their roles are defined by the treaty texts as adopted by state parties yet they have 
evolved alongside international human rights law. As bodies of experts they are 
better placed to concentrate their deliberations in the language of the rights embodied 
in their respective treaties. Both public opinion and state opinion are increasingly 
supportive of an integrated and indivisible human rights regime. The role of treaty 
bodies in reviewing periodic reports and individual communications pursuant to their 
respective treaties has manifestly supported the increased, albeit incremental, 
recognition of human rights which is evident not only i  the increased acceptance of 
these bodies by states but also the recognition of their opinions as soft law. Their 
determinative role is mutually reinforcing when considered as both a counterpoint 
                                               
11 M.I. Uhomoibh, President of the Human Rights Council, Statement to the UN General Assembly at 
its 65th plenary meeting.  UN Doc. A/63/PV.65 (2008). 
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and concurrent mechanism of interpretation in conjunction with states and courts in 
the assessment of reservation validity.  
Recognising the competency of the treaty bodies to interpret human rights 
obligations is an essential step toward providing the impetus for states on the 
periphery of the human rights regime to take the gradual steps toward joining the 
majority of the civilisations of the world in fulfiling their UN human rights treaty 
obligations. Considerations of treaty integrity demand that the treaty bodies be 
recognised as reservation monitors as they are the key to ensuring effective 
implementation across all states for which a treaty is in force. The realities of state 
reservation practice, limitations on the courts andthe special position of the treaty 
bodies culminate to underline the importance of human rights treaty bodies as 
mechanisms of review in the international human rights system.  
The opportunity to improve the law surrounding resevations to human rights 
treaties has not passed. If the Vienna Convention reservations rules are the rules to be 
applied to evaluate reservations to all types of treaties, the special nature of human 
rights treaties must inform their execution when applied to those treaties. The 
absence of a defined legal effect or consequence for an invalid reservation to a 
human rights treaty could be easily addressed if the treaty bodies are recognised as 
competent to not only determine the validity of a reservation but also to steer a ruling 
of invalidity toward a concrete consequence based on a determined legal effect.  So, 
too, must the treaty bodies be willing to take thisauthoritative step. They must work 
to provide clearly defined determinations of reservation validity using the stringent 
language of determination. Consistent application of the normative vocabulary 
indicative of impermissibility and invalidity will provide unambiguous guidance on 
reservations and the extent to which human rights obligations are altered by such. 
Perhaps it is only now that a new tipping-point regarding reservations has been 
reached. Perhaps now, too, the international community will react by recognising 
that the ambiguities in the Vienna Convention can be checked by allowing the human 
rights treaty bodies to serve the purpose for which they were created. This work set 
out to analyse the lacunae in the Vienna Convention reservations rules and to assess 
the opportunity for the treaty bodies to correct the normative deficit resulting from 
the application of the reservation rules to human rights treaties and, thereby, provide 
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an end to the incoherent story of reservations to human rights treaties that has 
unfolded over the last sixty years. 
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ABBREVIATIONS  
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights 
CAT Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women 
CERD Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
COE  Council of Europe 
CRC  Convention on the Rights of the Child 
CRPD  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
ECommHR European Commission on Human Rights 
ECOSOC UN Economic and Social Council 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
HRC  Human Rights Committee 
HRCouncil Human Rights Council 
IACommHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICED International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
ICRMW International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers’ and their 
Families 
ILC International Law Commission 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
NGO Non-governmental Organisation 
OHCHR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
UDHR  Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
UN   United Nations 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council 
UPR  Universal Periodic Review 
 
TREATY BODIES ATTACHED TO HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS - SHORT FORM  
CAT  CAT Committee 
CEDAW CEDAW Committee 
CERD  CERD Committee 
CRC  Children’s Committee 
CRPD  Disabilities Committee 
ICCPR  Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
ICED  ICED Committee 
ICESCR ESCR Committee 
ICRMW Migrants Committee 
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ANNEX  I 
 
DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.117 and Add.1 (1966) 
 
Section 2: Reservations to multilateral treaties 
 
Article 18 – Formulation of reservations 
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, 
formulate a reservation unless: 
(a) The reservations is prohibited by the treaty; 
(b) The treaty authorizes specified reservations which do not include the 
reservation in question; or 
(c) In cases where the treaty contains no provisions regarding reservations, 
the reservation is incompatible with the object andpurpose of the treaty. 
 
Article 19 – Acceptance of an objection to reservations 
1.  A reservation expressly or impliedly authorized by the treaty does not require any 
subsequent acceptance by the other contraction States unless the treaty so provides. 
2.  When it appears form the limited number of negotiating States and the object and 
purpose of the treat that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the 
parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound, a reservation 
requires acceptance by all the parties. 
3.  When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization, the 
reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization, 
unless the treaty otherwise provides. 
4.  In cases not falling under the preceding paragrphs of this article: 
(a) Acceptance by another contracting State of the res rvation constitutes the 
reserving State a party to the treaty in relation t that State if or when the 
treaty is in force; 
(b) An objection by another contacting State to a rese vation precludes the 
entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States 
unless a contrary intention is expressed by the objcting State; 
(c) An act expressing the State’s consent to be bound by the treaty and 
containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting 
State has accepted the reservation. 
5.  For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 a reservation is considered to have been 
accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of 
a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on 
which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later. 
 
Article 20 – Procedure regarding reservations 
1.  A reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation, and an objection to a 
reservation must be formulated in writing and communicated to the other States 
entitled to become parties to the treaty. 
2.  If formulated on the occasion of the adoption of the text or upon signing the treaty 
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, a reservation must be formally  
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confirmed by the reserving State when expressing its consent to be bound by the 
treaty. In such a case the reservation shall be considered as having been made on the 
date of its confirmation. 
3.  An objection to the reservation made previously to its confirmation does not itself 
require confirmation.8 
 
Article 21 – Legal effects of reservations 
1.  A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 
18, 19 and 20: 
(a) Modifies for the reserving State the provisions f the treaty to which the 
reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and 
(b) Modifies those provisions to the same extent for such other party in its 
relations with the reserving State. 
2.  The reservation does not modify the provisions f the treaty for the other parties 
to the treaty inter se. 
3.  When a State objecting to a reservation agrees to consider the treaty in force 
between itself and the reserving State, the provisins to which the reservation relates 
do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation. 
 
Article 22 – Withdrawal of reservations 
1.  Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation may be withdrawn at any time 
and the consent of a State which has accepted the reservation is not required for its 
withdrawal. 
2.  Unless the treaty otherwise provides or it is otherwise agreed, the withdrawal 
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ANNEX  II 
 
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969 
 
ARTICLES ON RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES 
 
Article 19 -- Formulation of reservations 
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, 
formulate a reservation unless:  
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty; 
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include 
the reservation in question, may be made; or 
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. 
  
Article 20 -- Acceptance of and objection to reservations 
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent 
acceptance by the other contracting States unless th  treaty so provides. 
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object 
and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the 
parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, 
a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties. 
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and 
unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires th  acceptance of the competent 
organ of that organization. 
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise 
provides: 
(a) acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the 
reserving State a party to the treaty in relation t that other State if or when 
the treaty is in force for those States; 
(b) an objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not 
preclude the entry into force of the treaty as betwe n the objecting and 
reserving States unless a contrary intention is definit ly expressed by the 
objecting State; 
(c) an act expressing a State’s consent to be bound by the treaty and 
containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting 
State has accepted the reservation. 
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless th  treaty otherwise provides, a 
reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no 
objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was 
notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be 
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Article 21 -- Legal effects of reservations and of objections to reservations 
1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 
19, 20 and 23: 
(a) modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other party the 
provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the 
reservation; and 
(b) modifies those provisions to the same extent for hat other party in its 
relations with the reserving State.  
2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to 
the treaty inter se.  
3. When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the 
treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation 
relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation. 
 
Article 22 – Withdrawal of reservations and of to objections to reservations  
1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation may be withdrawn at any 
time and the consent of a State which has accepted the reservation is not required for 
its withdrawal.  
2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, an objection to a reservation may be 
withdrawn at any time. 
3. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, or it is otherwise agreed: 
(a) the withdrawal of a reservation becomes operative in relation to another 
contracting State only when notice of it has been rceived by that State; 
(b) the withdrawal of an objection to a reservation becomes operative only 
when notice of it has been received by the State which formulated the 
reservation. 
 
Article 23 -- Procedure regarding reservations 
1. A reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation and an objection to a 
reservation must be formulated in writing and communicated to the contracting 
States and other States entitled to become parties to the treaty. 
2. If formulated when signing the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or 
approval, a reservation must be formally confirmed by the reserving State when 
expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty. In such a case the reservation shall 
be considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation. 
3. An express acceptance of, or an objection to, a reservation made previously to 
confirmation of the reservation does not itself require confirmation.  
4. The withdrawal of a reservation or of an objection to a reservation must be 
formulated in writing. 
 




QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE TOPIC OF RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES 
ADDRESSED TO STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OR OF A 
SPECIALIZED AGENCY OR PARTIES TO THE ICJ STATUTE 
Annex II of the Second Report on Reservations to Treaties by A. Pellet 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/478 (1996), pp. 98-106. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Period covered in principle by replies: 19..–19.. 452 
 
I. Formulation and withdrawal of reservations 
1.1  How many multilateral treaties has the State become party to during the 
period under consideration? 
1.2  How many of these treaties have been the subject of reservations by the 
State? (Please list the treaties and attach the text of the reservations) 
1.3  Which of the treaties to which the reservations apply contain provisions 
concerning reservations? (Please list the treaties nd, if possible, attach the text of the 
relevant provisions) 
1.4  Has the State formulated reservations to bilateral reaties? (Please list the 
treaties and attach the text of the reservations) 
1.5  What were the reasons for each of the reservations mentioned in the replies to 
questions 1.2 and 1.4: 
I i (i) Political considerations? Were such considerations internal or 
international in nature? 
i(ii) Desire to maintain the application of the national rules currently in force? 
(iii) Doubts about the soundness of the provision to which the reservation 
refers? 
(iv) Other reasons? 
1.6  Were or are some or all the State’s reservations f rmulated for a specific 
period of time? 
1.6.1  If so, what was/were the reason/reasons for pecifying that period of time? 
1.6.2  If not, has the State withdrawn or modified some reservations? (Please attach 
the text of the documents notifying the withdrawals) 
1.6.2.1 If so, 
I (i) What period of time elapsed between the State’s expression of consent to 
be bound and the withdrawal? 
(ii) What was/were the reason/reasons?  
1.7  At the internal level, which authority or authorities decide(s) that the State 
will formulate a reservation: 
– The Head of State? 
   
 266 
– The Government or a government body? 
– The parliament? 
1.7.1  If it is not always the same authority which has competence to decide that a 
reservation will be formulated, on what criteria is this competence based? 
1.7.2  If the decision is taken by the Executive, is the parliament informed of the 
decision? A priori or a posteriori? Invited to discu s the text of the intended 
reservation(s)? 
1.8  Is it possible for a national judicial body to oppose or insist on the 
formulation of certain reservations? 
1.8.1  If so, which authority and how is it seized of the matter? 
1.8.2  What reason(s) can it invoke in taking such a decision? (Where appropriate, 
please attach the relevant decisions) 
1.9  Do reservations appear in an official national publication? 
1.9.1  If this publication is not issued on a regular basis, what are the criteria for its 
issuance? 
1.10  Of the reservations mentioned in the replies to questions 1.2 and 1.4, which 
were formulated: 
– At the time when the treaty was signed? 
– At the time when definitive consent to be bound was expressed? 
– After the treaty entered into force with respect to the State? If so, according 
to which procedure? 
1.10.1 Was the timing of the formulation of the reservations based on any particular 
considerations? If so, what considerations? 
1.10.2 If reservations were formulated at the time wh n the treaty was signed, were 
they formally confirmed when the State expressed its efinitive consent to be bound? 
If so, which reservations? 
1.10.2.1 If not, does the State consider that the foundation of those reservations was 
valid? 
 
II. ACCEPTANCE OF RESERVATIONS AND OBJECTIONS TO 
RESERVATIONS, EFFECTS OF RESERVATIONS 
2.1  Acceptance of reservations formulated by the State and objections to those 
reservations 
2.1.1  Have any of the reservations mentioned in the replies to questions 1.2 and 1.4 
been formally accepted? (Please list the reservations and attach the text of the 
acceptances) 
2.1.2  Have objections been made to any of the reservations mentioned in the 
replies to questions 1.2 and 1.4? (Please list the res rvations and attach the text of the 
objections) 
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2.1.2.1 If so, have the objecting States or internatio l organizations expressed the 
intention that the objection should preclude the entry i to force of the treaty between 
the author of the objection and the reserving State? 
2.1.3  If there have been formal acceptances of or bjections to the reservations 
mentioned in the replies to questions 1.2 and 1.4, were such acceptances or 
objections preceded or followed by diplomatic discussions or exchanges of notes 
between the two States, between the State and the international organization or 
between the State and the depositary? (If possible, please attach the text of the 
relevant documents) 
2.1.3.1 Following such discussions or exchanges of notes, has the other State or the 
international organization concerned ever decided not to raise an objection which it 
had originally envisaged? 
2.1.4  Has the interpretation or implementation of the reservations mentioned in the 
replies to questions 1.2 and 1.4 given rise to any particular difficulties in the 
application of the treaty? If so, what difficulties? 
2.1.4.1 In particular, have those difficulties: 
– Given rise to diplomatic protests? (If possible, pl ase attach the text of the 
protests) 
– Been examined by an international judicial body or a body monitoring the 
application of the treaty? (Please attach the text of the relevant decisions 
and/or opinions) 
2.1.4.2 Has a judicial body or other national authori y ruled on the meaning or effects 
of the reservations? (Please attach the text of the relevant decisions) 
2.1.5  If any of the reservations mentioned in the reply to question 1.2 were 
formulated in relation to the constituent instrument of an international organization, 
were those reservations accepted by an organ of that org nization? (Please attach the 
text of the relevant deliberations) 
2.1.6  Has the withdrawal of a reservation formulated by the State (see reply to 
question 1.6.2) given rise to any particular difficulties? If so, what difficulties? 
2.1.7  Have any of the objections mentioned in the reply to question 2.1.2 been 
withdrawn? (Please attach the text of the instruments of notification of the 
withdrawals) 
2.1.7.1 If so, have the withdrawals given rise to any particular difficulties? What 
difficulties? 
2.2  Acceptance by the State of reservations formulated by another State or by an 
international .organization and objection by the State to those reservations 
2.2.1  Has the State formally accepted any reservations formulated by another State 
or by an international organization? (Please list, and provide the text of, the formal 
acceptances) 
2.2.1.1 In the absence of a formal acceptance, does silence on the part of the State 
imply that it accepts the reservation(s) in question? 
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2.2.2  Has the State made objections to any reservations formulated by another State 
or by an international organization? (Please list, and provide the text of, the 
objections) 
2.2.2.1 What were the reasons for each of the objections: 
I (i) Political considerations? Were such considerations internal or international 
in nature? 
I (ii) Desire to ensure the integrity of the treaty? 
(iii) Incompatibility of the reservation with the purpose and object of the 
treaty? 
(iv) Other reasons? 
2.2.2.2 At the internal level, which authority or authorities take(s) the decision to 
make objections to reservations formulated by other Contracting Parties? 
2.2.2.3 Do objections to reservations appear in an official national publication? 
2.2.2.4 How much time elapsed between the notificaton of the reservation and the 
formulation of the objections mentioned in the reply to question 2.2.2? 
2.2.3  In formulating the objections mentioned in the reply to question 2.2.2, did the 
State express the intention that the objection should preclude the entry into force of 
the treaty between itself and the reserving State or international organization? 
2.2.3.1 If so, what were the reasons for that position: 
Ii (i) Political considerations? Were such considerations internal or international 
in nature? 
I (ii) Desire to ensure the integrity of the treaty? 
(iii) Incompatibility of the reservation with the purpose and object of the 
treaty? 
(iv) Other reasons? 
2.2.3.2 If not, what were the reasons for that position? And what effects did the 
objections have? 
2.2.4  Were the formal acceptances or objections mentioned in the replies to 
questions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 preceded or followed by diplomatic discussions or 
exchanges of notes with the reserving State or intena ional organization or with the 
depositary of the treaty? (If possible, please attach he text of the relevant 
documents) 
2.2.4.1 Following such negotiations or exchanges of notes, has the State ever 
modified, or decided not to raise, an objection which it had originally envisaged? 
2.2.5  Has the interpretation or implementation of the objections mentioned in the 
reply to question 2.2.2 given rise to any particular difficulties in the application of 
the treaty? If so, what difficulties? 
2.2.5.1 In particular, have those objections: 
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– Given rise to diplomatic protests? (If possible, pl ase attach the text of the 
protests) 
– Been examined by an international judicial body or a body monitoring the 
application of the treaty? (Please attach the text of the relevant decisions 
and/or opinions) 
2.2.5.2 Has a judicial body or other national authori y ruled on the meaning or effects 
of the objections? (Please attach the text of the relevant decisions) 
2.2.6  Has the State withdrawn or modified any of the objections mentioned in the 
reply to question 2.2.2? 
2.2.6.1 If so, which ones and why? 
[Sections III  Interpretative Declarations and IV Succession of States omitted.] 
 
V. PRACTICE OF THE STATE AS A DEPOSITARY4 
5.1  Is the State a depositary of multilateral treaties? (Please list the treaties)  
5.2  In its capacity as depositary, has the State encountered any particular 
difficulties with regard to reservations, objections to reservations, interpretative 
declarations or responses to interpretative declarations? If so, what difficulties? 
5.2.1  When such difficulties arose, did the State: 
– Refer the problem to the Contracting Parties? 
– Itself take a position with regard to the difficulties? (Please attach the 
relevant documents) 
5.3  In particular, did problems arise in respect of the entry into force of the treaty 
because of the formulation of reservations or objections to reservations? 
5.3.1  If so, how were such problems resolved? (Please attach the relevant 
documents) 
5.4  In its capacity as depositary, has the State encountered any particular 
difficulties with regard to reservations, objections, interpretative declarations or 
responses to interpretative declarations, which arose in connection with one or more 
instances of succession of States? If so, what difficulties? (Please attach the relevant 
documents) 
VI. MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS 
6.1  In the State’s view, what are the main problems arising in connection with 
reservations to treaties that are not resolved, or not esolved satisfactorily, by the 
relevant provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the 1969 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties and the 1986 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations? 
6.2  Please add here any relevant information on the practice of the State relating 
to reservations to treaties which could not be included in the replies to the above 
questions. 
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ANNEX  IV 
 
2007 QUESTIONS ON RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES FOR STATES MEMBERS 
UN Doc. A/62/10 (2007), pp. 10-11, paras. 23-25. 
 
CHAPTER III: 
SPECIFIC ISSUES ON WHICH COMMENTS WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR 
INTEREST TO THE COMMISSION 
 
A.  Reservations to Treaties 
 
23.  The Special Rapporteur on reservations to treaties proposes to complete his 
presentation of problems posed by the invalidity of reservations next year. With this 
in view, the Commission would welcome replies from States to the following 
questions: 
(a)  What conclusions do States draw if a reservation is found to be invalid 
for any of the reasons listed in article 19 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna 
Conventions?  Do they consider that the State formulating the reservation is 
still bound by the treaty without being able to enjoy the benefit of the 
reservation?  Or, conversely, do they believe that the acceptance of the 
reserving State is flawed and that that State cannot be considered to be bound 
by the treaty?  Or do they favour a compromise solution and, if so, what is it? 
(b)  Are the replies to the preceding questions based on a position of principle 
or are they based on practical considerations?  Do they (or should they) vary 
according to whether the State has or has not formulated an objection to the 
reservation in question? 
(c)  Do the replies to the above two sets of question  vary (or should they 
vary) according to the type of treaty concerned (bilateral or normative, human 
rights, environmental protection, codification, etc.)? 
(d)  More specifically, State practice offers examples of objections that are 
intended to produce effects different from those provided for in article 21, 
paragraph 3 (objection with minimum effect), or article 20, paragraph 4(b) 
(maximum effect), of the Vienna Conventions, either b cause the objection 
State wishes to exclude from its treaty relations with the reserving State 
provisions that are not related to the reservation (intermediate effect), or 
because it wishes to render the reservation ineffective and considers the 
reserving State to be bound by the treaty as a whole and that the reservation 
thus has no effect (“super-maximum” effect).  The Commission would 
welcome the views of States regarding these practices ( rrespective of their 
own practice). 
24.  The Commission would note that it is aware of the relative complexity of the 
above questions, which are related to problems that are hemselves highly complex 
and take into account a wide range of practice.  The commission suggests that the 
replies to these questions be addressed to the Special Rapporteur in writing through 
the Secretariat.  It would be particularly useful i the authors could include with their 
replies as precise a description as possible of the practice they themselves follow. 
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25.  The Commission has noted that, in the main, the formulation of objections to 
reservations is practised by a relatively small number of States.  It would thus be 
particularly useful if States that do not engage in th s practice could transmit their 
views on these matters, which are fundamental to the topic of “Reservations to 
treaties”.  
 




American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 UNTS 144, 22 November 1969, 
entered into force 18 July 1978.  
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945.  
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, 
1249 UNTS 13, 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 S ptember 1981. 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 
195, 7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 
UNTS 277, 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951. 
Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85, 10 December 1984, entered 
into force 26 June 1987.  
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc. A/61/611, 13 
December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008.  
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3, 20 November 1989, entered 
into force 2 September 1990.  
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1015 
UNTS 243, 30 November 1973, entered into force 18 July 1976. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. ETS No. 005, 213 UNTS 221, 4 November 1950, as amended 
by Protocol Nos. 11 (ETS No. 155) and 14 (CETS No. 194), entered into 
force 1 June 2010. 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families, 2220 UNTS 3, 18 Decemb r 1990, entered 
into force 1 July 2003. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultura  Rights, 993 UNTS 3, 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976. 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, UN Doc. A/61/488.C.N.737.2008.TREATIES-12, 20 
December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010. 
International Labour Organization Convention No. 29on Forced Labour, 
ILO/C29, 28 June 1930, entered into force 1 May 1932.  
International Labour Organization Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right to Organise, ILO/C87, 9 July 1948, entered 
into force 4 July 1950. 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, 2131 UNTS 83, 6 October 1999, entered into force 22 December 
2000. 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
UN Doc. A/61/611, 13 Dec. 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008. 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 
UNTS 171, 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976. 
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Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, UN Doc. A/63/435 (2009), 10 December 2009, not yet in force.  
Second Opium Convention of 1925, 19 February 1925. 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945. 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 596 UNTS 261, 24 April 1963, entry 
into force 19 March 1967. 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. 1946 UNTS 3, 
23 August 1978, entered into force 6 November 1996. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969, 
entered into force 27 January 1980. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.129/15, 21 March 1986, not yet in force. 
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